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ABSTRACT
Over the years 1947-86, electricity has become an 
important source of energy. The social, political, economic 
and institutional conditions under which the electricity 
industry has evolved in India are studied in this thesis.
Though electricity demand has increased in India, due 
to electricity supply shortages after 1972 it was difficult 
to study electricity demand since no data are available on 
unconstrained demand. Hence, the factors affecting 
electricity sales are studied at all-India level for three 
consumer groups: i) industrial ii) agricultural and iii) 
"other" consumers. Since states in India differ in their 
characteristics, electricity sales to industrial and 
agricultural consumers were studied for the States of 
Bihar, Kerala, Maharashtra and Punjab.
In this analysis, economic and econometric principles 
are applied to historical data. On the basis of demand 
theory, income elasticities were expected to be positive 
and the price elasticities were expected to be negative. 
From the analysis, it was found that income and price 
elasticities varied across States and across different 
consumer groups. Income elasticities were found to be 
positive and high in each case. Price elasticities were 
negative and very low in each case with the exception of 
industrial consumers in Punjab.
The time-of-day ("unrestricted") demand for power in 
Gujarat was studied for the years 1985-86 to 1988-89. The 
expectation of an hourly and seasonal pattern in the 
("unrestricted") demand for power was confirmed. A series 
of 24 seemingly unrelated equations testing the effects of 
employment and price on "unrestricted" demand for power at 
each hour of the day were analysed. It was found that the 
observed hourly pattern of power demand could not be 
affected in the desired manner with the existing pricing 
policy and structure in Gujarat.
Pricing remains an important practical tool for 
managing electricity demand. Pricing also directly affects 
the performance of the State Electricity Board. The 
financial performance of Gujarat State Electricity Board 
was examined and found to be poor due to its pricing 
policy. On the basis of the literature on the theory of 
pricing in public enterprises, a method of calculating 
prices in Gujarat was derived. Due to data constraints, the 
estimation of prices in the period 1961-86 was limited to 
prices charged to all consumers of the Gujarat Electricity 
Board taken as a group. For similar reasons, it also 
ignored the response of consumers at different time of the 
day. The prices charged by Gujarat Electricity Board were 
then compared with the estimated prices. It was found that 
the estimated prices were higher than the prices charged by
Gujarat Electricity Board in the period 1961-86. One of the 
consequences of low electricity prices was Gujarat 
Electricity Board's poor financial performance.
The study concludes that it is important for the State 
Electricity Boards in India to study their costs and demand 
in order to derive a pricing policy that allows the 
consumer to be aware of the costs and helps the State 
Electricity Boards to eliminate financial losses.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite its rather modest contribution to the gross 
product, energy plays a decisive role in economic 
development, since, to the extent that it is available, it 
stimulates or hinders economic growth.
Electricity constitutes an advanced form of energy and 
its development has not only made it possible to take 
advantage much more intensively of some renewable resources 
like water, but it has also created a number of new uses 
for all kinds of energy in production and social processes. 
Industrial development, mechanisation and urban progress 
are profoundly affected by electricity supplies.
The unique position of power in economic development 
justifies a study in depth of this sector. India has made 
major progress since Independence (in 1947) in developing 
indigenous energy supplies for a rapidly increasing and 
diversified set of economic activities. But progress has 
not been without problems. The history of government 
regulations of this industry in India and its management 
partly explains the movement from electricity as a luxury 
good to a necessary input in a production process. It also 
indicates the causes of the problems that the industry is 
facing. One of the causes of poor financial performance 
could be the pricing of electricity. It is important to 
work out the possibility of poor pricing policy as a 
plausible cause of poor performance of the electricity 
boards in India.
Section I is concerned with the growth of the 
electricity industry since it started until 1986. Chapter 
I narrates the social, economic and political environment 
in India in the period when the electricity industry 
evolved. The regulation of the industry over the period 
prior to Independence and after Independence is also 
discussed in the first Chapter. Chapter II discusses
important aspects of the electricity industry over the 
period. The growing demand within capacity constraint was 
one of the features.
Section II deals with the study of electricity demand. 
Chapter III discusses important contributions to the study 
of electricity demand elsewhere and in India. Chapter IV 
covers electricity sales at the all-India level. Economic 
and econometric principles are applied to historical data 
to study the effect of important variables like price and 
income on the electricity sales to different consumer 
groups. Chapter V discusses the disparity over different 
regions in India and again the effect of important 
variables on electricity sales is observed in four 
different states. From the findings of Chapters IV and V, 
it was gathered that some states may have failed to use 
pricing as a tool to manage electricity demand. To get some 
idea of the extent to which any State Electricity Board may 
have mispriced electricity, we need to know about the cost 
of generating and distributing electricity. In Chapter VI, 
the effects of Gujarat Electricity Board's (GEB) pricing 
policy on the demand for power at each hour of the day is 
further analysed.
Section III deals with pricing. In Chapter VII, the 
financial performance of Gujarat State Electricity Board is 
evaluated. The tariff policy of Gujarat Electricity Board 
is also analysed. Having realised the need to change the 
tariff policy from the analysis of the electricity tariff. 
Chapter VIII scans through the vast literature on pricing 
in public enterprises, and on the basis of that literature 
derives a method for estimating electricity prices for 
Gujarat Electricity Board. Having derived the method. 
Chapter IX estimates electricity prices while incorporating 
the costs of generating and distributing electricity in 
Gujarat. Despite considerable data limitations, this 
analysis allowed much to be said about the pricing that was
practised and whether it was efficient or not.
SECTION I; EVOLUTION OF RTÆCTRICITY INDUSTRY IN INDIA,
Introduction.
Section I includes a general discussion of the Indian 
economy in the nineteenth century. The discussion provides 
a background within which the electricity industry started. 
It also includes the explanation of the rules regulating 
the electricity industry from the time the first plant 
started till 1986.
The progress of the electricity industry is also 
examined with the help of conventional measures of 
intensity of plant use.
CHAPTER I
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE INDIAN ECONOMY 
AND THE STATUS OF THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY IN INDIA.
I.1 The social and political environment of the Indian 
subcontinent.
Indian society is considered to be one of the most 
complex in existence. According to Morris^ the neglect of 
India's economic history particularly the period 1800-1947 
has kept the world unaware about its structure, 
functioning, development and dynamics.
India's economic and cultural development depends in 
the main upon its geography and the quality and the 
quantity of its people. India lies about half in the torrid 
and half in the north temperate zone.* Variety but not 
abundance characterises its material resources. The 
tropical heat tends to induce plant growth at all times of 
the year but much of the soil is infertile. Mineral 
resources were fairly abundant but their concentration in 
restricted areas involved great difficulties of transport 
over the wide stretches of the country.
In the nineteenth century the "traditional India" was 
a subsistence economy which was self contained and static. 
People were organised in a rigid economic and social 
system, a unit of which was the agricultural village. The 
effect of the rigid social structure was observed by many
 ^M.D. Morris, "Towards Reinterpretation of Nineteenth 
Century Indian Economic History", Journal of Economic 
History (December 1963), Reprinted in Indian economy in the 
nineteenth Centurv: A Symposium, edited by M.D.Morris,
Published by the Indian Economic and Social History 
Association, Delhi School of Economics, (Delhi, 1969).
* L.Dudley Stamp, Asia. (1929), pp. 166-356.
scholars.^ There was a somewhat elaborate division of 
occupations based mainly upon caste. Each kind of work was 
hereditary. The number and variety of artisans in a village 
depended upon the part of the country in which it was 
located and its particular conditions. The few cities of 
political, religious or commercial importance constituted 
the only exception to this rural life.
It is observed that there was a lack of political 
unity and stability. Despite a Hindu tradition of imperial 
expansion, at no time in Indian history over any large 
region did a stable political unit survive for more than a 
century. British rule was firmly established by 1820 and 
two thirds of the territory (three-fourths of the people) 
were directly under the British Government; while the 
remaining area and people within the states were ruled by 
Indian princes whose positions were guaranteed by the 
British.
1.1.1 The effect of British rule on Indian economy.
It is fatuous to generalise about conditions before 
the accession of the Crown. There were good and bad years, 
prosperous and impoverished areas. À common speculation 
before and during the British rule, was that the "standard 
of living", "economic conditions" and "prosperity" 
deteriorated, or at best, failed to improve from 1858 until
 ^ For example in 1966 D.H.Buchanan in his book 
Development of Capitalistic Enterprise in India. (1*^  
edition, new impression, 1934, 1966), finds a lack of
ambition for economic and financial success in the
religious thinking of the Indian community. But Dr. Harold 
Mann, Director of the Agriculture Department in Bombay 
Presidency expresses, in Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, part II, (1934), p.80, the
view that the idea of innate conservatism among the rural
classes was not correct and possibly they were less averse 
to change than a very large proportion of the farmers of 
the western countries.
Independence. With some exceptions/ the bulk of Indian and 
some other writers until the 1950s took this view. Nehru 
maintained that "no statistics, facts or numbers are wanted 
to convince you of this, that India has suffered terrible 
economic decline.®
Indian writers typically stress the exploitative 
features of British rule as the cause of nineteenth century 
decay. Western scholars, to the extent that they do not 
accept the "exploitation thesis", attribute the failure of 
the Indian economy to respond to the warming influences of 
the industrial revolution to the society's "other 
worldliness", to its lack of enterprise and to the class 
exclusiveness of groups within the society.
Without any doubt, India had a "special relationship" 
with Britain. In L.H.Jenks' words; "It is India which made 
the empire".® According to Amiya Bagchi,^ Britain's 
economic policy in India discouraged large scale industrial 
development. A large scale development of industry could 
have been supported by an increase in agricultural 
production and then Indian cultivators would not have been 
so vulnerable to business cycles in advanced capitalist 
countries. The small cultivators or landless labourers 
could have been absorbed into industry and with continued
* M.G. Ranade in Essays on Indian Economics (Madras, 
1906) and R.Sharma, "The Legacy of the British Rule in 
India", Journal of Indian History. Vol.XXXIV, Part III, 
(December 1956).
® Jawaharlal Nehru, "Address to the League against 
Imperialism", quoted in Seminar. Vol.LIX, (1962-4).
® L.H. Jenks, The Migration of British Capital to India 
(First published in 1927, reprinted in London, 1963),
p.206.
 ^ Amiya Bagchi, "Foreign Capital and Economic 
Development in IndiarA Schematic View", in K.Gough and
H.P.Sharma(ed). Imperialism and revolution in South Asia 
(1973) .
economic growth, could have escaped the tyranny of rural
slums. But such a development would have been contrary to
the basic interests of the ruling classes of Britain, and
the maintenance of "free trade" (rather "one way free
trade") provided the best guarantee against such a
development. Barrington-Moore, in a widely discussed book,®
points out that India became a "landlords' paradise" under
British rule. According to M. D. Morris, the Indian
Government had no self-conscious programme of active
economic development. He further stated that:
"One does not need to argue in terms of the evilness 
of imperial policy. Certainly, the general object of 
the "raj" was the welfare of the society. The 
difficulty is that British economic policy in India 
could not rise above the ideological and policy level 
at work at home. And a general economic policy 
appropriate for Britain at the peak of her economic 
power was not adequate to provide for long run growth 
in India."*
India had been vitally important to Britain in the pre-war
years in three respects- as a vast market for British
manufactures, as a guaranteed outlet for profitable
investment and as a crucial link in the settlement of
Britain's balance of payments. India's political and
economic subordination had resulted in an artificially
heavy trade deficit with Britain. In Dr.R.K.Ray's view:^°
"The strategic, political and financial aspects of the 
relationship between the two countries gained ground 
at the expense of the diminishing exchange of goods
and services......... Britain's great 'vested
interest' in India, the sterling debt, was wiped out 
by her enormous borrowing from India in order to meet 
the financial requirements of the Second World War: 
the Second World War wiped out at one stroke the
® Barrington-Moore Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship 
and Democracy. (1967).
* M.D. Morris, op.cit. footnote 34, p.12.
R.K.Ray, Industrialisation in India 1914-1947. (New 
Delhi, 1979), p.14.
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financial stake of Britain in India, removing thereby 
a potential impediment to her withdrawal at the end of 
the war.”
The state of India was summed up by William Digby“ as 
follows :
” There are two Indias: the India of the Presidency 
and the chief provincial cities, of the railway 
systems, of the hill stations.. .There are two 
countriesrAnglostan, the land especially ruled by the 
English, in which investments have been made and 
Hindustan, practically all India fifty miles from each 
side of the railway lines".
Thus, the views of different scholars on the effect of 
the British economic policy in India on the economic pat­
tern of the Indian society prevailing at that time is a 
controversial issue.
1,2 The growth of national income in India during the 
nineteenth century.
The available information on India's overall 
performance is not enough to make any definite conclusions 
on the progress of the Indian economy. Many details as 
well as some of the significant features of growth are not 
reflected in national income and allied aggregates. The 
institutional set up, the growth of the educational and 
health services, the progress in specific and technological 
research, the improvement in social relations and changes 
in the socio-political environment are all imperfectly 
represented by the national income figures and their 
breakdowns. Apart from this, even within the sphere to 
which national income relates, difficulties of comparison 
arise as a result of changes in the structure of production 
and consumption. Net output generally becomes a smaller 
percentage of the total value of output in most of the 
sectors and hence the meaning of aggregate net output as an
“ William Digby, "Prosperous" British India. (1901), 
pp.291-292.
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indicator of output changes over time. The pattern of 
consumption also changes and it becomes progressively more 
difficult to decide upon a basket of goods representative 
of the national economy at both past and current point of 
time. This makes it difficult to estimate changes in real 
consumer expenditures in a rigorous way. Similarly, changes 
in the real content of investment are difficult to 
ascertain. A process of growth in a relatively less 
developed economy leads to an expansion of the market 
economy as a result of which it becomes progressively 
necessary to buy goods and services which were obtained 
free in the past. The consequence of this is an 
overestimation of the rate of growth.
However, the general evidence as shown in Table I .1 is 
clearly indicative of a sustained, but very slow growth of 
per capita income, and is not consistent with a hypothesis 
of a constant or declining per capita income at constant 
prices over the century in question. During the first 40 
years i.e.1860-1900, per capita income at 1948-49 prices 
rose from about Rs. 170 to Rs. 200 or by about 18%. As 
population increased by about 22% during the period, the 
national income in real terms grew by a little more than 
40% in forty years. The main finding in the first half of 
the twentieth century is that per capita income at constant
1948-49 prices grew from about Rs.200 in 1900 to about Rs. 
260 in about 1930, i.e., by 30% in 30 years. Then the level 
of income remained stable, or perhaps declined after World 
War II to a level of about Rs. 250. After 1950, the per 
capita income again started to grow, the figure being Rs. 
295 for 1962-63. The large rise between 1900 and 1930, 
followed by a stability until 1950 in terms of per capita 
income, does not, however, depict the rates of growth of 
national product because of the dissimilar rates of 
population growth during the two periods.
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Table I.l
Average per capita national incone of India at 1948-49 prices for overlapping nine year periods. 
(1860-1955).
Period Centering Per Capita 
Incone in 
Rupees.
In 1948-49 prices
Index of Per 
Capita Incone at 
1948-49 prices 
with reference 
year 1860 = 100.
1 2 3 4
1857-1863 1860 169 100
1861-1869 1865 169 100
1866-1874 1870 172 102
1871-1879 1875 177 105
1876-1884 1880 197 117
1881-1889 1885 216 128
1886-1894 1890 204 121
1891-1899 1895 201 119
1896-1904 1900 199 118
1901-1909 1905 203 120
1906-1914 1910 220 130
1911-1919 1915 241 143
1916-1924 1920 253 150
1921-1929 1925 261 154
1926-1934 1930 260 154
1931-1939 1935 260 154
1936-1944 1940 265 157
1941-1949 1945 255 151
1946-1954 1950 253 150
1952-1958 1955 275 163
Source: Fron K.Mukherjee National Incone of India and structure. 1969, (p. 61, Table 2.5) 
N.B. Colunn 4 is derived fron coluim 3 taking 1860=100.
While the population grew by only 18% during the first 30 
years, it increased by 29% during the next twenty years. 
Thus, roughly speaking, the national product grew by a 
little less than 50% during the next 20 years.While the 
tempo of growth slackened, the performance of the nation 
between 1930 and 1950 is not as bad as is conveyed by the 
figures of per capita income. The lack of information 
regarding indicators like the capital stock in different 
years, or the rate at which saving and investment took 
place, do not allow us to study the effects of certain 
hypothetical assumptions in respect to these magnitudes.
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Also, there does not exist any study of how the process of 
growth of a modern type got initiated in a poor country 
like India.
1.3 Urbanisation in the economy.
The state of urbanisation in India depended on factors 
like race, rainfall, plague and pilgrims. The growth of 
trade and industries did play a role as was commented upon 
in the 1911 Census report on Bengal, Bihar and Orissa;
"After the somewhat dreary sketch of urban decay, 
stagnation or decimation by disease., it is refreshing to 
turn to the number of towns, some old, some young and 
nascent, which are fast developing owing to the expansion 
of trade and industrial enterprise, often introduced and 
directed by Europeans.
Table 1.2 gives the percentage variation for each of 
the five decades, in total, rural and urban population 
separately.
Table 1.2
Percentage (Decade) variation in total, rural and urban population of India (1901-1951).
Decade Total Rural Urban
1901-11 5.8 6.4 0.4
1911-21 -0.3 -1.3 8.3
1921-31 11.0 10.0 19.1
1931-41 14.2 11.8 32.0
1941-51 13.3 8.8 41.4
Source: Derived from the data, available in Census of India, 1901, 1911, 1921, 1931, 1941, 1951.
In the 1901-11 decade, the rate of growth of the rural 
population was much higher than that of the urban 
population, while in the following decade (1911-21) there 
was an absolute decrease in the rural population and a
Census of India, Report on Bengal. Bihar. Orissa and 
Sikkim, Volume V, (New Delhi, 1911), pp.27-28.
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modest increase in the urban population. In the decade 
1921-31, the rural population increased by 10.0% while the 
urban population increased by 19.1%. The decade 1931-41 
witnessed a fairly rapid growth of urban population, namely 
32.0%, while there was only nominal increase in the rate of 
growth of rural population. The decade 1941-51 witnessed 
the highest rate of urban growth, namely 41.4% while the 
rate of growth of the rural population decreased in this 
decade compared to the previous decade.
1.4 Agricultural development in India.
Agriculture in India has been largely dependent upon 
nature. The amount of rainfall at a particular time of the 
year was the main factor determining agricultural output. 
Assured water supply at a particular time of the year, 
depending upon the crop pattern, was one of the necessities 
in the agricultural sector to reduce the fluctuations in 
agricultural output. Irrigation was one solution for 
assured water supply. The decision regarding the choice of 
the means of irrigation was dependent upon the geographical 
condition of the area to be irrigated. In many areas 
construction of canals without adequate drainage facilities 
led to extensive waterlogging and salinity, ultimately 
converting millions of areas of land into desert. The 
cultivator had no protection against such external 
diseconomies of canals. The development of irrigation works 
was met with almost unqualified approval from Indian 
nationalists and British officials alike. But agricultural 
production was not, under British rule, raised to such an 
extent that India could be self sufficient even in the 
production of food grains; and as a result India continued 
to be dependent on foreign aid after Independence. The 
sluggishness of Indian agricultural growth has been due not 
simply to the lack of new inputs or information, or to the 
lack of proper incentive to the farmers, although these
15
played an important part in the late 1950s. One basic 
difficulty has been that Indian farmers have not been 
acting under a purely competitive environment. The richer 
farmers, many of whom belong to old "zamindar" families or 
to prosperous professional or business families, have been 
able to act as monopolists within the village and have been 
cushioned against the consequences of economic changes by 
this monopolistic slack.
1.5 Industrial development in India.
India's annual rate of industrial growth from 1880 to 
1913 was about 4 to 5%. Between 1850 and 1914 India had 
created the world's largest jute manufacturing industry, 
fourth largest cotton industry and third largest railway 
network. This was possible mainly due to the increasing 
inflow of British capital to India. Industrial growth in 
India under the British Empire was also affected by the 
First and Second World Wars.
The First World War interrupted the inflow of British 
capital to India. On the one hand the diminishing inflow of 
British investment after the First World War enabled Indian 
merchants and manufacturers to seize the initiative for 
developing newer industries; on the other hand the 
repatriation of British capital acted as an adverse factor 
on general conditions of trade and industry which had been 
particularly prosperous during 1900-1914 on an ample inflow 
of British capital. In the interwar period India did better 
than most other tropical countries. With the onset of the 
depression, new issues of British capital thinned out and 
the British financial crisis of 1931 put a stop to the 
export of capital to India from Britain. From 1930 to 1932 
India experienced a brief recession. From 1932 to 1938, 
India was called on to pay, in addition to the interest and 
dividends, part of the principal lent to her earlier. There 
was a sudden, massive and persistent withdrawal of capital
16
from India. Yet large scale manufacturing in India grew at 
a rapid rate of 7.3% between 1913-1914 and 1946-1947. 
However, since small scale industries (which until 1940-41 
outweighed large scale industry) grew only at the rate of 
0.6%, the overall income from the secondary sector in­
creased at a slower rate of 2.5% per annum.“ Both in the 
period preceding the First World War and in the period 
following it, India's considerable industrial development 
occurred through import substitution due to more effective 
use of supply factors such as raw materials, skilled 
labour, technical expertise, financial resources and 
business experience. At the end of the interwar period, 
India was not only consuming less British manufactures but 
had also started competing with British products in many 
external markets.
Just as in agriculture one can put one's finger on the 
decisive cause of slow growth- inadequate expenditure on 
irrigation -so also in manufacturing industries one major 
failure stands out- inadequate development of iron and 
steel production. The very process of import substitution 
on a large scale was bound in the long run to create a new 
demand for basic capital goods.
The outbreak of the Second World War implied a 
structural transformation of India's industrial economy, 
leading to production of heavy chemicals, sophisticated 
machinery, aircraft, automobiles, locomotives, ships and a 
variety of other heavy capital goods. The enormous needs of 
global war shortened the gestation period for this new 
phase of production.
Industrial growth between 1914 and 1947 was affected 
by both demand constraints and supply constraints.
13 R.K. Ray, op.cit.
A.K. Bagchi, Private Investment in India. 
(Cambridge, 1972).
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The size of the population and its growth did not 
necessarily create a demand that encouraged machine 
production. The average per capita income was very low. 
Much of this income was produced in non-monetised 
activities. Unequal distribution of income created market 
demand for different goods. The demand from the 
concentrated higher income groups -traditional luxury- 
loving social groups in urban areas- was mainly for the 
special items which could not be mass-produced. The bulk of 
domestic demand was heavily dependent upon agricultural 
performance and this unstable demand had adverse effects on 
entrepreneurial behaviour.
On the supply side most factors of production were 
costly. All machinery had to be imported. Skilled labour 
was scarce and initially had to be imported from abroad. 
Fuel was costly and so was domestic transport. Only labour 
was cheap and this worked against mechanisation. 
Businessmen were encouraged to expand existing 
organisations rather than shift to techniques where capital 
requirements were relatively greater. Capital was also 
immobile. There was always a substantial element of 
uncertainty along with risk. Thus the incalculability of 
demand and uncertainties of the cost of production 
intimidated the potential entrepreneur.
Generally the factors that a native or foreign 
businessmen had to consider were the nature of the demand 
for products, supply of productive resources, the prices at 
which output could be sold, the cost of producing it and 
relative rates of profit. But there is an important body of 
literature which emphasises "demotivating" factors of a 
cultural and sociological character that influence the 
private businessmen's attitude and decisions in business. 
The difficulties of the social class system and the effects 
of colonial rule have already been discussed. In addition 
to that, the fact that India failed to industrialise at the
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end of the nineteenth century had certain extremely 
important effects on the structure of the economy and 
society. With the growth of population, stagnation in 
industrial production and the closure of the higher offices 
and more profitable occupations to upper class Indians, 
both the rich and the poor were made increasingly dependent 
on a single source of income: land. With the partial
introduction of a market in land in late 1930s and the 
removal of many protective devices built into the 
traditional systems against the total separation of a 
cultivator from a permanent claim on the income of the 
land, a large number of people in rural areas found 
themselves unemployed for a large portion of the year.
1.6 Importance of energy in overall development.
Social scientists are apt to point out the extent to 
which a given geographical setting can be transformed in 
spite of severe natural limitations by the human element 
working on it. Economic miracles like that achieved by 
Japan, a country poorly equipped in minerals, have 
encouraged this tendency. But for a poor and underdeveloped 
country like India where the gap between the potential 
resources and economic utilisation of them is immense, 
there is low probability of such miracles. One of the main 
gaps was failure of energy supplies to increase as demand 
grew.
The slow growth in output of the energy sector has 
been one of the major supply constraints for Indian 
agriculture and industries. For example, Sir William 
Stampe^® expressed his view regarding the causal 
relationship between the availability of cheap "grid" power 
and the industrial development in India during 1920s and
William Stampe, "Some Aspects of cheap power 
development under the new constitution in India", The 
Asiatic Review, Volume 34, (1938), pp.650-710.
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1930s. He gave examples of the brass turning and polishing 
industry in Moradabad and other towns, the flour-milling 
industry in major large towns, cotton-spinning and weaving 
mills in Punjab and Madras. Consumption of non-commercial 
sources of energy is one of the characteristics of a less 
developed economy. In the process of development, the con­
sumption of commercial sources of energy is gradually sub­
stituted for non-commercial sources of energy. In India, 
the particular climatic and geographical features of the 
landscape made it difficult and usually impossible to 
employ water wheels and windmills as power sources. 
Agricultural development thus necessitates an adequate 
supply of power to run irrigation pumpsets, to electrify 
villages, and to operate agro-based industries.
There was clearly a link between the smallness of most 
coal mining operations, the absence of more efficient modes 
of transport and the very limited production and use of 
metals. Electric Power could be generated from coal, oil or 
water. But in the pre-independence period coal was
distributed unevenly in India and was not available to 
Southern and Western India at all. Large deposits of good 
coking coal were available only in Ranigunj and Jharia but 
their high ash content and the consequent low calorific 
value reduced their radius of economic use. Large-scale 
export of coal, which would have alleviated the supply
problems arising from the low and uncertain consumption of
coal at home, could not be developed on account of these 
defects. India was not well endowed in oil resources. As 
for water power, it was difficult to develop this as a 
source of power for industries on account of the seasonal 
character of rainfall which made storage a necessity. The 
outlay necessary for construction of storage facilities, 
unless the water could be used for irrigation afterwards,
tended to raise the cost of water power in relation to
other sources of power.
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The cotton-textile industry in Bombay was dependent, 
up to the First World War, on regular supplies of coal from 
Bengal and Bihar, which entailed a long and expensive 
railway haul across the peninsula. The vast distance 
separating the coalfields in the east from the cotton 
tracts in the west led to the formulation of a great hydro­
electric scheme by the Tatas (one of the Indian industrial 
groups in the cotton textile industry) which became 
operational during the First World War. Although initiated 
under Indian enterprise, the scheme also attracted the 
support of British cotton manufacturing in Bombay. The 
undertaking of the Sassoons (a cotton textile industrial 
group managed by the British) to take a substantial amount 
of electric power from the scheme when it was completed was 
characteristic of the optimistic and dynamic attitude of 
British managing agencies in Bombay and it helped in 
finding the enormous capital needed for the scheme. Without 
the assured supply of electric power which the great Tata 
hydro-electric scheme made possible, the great and rapid 
expansion of the cotton-textile industry in Bombay after 
the First World War would have been difficult. Although 
hydro-electricity gave the cotton mills a clean and 
reliable supply of power in Bombay, it did not cheapen the 
cost of power. Electric power was more expensive than coal 
and this was a disadvantage to Bombay in view of much 
cheaper rates at which electric power was supplied to 
Japanese mills.Although inland centres could provide the 
cotton textile industries with much cheaper labour, this 
competitive advantage could not be properly exploited 
without solving the problem of supply of power in the 
inland tracts where cotton was grown. The extension of 
hydro-electric schemes in south India, where cotton was 
grown in considerable quantity but coal was not available,
R.K. Ray, op.cit  ^ p.65.
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contributed to the expansion of the cotton industry in 
south India in the thirties. The share of Madras Presidency 
in the total production of yarn in India rose from 6.3% in 
1921-22 to 13% in 1938-39 as a result of the completion of 
several large hydro-electric schemes.^" The unusually rapid 
expansion of the spinning industry in Coimbtore, Madurai 
and Tirunelveli was a consequence of the completion of the 
Pykara Hydro-electric scheme and the readiness of local 
industries to take advantage of new sources of power.
The experience in the paper mills was similar. The 
paper mills of Bombay and UP were at a disadvantage in 
relation to mills in Bengal. The cost of production was 
affected mainly by the relative distance of coal sources, 
the major source of energy. The development of paper 
manufacture in south India was made possible by the 
simultaneous growth of bamboo pulp technology and hydro­
electric works, from which Mysore and Punalur Paper Mills, 
both located in the heart of the bamboo growing tracts of 
Bangalore and Travancore and near the sources of cheap 
hydro-electric power supply, benefited.
1.7 Public sector in the economy.
In Gerschenkron's view, the state has a major role to 
play in order to push the economy towards in­
dustrialisation. He writes,
"Supply of capital for the needs of industrialisation 
required the compulsory machinery of the government, 
which through its taxation policies, succeeded in 
directing incomes from consumption to investment..
According to him, the great industrial upswing in Russia
T.R.Sharma and S.D.Singh Chauhan, Indian Industries: 
Development, Management. Finance and Organisation, (Agra, 
India, 1965), p.458.
“ A Gerschenkron, Economic backwardness in historical 
perspective; A book of Essavs, The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, (Massachusetts, 1962), p.20.
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came when the railroad building of the state assumed 
unprecedented proportions and became the main support of a 
rapid industrialisation policy. He also argues that when 
the economic backwardness gets reduced by state sponsored 
industrialisation processes, policies suitable to the new 
”stage of backwardness" become applicable wherein the role 
of the state gets reduced. He suggested that the 
institutional requirement for industrial development 
differed according to the backwardness of industries and 
the stage from which the industrial development started. He 
concludes that in the last period of industrialisation, the 
significance of the state gets greatly reduced.
1.7.1 Public sector in India.
Before Independence, in 1944, the leading men of 
Indian business and industry came to-gather to publish what 
is popularly known as the Bombay Plan for the development 
of India. This was the first major industrial policy 
statement by Indians, impressively titled "A Plan of 
Economic Development in India". It worked out the actual 
financial outlays to be incurred over a fifteen year period 
aimed at doubling per capita income and registering a five 
fold increase in industrial production in India. The Bombay 
Plan also set out the strategy for resource mobilisation 
and for the development of related infrastructure in health
Sir Purshotamdas Thakurdas and other members, A 
brief Memorandum Outlining a Plan of Economic Development 
For India, Part 1 and 2, (Bombay, 1944) pp.1-105.
The eight signatories to the Bombay Plan were 
representative of a wide cross-section of India's business 
world. In Proper order of succession the signatories were 
Sir Purshotamdas Thakurdas, "king cotton" of Bombay, 
J.R.D.Tata, of the house of Jamsetji Tata; G.D.Birla, 
representing the second biggest business house in India, 
Sir Ardeshir Dalai, a Parsi stockbroker of the modern type; 
Sir Shri Ram of DCM (Delhi Cloth Mills) complex of north 
India; Kasturbhai Lalbhai, the leading mill owner of 
Ahmedabad, A.DS.Shroff, a stockbroker of Bombay and John 
Mathai, an economist and a Tata director.
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care, education, food supply, transportation and 
communications and so on. Undoubtedly, it was a blue-print 
for industrial development and the government was given the 
central role in this strategy. The Bombay Plan envisaged 
not only state support for private capital, but also 
control by the state (accompanied in appropriate cases by 
state ownership or management) of public utilities and 
basic industries.
It can be argued that the role of the public sector 
must be seen as one of facilitating a process of "primary 
accumulation" of capital in an under-developed post­
colonial economy wanting to speed up the process of 
industrialisation. The Bombay Plan's explicit preference 
for deficit financing (budget deficits were to contribute 
as much as 35% of the total outlay of Rupees 10000 crore 
(10 billions)), as a way of mobilising financial resources 
for industrialisation, illustrates the point. Apart from 
"creating money" (the term is used in the Bombay Plan) the 
state was also asked to administer land reforms, control 
food prices (to reduce the middlemen's profit and to 
facilitate agricultural surpluses), and invest in the 
creation of technical and managerial skills necessary for 
industrial development. In part II of the Bombay Plan, the 
authors, taking a long term view, perceived the diminishing 
role of the state as the economy progressed.
The national freedom movement had raised the expecta­
tions of the people regarding their economic emancipation. 
This led to the emergence of industrialisation with social 
justice as an ideology of the ruling class. To accelerate 
the pace of industrialisation, the country needed a 
comprehensive network of infrastructure; basic and heavy 
industries and an assured supply of energy. These 
industries require large capital investment, having high 
risk, uncertainty and a long gestation period. Profit 
maximising industrialists do not necessarily opt for such
1
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types of investments. However, these industries are a pre­
requisite for a self reliant and independent industrial 
base. Therefore, the government took the task of developing 
these industries upon itself. '
The government of India came forward with its 
industrial policy in April 1948, with a view to promoting 
a rapid rise in the standard of living of the people by 
exploiting the latent resources of the country, increasing 
production and offering opportunities to all for employment 
in the service of the community. The fundamental principle 
of the policy, which may be called the First Industrial 
Policy of the country, was that the State must play a 
progressively active role in the development of industries. 
The Industrial Policy Resolution, 1948, carved out an 
exclusive monopoly sector and a "reserve sector" for 
industries wherein the Government would have the sole right 
to establish undertakings in future, and existing private 
enterprise would be allowed to continue under the close 
watch of the Government. It was further added that the 
Government, if it was considered necessary, would seek the 
collaboration of the private sector with regard to the 
group of industries included in the reserved sector. The 
remaining industries were left to be developed by private 
enterprise/*
After the Industrial Policy Resolution, 1948, the 
country gave itself a Constitution which set out certain 
directive principles. The State shall in particular, direct 
its policy towards securing that: i) The ownership and
* The Industrial Policy Resolution, 1948, classified 
industries into three categories. Under the first schedule, 
the following industries were included: arms and
ammunition, atomic energy and railway transport. Under the 
second schedule, referred to as the "reserved sector" 
industries above, the following industries were included: 
coal, iron and steel, aircraft manufacture, ship-building, 
manufacture of telephone, telegraph, and wireless apparatus 
excluding radio receiving sets and mineral oils.
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control of the material resources of the community are so 
distributed as best to serve the common good, ii) The 
operation of the economic system does not result in the 
concentration of wealth and means of production to the 
common detriment. In 1956, when the First Five Year Plan 
drew to a close and the Second Five Year Plan was about to 
commence it was realised that the Industrial Policy 1948, 
would not be able to bring about what had been envisaged in 
the Constitution and implied in the national objective of 
establishing a socialistic society. It was therefore found 
necessary to recast the 1948 policy. Consequently, the 
Industrial Policy Resolution, 1956 was presented to and 
accepted by Parliament. The 1956 Industrial Policy 
Resolution retains the old threefold classification of the 
industries but made significant additions to the list of 
industries that would fall in the public sector.
Thus the evolution of the public sector in India was 
shaped by the Industrial Policy Resolution, 1948, the 
Constitution and the Industrial Policy Resolution, 1956. 
The growing importance of the public sector was reflected
According to Industrial Policy Resolution, 1956, 17 
industries were classified in the "exclusive monopoly" 
schedule A, as compared to 3 in 1948 resolution. The 
industries that have been included in the exclusive 
monopoly sector are as follows: 1) arms and ammunition, 2) 
atomic energy, 3) iron and steel, 4) heavy casting and 
forging of iron and steel, 5) heavy plant and machinery, 6) 
heavy electrical plant, 7) coal and lignite, 8) mineral 
oil, 9) mining of iron ore, 10) mining and processing of 
copper, lead, zinc tin etc., 11) minerals connected with 
production and use of atomic energy, 12) aircraft, 13) air 
transport, 14) Railway transport, 15) ship building, 16) 
telephone cables, 17) generation and distribution of 
electricity. Schedule B - the reserved sector for the state 
- the industries were to be progressively state owned. 
There are now a dozen industries in the list. There were 
only six industries in this category in the 1948 Industrial 
Policy Resolution. The remaining industries were left to 
the private and co-operative sector but the state reserves 
the right to nationalise an industry in this sector if it 
should feel so inclined.
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in the government regulated plan outlays as shown in the 
Table 1.3.
Table 1.3
The share of the public sector in total investment during the five year plans. (Rupees in crores 
i.e. 1 crore = 10 millions).
Period/
Plan
1951-52
1955-56 
Plan
1956-57
1960-61 
Il“ Plan
1961-62 
1965-66
Plan
1969-70
1973-74 
IV^  Plan
1974-75 
1978-79 
V“ Plan 
1980-81
1984-85 
Vl“ Plan
1985-86 
1989-90 
VII“ Plan
Total
Outlay
3,760
7,772
12,677
24,759®
66,474®
185,531®
348,148
Total
Invest­
ment
3,360
6,831
11,280
22,635*
63,751*
158,710*
322,366*
Invest­
ment in 
Public 
Sector
1,560
3,731
7,180
13,655^
36,703
84,000
154,218
Invest­
ment in 
Private 
Sector
1,800
3,100
4,loot
t,980t
27,048
74,710f
168,148
% of Mic^  
Public 
Sector I. 
to Total 
Investment
46.4 1ÜJ5
63.7 109
60.3 10Æ
57.6 1&%
52.9 1089
47.8 ldJ09
* Ratio of Public Sector Investment to Private Sector Investment, t Target, e Estimate. 
Source: Statistical yearbook, Tata Economic Consultancy Services, Bombay, Published in 1988.
The share of public enterprises in the Net Domestic Product 
increased from 3% to 12.33% in the same period. As can be 
seen from Table 1.4 the share of public sector in the 
capital formation as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product 
has been less compared to the private sector in the period 
1951-1986.
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Table 1.4
Share of public sector and private sector in the domestic capital formation as a percentage of GDP. 
(at current prices).
Years % Share of capital formation in the gross domestic product.
Public Private
1950-51 2.7 9.1
1055-56 4.9 8.9
1960-61 7.6 9.6
1965-66 9.2 9.2
1970-71 6.8 11.4
1975-76 10.3 11.9
1980-81 11.0 13.7
1985-86 11.7 14.4
Source: Economic Survey. 1987-88, Ministry of Finance, Government of India.
Analysis of the performance of the public sector provides 
some clues about the unsatisfactory growth of the 
industrial sector. Public sector investment in industry has 
been largely in capital intensive industries. The public 
sector in India includes basic and heavy industries, 
electrical equipment, various sources of commercial energy 
and infrastructural facilities which were crucial to 
increasing the productive capacity of the country and are 
therefore of great significance.
Table 1.5
Share of the employment generated by public sector and private sector in the total employment 
generated by public and private sectors, (in percentages).
% of Total % of Total 
employment in employment in
Years Public Sector Private Sector
1951-52 H.A. (5400000 persons.)
1955-56 46.48 53.51
1961-62 58.97 41.02
1965-66 57.9 42.06
1971-72 62.54 34.45
1975-76 66.06 33.94
1981-82 67.87 32.12
1985-86 70.6 29.03
Source: Economic Survey. Ministry of Finance, Government of India.
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The public sector's share in total employment has been very 
high as can be observed from Table 1.5.
The inability of the public sector to generate 
satisfactory levels of investible surpluses has been one of 
the main factors contributing to slowdown in the growth 
rate of the industrial sector.
Thus we find that though the public sector was 
believed to be crucial to the development of the Indian 
Economy, it's growth has coincided with poor performance in 
recent years.
1.8 Regulation of the electricity industry in India: The 
changing environment.
There have been three central government acts 
governing this industry from 1887.
1) The Electricity Act; 1887
2) The Indian Electricity Act; 1910
3) The Electricity (Supply) Act: 1948
Before independence, this industry was regulated by 
the Indian Electricity Act 1910. Private electric companies 
were issued licenses for the supply of electric power in 
specified areas. After independence this industry was 
placed in the public sector. The Electricity (Supply) Act 
was passed in 1948 with the objective of rationalising the 
generation and distribution of electricity and its 
development on a regional basis.
1.8.1 Procedure in India before 1910.
In 1887 the Government of India decided to introduce 
the first legislative measure dealing with the matter, 
which had allegedly put a stop to all electrical progress 
for six years. The Government of India did not commit 
itself hastily to exhaustive or detailed legislation on so 
complicated a subject. The Act of 1887 professed to be no 
more than a temporary measure, designed to give the
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Government a sufficient controlling power for the adequate 
protection of the public until the time should be ripe for 
full consideration of the subject. At that time little 
experience was available in India on which a measure of 
such industrial importance could be based.
The Calcutta licenses were revoked by consent, new
licenses being granted under the passing of the Imperial
Act i.e. Indian Electricity Act; 1903. Up to the year 1903, 
the Indian statute Book contained only three enactments 
relating to electricity, one general and the other two of 
purely local application, namely, the Electricity Act (XIII 
of 1887), the Calcutta Electric Lighting Act (Bengal Act IX 
of 1895) and the Howrah Bridge Electric Lighting Act 
(Bengal Act I of 1902). The only undertaking working under 
statutory powers in that year was one for general supply in 
Calcutta, where it was found that the legislation in force 
was by no means satisfactory either to Government, the 
company or to the public. In point of simplicity the Indian 
Act of 1903 was found a great improvement on its English 
m o d e l s . S o m e  of the best points in the Indian Act of 1903 
had been embodied in a Bill which had been several times 
before Parliament, designed to carry out the 
recommendations of the two Joint Select Committees which 
reported on the subject so long ago as 1893^^ and 1898
Although the secretary to the government of India, Mr.
T. Higham, had revised the Electric Lighting Rules in 1901 
under the Section 4 of Act XIII of 1887, it was only in 
1903, under the Indian Electricity Act, that a considerable
J.W. Hears, The law relating to electrical energy in 
India, being the electricity supply Act. 1910, (Calcutta, 
1910).
“ Report on Electric Power TProtective Clauses). 
Government of India, (India, 1893).
Report on Electrical Enerav (Generating Stations and 
Supply). (India, 1898),
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number of licenses were granted in connection with the 
ordinary supply of electricity for lighting and power in 
towns, from steam generating stations on the spot. But none 
of the various schemes for the supply of energy over large 
areas, for industrial and general purposes, utilising 
either water power or coal near the pits' mouth in 
conjunction with electrical transmission of power, had 
started by 1910. The state of the money market and matters 
connected with the purchase clauses of the Act were largely 
responsible for this state of affairs. Meantime the 
striking success of the Mysore installation, transmitting 
power from the Cauvery Falls to the Kolar Gold Fields and 
Bangalore led the Kashmir Durbar to embark on a large 
hydro-electric development on the Jhelum river. Neither of 
these states, however were included in British India.
Owing to the large number of amendments and verbal al­
terations being found necessary either by the committee or 
subsequently, it was ultimately decided to repeal and re­
enact the Act rather than to pass an amending Bill. Thus, 
the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (Act IX of 1910), received 
the assent of the Governor General on the 18th March, 1910- 
It consisted of four parts aggregating 58 sections, and of 
a schedule of 17 clauses.
1.8.2 Procedure after 1910.
The Indian Electricity Act (1910) gave the Provincial 
Governments a certain measure of control, but the amount 
of financial control which a Provincial Government could 
exercise was inadequate and was lacking both in precision 
and uniformity.^® In any license granted by a Provincial 
Government, although a schedule of maximum prices was 
incorporated, the other operations could not be regulated
Rules regulating the generation, transmission, 
supplv and use of electrical energy, by Public Works 
Department, Issued on 23 December, 1910, (Calcutta, 1911).
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to any appreciable extent. Under these conditions the 
interests of the consumer took second place to those of the 
shareholder. Several licensees paid unduly high rates of 
interest on their capital. So long as this continued to be 
the case the cost of electricity to the consumer remained 
unnecessarily high.
After the application of the Indian Electricity Act; 
1910, there were no major changes in the regulation of the 
electricity industry as such till 1947. But while 
electricity generation was in the private sector of the 
economy before Independence, there were various committees 
set up by the government of India to evaluate either the 
functioning of electricity companies in a particular area 
or the performance of a particular company.
The first committee in this period was set up in 
1936.^® The government of India appointed a committee to 
examine the supply of electricity in Delhi Province. The 
Committee found that the supply of electrical energy in 
Delhi was adversely affected by the uncertainty regarding 
the supply position between New Delhi Municipal Corporation 
and the Company. The supply of electricity in Delhi was 
found to be inadequate and the Committee recommended the 
installation of additional generating equipment. But they 
felt that the concentration of generation was most 
essential in Delhi.
Also in 1936, the Government of Bengal's Department of 
Commerce published a report of the Committee^^ appointed to 
enquire into the charges for electrical energy levied by 
the Calcutta Electricity Supply Corporation Limited. The 
Committee was quite surprised by the high standard of plant
Report by Delhi Electric Supply Enquiry Committee. 
Government of India. (India, 1936).
Report by Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation 
charges Enquiry Committee. Government of India, (India, 
1935-36).
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and equipment used and also by the excellent way in which 
the plant and equipment were maintained. At the same time 
the Committee criticised the company's expenditure on 
repairs and maintenance which amounted to 0.69 annas per 
unit generated (in 1934) as being excessive and suggested 
that savings could be made which would reduce this figure 
to 0.26 annas per unit generated.
Such government committees did little to change 
overall policies, although electric power in this period 
established its place as a productive input in industries. 
There was a marked difference between the availability of 
power supply and the efficiency of the electric companies 
in different regions. The evidence of diversity between 
states is given in the following Chapter.
In 1944 it was observed that the electricity supply 
industry in India was characterised by multiple small 
undertakings, the issued capital of which in the great 
majority of cases was under 5 lakhs of rupees. The 
development of large, commercially owned electricity 
undertakings had been impeded by difficulties experienced 
in raising capital and the high rate of interest demanded 
for its provision. According to the government advisory 
Committee,^* the monopolistic character of the Electricity 
Supply Industry could lead to abuses in the absence of 
adequate control. Due to a number of reasons it was 
expected that the existing licenses would remain in 
existence for some considerable time and therefore an 
effective and uniform method of control by Provincial 
Governments was found to be necessary.
The advisory Committee of the Government of India 
outlined some Principles for the control of public utility 
electric supply companies on a standard basis. The
Report of the Advisory Board on the Principles for 
the control of public utility electricity finance. 
Department of Works, mines and Power, (Delhi, 1947).
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principles were referred to the Provinces, the Federation 
of Electricity Supply Undertakings and some individual 
electricity supply undertakings. The main aims of the 
principles were:^®
a) To safeguard the interest of the consumer by limit­
ing interest and dividends payable to the minimum necessary 
to ensure an adequate flow of capital and a reduction in 
the selling price of electricity.
b) To safeguard the interests of investors by insis­
tence on a properly devised system of compulsory 
depreciation and at the same time permit the earning of a 
"reasonable" or "fair" return on investment, though there 
were no clear cut declarations of what the fair return on 
capital was.
The Policy Committee (no. 3-c Public Works and 
Electric Power) of Reconstruction Committee of Council, 
Government of India, at its second meeting held on 2nd 
February, 1945 resolved that,
a) The development of electricity supply in areas out­
side existing licensed areas should be actively pursued as 
far as possible, as a state or quasi-state enterprise; but 
if for any reason the state was not prepared to undertake 
such development in any area within a reasonable time, 
private enterprise should not be excluded.
b) Provided efficient and economic operation could be 
assured to the public, options existing under any license 
to acquire an undertaking should, as a general rule, be 
exercised when they arise,
c) That steps be taken to eradicate any factors that 
retard the healthy and economical growth of electrical 
development on regional lines whether in Provincial state 
or Local authority owned or in commercially owned 
electrical undertakings.
Ibid, pp.16-18.
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Under the Electricity (Supply) Bill 1946 most 
provinces were expected to set up Public Electricity Supply 
Boards. It was proposed that the Principles set up by the 
Committee should be incorporated in the Bill to govern the 
relationship between Licensees and Electricity Supply 
Boards. The Committee looking into the matter was 
reorganised four times at different points and there were 
difference of opinion between the Committee Members and 
Mr.I.A.Macpherson, advisor to the government of India on 
various issues. Finally the report was ready in 1947.
1.8.3 Procedure after Independence.
After Independence, this industry was placed in the 
public sector. The Electricity (Supply) Act was passed in 
1948 with the objective of rationalising the generation and 
distribution of electricity and its development on a 
regional basis.
We observed in the previous Section that in each of 
the committee reports beginning from the year 1910 the 
committee members seem to have realised the need to protect 
the consumers' interest. They also realised the need for 
investments by the states due to the heavy capital 
requirements of the industry as well as its monopolistic 
nature. But it was only after Independence that these 
aspects could be enacted.
According to the federal constitution of the union of 
India, the supply of electricity is a "concurrent" subject 
i.e. it comes within the purview of both the central and 
the state governments.
However, the major burden of its development is the 
responsibility of the states. According to the Electricity 
Supply Act of 1948, generation and distribution was 
decentralised to some extent by creating State Electricity 
Boards. Under section 5 of the Electricity (Supply) Act; 
1948, State Electricity Boards were constituted so as to
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promote the coordinated development of the generation of 
electricity within the state in the most efficient and 
economic manner with particular reference to such 
development in areas which are not at all served or only 
inadequately served by any licensee. Thus, after 
Independence, though the electricity industry was not 
nationalised as such, encouragement was given to the state 
to invest more in this public utility, and private 
investment was discouraged. Under the Electricity (Supply) 
Act; 1948, five Regional Electricity Boards were set up to 
achieve regional operation of power systems. The functions 
assigned to them were:
1) Reviewing the progress of power development schemes 
in the region.
2) Planning and ensuring the integrated operation of 
the systems in such a manner that at any time the total 
amount of electricity generated and transmitted shall give 
the maximum possible benefits to the region as a whole.
3 ) Preparation of a coordinated overhaul and 
maintenance programme for the generating plants in the 
region.
4) Determining the quantity of power available for ex­
changes from time to time between the States, over and 
above the requirements of each State.
5) Determining the generation schedules to be followed 
by the constituent systems.
6) Determination of a suitable tariff structure to 
govern exchanges of power within the region.
The five Boards-for the Northern, Western, Southern, 
Eastern and North Eastern regions-were also engaged in 
developing Load Despatch Centres so that systems in each 
region could work in an integrated manner for utilising the 
existing capacity so as to give maximum benefits to the 
region as a whole.
The act also provided for the creation of the Central
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Electricity Authority. It coordinates the activities of the 
Planning agencies, acts as arbitrator in matters arising 
between the State Governments or State Electricity Boards 
and licensees, collects data concerning generation, 
distribution and utilisation of power, and publishes 
relevant statistics concerning electricity supply and 
assessment and reports on power surveys.
In the 1956 industrial policy resolution, the future 
development of the generation and distribution of 
electricity became the exclusive responsibility of the 
states. Since then, investment in the electricity supply 
industry has been largely public sector investment and the 
Central Electricity Board was constituted with powers to 
make rules for regulating generation, transmission, supply 
and use of electrical energy.
The Rural Electrification Corporation (REC) was set up 
in July 1969. The REC has given a special consideration to 
rural electrification schemes in backward areas. The loans 
and viability norms have been devised specially to take 
into account the fact that it takes a longer time for the 
demand for electricity to materialise in these areas and, 
consequently, it takes more time for a scheme to become 
viable.
The Central Electricity Consultative Council was 
reconstituted in 1972. This Council is an advisory body. 
Its objective is to establish closer relations between the 
suppliers and users of electricity. During the late 1970s 
the Electricity Supply Act was amended to allow the setting 
up of central organisations called the National Thermal 
Power Corporation and National Hydro-electric Power 
Corporation to build large thermal power stations in the 
case of the former and large hydro-electric power stations 
by the latter organisation. The purpose of setting up these 
organisations was fully to exploit economies of scale which 
would have been beyond the resources of individual states
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and could best be taken advantage of by funding directly 
from the central government and by sharing the benefits 
between groups of states.
Thus, we can observe a movement from small electricity 
companies in the private sector to electricity generation 
and distribution in the public sector. The central 
government was cautious not to repeat the results of 
private electric companies, deriving instead the economies 
of scale in generation, and also taking consideration of 
the consumers' interest.
As we have observed, all possible policy instruments 
were adopted to utilise the economies of scale benefits. 
And in this respect the transition from small companies in 
the Pre-Independence period to State Electricity Boards 
along with the central organisations in the Post- 
Independence period have been successful.
As far as the consumers' interest was concerned, in 
the Pre-Independence period the electric companies did 
charge high prices and also made profits. The supply was 
quite unreliable^® But the efficiency levels of some 
electric companies were very high as observed by the 
Committee which was appointed in 1936 to enquire into the 
changes for electrical energy levied by the Calcutta 
Electric Supply Corporation.
In the Post-Independence period, the State Electricity 
Boards charged "reasonable prices" for electricity in order 
to protect the "consumers' interest". Though we find a lot 
of variation in the electricity prices between the states.
The reliability of the electric supply was observed 
by the Delhi Electric Supply Enquiry committee. One of the 
responses to their questionnaire was "At the present time 
the interruptions of power supply cause us the greatest 
trouble in this respect. The number of shut downs we obtain 
is greater than should be expected from a present day power
supply system " According to the report of the
Committee this reply was representative of many replies 
that they received.
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for example in 1978-79 the average revenue in Orissa was
0.154 rupees per KWH against 0.383 rupees per KWH in Assam. 
These differences led to differences in the forward 
linkages between the states. Two questions emerge in this 
context, i) What was the real or social cost of power 
supply? ii) Why were the State Electricity Boards making 
financial losses?
As far as the reliability is concerned the occasional 
blackouts and frequent brownouts were no surprise to the 
electricity consumers. And the consumers got used to the 
scheduled power cuts imposed by the State Electricity 
Boards. The result of these shortages in the late 1970s was 
obvious in the development of "captive power generation"
1.e. industrial units developed their own generating 
capacity either to support their demand or as standby 
arrangements in case of power cuts. The fact that none of 
the State Electricity Boards had any department to deal 
with the consumers' complaints or/and to observe the 
consumers' response to their supply reflects the level of 
electric utilities' concern for the consumers!
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CHAPTER II
THE GROWTH OF THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY IN INDIA-
II. 1 Developments in the electricity industry prior to 
1900.
Although the principle of the electric dynamo was 
developed as early as 1831, practical use of it was made 
only from the late 1870s. The electric generating plant at 
that time was mainly designed to provide lighting for 
homes, streets and public buildings.
The first installation of generating plant in India 
was in 1897 at Darjeeling, when the local Municipality 
launched their hydro-electric project utilising the local 
river waters. The installed capacity of 9 small hydro­
electric plants was of the order of 130 KW. Soon after, in 
1899, the first 1,000 KW coal-based plant was installed at 
Calcutta by the Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation. 
Otherwise the only prime movers in service prior to 1900 in 
India were water wheels, supplying motive power to small 
mills and factories. Such water wheels of crude design had 
been in use for several centuries in some places in India.
II.2 Development during 1901-1920.
Earlier in the century, one commentator remarked:
"The electrical era in India has scarcely 
commenced; for so far as I know there are, excluding 
private plants, only three public electric supply 
stations and one tramway system actually working and 
about half-a-dozen more schemes in contemplation or 
under construction. Calcutta was the first place with 
its extensive installations both for general 
electrical supply and for tramway, the latter nearly 
completed by 1903. Light railways, which in many 
countries were almost all electrical, were worked by 
steam where they existed in India at all.....
J.W. Mears,(Electrical Advisor to GOI), Lectures on 
Electrical Engineering. (Six lectures delivered at the 
Civil Engineering College, Sibpur in March 1902) , Lecture 
1 on "Electric Traction", (Calcutta, 1913), p.l.
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During this period electric supply for purely lighting 
purposes was started in some of the large towns and cities. 
Only well-to-do people were able to enjoy the luxury of 
electric lights. Industries were generally dependent on 
manual or animal labour; but some installations were 
mechanically driven by steam engines. Motive power through 
the medium of electric drives had not yet become very 
popular. A few of the important installations constructed 
during this period are as follows.
a) Coal-based Electric Plants:
The Madras Electricity Supply corporation Ltd. 
commissioned a 3,000 KW power station in 1906, the capacity 
of which was raised to 9,000 KW by 1914. The Kanpur 
Electric Supply Co. Ltd., brought into operation in 1906 
generating plant of 2,170 KW capacity. The Calcutta 
Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. commissioned, in 1912, a 
new power station of 15,000 KW capacity at Cassipore. Other 
coal-based power plants each of less than 1,000 KW capacity 
were installed at various places like Bikaner, Bilaspur, 
Gwalior, Barrackpore, Bareilly and Joara.
b) Hydro-Electric Plants:^"
The Mysore Government launched a 4,500 KW project on 
the Cauvery river at Sivasamudram in 1902 mainly to supply 
power to Kolar Gold Mines. The capacity of this station was 
progressively raised to 15,700 KW by 1920. This happened to 
be the first major power development in India, designed to 
promote industrial development. In 1909, the Kashmir 
Government inaugurated the Jhelum Power Station at Mohora 
with plant having capacity of 4,227 KW. The Simla
All the information for this period was taken from 
Electrical undertakings in India, Various issues which were 
corrected up to 1912, 1913 and 1918, Government of India, 
Printed in Calcutta in the respective years.
J.W. Mears and R.D.Bull, Hvdro-electric Survev of 
India, 3 Volumes, (Calcutta 1919-1922).
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Municipality installed 1,250 KW of plant in 1913. The Tata 
Hydro Electric Power co. commissioned the first large power 
station of 50,000 KW capacity at Khapoli in 1914. The 
Bombay Government commissioned 1,024 KW of plant at 
Bhatnagar Dam in 1915. During this period, the plant 
capacity of Darjeeling was raised to 600 KW. At Mussorie a 
450 KW plant was installed in 1909. A 240 KW generating 
station was commissioned at Patiala. A 400 KW plant was 
installed at Munnar to supply power to the Tea Estates in 
Travancore.
c) Diesel Electric Plants:
During this period diesel engine driven generators 
aggregating to a capacity of 6,325 KW were installed at 25 
different towns including Delhi, Allahabad, Ahmedabad, 
Bareilly etc.
The aggregate installed capacity of the coal-based, 
hydro-electric and diesel plants in operation in the public 
electricity supply systems in India by the end of 1920 
amounted to only 130,009 KW.
Technical and Financial Aspects of the Industry:
In accordance with a resolution of the second 
conference of Electrical Engineers and Inspectors, held in 
Calcutta in December 1916, reports were prepared which
reveal technical and financial data on the electrical
undertakings licensed under the Indian Electricity Act 
1910. From Table II.1 it can be observed that out of the 
total 159,677 KW of capacity in 1916-17, coal-based plants 
were responsible for 41%, water power for 56% and oil (with 
steam auxiliaries) for the balance. The total connected 
load came to about 138,000 KW. The total units generated 
amounted to some 235 million, of which the Tata Hydro
Electric Power Supply Company accounted for just about
half. On this basis, of units generated, the average load 
factor was 40%.
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Table II.1
Installed capacity and generation in the year 1912 and 1916.
1912 1916
Installed Capacity in KW.
Total 133,940 159,677
Native States 18,290 26,210
Coal
Total n.a 65,467.57
Native States n.a 4,750.0
Oil
Total n.a. 4,790.31
Native States n.a. 460.0
Water
Total n.a. 89,419.12
Native States n.a. 21,000.0
Connected load in KW.
Total 111,840 138,000
Native States n.a. 21,000
Generation in HKWH.
Total 210.0 235.0
Native States 83.8 102.56
Source: Electrical undertakings in India. Various issues which were corrected up to 1912, 1913 and 
1918, Government of India, Printed in Calcutta in the respective years.
In 1916-17, the native states of India (Mysore, 
Kashmir, Baroda, Bikaner, Patiala and Hyderabad) had 26,210 
KW of total installed capacity out of which coal was 
responsible for 18.12%, water power for 80.15% and oil for
1.7%. Water power (i.e. power generated from hydro-electric 
plants) was remarkably predominant in the native states of 
India compared to the remaining part of India directly 
under British rule. The availability of the capital 
required to build up the hydro-electric plant could be one 
of the reasons (and the capital for investment in capacity 
to generate electricity was made available in native 
states).
The electric companies in different areas had
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different dominant consumer groups. For example, Simla had 
large public and private lighting demand (KWH) as well as 
Public Water Works, whereas Bombay had a large traction 
load. The Tata Electric Supply Company, serving an 
industrial load in bulk, had 44 large consumers. Excluding 
this company 3,000 units were sold per consumer in 1916-17. 
But as a very large (unspecified) proportion of the sales 
in the combined undertakings were for traction, this figure 
is likely to be considerably above the median and modal use 
per consumer.
All the financial data were complicated by the fact 
that some companies had sterling capital and others rupee 
capital. As the greater part of the capital expenditure was 
incurred in pre-war days the conversion was carried out at 
ls.4d. to a rupee. The capital expended on the undertakings 
in the list (with Rangoon added) was some 1,287 lakhs; but 
this includes the tramway attached to the Bombay, Delhi, 
Cawnpore and Rangoon undertakings. The total expenditure on 
licensed undertakings, omitting four of which no 
particulars have been given, was over 10 crores (100 
million rupees). The actual capital represented by the 
Electric Supply and Traction Federation of India was stated 
to be about 14 crores (140 million rupees).
The total revenue in 1916-17, from electric supply 
exclusive of other sources after adding in Rangoon was 
about 175 lakhs (17.5 millions), or some 13.75% on the 
capital sum.
The revenue earned by the electric companies was 
affected by their pre-dominant consumer group. On the other 
hand the prime-mover of the plants governed the cost of the 
units generated. The methods of accounting as well as the 
efficiency in collecting the revenues from the customers 
were affected by the way in which the companies were 
managed and controlled.
Of the hydro-electric licensed undertakings, the Tata
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Hydro Electric Power Supply Company was the largest. The 
other licensed water power installations were in the three 
hill stations of Simla, Mussourie and Darjeeling. These 
were all Municipal undertakings. In each case it was found 
difficult to get at their true financial position; owing to 
the adoption of unusual methods of finance or account
k e e p i ng.Simla received a large part of its capital as 
subsidy from the government free of charge. Though the
electricity generated in Simla was largely used for pumping 
water, the major part of the revenue was not from the 
Public Water Works. This was mainly due to the mutual
understanding between the Public Water Works and the 
Electricity Company. The revenue was largely derived from 
domestic consumers who used the electricity for lighting 
and heating purposes. Also in Mussourie no charges were 
taken for the large proportion of the units used in pumping 
water and in street lighting by the municipal corporation. 
The local authority was exempted from rendering statutory 
accounts. In Darjeeling, the Government made an annual
grant towards upkeep.
The analysis of the "works cost" per unit generated 
shows a very wide range of results. (It must be borne in 
mind that these "works costs" exclude all capital charges). 
Naturally, the hydro-electric installations had the lowest 
works cost, the Tata Company heading the list with 0.111 
annas (i.e. 0.444 paise) a unit. Both Simla and Mussourie 
had far lower costs than the best of the coal-based power 
stations. The works cost in Bombay was 0.831 annas (i.e. 
3.324 paise) per unit generated, whereas in Calcutta the 
works cost was 0.694 annas (i.e.2.776 paise) per unit 
generated. (The works costs in Darjeeling was not found in 
the reports.) The stations with diesel engines had very 
uniform costs averaging about 1.8 annas (7.2 paise) a unit,
J.W. Mears, op.cit. p.34.
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which is lower than all but four of coal-based power 
stations. Among the newer companies, and those which had 
made little headway, the works costs were over 3 annas (12 
paise) per unit generated. Till 1921, the highest dividend 
paid by any company was that paid by Calcutta Electric 
Supply Corporation in 1919, viz. 20% including the bonus 
shares issued. The Bombay Electric Supply and Tramway 
Company was not far behind with 18% in the same year. The 
small undertaking at Dacca paid 12.5% for several years and 
showed efficient management. Ahmedabad Electric Company 
also had efficient management and paid a 9% dividend in 
1920. The same remark cannot be made of Lahore which paid 
12.5% dividend in 1918 but had been in a state of continual 
trouble with its consumers and the government. The India 
Electric Supply and Traction Company (Cawnpore) paid 9% in 
1919 and was favourably situated in an industrial area. 
After many vicissitudes the Madras Electric Supply 
Corporation reached the position in 1920 where a reasonable 
dividend of 8% could be declared.
II.3 Developments During 1921-1940.
The industrial boom following World War I, the 
realisation of the advantages of adopting electric-drive 
for industries, and the participation of the Provincial 
Governments in the business of electricity generation, 
contributed largely to the substantial growth of power in 
the period 1920-1940. During this period the aggregate 
installed capacity increased by about ten times i.e. from 
130,009 KW to 1,208,422 KW. In areas where public utility 
companies were not operating, industrial undertakings like 
Tata Iron and Steel Co. established their own private power 
stations. Some of the more important installations are
46
described below-^®
a) Coal-based Electric Plants:
Apart from the progressive growth of the installations 
at Calcutta, Madras, Kanpur, Bikaner and Nagpur, etc., new 
coal-based plants were erected at 55 new stations raising 
the installed capacity from 49,245 KW, to 624,162 KW.
b) Hydro-Electric Plants:
The most notable extensions during this period were 
carried out by the Tata Hydro Electric Company. In 1922, a 
new power station of 72,000 KW was installed at Bhivpuri. 
A 10,000 KW generating set was added at the Khapoli power 
station and a third power station of 110,000 KW was 
commissioned at Bhiar in 1927. Additional plant aggregating 
to 29,250 KW was installed at Sivasamudram Power Station. 
A station at Shimshapura was added to the system in 1940 
with a plant capacity of 17,200 KW. The installed capacity 
of Munnar Power Station in Travancore was raised to 1,900 
KW. There were many other new plants at various places in 
the country.
c) Diesel Electric Plants:
The aggregate capacity of diesel plants was raised 
from 6,325 KW to 115,291 KW during this period due to 
extensions in plants in operation and installation of new 
plants for the electrification of about 360 towns. 
Performance of the Electricity Industry:
The data availability regarding the technical and 
financial performance of electricity industry in the period 
between 1921 and 1940 is quite poor. As noted in the 
earlier section, the regulations governing this industry 
were changing. The industry was also in an infant stage. 
There was neither any Central Authority that could
The information was gathered from Electrical 
Undertakings in India, Corrected up to 1930, 1932, 1934;
Government of India, Printed in Lahore. Very little 
information was published in the form of any document for 
the period 1932-1940.
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coordinate the small units scattered in the major cities in 
India, nor there were any common methods of regulation to 
be followed. Hence, we find the relevant data in different 
forms, in various reports of the different electricity 
companies. The reports were prepared and maintained from 
the point of view of the individual company. The boundaries 
of the states were different than those of the present. 
Thus the data are not in comparable form to those available 
after Independence.
An attempt is made in this section to observe the 
technical and financial performance on the basis of the 
available data. Table II.2a and Table II.2b show that the 
installed capacity in different parts of the country varied 
enormously. The data in the Tables (i.e. II.2a, II.2b), 
reflect the sum of the installed capacity of the companies 
in each of the specified regions. Bengal, Madras 
Presidency, United Provinces, Central Provinces and Bombay 
Presidency were the dominant regions where electricity was 
generated. These regions were either the main centres of 
British trade and raw material activities or they were 
princely states. In either case the initial capital needed 
for setting up was available and private companies found 
some local demand (KWH), justifying investment in plants to 
generate electricity. In these areas electricity was a 
luxury good in the household sector so its sale was limited 
to the elite households. Realising that electricity was a 
very convenient fuel input, saving time and costs, the Tata 
cotton textile group initiated a project for a hydro­
electric plant at Bombay. This example was followed by many 
other groups of industrialists. Thus, electricity changed 
from being primarily a luxury consumer good to become an 
important productive input. As a result, the development of 
electricity generation was concentrated in the areas which 
were comparatively industrially developed. In contrast, as 
we can see from the Tables (i.e. II. 2a, II. 2b), Bihar,
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Orissa, Indian States and to some extent Assam, which were 
almost entirely agricultural, had relatively slow and 
delayed growth in electricity generation.
Table II.2a
Total installed capacity in KW by region.
Year Assam Bihar Bengal 
& Orissa
Punjab Madras United
Provinces
kAqs
1919 - - 23,410 2,655 4,500 2,670*3 -
1920 - - 23,260 2,655 4,500 3,170 -
1921 - - 28,626 2,770 4,500 -9,170 -
1923 - - 54,451 3,920 9,500 11,940 -
1924 200 - 69,451 3,690 9,500 21,250,, 625
1925 200 - 69,801 3,690 9,500 18,000 * 2,H)
1926 300 - 81,746 5,040 9,600 21,160 2 , m
1927 300 - 74,196 8,700 1 9,699 21,460 2,290
1928 300 - 114,370 3,400 2 9,783 21,460 2,250
1929 681 2.36 114,404 15,018 16,053 27,115 2,310
1930 712 3.11 157,815 14,193 22,463 29,415 2,286
1931 888 3.7 166,681 17,470 243,215 30,140 19,966
Table II.2b
Year Bombay Milit­ North Delhi Central
Presi­ ary West Province Provinces
dency Eng. Frontier
Works.
1919 51,132 - - 787 250
1920 51,446 - - 787 250
1921 51,736 - - - 250
1922 52,188 - - - 250
1923 113,478 - - - 250
1924 114,298 - - - 250
1925 114,766 - - 2,127 440
1926 127,277 - - 2,127 940
1927 130,900 - 295 2,127 940
1928 241,418, - 315 2,127 3,423
1929 241,358 4 - N.A. 5,227 3,223
1930 242,374 - N.A. 3,100j N.A.
1931 198,485 539 799 2,100 2 3,448
*1 Hydro-electric plants not included. *2 Data not available for coal-based plants. *3 Hissing data 
for sone units. *4 Kissing data for sone hydro-electric plants.
Source: Electrical Undertakings in India. For the years 1930, 1932, 1934, Government of India, 
Printed in Lahore.
The data on the electricity generated (KWH) per unit
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of installed capacity (KW) reflects the capacity 
utilisation in each region. To some extent capacity 
utilisation reflects the electricity availability. Usually, 
in the absence of excess demand, capacity utilisation would 
reflect the characteristics of electricity demand (KWH). As 
can be observed from Table II.3a and Table II.3b, the 
generation was increasing at different rates in different 
regions. These differences could be due to the differences 
in the level of economic activity or differences in 
electricity availability. The differences in the 
availability (electricity in KWH) is the obvious result of 
the vast difference in the installed capacity in the 
different regions in the absence of the interconnections 
between the regions to exchange power.
Observing the installed capacity according to prime 
mover, we gather that in the beginning the hydro-electric 
plants were predominant but over a period of time there was 
a shift towards coal-based plants.
As seen from the Table II.4, the development of the 
oil-based plants over the period is slow. Assuming the 
available data is the total, one can compare the share of 
different plants in the "total". The share of the oil-based 
plants was not more than 7% till 1931. In absolute terms 
the increase in the hydro-electric plants is slower than 
the coal-based plants. Among the reasons are high capital 
requirements, the gestation period and the seasonal 
characteristics of the hydro-electric plants. The state 
governments and the British government were not interested 
in investing capital in electricity generation, requiring 
long term planning, during the disturbed years of First 
World War and the depression. Meanwhile private investors 
were in need of either low load, small generating plants 
satisfying domestic requirements or shorter gestation 
plants to satisfy industrial demand (KWH).
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Table II.3a
Average capability by region, i.e. generation (in KWH) per KW of installed capacity in different 
regions.
Year Assam Bihar Bengal
Orissa
Punjab Madras United
Provin­
ces
Railways.
1919 - - 1,415.5 2,227.7 1,463.3 2,181.7 -
1920 - - 1,716.6 2,718.9 1,633.7 1,627.6 -
1921 - - 1,548.9 2,750.6 1,742.4 - -
1922 - - 1,367.6 2,773.4 2,000.3 - -
1923 - - 1,406.2 2,447.8 1,131.2 700.3 -
1924 734.0 - 1,407.8 1,537.2 1,122.3 607.3 172.3
1925 412.3 - 1,768.0 2,790.5 1,217.2 750.6 70.5
1926 616.8 - 1,509.8 2,235.8 1,311.7 1,204.4 91.9
1927 721.0 - 1,769.4 1,026.8 2,198.5 1,143.4 112.7
1928 804.5 - 1,472.1 622.5 1,944.5 1,446.7 81.4
1929 723.6 1,179 1,674.4 1,148.6 1,271.9 1,573.4 88.0
1930 879.1 1,144 1,208.7 1,449.5 998.7 1,740.2 84.3
1931 966.0 1,162 1,169.7 1,328.8 109.7 1,893.6 14.9
Table II.3b
Year Bombay Milit­ North Delhi Central
Presi­ ary West Province Provinces
dency Eng. Front­
Works ier
1919 1,744.2 - - 2,587.4 955.9
1920 1,892.0 - - 2,975.5 1,117.8
1921 2,132.5 - - - 1,321,5
1922 2,351.5 - - - 1,321.5
1923 1,221.0 - - - 1,516.6
1924 1,706.3 - - - 2,109.5
1925 2,254.7 - - 1,853.3 1,715.7
1926 977.5 - - 1,941.8 858.7
1927 2,253.2 - 620.2 2,107.3 1,036.1
1928 1,207.1 - 618.5 2,630.5 770.4
1929 1,224.3 - - 2,632.5 1,124.9
1930 1,671.7 - - 5,066.5 -
1931 2,034.8 2,010.0 598.2 - 668.1
Source: Calculated fron Table II.2a and Table II.2b.
- means data unavailable.
N.B. Due to non-availability of data either in the installed capacity or in the units sold of sone 
plants in sone regions the figures give us general picture and not a very clear idea about 
efficiency in the particular region over a period of tine.
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Table II.4
Installed capacity by prime-mover at all-India level, (in KW).
Year Coal-based plants Hydro-ele. plants Oil-based plants Total
Total % share Total % share Total % share
1919 31,321 36.7 51,850 60.7 2,233 2.6 85,404
1920 32,135 37.4 51,850 60.2 2,083^, 2.4 86,068
1921 34,280 149.9 51,850 59 1,752 2 2.0 87,882
1922 54,220 50.1 52,350 48.1 2,184 2.0 108,754
1923 76,360 39.5 114,500 59,1 2,679 1.4 193,539
1924 101,465 46.3 114,400 52.2 3,199 1.5 219,064
1925 102,800 46.3 112,550 150.8 6,743 3.0 222,093
1926 118,711 47.5 124,300 49.7 7,252 2.9 250,263
1927 122,441 47.3 124,300 48 12,221 4.7 258,962
1928 162,481 39.7 232,050 356.6 15,235 3.7 409,766
1929 176,284*4 40.5 236,700 54.3 22,459 5.1 435,443
1930 220,398 46 238,632 49.8 20,269 3 4.2 479,299
* Kissing data in:
1 United Provinces
2 Delhi
3 Punjab
4 Bombay
5 Delhi and Central Provinces.
Source: Calculated from the yearly statements maintained by the individual companies in India in 
the respective years.
The availability of natural fuel resources and the 
availability of capital in different regions largely 
determined the choice of prime-mover. Though with no inter­
connection between the states, this left each area 
vulnerable to supply interruptions. Punjab was an exception 
to this, with a more balanced mix of hydro-electric and 
coal-based plants since 1919 and, after 1926, oil-based 
plants were also added to its total capacity. Its 
electricity generation was largely from the coal based 
plants and the share of the hydro-electric plants was 
decreasing over a period of time. However, in states like 
Assam, there was initially complete reliance on the hydro­
electric plants. After the introduction of oil-based plants 
from 1928, the share of the hydro-electric plants reduced 
to 50%. Electricity generation in Bengal and Madras 
Presidency was mainly from coal-based plants and this
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continued for the whole period. In the Bombay Presidency, 
though hydro-electric plants were the major source of 
electric power, there were also coal-based and oil-based 
electric power plants with a very limited share in the 
total capacity. In the Central Provinces electricity was 
generated mainly from oil-based plants until 1925 when the 
lead was taken over by coal-based plants.
Table II.5
Expenditure (in Indian Rupees) per unit (KWH) of electricity sold in major states. °
Year Assam Bihar Bengal
Orissa
Punjab Madras United
Provin­
ces
Bombay
1919 - - .67 0.63 2.11 1.0 1.0
1920 - - .68 0.57 1.87 0.92 1.3
1921 - - .78 0.62 1.77 0.94 1.09
1922 - - 0.93 0.52 1.89 0.97 -
1923 - - 0.72 0.68 2.13 0.89 1.31
1924 2.75 - 0.59 1.18 1.68 0.98 0.96
1925 5.15 - 2.70 0.79 1.58 1.0 0.47
1926 2.44 - 0.55 0.82 1.62 1.06 0.53
1927 2.19 - 0.45 1.19 1.72 0.69 0.55
1928 2.12 - 0.41 5.84 1.56 0.87 0.38
1929 2.41 1.10 0.38 0.74 1.19 0.88 0.49
1930 1.91 0.95 3.8 0.50 0.97 0.87 0.45
1931 1.57 1.04 0.44 0.66 1.69 0.78 0.43
1932 1.90 0.04 0.0013 0.23 0.75 0.19 0.71
Source: Calculated from the yearly statements maintained by the individual companies in India in 
the respective years.
Note: The data on expenditure as mentioned, were recorded by the individual electricity companies 
and no uniform pattern was followed to maintain the records. Sone electric companies maintained 
these records in Pound-Sterling and sone in Rupee-Paise. Also, the records of all electric 
companies are not available today. Hence, this representation is just an approximation and the data 
are unconvincing.
The data on expenditure as mentioned, were recorded 
by the individual electricity companies and no uniform 
pattern was followed to maintain the records. Some electric 
companies maintained these records in Pound-Sterling and 
some in Rupee-Paise. Also, the records of all electric 
companies are not available today, hence, this 
representation is just an attempt and may not appear 
convincing.
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The presence of natural resources was not always sufficient 
to guarantee the development of electricity generation. For 
example, regions like Bihar were well endowed with coal but 
the development of electricity generation was slowest in 
Bihar. This was mainly due to lack of local demand (KWH) 
for electricity.
Data on total expenditure and revenue were also 
collected for various purposes by the companies. For many 
companies the data is missing, nevertheless the conclusions 
drawn on the basis of this data throw some light on the 
financial position of the industry before World War II. The 
expenditure per unit of electricity sold is shown in Table 
II.5. It is obvious that the states having larger installed 
capacity in hydro-electric plants had lower unit 
expenditure than the rest.
The data on unit expenditure (as can be seen from 
Table II.5) even in one state did not always follow any 
trend and the fluctuations could be due to the way in which 
the records were maintained. Hence, it is not possible to 
draw any definite conclusions from the financial data. The 
data on revenue earned per unit of electricity sold is much 
more unreliable. It seems that the revenue per unit is less 
than the expenditure per unit; on the other hand the 
reports give us evidence regarding the interest paid to 
the shareholders I
II.4 Developments during the period 1941-1950.
The growth of power facilities during the decade was 
largely affected by the Second World War (1939-1945) and 
the abnormal post-war conditions that followed. During the 
War, all the available power supply resources were strictly 
controlled and regulated from the point of view of the war 
effort. The available plants were used to the maximum 
extent possible; wear and tear became very heavy and spare 
parts could not be produced. Provision of additional
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capacity and other equipment was often impossible, while 
poor maintenance and frequent breakdowns aggravated the 
condition of the plants in service.^' The coal-fired 
stations suffered particularly due to deterioration of the 
quality of coal supplies, resulting in reduced outputs. 
Shortage of fuel oil compelled a number of diesel power 
stations to operate for a few hours only during the day.
At the end of the war, the power supply industry found 
itself in a very precarious situation. Apart from the 
expansion of the capacity needed to meet the unsatisfied 
and future power demands (KW), the plants in operation 
needed considerable rehabilitation. The country was 
partitioned in August 1947. The installed capacity which 
fell within the jurisdiction of Pakistan immediately after 
partition amounted to 74,570 KW.^* A significant feature of 
electric power development in India during the latter half 
of this decade was the increasing participation in the 
electric supply industry by the various State Governments. 
Punjab, Madras, Mysore, Travancore and Uttar Pradesh were 
already in the field and certain other states viz., Bengal, 
Bihar, Bombay, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa entered the field 
after the War. During the period several private electric 
utilities were also responsible for substantial plant 
extensions in their respective areas. The important 
additions to plant capacity during this period were-
a) Coal-based Electric Plants-
During this decade, particularly in the later half.
Record of the 1*^  and 2”* meetings of Policy Committee 
no. 3c. Reconstruction Committee of Council, Public Works 
and Electric Power, held in October 1943, February 1945, 
Published in 1945 at New Delhi. Also see, Report of the 
advisory Board on the Principles for the control of public 
utility electricity supply finance, op.cit. p.45.
Though this was 5% of the total installed capacity 
at all India level, Punjab and Bombay state were affected 
severely since they lost some of their plants.
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there was an addition of 380,000 KW of coal-based 
generating plant in public utility undertakings, so that 
the total installed capacity at the end of this period 
stood at 1,004,434 KW which represents an increase of 61% 
over the capacity in 1940. The major installations were at 
Calcutta, Ahmedabad, Kanpur, Delhi, Allahabad, Agra, 
Banaras, Jabalpur, Patna, Hyderabad and Vijayawada.
b) Hydro-Electric Plants-
The expansion of the capacity of hydro-electric plants 
was much less than that of coal-based plants. Among the new 
installations commissioned were Papanasam in Madras State- 
21,000 KW (1944) and -Jog falls station in Mysore (1st 
stage)-48,000 KW (1947-49). Extensions to existing stations 
were completed at Mettur in Madras-10,000 KW (1946) and at 
Pallivasal in erstwhile Travancore 15,000 KW (1947-49). The 
aggregate capacity in hydro-electric plants in 1950 was 
over 559,000 KW which represents an increase of about 20% 
over the 1940 level.
c) Diesel Electric Plants- Some 25 new towns were 
electrified during this period with diesel power plants. 
The aggregate installed capacity at the end of 1950 was 
148,796 KW.
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As can be observed from Graph II. 1 and II.2, the 
installed capacity and electricity generated increased 
almost continuously throughout the period. The energy sold 
to the consumers and the peak load also had increasing 
trends.
II.5 Developments during 1951-1986.
During the period 1951-1971, the national economy was
affected by the strategy adopted in the Second Five Year
Plan, based on the Mahalanobis model. The basic philosophy
of the Second Plan was to give a "big push" to the economy
through rapid industrialisation. The Draft Outline of the
Second Five-Year Plan observed,
"The Indian economy at present depends excessively on 
agriculture. It has to be diversified, and special 
stress has to be laid on development in the future if 
industries are to be sustained. The increase in 
agriculture during the First Plan period has prepared 
the ground for a greater emphasis on 
industrialisation."
The Second Five Year Plan encouraged the basic and heavy 
industries which were also capital and energy intensive. 
Political factors like the war with China and Pakistan in 
1960s and the Bangladesh war in the early 1970s created the 
problem of refugees and particularly affected the 
neighbouring regions of India.
In the period after 1973, the continuity in investment 
was disturbed by the "state of emergency" declared by the 
Congress Party and the rapid changes in the party in power.
Second Five-Year Plan. Government of India, (New 
Delhi, 1956), p.5.
Accordingly, the Second Plan aimed at (a) a sizable 
increase in national income so as to raise the level of 
living in the country; (b) rapid industrialisation with 
particular emphasis on the development of basic and heavy 
industries; (c) a large expansion of employment 
opportunities; (d) reduction of inequalities in income and 
wealth and a more even distribution of economic power.
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Some assets in industry in the 1970s were already 20 or 
more years old and needed rehabilitation. The low quality 
of coal affected the plants' performance, creating high 
demand for investment in maintenance. The "oil crisis" 
affected the economy more than the power sector since 
generation from imported oil was low. But the substitution 
of non-oil for oil power continued due to the oil crisis. 
Electricity demand (KWH) was growing and much encouragement 
was given to the rural electrification programmes.
The emphasis on public sector investment in electric 
power changed the structure of the industry; as can be seen 
from Table II.6 , the public sector share increased from 38% 
to 95.4% between 1951-1971. The share of the public sector 
in the total installed capacity increased over the period 
1971-86, while the share of the private sector in the total 
installed capacity decreased till 1982. However after 1982 
it increased only marginally. It was in this period that 
the of captive power plants (i.e. generating capacity owned 
by the individual consumers either to support their own 
electricity demand (KWH) or as standby capacity in case of 
power cuts) emerged due to the increasing unreliability of 
power supply by the utilities. Also in this period the 
share of the private sector in total generation was higher 
than its share in the total installed capacity.
Despite the rapid progress in the post Independence 
period, electricity was still provided by a large number of 
small and very old plants. They were operating at a low 
fuel efficiency and were inadequately interconnected. The 
growth of generation depends upon the capacity planned and 
installed in the past. Capacity in the period 1951-1971 
increased by 11% per annum but the problems of increasing 
electricity supplies were great. By contrast, in the period 
1971-86, the installed capacity increased at only 8.4% per 
annum.
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Table II.6
Capacity and generation by ownership and their respective share in the total.
Year
1
Public Sector
I.C
KW.
2
Gen.
GWH^.
3
Private sector
I.C
MW.
4
Gen.
GWB.
5
Total
I.C
MW.
6
Gen.
GWB.
7
1951 698.3 2,457.8 1,131.1 3,400.5 1,835.4 5,®
% Share 38.0 41.9 61.9 58.04
1954 1,209.5 3,390.0 1,284.4 4,131.8 2,493.9 7^
% Share 48.5 45.1 51.5 54.93
1958 2,216.2 7,982.9 1,295.4 5,011.0 3,511.6 ]2^
% Share 63.1 61.4 36.8 38.6
1962 4,305.6 16,070.4 1,474.2 6,294.7 5,779.8 2^
% Share 74.5 71.8 25.5 28.14
1966 8,677.6 30,675.9 1,571.5 5,701.7 10,189.1 35^
% Share 85.1 84.3 14.8 15.7
1970 13,221.4 49,561.8 1,487.6 6,265.8 14,708.9
% Share 89.9 88.8 10.1 11.22
1971 13,768.9 53,990.7 1,485.5 6,934.9 15,254.4 63,90S
% Share 90.3 88.6 9.7 11.4
1974 16,067 63,460 1,289 6,102.0 17,356.0 ffi,5S
% Share 92.6 91.2 7.4 8.77
1978 25,291.2 95,637.4 1,388.9 6,885.3 26,680.0 123
% Share 94.8 93.3 5.2 6.71
1982 33,959.1 124,377 144.2 7,004.2 35,363.0 B13
% Share 96.1 94.7 3.9 5.33
1986 44,603.8 160,347 2,165.2 10,003.1 46,769.0
% Share 95.4 94.1 4.6 5.88
1; GWfl = Million KWH. Source: Public Electricity Supply: All India Statistics. Ministry of 
Irrigation and Power, Yearly Publication for the Years 1950-51 to 1986-87.
Plant Mix:
Due to the change in ownership and control after 
Independence, there was change in the plant mix of the 
capacity. The share of the hydro-electric plants increased 
(though at a lower rate than the coal-based plants) until 
1963 and then decreased. The share of oil-based plants 
decreased from 9.1% to 1.5%. In the late 1960s gas based 
and nuclear plants were introduced. The government 
successfully discouraged the expensive oil-based plants, 
but at the same time failed to achieve the cost advantage 
from the hydro-electric plants due to capital shortages.
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The private sector's share of coal-based plant capacity was 
slowly taken over by the public sector, whereas the private 
sector's share in the oil-based plants increased till 1965- 
66 and then decreased. In the case of hydro-electric plants 
the installed capacity in the private sector increased from 
253.44 MW to 277.51 MW during the period 1951-71. Nuclear 
and gas based plants were in the public sector from the 
beginning.
As can be seen from Table II.7, the share of hydro­
electric capacity continued to decrease after 1971.
Table n.7
Plant Nix; i.e., installed capacity in HW by prime-mover.
Year Total Hydro- Coal Oil Gas Ndsar
1951 1,835 575 1,097.6 162.7 - -
% Share 31.3 59.8 8.9
1954 2,494 793 1,491.0 209.6 - -
% Share 31.8 59.8 8.4
1958 3,612 1,362 1,879.6 270.2 - -
% Share 38.8 53.5 7.7
1962 5,780 2,916 2,536.3 327.2 - -
% Share 50.5 43.9 5.7
1966 10,189 4,782 4,941.5 331.7 134.0 -
% Share 46.9 48.5 3.3 1.31
1970 14,709 6,383 7,508.2 229.5 168 420
% Share 43.4 51.1 1.5 1.14 25
1974 17,356 7,279 9,000.0 237.0 200 640
% Share 41.9 51.8 1.4 1.2 3.7
1978 26,680 10,833 14,874.9 164.1 168 640
% Share 40.6 55.7 0.615 0.62 239
1982 35,363 13,056 20,712.2 176.2 559.0 860
% Share 36.9 58.6 0.4 1.6 m
1986 46,769 15,472 28,808.6 180.3 978.5 1,3300
% Share 33.1 61.6 0.4 2.1 25
Source: Public Electricity Supply? All India Statistics, years 1950-51 to 1986-87. 
Note: - represents zero.
The share of oil-based plants also decreased as a direct 
effect of the disturbance in the balance of payments due to 
the oil crisis in the early seventies. The supply options 
have raised certain issues in planning. First, because of
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their long gestation lags and high capital requirements, 
hydro-electric options in the past have been overridden by 
coal plants. However, according to the National Power Plan, 
hydro-electric power will come back in a big way replacing 
coal plants. Earlier, as we have seen, the contribution of 
hydro-electric plants in total electricity generation was 
much higher. Secondly, there has been a considerable 
difference of opinion amongst government officials 
regarding the environmental effects of hydro-electric 
projects. Thirdly, the pace of hydro-electric power 
development was affected by inter-state disputes regarding 
their share in energy generation using the water of the 
river that passes through more than one state, political 
interference and technological hang-up on multi-purpose 
river valley systems. The grid on the regional basis helped 
in balancing the plant mix at least within each region.
Though at the all-India level, we find a balance 
between coal-based and hydro-electric plants, this may be 
due to the aggregation of installed capacity of individual 
states. The individual state supply systems were not inter­
connected, and it is important to observe the optimality 
of the plant mix at the state level. In planning the 
expansion of the electricity system, the choice between 
different plants would be partly determined by the 
availability of the resources and the capital. In a vast 
country like India, the states are not all similarly 
endowed with natural resources. The southern part of India 
has more water resources whereas the eastern part of India 
has coal mines. The western part of India is dependent on 
coal from the east. Thus, we find that southern states like 
Kerala depend upon hydro-electric plants. This system, in 
the absence of interconnection, is inadequate when it comes 
to responding to certain problems, as in the case of a bad 
monsoon.
The selection of an appropriate plant mix is best
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discussed in the context of the annual load duration curve 
(LDC) for a system. For example, in the LDC shown in Figure
II.1, the hourly megawatt demand of the system is plotted 
against the number of hours of the year during which this 
level of demand is equalled or exceeded. The peak demand MW 
occurs only over a short period of time. Since the average 
level of megawatt demand — that is, the total energy in 
megawatt-hours or area under the LDC curve divided by 8,760 
hours—  is less than the peak demand, the load factor will 
be less than unity.
For simplicity, only two kinds of generating units are 
considered; gas turbines and base-load coal plants. The 
relevant characteristics of both these types of machines 
are shown by the solid lines in the upper diagram of Figure
II. 1, which is a linearised graph of the total average cost 
per megawatt of installed capacity, that is capital cost 
plus operating cost, plotted as a function of the numbers 
of hours of operation. Gas turbines have lower capital 
costs represented by the intercept a^ , which is the 
investment cost of a megawatt annuitized over the lifetime 
of the machine. They have higher fuel costs then coal 
plants, as indicated by the slope b^  of the operating cost 
curve.
First, consider the problem of determining the amounts 
of new gas turbine and coal-based plant capacity that must 
be built to meet the given load. From the economic point of 
view, gas turbines are more expensive than base-load units 
if they are to be used more than H hours a year.
This essentially static picture is only illustrative, 
because the relevant streams of present discounted 
investment and the operating costs of the machines would 
have to be compared over many years.
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Figure II.1 Types of generating plants needed to meet the 
annual load duration curve.
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To pursue this further, the lower diagram indicates that it 
would be economical to serve the bottom Xz megawatts (the 
base load) with coal-based plants and the upper megawatts 
(the peak load) with gas turbines. A reserve margin may be 
included if necessary. Thus, planning an expansion of 
electric system is done in such a manner that gas turbines 
are to be used only for a short time of the year, whereas 
the coal-based plants (or any other plants designed to meet 
the base-load e.g., nuclear) are to be used for a long time 
of the year.
II.5.1 Intensity of plant use measured by different 
parameters.
Generally intensity of plant use is measured by 
average capability, load factor, or plant factor. And we 
shall discuss to what extent they reveal the technical 
efficiency of the plant.
Also, the plant factor, load factor and average
capability are related to each other and we shall observe
the relationship between them.
Average capability.
Average capability is measured in terms of KWH 
generated per KW of installed capacity. The average
capability of private sector plants measured in terms of.
units generated per unit of installed capacity in the 
period 1951-71 was generally equal to or higher than the 
public sector plants irrespective of the prime-mover used. 
Average capability continued to be higher in the private 
sector than in the public sector in the period 1971-1986. 
This could be because the responsibility for dealing with | 
the changes in the power demand, the low agricultural load 
and the high transmission and distribution losses fell on 
the public sector and not on the private sector.
As we have discussed in the section on plant mix, 
there would be some plants like gas turbines that are meant
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to be used for a short period of time in the year, we would 
not expect the average capability of gas turbines to be as 
high as the average capability of coal-based plants. In 
order to know the utilisation of the plants, we need to 
compare the actual average capability with planned average 
capability of the plant. It is quite likely that the hydro­
electric plants in one state of India (for example Kerala) 
have higher capability than the hydro-electric plants in 
another state (for example Bihar). But this would not mean 
that the hydro-electric plants in Kerala are more efficient 
technically than the hydro-electric plants in Bihar. 
Instead it is quite likely that in Kerala the hydro­
electric plants are designed to meet base-load of the 
system, whereas the hydro-electric plants in Bihar are 
designed to meet the peak. Thus, without being aware of the 
planned average capability one can not say much about 
average capability as a measure of utilisation of plants. 
Load Factor.
Unlike the case of gas or water, electricity cannot be 
stored economically in appreciable quantities. The quantity 
of electricity demanded determines what is generated at any 
one time, so the load factor on a power system will 
generally be the load factor of the demand. The relation 
between the level of the maximum demand (KW) reached at any 
one time and the actual sales during a given time period is 
the load factor of the system: the higher the load factor 
the shorter the period of idle capacity for the system.
In its simplest form "Load Factor" may be defined as 
the ratio of average load to maximum load. The value of 
this ratio may be expressed either as a decimal fraction or 
as a percentage, and of course, can never exceed 1.0 or 
100%. If u represents the number of KWH supplied during a 
time of t hours, and if M is the maximum demand in KW 
during the same time then.
Load Factor = L = u/(t * M)
65
The conception of load factor can have various 
applications. It can be reckoned for a complete supply 
system, for a composite class of consumers or for an 
individual; also for a single item of equipment.
Generally, the higher the load factor the better the 
plants are utilised. Plants can be utilised better only 
when there is an optimum level of demand (KW) prevailing 
throughout the 24 hour period of the day. In any system, a 
very high maximum demand (KW) for a very short time would 
not lead to better utilisation of plants. As noted earlier, 
pricing is one of the important instruments to manage 
demand (KW) in an efficient manner. Efficient pricing 
policy can avoid a situation of high maximum demand (KW) 
for a short period in any system and thereby can also 
improve the load factor of the system.
But is "load factor" a good measure of plant 
utilisation? As discussed earlier, it is quite obvious that 
the plant mix is designed in such a manner that some plants 
have high load factors and some have low load factors. 
Hence, the comparison between the planned load factors and 
the load factors experienced can give us some idea about 
plant utilisation.
Plant Factor.
Plant factor is a measure of the degree of 
utilisation of a piece of plant or equipment which is. 
Plant Factor = (Demand Factor * Load Factor)/100 
It can be defined as,
P = U / (t * C)
Where,
U = number of KW supplied, 
t = time period,
C = capacity of the plant,
(Time period t is taken the same for U and C).
It follows that if the plant is loaded to its full 
capacity then the capacity of the plant becomes equal to
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the maximum demand (KW) i.e.C = M, and the load factor and 
the plant factor become identical.
Sometimes one hears of the plant factors exceeding 
100%. This is really due to a confusion of terms relating 
to plant ratings. A plant may have a continuous maximum 
ratings and also a short term overload rating. If the value 
chosen for C in the above formula for the plant factor is 
taken as the continuous maximum rating then it would not be 
impossible for plant factors to exceed 100% by drawing on 
the overload capacity of the plant; but if C is defined as 
the true maximum output of which the plant is ever capable, 
then the plant factor would never exceed 100%.
Lower values of plant factor would imply that during 
at least part of the time, some of the available plant 
capacity is idle. Hence, from an economic standpoint it is 
desirable that the plant factor should be as high as 
possible. Nevertheless, despite the economic value of 
having very high plant factors there are practical limits 
to what is desirable. For security of supply, it is 
essential that an enterprise retain a margin of generating 
capacity, either as standby, or to cover the needs of plant 
maintenance and unforeseen breakdown.
Table II.8
Plant load factor by prime-mover; (in percentage).
Year Coal Hydro- Oil Gas Nuclear
1951 56.8 89.4 41.38 - -
1954 55.85 89.64 38.69 - -
1958 68.15 85.6 35.64 - -
1962 77.85 87.1 36.71 - -
1966 81.55 84.84 63.18 - -
1970 77.68 95.49 51.86 38.75 100.0
1971 79.37 98.53 55.89 44.87 96.6
1974 89.13 93.85 39.46 48.65 83.12
1978 73.78 95.2 45.27 52.67 90.0
1980 79.51 96.22 44.77 72.26 84.88
Source: Calculated from the data available in Public Electricity Supply: All India Statistics. For 
the years 1950-51 to 1979-80.
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Hence plant factors should therefore be as high as possible 
consistent with the needs for spare capacity. The plant 
factors by prime-mover in all-India can be observed from 
the Table II.8 . The plant factor for the hydro-electric 
plants has been the highest of all, except in 1970. 
Comparing the plant load factor of hydro-electric plants 
with the plant load factor of coal-based plants, one may 
gather that the hydro-electric plants are highly utilised. 
But hydro-electric generation being the cheapest mode of 
generating electricity, the hydro-electric plants were 
planned to be utilised the most, subject to water 
availability. Thus, it is important to compare the planned 
plant load factors with the observed plant load factors.
Due to the non-availability of the data regarding peak 
load by prime-mover after 1980, it is not possible to 
calculate the plant factor and the load factor after 
1 9 8 0 . The rise in the peak demand (KW) was much faster 
than the rise in the electricity demand (KWH) and the 
supply system failed to increase the capacity to fulfil the 
fast rising peak demand (KW).
The annual reports of Central Electricity Authority 
named Public Electricity Supply: All India Statistics;
stopped publishing data on peak load (i.e., maximum demand) 
after 1980. There could be two possible reasons. The first 
reason is a technical one. The movement towards the
National Grid led to technical difficulty in recording the
simultaneous maximum demand for individual plants in
different regions. The second, administrative reason is 
that the peak load in the system was growing much faster 
after 1973 and it became increasingly difficult for the 
electric supply system to fulfil the maximum demand. Hence, 
the electricity authorities considered the peak load of the 
system as the one that the supply authority could fulfil 
ignoring the level that actually would have prevailed in 
the system, if supplies were available. They continued 
publishing such a "restricted peak load" in some years 
after 1973 till 1980. But after 1980 the electricity supply 
authority stopped publishing the peak load.
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Utilisation.
After 1955, there was a major shift towards 
electricity consumption in industries. The investment in 
creating the installed capacity by the government was 
growing and in order to utilise the additional capacity, 
electricity consumption was promoted. The comparative 
advantage of electricity over other sources of energy 
encouraged innovation in its uses and the cost advantage of 
using electricity compared to other fuels further 
encouraged industrialists to put these ideas into practice.
Overall electricity consumption grew at about 12.24% 
per annum between the period 1951-71, with the electricity 
sales to industries increasing by 12.7% per annum and to 
agriculture at 17.24% per annum. Industries were the major 
electricity consumer group. The share of industrial 
consumption of electricity in the total demand (KWH) grew 
sharply in the 1950s and until 1966 mainly due to three 
reasons, a) new industries had electricity intensive 
technology, b) the growth of the existing electricity 
intensive industries was faster and c) there were many 
industries switching over to electricity as their source of 
power. Though its share was small, the agricultural demand 
(KWH) for electricity was growing at a much faster rate, 
mainly due to the rural electrification programmes. Thus, 
in this period agriculture emerged as an important consumer 
of electricity. The data on electricity consumption by 
different consumer groups in the period 1951-86 are 
presented in Table II.9.
From the reports I gathered that the total sales for 
electricity between the period 1971-1986 increased at 7.2% 
per annum, electricity sales to industries grew at 5.7% per 
annum and sales to agriculture at 10.5% per annum. The 
shares of the domestic and agricultural sectors have been 
increasing during the period after 1971, while the 
industrial share was decreasing. According to a study by
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the Advisory Board on Energy in 1985, drastic changes are 
anticipated by the year 2004-05, putting industrial demand 
(KWH) back to more than 60% and reducing agriculture's 
share to less than 10%. These shifts are to be evaluated 
against the possibilities of inter-fuel substitutions in 
these sectors.
Table II.9
Pattern of utilisation.
[Energy consumption by category of the consumers measured in terms of GWH (i.e. Million KWH)],
Year Dorn- 1Comm- Traction Agri. Indus. Others Total
1951 595.0 331.5 329.6 203.0 3,054.7 279.5 4,793.3
% 12.4 6.9 6.9 4.3 63.7 5.8
1954 759.2 446.1 378.4 231.4 4,075.9 361.4 6,252.5
% 12.1 7.1 6.1 3.7 65.2 5.8
1958 1,093.6 609.8 423.3 544.6 6,166.8 507.0 9,345.2
% 11.7 6.5 4.5 6.0 66.0 5.4
1962 1,698.1 934.1 584.8 911.1 11,545.6 695.2 16,448.3
% 10.3 5.7 3.6 6.0 70.2 4.2
1966 2,355.1 1,650.1 1,057.3 1,891.8 18,875.9 904.7 26,734.9
% 8.8 6.2 4.0 7.1 70.6 3.3
1970 3,491.0 2,333.3 1,448.1 3,774.1 23,878.7 1,636.3 50,246.4
% 8.6 5.7 3.5 9.2 69.1 3.9
1974 4,644.6 2,987.5 1,530.7 6,310.2 32,481.4 2,292.0 69,255.0
% 9.2 6.0 3.0 12.6 64.6 4.6
1978 6,821.3 4,427.6 2,296.8 10,107.4 42,635.2 2,966.8 90,245.3
% 9.8 6.4 3.3 14.6 61.6 4.3
1982 11,439.2 5,194.4 2,504.7 15,201.2 53,063.8 3,841.6 122,999.3
% 11.6 5.7 2.8 16.8 58.8 4.3
1986 17,257.8 7,290.1 3,182.1 23,421.9 66,980.0 4,967.2 123,098.3
% 14.0 5.9 2.5 19.0 54.5 4.0
Source: Public Electricity Supply: All India Statistics. Central Electricity Authority, Ministry 
of Irrigation and Power, (Power wing). Government of India, New Delhi, Years: 1950-51 to 1985-86.
Since the commercial fuels can not be substituted in the 
industrial sector, their share in the total electricity 
consumption may not decrease after a certain level. But if 
the renewable energy sources (e.g. tidal, solar, wind, geo­
thermal energy, energy from biogas) become economically 
viable, they can substitute for the electricity consumption
70
by the agricultural c o n s u m e r s . Thus, even if the 
percentage share of electricity consumption by the 
agricultural sector were to decrease over a period of time 
(i.e, electricity intensity in agriculture sector), it is 
not necessary that the energy intensity would also 
decrease.
The growth-rates of the total and sectoral consumption 
of electricity were less in the period after 1971. The 
sales (on the basis of which the above mentioned growth- 
rates were calculated) were less than demand (KWH) but we 
do not know the level of the unrestricted demand (KWH). 
There have been restrictions of three kinds: firstly,
restrictions by the cutting-off of supplies during periods 
of excess demand (KW); secondly, restrictions in the form 
of limitations on the amount of electricity that might be 
taken by a connected customer; thirdly, restrictions in the 
form of refusals of applications for connection. It is very 
clear that in recent years the limitations of electricity 
supply have not only caused interruptions from time to time 
to industrial production but also have involved refusals of 
electricity supply which, if available, would have made 
possible a greater increase in industrial production.
It is not easy to measure the extent of the present 
shortfall of electricity supply, but that it existed over 
this recent period, there can be no question. The shortage 
of power can be observed from the reports published by the 
Ministry of Irrigation and Power. These annual surveys
For example in State of Gujarat there are villages 
like Mandvi, which is "adopted" by an industry and 
investments have been made in that village by the parent 
industry to experiment on solar, wind and gobar gas plants 
to "electrify" the village. Thus, though Mandvi is not 
connected by Gujarat Electricity Board, the activities like 
cooking, and irrigation using a pumpset have become energy 
intensive. Also, the energy generated using the renewable 
sources like the wind and solar, is used for domestic and 
street lighting purpose.
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report the installed capacity, peak load, capability, 
energy availability and energy requirement for each region 
and the state. Footnotes in the table reveal that 
particularly after 1972, the data on peak load reflects the 
restricted peak load. Also the data regarding the energy 
requirement are restricted and were the same as energy 
availability.
Thus one of the main features of electricity industry 
in India was power cuts particularly after 1972-73. Though 
the organisation of the industry became more structured 
after Independence, the power shortages became a pre­
dominant feature. Hence, the available data on electricity 
demand (KWH) or energy requirement do not reflect the 
'demand' in economic sense. Neither it reflect electricity 
consumption since electricity consumption in true sense 
includes stolen electricity as well. Therefore I would 
prefer to call the available data on electricity demand 
(KWH) 'electricity sales'.
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SECTION II; ELECTRICITY DEMAND ANALYSIS.
Introduction
Section II reviews the literature on demand analysis 
and analyses the electricity demand at the All-India level 
for the period 1947-86. The disparity in most of the 
variables affecting electricity demand over different 
regions in India emphasised the need to study electricity 
demand at the disaggregate level. Hence, electricity demand 
is analysed at the state-level for the period 1961-86. An, 
attempt is made in this section to apply economic theory] 
and econometric principles to historical data.
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CHAPTER III
ELECTRICITY DEMAND ANALYSIS; THE LITERATURE.
111.1 Explanatory models for elecbrici-by demand.
Electricity does not yield utility in itself, but
rather is desired as an input into other processes that do 
yield utility. (These processes could be productive or 
service, for example industrial and domestic consumption of 
electricity). These processes utilise a capital stock of 
some durability and electricity provides the energy input. 
The demand for electricity is thus a derived demand. The 
demand for electricity may therefore be thought of as the 
derived result of a three stage process: 1) the decision to 
purchase energy-using equipment; 2) the related choice 
(where one exists) between electrically powered or 
otherwise- operated equipment; and 3) the decision as to 
how intensively equipment is used.
111.1.1 Measuring the price of electricity.
The typical electricity price schedule could be a 
declining block tariff which implies a declining marginal 
price as the quantity of electric power consumed increases. 
Or it could be an increasing block tariff which implies 
increasing marginal price as the quantity of electric power 
consumed increases. Because monthly electric power 
consumption varies due to a variety of factors —  including 
climate changes, alterations in the intensity of equipment 
usage, and changes in equipment stock —  any individual 
consumer may pay two or more different marginal prices for 
electric power during the course of a given year. In 
practice, most electricity demand studies have measured the 
price of electricity by either of two common methods: (1) 
average revenue calculated by taking the ratio of total 
revenues to total sales; or (2) Typical electricity bills 
incurred by the consumer. Both of these methods reflect the
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electricity price per unit to a consumer. They both include 
certain taxes collected by utilities. But the first one may 
exclude the taxes levied by the Government and to that 
extent it understates the marginal price to the consumer. 
In a time-series analysis, this may not substantially 
affect the results since tax rates (over and above the tax 
by the electric utility) tend to remain stable over time. 
However, in a cross-section analysis, this could cause 
significant bias to the extent that such taxes vary 
regionally. In addition, each of the two measures contain 
other biases.
As we shall see later, average revenue has been the 
most frequently used electricity price measure because of 
its simplicity and ease of calculation. The typical 
electricity bill price measure is an average price for a 
specified level of electricity usage —  not a marginal 
price.
Economic research on electricity demand analysis so 
far clearly indicates that electricity demand contains a 
number of factors that have proved singularly difficult to 
model. The main problem lies in the fact that the consumer 
of electricity does not face a single price, but rather a 
price schedule, from which electricity is purchased in 
blocks at a decreasing/increasing marginal price. It has 
been well known since the paper of Houthakker**^ that the 
presence of a price schedule has important econometric 
implications, but the literature has focused on the 
question of the type of price -marginal or average- that 
should be included in the demand function. That the price 
schedule has implications for the equilibrium of the 
consumer and therefore for the demand function itself - has
H.S. Houthakker, "Some Calculations of electricity 
consumption in Great Britain", Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society (A), Vol.114, Part.Ill, (1951), pp.351- 
371.
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not been systematically investigated.
The conventional view, since Houthakker's earlier 
work, is that a marginal price, not an average price, 
should be used in the demand function; the reason being 
that the consumer in achieving equilibrium equates benefits 
with cost at the margin. Also, there is the problem that 
when average price is defined ex-post as the total 
expenditure divided by quantity consumed, a negative 
dependence between quantity and price is established. 
Though the use of a marginal price for "the” price variable 
has some appeal, it only conveys part of the information 
required, for a single marginal price is relevant to the 
consumer's decision only when he is consuming in the block 
to which it attaches. It governs behaviour while the 
consumer is in that block, but it does not, in and of 
itself, determine why he consumes in that block.
In view of the foregoing, a simple procedure is to 
include both a marginal and average price as predictors in 
the demand function. However, both of these should be taken 
from the actual tariff schedule and not calculated ex-post. 
The marginal price should refer to the last block consumed 
while the average price should refer to the electricity 
consumed up to, but not including the final block. 
Alternatively, the total expenditure on electricity up to 
the final block can be used in place of the average price. 
In either case, the variable will measure the income effect 
arising from intra-marginal price changes, thus leaving the 
price effect to be measured by the marginal price. This 
method will cause bias in the estimate of price elasticity 
if average and marginal price are positively correlated 
which is likely to be the case.
Broadly classified, studies of the demand for 
electricity can be divided into those that analyse the 
consumers' equipment choice, and those which directly 
examine the consumers' consumption of electric power. The
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methodologies applied in these studies are of two types: 
cross-section analysis of one or several periods of time, 
and time-series models, many of which are autoregressive, 
incorporating lagged or previous values of consumption. The 
cross-section studies may help to estimate long-run effects 
if consumers have completely adjusted to the different 
local conditions with which they are faced and if the world 
is stable in the long-run. The autoregressive models have 
the advantage of separately estimating short-run or 
immediate demand responses as well as long-run or ultimate 
responses to changes in price or other independent 
variables. Since a time series of observations is required 
for the development of an autoregressive model, data 
limitation often dictate that the specification of the 
explanatory factors cannot be as extensive as in a cross- 
section study. This in turn, leads to an increase in the 
possibility of biased estimates.
Using Fisher and Kaysen's model/" L.D. Taylor**^ 
suggested the distinction between a short-run demand for 
electricity and long-run demand for electricity. The short- 
run is defined by the condition that the electricity 
consuming capital stock is fixed, while the long run takes 
capital stock as variable. In essence therefore, the short- 
run demand for electricity can be seen as arising from the 
choice of short-run utilisation rate of existing capital 
stock; while the long-run demand is tantamount to the 
demand for the capital stock itself.
Following Fisher and Kaysen;" Taylor assumed that the
** F.M. Fisher and C. Kaysen, A Study in Econometrics: 
The demand for electricity in U.S.. Amsterdam, North 
Holland Publishing Co., (Amsterdam, 1962).
L.D. Taylor, Demand for Electricity:A Survey. Study 
by the Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, 
(California, 1968).
F.M. Fisher and C. Kaysen, on.cit.
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stack— o-f electricity consuming capital goods could be 
measured in terms of the number of watts of electricity 
that the stock could potentially draw - he denoted this by 
s. If the amount of electricity consumed in the short run 
was measured in KWH, and if we denote the electricity 
demand in the short run by q and measured in kwh's, then:
q = u(x,7T,z)s................................(3.1)
where u(.) is the utilisation rate of s and is assumed to 
depend upon the level of income (x) the "price" of 
electricity (tt) and any other factors (economic, social or 
demographic) that might be relevant, denoted by (z).*^
In their framework, specifying the short-run demand 
function for electricity was thus specifying the form of 
the function u.
He assumed u to be given by,
U = CKo + CKiX + (KgTT + CK^ Z .................. (3.2)
u could also be specified as,
u = tto + ttilnx + ttalnTT + ojalnz ............ (3.3)
The short run demand function for electricity 
therefore became,
q = (ao + CXiX + ttaTT + naz)s ............ (3.4)
or,
q = (ûo + CKilnx + otalnTT + ût3lnz)s .........(3.5)
In the long run, it is assumed that assuming that the 
desired stock of electricity consuming capital goods (S) is
47 Among others things, z should include the price of 
natural gas.
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given by,
S = #o + BiX + 62^ + 03(r+6)p + 64Z .........(3.6)
(r) and (5) denote the market rate of interest and the rate 
of depreciation of the capital stock, respectively and (p) 
denotes the price per watt of additions to the capital 
stock, (z) was a vector of other relevant predictors.
The model thus stated that the desired stock of 
electricity consuming capital goods was a function of the 
level of income, the price of electricity, the user cost of 
the capital stock as represented by the term (r+6)p and any 
other factor that might be thought to be important. 
Certainly, the prices of energy substitutes and user costs 
of their associated capital stocks are important enough to 
be included.
Thus, the distinction between short-run and long-run 
demand for electricity was made clear.
III.1.2 Aggregation Problems.
The consumption data that are typically collected by 
electric utilities deviate from optimal demand measurements 
because they are generally aggregated over broad (e.g. 
monthly or annual) time periods. First, the aggregation of 
consumption over time suppresses valuable information. Most 
electricity demand studies have been concerned with 
determining the directions and magnitudes of the effects of 
the price of electricity, the price of the substitute 
fuels, and income on the annual level of consumption, 
rather than on the rate of consumption at a moment in time. 
Secondly, aggregation conceals the full extent of factor 
variation in that average values vary less than their 
individual components. To the extent that aggregation 
restricts the range of the underlying variable demand 
determinants, the reliability of projections derived from
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such data is reduced. The third problem stemming from 
excessive data aggregation is that the estimated 
elasticities will be misleading if individual consumer 
groups behave differently as demand factors change.
III.1.3 Model or functional form.
The choice of the form of the model with which to 
estimate demand may also cover up underlying differences in 
elasticities, which may be vital to an understanding of the 
full range of demand responses to rate structure design. 
With one exception, all of the studies reviewed in this 
Chapter have chosen a functional form of the estimating 
equation which imposes an important restriction on the 
nature of the demand on electric power. Specifically, this 
functional form assumes that the response of consumption to 
a change in one of the causal variables is the same over 
all ranges of value of the variable in question; this is 
referred to as the assumption of constant elasticities of 
demand. In the case of demand for electric power, the 
assumption implies that the percentage demand response to 
a ten percent increase in the price of electricity will be 
the same at a beginning price of ten paise per KWH as it 
would be at a beginning price of one paise per KWH. The 
assumption of constant elasticities may not be valid for 
many of the variables which affect the demand for electric 
power; this may be especially true for the price of 
electricity. Price elasticity is likely to be relatively 
high at low price levels and relatively low at high price 
levels. Similar variations may also characterise changes in 
the price elasticities of demand for electricity to operate 
other appliances and equipment that can be fuelled by 
alternative energy sources. Unless the variations (jumps in 
values) of the elasticities with respect to these several 
component uses just balance each other out (which is highly 
doubtful), then even aggregate studies of demand (e.g., on
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a statewide basis) may produce misleading estimates of the 
(aggregate) price responsiveness of demand.
III.1.4 Exclusion of Important Causal Variables.
To derive accurately the relationship between 
consumption and the price of electricity, other significant 
factors that cause demand for electric power to vary must 
be accounted for. Those factors which affect the non- 
residential demand include: (1) the price and availability 
of alternative fuels; (2) the prices of the inputs into the 
production process ; (3) the type of industrial and
commercial activity; (4) the level of output; and (5) other 
regional factors such as climate variables. Omission of an 
important causal variable will bias the estimate of price 
elasticity of demand if that variable is highly correlated 
with the price of electricity. This problem is often 
present in time-series analysis. For example, if one has to 
analyse the demand for electricity in United States, and if 
the effects of climate and income (or output) are ignored 
then the estimate of demand elasticity will probably be too 
high. In addition the estimated elasticity may also include 
some reduced consumption which was due to some unusually 
mild weather or the recession which followed in the wake of 
the Arab oil embargo. If, over a cross section of utility 
service areas, the price of electricity is positively 
correlated with income and industrial output levels, 
estimates of the price elasticity of demand, based on this 
cross-sectional data, would be biased downward. Reduced 
consumption of electric power in high price service areas 
would be partially offset by the higher income and output 
levels in those areas, thus camouflaging the true (and 
higher) demand response to changes in the price of 
electricity in all areas. Similarly if one has to analyse 
the electricity demand in India ignoring factors like the 
policy on rural electrification programmes and
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rainfall, it is likely that the agricultural demand for 
electricity may appear income inelastic i.e. there will be 
a downward bias in the income coefficient.
In short, elasticity is a measurement of the partial 
response of consumption to a change in one variable (e.g., 
price) when the values of all other variables are held 
constant. If other significant variables are not accounted 
for and are positively or inversely correlated with the 
variable in question, then that partial elasticity estimate 
will be biased either upward or downward. When this 
happens, elasticity estimates no longer indicate the effect 
of rate changes given probable values of the other causal 
factors.
A good demand study should capture several different 
causal factors of systemwide KWH demand as well as the 
interactive effect of some of these factors on total 
demand. Further, the response to electricity price changes 
may come through changes in the rate of utilisation of 
electricity-using machinery and appliances, and in part 
may occur through the process of appliance and machinery 
stock adjustments to permit fuel substitution; these 
responses (or elasticities) also need to be measured. 
Finally (though this hardly exhausts the list of possible 
factors), the model should identify any time variation in 
these responses which the data permit.
III.2 Literature Review.
III.2.1 Studies prior to 1972.
In any electricity supply system electricity is 
demanded by different consumers, either for lighting in the 
house, or for lighting and air conditioning the office, or 
it can be used as a fuel in the production process. Thus 
the demand for electricity can be categorised on the basis 
of its uses: for example, domestic/residential demand.
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commercial demand, industrial demand, agricultural demand 
and so on. In the literature we find different studies 
focusing on the issues of individual categories.
Taken as a whole the existing body of studies deals 
with each of these dimensions of electric power demand, 
though with considerably different degrees of frequency, 
completeness and success. In this section an attempt is 
made to synthesise the findings with respect to each of 
these important dimensions.
Fisher . and Kaysen's monograph*® is a standard 
reference on the demand for electric power in the United 
States. They analysed industrial demand as well as 
residential demand and were the first to distinguish 
explicitly, for residential demand, between the short run 
and the long run. They were also first to utilise the 
extensive data on electricity consumption that were 
regularly collected by the Federal Power Commission and 
published by the Edison Electric Institute. According to 
them, electricity played a double role as an input in the 
production of almost every good. They thought that, with a 
given size of industrial plant, electricity input had a 
fixed and a variable component. The intensity of 
electricity used for lighting of the plant, sometimes for 
heating and for other minor uses did not vary with the size 
of the plant's output, though this was just an 
approximation since overtime work and extra shifts required 
more electricity when the plants' output became unusually 
large; and at zero output the lights were turned off. 
Nevertheless, for normal operations the intensity of use of 
electricity for such purpose was considered relatively 
constant. But electricity required by industries to use 
various machines, and in some industries for electro­
chemical processes, varied with output.
F.M. Fisher and C. Kaysen, O D . c i t .
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With this background they tried to model electricity 
demand for industrial use, by fitting functions of the 
form.
Dit “ A.1 + BiXit + Uit .....«..........(3.7)
where,
Dit = total electricity used by the i^ industrial
establishment,
Xit = the total output of that plant,
Ai and Bi are constant parameters and Uit is a random 
disturbance with the usual properties.
They found this analysis to be incomplete since it 
ignored the effect of the electricity price on output size 
and on the composition of output among various products. 
They tried to overcome the problem of aggregation over 
products of multi-product firms and felt the need to look 
at fairly broadly defined commodity groups. They also 
considered the problem of valuation arising from the 
industrial establishment having its own generating
equipment: which was the result of a rise in the price of 
public electricity supply. After considering these issues, 
they tried to study the electricity demand for a single 
establishment using the following model:
Di. = A,+Bi(Xit +U.t .............. (3.8)
where,
Dit is understood to mean all electricity used by the i^ 
establishment (i.e., self generated and the public supply). 
Pit - the real price of electricity to the establishment, 
Xit = output index,
TTi is a parameter.
They extended the above model to a set of
establishments, I. They considered the minimum size of
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plant -minimum Ai- in all the data on plants with the same 
technology and products. They thought of I as consisting of 
many plants of this size; that number at time t denoted as 
Nit and taking minimum Ai = A; for all establishments in I, 
they derived,
Dit = NitA + BXitPit' +Uit  (3.9)
where, (all summations being over all i in I),
Dit — ZDit ? B = Bi ,
Xit ~ ZXit ; tt =  7T^ ,
Uit = SUit/* Pit = Pit for all i in I.
Allowing the capacity output of the minimum size plant 
be X and the capacity output of I at time t be Xit then.
Nit = Xit/ X,
With fixed technology (i.e., fixed B and fixed Ai for 
given plant size); the long-run demand function for 
electricity from I would be:
Dit = (A/x + BPit") Xit + Uit .......... (3.10)
as capacity could be adjusted to output in long run (so 
that Xit = ^ it) •
But changes in technology were far more important in 
determining long-run electricity input requirements, they 
considered this problem extensively and thought that a non­
linear model was the best suited.
Dit = KX^ zt P V  + Vit ..................(3.11)
where,
K = constant,
Xit = index of output.
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a and 5 are parameters.
Price was taken as average cost per kilowatt hour of 
purchased electricity. The analysis was performed for two 
digit industries over the states for the year 1956.
There was a significant negative price effect in six 
out of ten industries, and a non-significantly negative 
effect in two more. Values of B were all positive and were 
significant in all but two industries. They found a to be 
non-significantly different from unity in seven industries 
and significantly different in the remaining three. They 
observed an elastic price effect in six industries.
A study by Baxter and Rees'*® focused on the industrial 
demand for electric power. The authors explicitly rejected 
the aggregate energy approach. This involved a two-stage 
procedure in which output was first related via a 
conventional production function to capital, labour and 
"energy" as inputs. Once the total input of energy was 
determined, this total was then allocated among the various 
fuels according to their relative prices. This approach of 
Baxter and Rees was to include the several fuels 
individually along with capital and labour as arguments in 
the production function.
In particular, Baxter and Rees considered alternative 
models, the first of which related output to capital, 
labour, oil, gas, coal and electricity. A Cobb-Douglas 
production function was assumed with no restrictions on the 
parameters. The desired demand function for electric power 
than took the form,
Xe = BoPx^^P^"...... ............... (3.12)
where,
R.E. Baxter and R. Rees, "Analysis of the Industrial 
demand for Electricity", Economic Journal. vol.78, (June 
1968), pp.277-298.
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X = electricity,
P o . . . . P e  = parametric prices,
Q denotes output.
The second model considered by Baxter and Rees laid 
emphasis on the effects of changes in fuel technology. In 
this model, electric power consumption was related to 
output and a surrogate for technology in place of input 
prices. Since during the period studied, most of the 
substitution in energy had been against coal, coal 
consumption was employed as the surrogate.
Finally, their third model was designed to test the 
hypothesis that there was a proportional relationship 
between changes in total output and in electricity 
consumption and that deviations from this relationship were 
explained by changes in relative prices and changes in 
labour and capital intensity. Thus, in this model it was 
assumed that,
Dt = T(y)Qt .......................... (3.13)
where,
Dt = measures electricity demand,
Qt = denotes output and
y = vector representing relative prices and labour and 
capital intensities.
Baxter and Rees fitted their models to 16 industry 
groups (most of them in manufacturing) for the United 
Kingdom; using 44 quarterly observations over the period 
1954 to 1964. Seasonal effects were allowed for through the 
use of dummy variables. The authors concluded that relative 
price changes were not unambiguously an important 
determinant of growth in industrial electricity 
consumption. The chief determinants were growth in output 
and changes in technology. Taken at face value, the results 
for the relative price variables suggested that in at least
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9 out of the 16 industry groups, price elasticity of demand 
was zero; in a further two it was relatively inelastic; and 
only in five, did there appear to be a marked 
responsiveness of demand to relative price changes. They 
avoided many of the aggregation problems that could occur 
if the variation in electric power use among different 
industry types was not accounted for. However, the authors 
themselves were careful to qualify their results, noting 
that poor data quality and statistical problems required 
that their estimated elasticities be considered as a first 
approximation only.
Mount, Chapman and Tyrrell^® (MCT) analysed both the 
short-run and long-run demand for electricity for three 
classes of consumers: residential, commercial and
industrial. Their procedure was to estimate a model, using 
a pooled cross-section and time-series data set consisting 
of annual observations on 47 contiguous states of U.S.A. 
from 1947 to 1970. This method allowed elasticities to vary 
both geographically (i.e. state to state; or region to 
region) and over time. They used an autoregressive model. 
The study was noteworthy primarily because it was the only 
one to use a functional form that allows for non-constant 
elasticities. The dependent variable, total quantity 
consumed, was explained by the average price of 
electricity, income, the lagged average price of gas, 
population, lagged price of appliances or machinery and 
nine regional dummy variables.
À major deficiency in MCT's study of residential 
demand for electricity was their use of average revenue as 
a measure of the price of electricity, without correcting 
for the simultaneity problem. Further bias was introduced
T.D. Mount, L.D. Chapman and T.J. Tyrrell, 
Electricity demand in the United States: An Econometric 
Analvsis, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL-NSF-49), Oak 
Ridge, (Tenn, June 1973).
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by their failure to include demographic and geographic 
variables as causal factors. Their commercial and 
industrial estimates should be considered as a rough 
approximation of the true elasticity values. In addition to 
the average revenue bias in the model, there were several 
other sources of error that hinder the interpretation of 
the derived results. First, the "commercial" and 
"industrial" classifications used by utilities were based 
on voltage and volume levels —  not on consumers' actual 
characteristics. Thus, a master-meter apartment building or 
an office building may be classified as an "industrial" 
customer and small manufacturing firms may pay "commercial" 
rates. Further, MCT's model was clearly mis-specifled. 
Income, which was used as a proxy for output, could not 
adequately capture the influence of output changes on 
electric power consumption, especially in the industrial 
sector. Furthermore, the price of gas was the only 
alternative fuel price included, and that was found not to 
be significant. Finally, because different industries had 
different power needs and because industry mix varies from 
state to state, there are severe aggregation and 
simultaneity biases in studies such as this, which 
aggregate across all industry types. For example, since 
power-intensive industries concentrate in regions where 
rates were low, average price elasticity from a cross 
section of all states would not be descriptive of actual 
conditions in any given state.
Anderson®^ analysed the producers' demand for energy 
by the U.S. primary metals industry. Anderson's analysis 
was based on the methodology of Fisher and Kaysen with some 
extensions. First, the study focused on the total 
producers' demand for energy, not just the demand for
K.P. Anderson, Residential Energy Use; An 
Econometric Analysis. The Rand Corporation, (R-1297-NSF), 
(October 1973).
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electric power. Second, allowance was made for quantity 
discounts in the purchase of energy inputs. Third, 
allowance was made for the effects of the supply equation 
on the demand equation. In addition to the direct effect on 
demand of the price of the input itself, allowance was made 
for the effects of competing or related input prices. The 
following demand function was used.
InE =tto tttilnPc H-cKzlnPk H-a^lnPo H-a^lnPe +aglnW ....(3.14) 
where,
E = (KWHs electricity purchased)/(value added),
Pc = price of coal,
Pk = price of electricity,
Po = price of heating oil,
Pe = price of gas,
W = average wage-rate of production workers in primary | 
metals.
Using cross-section data from 1958 and 1963, the 
result showed a substantial and highly significant negative 
price elasticity of demand.
Lyman's®^ study based on his doctoral dissertation in 
1973, analysed the demand for the three major consumer 
classes: residential, commercial and industrial. He used 
firm (as opposed to national) data and non-linear demand 
functions of the type considered by Box and Cox.®^ Still 
another innovation was the inclusion of an income variable 
describing the income distribution, which allowed for 
income and price elasticities to vary with the level of
“ R.À. Layman, Price elasticities in the electric 
power Industry. Department of Economics, University of 
Arizona, (Arizona, October, 1973).
G.E.P. Box and D.R. Cox, "An Analysis of 
Transformations", Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 
Series B, Vol.26, No.2, (1964), pp.211-243.
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income.
Lyman assumed that demand was related to a list of 
predictor variables as follows,
q = H(PE,PG,PI,M,Z,U) .................. (3.15)
where,
q = purchase of electricity per consumer,
PE = price of electricity,
PG = price of gas,
PI = index of other prices,
M = vector of economic and demographic variables,
Z = vector of climatic variables, 
u = random error term.
Lyman suggested a linear semi-logarithmic function for 
residential demand and a linear double-logarithmic function 
for commercial and industrial demand. He found that demand 
was typically price elastic for each of the consumer 
classes and for residential demand. He also found the 
income elasticity of residential demand weak in general and 
zero or negative in the southern regions. However, for most 
regions considered, the size of the income elasticity
varied inversely with the level of income.
III.2.2 Studies after 1973.
After 1973, in the literature of energy economics, the 
emphasis moved from electricity demand studies to that of 
the possibility of fuel substitution for different groups 
of consumers. The residential consumer group continued to 
be the most interesting one for the researchers and a long 
list of studies on residential demand for electricity can
be listed. But studies for the aggregate demand for
electricity, industrial demand for electricity and
agricultural demand for electricity were very few.
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McFadden et al.®“ parameterised a model in which three 
price measures were assumed to summarise the rate schedule 
faced by each household: (i) marginal price at an
intermediate consumption level; (ii) rate of decline of 
marginal price; (iii) average price. The model was fitted 
to monthly data on individual households using a stratified 
random sample of a survey of 3,249 households. The prices 
were determined from typical electric bill rates. Typical 
bill rates for 1975 at consumption levels of 100, 250, 750
and 1,000 KWH per month were collected for each city
occurring in the sample. The marginal price was defined to 
equal marginal price between typical electric bills at 500 
and 750 KWH per month. The rate of decline of marginal 
price was defined to equal marginal price between typical 
electric bills at 750 and 1,000 KWH per month, divided by 
marginal price between 500 and 750 KWH per month. The 
average price was defined as the measured average monthly 
consumption of the household, with cost obtained by linear 
interpolation between adjacent typical electric bills. 
Using about 1,600 cross-sectional units, a reasonable 
explanation of the demand for electricity was obtained (R* 
= 0.559). The price parameters possessed the correct,
negative sign, though the parameter on average price was 
not statistically significant.
The paper by Michael Murray, Robert Spann, Lawrence 
Pulley and Edward Beauvais^® presented a demand study of 
the Virginia Electric Power Company (VEPCO). Residential, 
commercial and industrial demands were analysed using
D. McFadden, C. Puig and D. Krishner, "Determinants 
of the long-run demand for electricity", Proceedings of the 
Business and Economic Statistics Section. Part 2, American 
Economic Association, (1977), pp.109-117.
P. Michael, Murray, Robert Spann, Lawrence Pulley 
and Edward Beauvais, "The demand for Electricity in 
Virginia", Review of Economics and Statistics. (November
1978), pp.585-600.
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monthly data from each of VEPCO's nine Virginia billing 
districts over the period 1958-1973. Seasonal variations in 
the kilowatt hour demand coefficients were permitted and 
the structure of VEPCO's monthly kilowatt peak demand was 
estimated to allow some conclusions to be drawn about 
VEPCO's peak load problems. The study gave more careful 
attention to the two-part tariff nature of commercial and 
industrial electricity price schedules. They tried to 
account for seasonal variation in demand coefficients, and 
for the dynamics of consumer demand. They integrated the 
analysis of kilowatt hour demand (KWH) with the analysis of 
the system wide kilowatt (KW) peak demand. Major 
conclusions were: both growth in income and growth in real 
price of electricity tend to induce load factor 
deterioration because the long run KWH demand income 
elasticity (about (0 .8)) and marginal price elasticities 
for both energy and demand charges (between -0.9 and -0.5 
and between -0.64 and -0.14 respectively) were less than 
the corresponding KW peak demand elasticities (about 1.27 
for income, -0.44 for energy charges and -0.08 for demand 
(KW) charges). This finding suggested that, in periods of 
rising real incomes and rising real electricity prices, 
electric utilities would increasingly feel the need for 
means, such as time of day pricing, to alleviate peak load 
problems. They also concluded that the prices of 
alternative fuels should be considered in forecasting 
electricity demand, since industrial customers seem 
responsive to these prices.
According to Studness®® both energy consumption and 
electricity demand in U.S. had been growing faster than 
real gross national product before 1973, but energy 
consumption had grown more slowly than real GNP since then.
Charles M. Studness, "Electric demand and aggregate 
U.S. energy consumption". Public Utilities Fortniahtlv, 
July 31, (U.S., 1980), pp.38-39.
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while electricity demand continued to grow more rapidly 
than real GNP. The continuing rise of electric generation's 
share of energy consumption stems from the structure of 
energy prices encouraging a shift to electricity usage, as 
electric rates had increased less since 1973 than the 
prices of other forms of energy.
L.D T a y l o r , n o t e d  a major shortcoming in the
econometric literature dealing with the residential demand 
for electricity, namely the failure to deal adequately with 
decreasing block pricing. Motivated by this comment, 
Timothy Roth®* made an attempt to estimate the residential 
demand function employing both average and marginal price. 
He found that the coefficient on marginal price was "right" 
and significant, that is he found the expected inverse
relationship between the quantity of electricity demanded 
and the marginal price it obtains. On the other hand, the 
positive sign on average price was counter-intuitive.
Because average price in that case was exactly the same 
concept as the intra-marginal payment, a change in average 
price is exactly same as a change in real income. The
positive sign on average price according to him implies 
that a reduction in real income (equivalent to an increase 
in average price) causes an increase in electricity demand; 
that is electricity is an inferior good. This result was 
anomalous because it contradicted most existing empirical 
studies of electricity demand, i.e., studies which show 
positive income elasticities.
L.D. Taylor, "The demand for Electricity: A Survey", 
Bell Journal of Economics, 6, (1975), pp.74-110.
®* T.P. Roth, "Average and Marginal Price changes and 
the demand for Electricity: An Econometric Study”, Applied 
Economics. V.3, (September 1981), pp.377-388.
94
Christopher Garbacz®^ criticised Roth's model. The 
model relied on strong assumptions i.e., "white goods" are 
fixed, the level of aggregation is appropriate and supply 
is given.
À study by Maddigan et al®° employed econometric 
modelling to estimate price elasticities and the pattern of 
inter-fuel substitution for the irrigation use of 
electricity. They used pooled U.S. state-level data for the 
period 1969-79. They assumed a log-linear form and the 
average-usage equation was specified as,
ln(E/N)jt= do +  CKiln(PE/I) jt + AzlnPKjt + o:3ln(PL/I) jt
+ CK^lnARIDjt + CKglnlPIjt + (ZeDjt + ®jt...... (3.16)
where,
j is state and t is year; t= 1969,...1979,
E = quantity of irrigation electricity sales (MKWH),
N = number of irrigation customers,
PE/I = average price of electricity in the irrigation 
sector deflated by the cost of living index I($/MKWH),
PK = interest rate on farm real estate debt (%),
PL/I = hourly wage rate of field workers PL, deflated by 
the cost of living index I($),
ARID = aridity index,
IPI = irrigation production index,
D = regional set of state dummy variables, 
e = disturbance term, and
do, to d6 are the parameters to be estimated.
The inclusion of the interest rate and the wage rate
C. Garbacz, "Electricity demand and the Elasticity 
of Intra-marginal Price", Applied Economics. V.15, n.5,
(October 1983), pp.699-701.
Ruth J. Maddigan, W.S. Chern and C.G. Rizy, "The 
irrigation demand for electricity", American Journal of 
Agriculture Economics. (November 1982), pp.673-680.
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reflected the fact that electricity is combined with 
equipment and labour as input factors for irrigation. 
According to the authors, in the selection of irrigation 
systems capital and electricity are substitutes. This 
relationship appears in the average-usage equation because 
new irrigation customers are added every year. Once the 
units are in place, however the equipment and energy 
combine to irrigate the fields. Equipment costs include 
depreciation and maintenance, which depend on the intensity 
of equipment use. It is an empirical question whether the 
net impact of these effects will result in a positive or 
negative value for Og.
This analysis of irrigation demand for electricity 
sheds light on one of the major components of energy demand 
in agriculture. This demand varies widely from region to 
region, reflecting the great diversity in natural 
conditions and farming practices across the United States. 
The empirical results highlighted the North-West as the 
region in which changing electricity prices will have the 
strongest immediate impact on demand because of its 
relatively high short-run price elasticity. The significant 
price elasticities estimated in this study imply that (a) 
the cost of electricity is a factor in determining the 
amount of irrigation employed and (b) farmers will conserve 
electricity should energy prices continue to increase.
Charles M. Studness*^ analysed the total electricity 
sales in U.S.A for the years 1952-82. He found that the 
estimates of the demand elasticity of real electric rates 
were about -0.6 in both the first difference and 
distributed lag regressors, although the two regression 
forms differed on how quickly demand responded to a change 
in electric rates. In the electricity estimates, the value
C.M. Studness, "The long term Outlook for electric 
demand". Public Utilities Fortnightly  ^ (September 15, 
1983), pp.47-48.
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of the coefficient for the real GNP variable was 0.4 in the 
first-difference regression, but 1.3 in the distributed lag 
regression. Despite the difference in the real GNP 
elasticity between the two regression equations, the demand 
growth implied by the two regression equations was similar 
over likely ranges of real GNP growth and real electricity 
rate changes. Specifically, the elasticity estimates and 
the constant term derived from both the first-difference 
and the distributed-lag regressions imply that electricity 
demand would grow between 4.5 and 5% per year if real GNP 
grows at 3% per year and electricity rates rise roughly 2% 
per year in real terms.
Sutherland*: examined the temporal stability of
electricity demand functions with distributed lags over the 
1961-80 period. Demand functions were estimated for 
residential, commercial and industrial sectors and tested 
for stability in the pre- and post- oil-embargo period. 
Most of the demand functions estimated were statistically 
unstable over these periods. Although a partial adjustment 
specification of the industrial demand equation appeared to 
be stable, the income, price, and cross elasticities were 
significantly different over the sub-periods for the 
residential and commercial demand equations.
A demand for electricity model was specified for 
sector j in general form as,
= f ( , GNP^ _i , PNGj^ _^^  , D1, D2 , D3 ) ...... (3.17)
where,
ECjt = electric consumption in sector j during time t,
PEjt = predicted average price of electricity in sector j 
during time t (in 1972 dollars).
*: R.J. Sutherland, "Instability of electricity demand 
functions in the post oil-embargo period". Energy 
Economics. (4 October 1983), pp.267-272.
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GNP = gross national product (in 1972 dollars),
PNGjt = price of natural gas in sector j during time t (in 
1972 dollars),
D1, D2, D3 = seasonal dummy variables.
The above equation is in general form but was 
estimated assuming a double log specification. Two-stage 
least-squares was used to purge the price variable of its 
correlation with the error term. The instrumental variables 
were total electric utility operating costs, the price of 
natural gas, GNP and the three seasonal dummy variables. A 
hat ( ^ ) is used on the price of electricity variable to 
denote that the predicted value from this equation was used 
as an instrumental variable. The Cochrane-Orcutt procedure 
was used to adjust for first-order serial correlation. In 
the subscript t-i, the i denoted the length of lag and it 
could differ for each independent variable.
The above equation was estimated with aggregate 
quarterly data. The sets of regression coefficients were 
examined for statistical stability over the pre-embargo and 
post-embargo sub-periods, and in general the models were 
estimated to be unstable over these periods. One 
implication of this result could be that the econometric 
models estimated with pre-embargo data are likely to be 
unreliable in the post-embargo period. Second, models 
estimated with data over the entire period are likely to be 
biased due to temporal changes in the parameters. The 
author suggested that the future econometric estimates of 
electricity demand functions should consider the stability 
of the model during the pre- and post-embargo period.
Gordon Spangler and Vincent P Wright®^ felt that 
forecasts offered by many economic analysts differ markedly 
in their assessment of future demand for electricity.
Gordon Spangler and Vincent P Wright, "Another look 
at growth in demand for electricity", Public Utilities 
Fortnicrhtly, (April 26, 1984), pp.25-26.
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Hence, they returned to a very basic model and analysed the 
relationship between electric power sales and the gross 
national product. Their analysis indicated that despite 
some structural changes in the U.S. economy, sales of 
electricity remain positively correlated to GNP, and 
consequently to industrial production. Moreover, the 
contribution of the goods-producing segment of the economy 
to GNP had diminished only slightly in recent decades, 
despite apparent growth of the service industries.
It is important to notice the difference in the 
problems of electricity demand in developed countries and 
developing countries. For example, the substitutes of 
electricity in some sectors of the economy are different in 
developing nations compared to developed nations. Also the 
effect of the oil crisis of the early 1970s would be 
different in developing countries compared to developed 
nations, since the effect of the oil crisis would directly 
depend upon the energy intensities of production processes 
and dependency on oil from OPEC countries. Unfortunately 
there are very few studies on electricity demand in 
developing nations.
Glenn D Westley®^ studied electricity demand in 
Paraguay. He analysed the residential and commercial demand 
for electricity in ten regions in Paraguay for 1970-77. 
Models that were both linear and nonlinear in the 
parameters were estimated. The non-linear model took 
advantage of prior information on the nature of the 
appliances being utilised and simultaneously dealt with the 
demand discontinuities due to appliance divisibility. Three 
dynamic equations, including a novel cumulative adjustment 
model, all indicated rapid adjustment to desired appliance 
stock levels. Also, the multiproduct surplus loss obtained
Glenn D. Westley, "Electricity demand in a 
developing country". Review of Economics and Statistics, 
(Netherlands), V.66, n.3, (August, 1984), pp.459-467.
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from an estimated demand equation was used to measure the 
welfare cost of power outages.
Van Helden, et al*^ estimated residential demand 
functions for electricity employing different price 
variables, and, in contradiction to Roth's®® findings of a 
positive coefficient on average price and a negative
coefficient on marginal price, they found the coefficients 
on average price were "right”: the negative signs reflected 
the expected inverse relationships between the quantity of 
electricity demanded and the average price. On the other 
hand, non-significant but positive signs on marginal price 
were obtained. Evidence was given for the inclusion of the
average price as the only price variable in the demand
function for electricity. After trying the model that
included both: average price and marginal price, they tried 
the model which eliminated the marginal price. This led to 
a model with highly significant parameters. Hence, it was 
preferred above the other model that included both average 
and marginal price, though the elimination of the marginal 
price variable gave a decrease in absolute value of the 
parameter on average price. It appeared that the parameter 
on average price in a model with average price as the only 
price variable was approximately equal to the sum of the 
parameters of the marginal price and the average price in 
a model containing these variables.
A Pouris®"^ examined the effects of price on the demand 
for electricity in South Africa over the period 1950-83. 
Emphasis was placed on estimation of the long-run own-price
®® Van Helden, G. Jan, Leaf Lang, S.H. Peter, Serker, 
Elmer, "Estimation of the Demand for Electricity", Applied 
Economics, V.19 n.l, (January 1987), pp.69-82.
®® Timothy P. Roth, op.cit.
®^  A. Pouris, "The price Elasticity of Electricity 
demand in South Africa" Applied Economics  ^ V.19, n.9,
(September 1987), pp.1269-1277.
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elasticity of electricity demand. An unconstrained
distributed lag model was used and the elasticity (over the 
period of 12 years) was estimated to be -0.90. More than 
70% of the electricity in South Africa was consumed by the 
industrial and mining sectors.
As we can observe from the above discussion of the 
studies in the period under study, emphasis was laid on the 
possibility of forecasting the long-term demand for
electricity rather than observing the effects of prices on 
electricity demand over the period. In the long term the 
distributed lagged models are deficient since the
environment keeps changing. For example, with increasing 
electricity prices, the omission of price from the set of 
determining variables will cause overestimation of the 
long-term demand by the model. Hence, even for forecasting 
purposes, models that exclude the price effects could be 
useful only under the restrictive assumptions of a stable 
or slowly changing environment.
III.3 Electricity demand analysis in India.
Electricity authorities in the developed countries 
carry out detailed studies of past demand for the purpose 
of load growth projections. Some of them resort to studying 
past demand in relation to other economic variables. In 
Italy, for example, the government authorities employ rates 
of increase in population and consumption per capita as the 
basis for demand forecasts.®® They also use input-output 
matrices for estimating the demand for electricity. In 
Belgium, simple econometric models are used to study the 
demand for electricity and the index of industrial output^ 
is considered an appropriate explanatory variable for this 
purpose.
®® Ralph Turvey and Dennis Anderson, Electricity 
Economics: Essavs and Case studies  ^ A World Bank
Publication, Second Edition, (Washington D.C., 1981).
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In contrast, except for some ad hoc attempts by 
government agencies connected with the electricity industry 
and planning, no serious efforts seem to have been made in 
India to link electricity demand to its own price, to the 
price of its substitutes like coal, oil, or gas, to income 
or to any other relevant economic variable. The Central 
Electricity Authority, Planning Commission, Ahemedabad 
Electric Company, Calcutta Electric Supply Company and such 
other bodies have conducted demand studies with a view to 
forecasting future load growth. The techniques adopted by 
them were generally simple and crude. A study of demand for 
energy in India has been conducted by the National Council 
of Applied Economic Research where projections on the basis 
of certain "norms" are given. The report of the Fuel Policy 
Committee®® of the government of India gave forecasts of 
demand for electricity at the all-India level for the years 
1978-79, 1983-84 and 1990-91, based on the end use
method. The Annual Power Surveys of the Central 
Electricity Authority are other government documents which 
give projections of power demand at the states and all 
India levels. The only academic attempt at the state level 
in India is that of Prof.Pachauri^^ who estimated 
econometric models of demand for electricity in Andhra 
Pradesh. A study by Nirmala Banerjee for the Calcutta 
Electricity Supply Company tried to observe the
Report of the Fuel Policy Committee. Ministry of 
Energy, Government of India, (New Delhi, 1974), Also Known 
as Chakravarty Committee report.
The end-use method breaks down demand for power into 
its component end uses, and then on the basis of norms for 
each one of the end-uses, the demand for the years to come 
is projected. It does not take into account the effects of 
prices and technological changes etc.
R.K.Pachauri, Energy and Economic Development in 
India. Praeger Publishers, (New York, 1977), pp.145-178.
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elasticities of demand for that particular r e g i o n . I n  
1980, P.P.Pillai studied the demand for electricity for 
Kerala for the period 1967-68 to 1977-78.^* These studies 
are all discussed in this section.
The Fuel Policy Committee^' was appointed by the
Government of India in 1974 with the objective of surveying 
fuel resources and the regional pattern of their 
distribution; studying the trends in exploitation and use 
of fuels; estimating demand by sectors (in particular the 
transport, industry, power generation industry and domestic 
fuel and by regions); and studying the efficiency of use of 
fuel.
A statistical regression of energy consumption on the 
activity levels of the economy as a whole and on the
sectoral level was attempted. A linear regression model 
relating energy from coal, oil, electricity and total 
commercial energy, to i) national income, ii) income for 
mining and manufacturing, and iii) the index of industrial 
production, was developed for the years 1953-54 through 
1970-71. A set of log-linear models was also developed.
It was found that there was significant correlation 
between total commercial energy and income from mining and 
manufacturing sectors and the index of industrial 
production. The regression of total commercial energy on
national income indicated that a high proportion of the
total variation in energy consumption could be explained by 
national income. The results with the log-linear model were 
not presented since the Committee found the results with
Nirmala Banerjee, Demand for Electricity. A 
monograph published for Centre for studies in social 
sciences, (Calcutta, 1979).
P.P. Pillai, Dynamics of Electricity Supply and 
Demand in Kerala-A macro econometric Analysis. Agricole 
Publishing Academy, (New Delhi, 1981).
Report of the Fuel Policy Committee, op.cit.
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linear models more reliable (in terms of R^ ) as compared to 
the results with the log-linear model. Some multiple 
regressions using national income, population and index of 
industrial production were also attempted. The results were 
not given, but it was mentioned that,
"... while the models explained the past trends 
slightly better; they could not be used for projection 
purposes.. .
Since the objective was to forecast, the restricted 
models were used and the effects of prices were completely 
ignored.
In 1979, the Government of India set up a Working 
group on Energy Policy’* in order to estimate the 
prospective energy demand in the different sectors of the 
economy and regions of the country by 1982-83 and a decade 
thereafter, to survey the prospective supplies of energy, 
to recommend measures for optimum use of available energy 
resources and to outline a national energy policy and a 
longer term conservation policy.
The Committee studied regression models correlating 
energy consumption with activity levels of the economy as 
a whole and in individual sectors. One of the aims of the 
Group was to forecast energy needs; therefore they examined 
various forecasting methods and models. During the 1970s 
the price of different energy forms had undergone a sea- 
change and the basic directions of technological 
innovations were re-examined. The Group felt that data 
relating to the past might not provide a reliable guide to 
the future. Therefore, they developed a two stage 
methodology wherein first, using the conventional 
methodologies, a Reference Level Forecast of energy demand
Ibid. , p.136.
Report of the Working Group on Energy Policy. 
Planning Commission, Government of India, (New Delhi,
1979).
104
was attempted. This was obtained by averaging the forecasts 
obtained by different methodologies. The second stage of 
the exercise was to set out the best level and composition 
of energy demand that could materialise if the policy 
prescriptions suggested by the Group were adopted and the 
assumptions made by the Group of the likely developments in 
the international energy system actually materialised.^' 
This was referred to as the Optimum Level Forecast.
The exercise showed that, with the adoption of policy 
prescriptions of the type suggested, it might be possible 
to achieve the same rate of economic growth with a 
substantially lower level of energy inputs.
The Committee on Power’® was appointed in 1980 by the 
Government of India in the Ministry of Energy with the 
objective "to examine all aspects of the functioning of 
State Electricity Boards and Central Organisations engaged 
in electricity generation transmission and distribution.
” The assumptions were, (i) The annual average 
compound growth of GDP was assumed to be 4.7% for the 
period 1977-78 to 1982-83, 5.5% for the period 1982-83 to 
1987-88, 6.0% for the period 1987-88 to 1992-93 and 6.0% 
for the period 1991-92 to 2000-01. (ii) The average annual 
compound rate of growth of agricultural sector was assumed 
to be 3.92% in the period 1982-87, 3.72% in the period
1987-92 and 3.93% in the period 1992-2000. Similarly the 
annual average compound rate of growth of industrial sector 
was assumed to be 6.81%, 7.23% and 7.23% for the respective 
periods. The growth of the transport sector was assumed to 
be 6.5%, 6 .8% and 6.72% per annum for the respective
periods. And the rest of the sectors were expected to grow 
at the annual average rate of 6.27%, 7.23% and 6.74% in the 
respective periods, (iii) The population was assumed to be
697.2 million in 1982-83, 760.5 million in 1987-88, 823.3 
million in 1992-93 and 920.9 million in 2000-01. (iv) The 
relative prices of different fuels were assumed to be of 
the same order as in 1978. (v) The rate of substitution of 
non-commercial fuels and animal energy by commercial fuels 
was assumed to follow the same trend in the future as in 
the past 25 years.
’® Report of the Committee on Power. Department of 
Power, Ministry of Energy, Government of India, (New Delhi,
1980), Also known as Rajadhyaksha Committee Report.
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including organisational structure, management practices, 
planning systems, efficiency of operations, financial 
performance, tariff structure and legislative framework and 
make recommendations for improving them.”’*
The report took into consideration the need for long­
term electricity demand forecasts for planning installed 
capacity in future. The Committee referred to the Annual 
Power Surveys for their forecasts®® The surveys are 
conducted by the Power Survey Committee which was set up by 
the Department of Power with representatives drawn from the 
power industry, consuming sectors and the Planning 
Commission, and the Power Survey Directorate of the Central 
Electricity Authority (CEA) acts as the secretariat for the 
Committee.
The methodology adopted for forecasting medium term 
electricity demand in the Annual Power Surveys has been 
modified from time to time, the present method is a 
combination of the end use®^ method and past trends for 
individual states. But here again the effects of factors 
like income and price on the demand in the past were not 
given any importance; rather the past trends of electricity 
consumption were extrapolated.
In their study®^ of May 1985, the Advisory Board on
’* Ibid. p.l.
®® The Annual Power Survev started in the early sixties 
by the Central Electricity Authority, Government of India, 
New Delhi, on the pattern of the semi Annual Power Surveys 
of Edison Electric Institute of the U.S.
®^ Please refer to footnote 70.
®^ Towards a perspective on Energy demand and supply in 
India in 2004/05, Advisory Board on Energy, Government of 
India, (New Delhi, May 1985).
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Energy*^ (ABE) in their made an attempt to project future 
energy consumption in four major sectors i.e., 1)
Household, 2) Agricultural, 3) Industrial, 4) Transport.
Their approach was to project demand for energy on the
basis of the likely developments in the factors affecting 
the demand for energy in each of the sectors. Here again 
price as one of the factors was neglected and the effects 
of electricity price on demand in the past was not
considered.
Professor Pachauri studied the domestic, commercial, 
industrial and agricultural sectors of Andhra Pradesh.** 
The models for each of the mentioned sectors within the 
Andhra Pradesh region were specified and estimated in two 
parts. The first related to the relationship between 
numbers of customers for electricity in each sector and the 
second to average consumption in kilowatt hours per 
customer in each of these sectors. Hence, the dependent 
variables regressed were numbers of customers and kilowatt 
hours per customer in each case against a number of 
alternative sets of independent variables. The models were 
estimated both in the simple linear and log-linear forms.
For the industrial sector, a first order 
autoregressive model was considered for the analysis of the 
number of industrial consumers, whereas the electricity 
demand by the industrial consumer group was considered to 
be a function of the electricity demand in the previous 
year as well as a time trend. The income and the price 
variables were not included as the variables affecting 
electricity sale to industrial consumers. Hence, income and 
price elasticities were not estimated.
*^ The Advisory Board on Energy was set up in 1984 to 
make energy demand and supply projections for the next 
twenty years.
** R.K. Pachauri, Energy and Economic Development in 
India. Praeger Publishers, (New York, London, 1977).
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For the agricultural sector the number of consumers 
was considered to be a function of the number of villages 
electrified and average price of electricity, whereas the 
kilowatt hour consumption was considered to be a function 
of a seasonal factor, average rainfall, kilowatt hour 
consumption in the previous year and a time trend.
The models for agricultural consumers lacked 
significance due to a high degree of multicollinearity in 
the data set. The models were used to project demand up to 
the year 1990/91, based on a set of "reasonable 
assumptions" regarding the growth parameters for the 
future.
Nirmala Banerjee studied the domestic demand by state 
for the period 1951-1971; industrial demand for electricity 
was studied in detail i.e., electricity demand by all 
industries to-gather as well as the demand for electricity 
by each industry.®®
The industrial demand for electricity was the 
dependent variable, with industrial production, and the 
ratio of prices of electricity in coal equivalent terms and 
coal as independent variables. The cyclical influence on 
electricity use was also considered. The industrial demand 
for electricity was modelled as,
Yt = Ut  (3.18)
where,
Yt = total consumption of electricity by industries in t^ 
year,
Xt = industrial production in t^ year,
Pt = ratio of prices of electricity in coal equivalent terms 
and coal in t"* year,
Ut = error term.
Nirmala Banerjee, op.cit.
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t ~ 1^2/ • • a a T l a
The relative price of electricity was found to be of 
little relevance in explaining the overall demand for 
electricitya
Pa PaPillai*® studied electricity demand in relation to 
economic development in a southern state of India, namely 
Kerala; for the period, 1957-58 to 1976-77 a The aggregate 
demand for electricity was examined in terms of linear, 
log-linear simple equations and simple, first order, 
autoregressive process models a A model depicting the 
dynamic growth paths of demand for electricity was also 
tried a The dependent variable was the total electricity 
demanded during the t^ year (Em^) in the following model,
Log(Em)t=Bo+BilogXt+B2logPt+63log(Em)t-i+B4logT+Uta a a ( 3 . 1 9 )
where,
Eirit = total electricity demanded in t^ year in million KWH, 
Xfc = net domestic product at constant prices (1960-61),
Pt = the average price in paise per unit (KWH) of 
electricity in the t** year,
T = time trend variable.
Electricity demand by different sectors of the economy was 
also studied on the basis of electricity demand by 
different sectors, their respective income and price data.
The long-run income and price elasticities were found 
to be higher than short-run income and price elasticities 
in case of total, residential and commercial, industrial 
and agricultural demand. The long-run income elasticity for 
different consumers ranged between 1.048 to 2.103, and in 
the short-run it ranged between 0.68 to 1.3. The long-run 
price elasticity ranged between -0.156 to 0.818 and in the 
short-run it ranged between -0.115 and -0.633.
P.P. Pillai, op.cita
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The analysis ignored both demographic variables like 
the number of consumers and also, the pattern of economic 
growth in the state. Seasonal factors such as the rainfall 
were also ignored.
111.4 Summary of results: The literature.
As noted earlier there were various studies for 
different categories of consumers and in the earlier 
section the studies of industrial demand have been 
explained in detail, but various studies have been made 
also of the residential demand for electricity. Except for 
Ruth's study, I have not included studies of residential 
electricity demand in the literature in this chapter.*’ 
Also, this study does not include analysis of residential | 
electricity demand in India.
Both long-run and short-run elasticities have been 
estimated by some of the studies. Table III.l also contains 
a list of variables (other than price) used in each of the 
studies as well as a column describing the type of data 
used in each study.
111.5 Elasticities.
III.5.1 Long-run elasticities.
Studies so far have shown as expected, that for all 
classes of consumers the price elasticity of demand for 
electricity and the income elasticity of demand were much 
larger in the long run than in the short run.
The econometric literature on industrial demand 
consisted of few studies. The implications of decreasing 
block pricing, and peak demand verses non-peak demand, i.e. 
separating demand according to the time of the day, need 
more attention. Also, a distinction between short-run and
*’ The references on residential electricity demand 
analysis are given in the Bibliography.
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long-run demand analysis for industrial consumers was 
indicated. The industrial demand for electricity in the 
long run was linked with capital formation and 
technological change.
Table III.l
Results of various studies. 
Industrial Demand
SR LR P Other Important Variables
Fisher and Kaysen NE -1.25 A
Baxter and Rees 
Mount, Chapman &
NE -1.50 A Capital, Labour inputs.
Tyrrell -0.22 -1.82 A Population, Income, Gas price. Temperature.
Anderson NE -1.94 A Coal price. Coke price. Oil price. 
Manufacturing wage rate.
Lyman
Michael Murray,
NE (-1.40) A Gas price. Price Index, Income, Temperature.
Robert Spunn et el. -0.9 -0.5 M Seasonal variations, KW demand.
Sutherland NE -1.13 A Price of natural gas. Seasonal variations.
Banerjee Nirmala 
(India)
NE (-0.013)1 A Industrial Production, Ratio of prices of 
electricity in coal equivalent and coal
Agricultural Demand
Maddigan -1.1 -2.12 A Number of Consumers, Cost of living Index, 
interest rate on real estate 
Irrigation production.
Total daand
Pouris
(South Africa)
NE -0.9 A -
Pillai P.P. 
(India)
-0.6 -1.56 A -
Note: NE =Not Estimated,, SR =:Short-run, LR =Long-run, P =Proxy for price variable, A =Average
Price, H =Harginal price.
The long-run price elasticity of demand was indicated 
to be elastic. All of the studies support this for
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industrial demand. The evidence on the magnitude of the 
long-run income elasticity was much more mixed. Estimates 
ranged from 0 to 2 and clearly depend upon the type of 
model employed.
Perhaps the most important implication to be drawn 
from the long-run studies was that the magnitude of price- 
induced demand changes varied significantly from one system 
to another. The significance of this finding ran the risk 
of being underemphasised by its simplicity. In fact, the 
underlying reasons were often subtle and complex. Other 
demographic characteristics of the residential sector also 
played an important role in determining price 
responsiveness. For example, housing characteristics, the 
mix of urban, suburban and rural populations varied 
significantly. The importance of this regional variation 
for a specific utility was, of course, that elasticities 
calculated from a cross-section of statewide data might not 
reflect residential customers' price responses if the 
aggregation process had eliminated (or ignored) important 
characteristics of a particular service area. The same 
conclusion holds for non-residential demand and was 
intensified by two additional factors which operate on 
price elasticity. The price response of a utility's 
industrial class of customers would be seriously affected 
by the industrial composition of its service area; and this 
characteristic probably demonstrated greater regional 
variation than did many residential characteristics. 
Further, the long-run industrial demand response to changes 
in the price of electric power was likely to be far greater 
in a single service area than at the national level. Many 
power-intensive industries (e.g., aluminium production) 
responded to price level changes not only by altering their 
energy inputs, but also by locating and expanding 
production in areas that have lower energy price levels.
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III.5.2 Short-run elasticities.
Developing a synthesis of the results of the KWH 
demand models which estimated short-run price elasticities 
was a considerably easier task than dealing with long-run 
results. All of the studies found short-run (one year or 
less) responses to changes in the price of electricity and 
other fuel prices to be relatively small for both 
residential and nonresidential consumers. The estimated 
elasticity coefficients tended to fall in the neighbourhood 
of -0.15 to -0.30 for electricity price, and somewhat lower 
for the price of gas. As a general proposition, however it 
was expected, on the basis of consumption studies, that the 
short-run effects of price changes would be small in both 
residential and non-residential sectors. In a sense these 
conclusions suggested multifaceted implications for the 
electric utility industry. On the one hand low short-run 
elasticities indicated that changes in rate structure, 
which effectively increase the price of electric power to 
the consumer, may have taken some time significantly to 
reduce KWH demand (as compared to what it would have been 
if no rate alterations occurred). On the other hand, the 
relative slowness of these responses to price changes would 
have eased the electricity industry's financial burden 
stemming from altered rate structures. If responses were 
too rapid, higher electricity rates might have led to 
serious erosion of revenues while cost of service remained 
high due to the high fixed costs reflecting capital 
development programs of earlier years. The slower the 
demand responses to higher prices, the more time could be 
provided for the electricity industry to adjust capacity.
One more issue needs to be mentioned, relating to both 
long-run price response and especially to price responses 
in the short-run. Although observed changes in electricity 
consumption due to changes in equipment utilisation and 
efficiency have been relatively small, this does not imply
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that time-of-day pricing will have only a negligible impact 
on the rate of consumption. Even if electric power rates 
have only a small impact on decisions regarding the 
utilisation rates of these appliances, rate design may 
still have a large effect on when equipment is used. This 
remains the question to be raised in the consideration of 
KW demand models.
III.5.3 Cross elasticities.
The results concerning the cross elasticities of 
demand can be summarised briefly as,
(1) There was little evidence of any cross elasticity 
at all in the short-run. Mount, Chapman and Tyrrell found, 
for residential demand, the cross elasticity with respect 
to the price of natural gas was only 0.02. Houthakker found 
a somewhat higher value for the U.K. namely 0.21^.
(2) Though the evidence for the long run was not clear 
cut, it definitely suggested that electricity demand 
responds to the prices of other types of energy. Anderson 
found a positive cross elasticity with respect to the price 
for coke, for electric power consumption in the primary 
metals industries, but negative cross elasticities with 
respect to the prices of coal and fuel. Finally, Mount & 
Chapman and Tyrrell found cross elasticities with respect 
to natural gas of 0.19 for residential demand, 0.06 for 
commercial demand and 0 for industrial demand.
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CHAPTER IV
ELECTRICITY DEMAND ANALYSIS; CASE STUDY I.
Electricity demand analysis at all-India level.
Electricity demand in India has been growing since 
Independence. One of the aims of this study is to 
understand the pattern of electricity demand in India after 
Independence and the factors that might have affected it. 
In order to know the pattern of electricity demand it is 
important to know the growth-rate of electricity demand. 
And, in order to understand the reasons for the observed 
growth-rate, we need to observe the effects of different 
explanatory variables on electricity demand. Since the 
available information on the "electricity demand" is 
electricity sales (KWH), it may be more appropriate to 
consider it as electricity sales rather than demand.
IV.1 Growth of aggregate electricity sales in India.
To begin with, the process of growth of past 
electricity sales was examined in terms of two alternative 
models.
First, a simple linear trend in electricity sales 
enabled us to describe the change in electricity sales over 
the period of time. It assumes an arithmetic growth rate. 
The second, a semi-log model with time as the explanatory 
variable, assumes a geometric (compound) growth rate of KWH 
sales. These models have been used for "demand"** 
forecasting by extrapolation using the estimated trend 
equations by the electric utility companies in India.*®
*“ The data on electricity sales are considered as a 
good proxy for electricity demand in Indian electric 
utilities.
*® In interviews with the officials in the Planning 
Department of Gujarat Electricity Board, Baroda and 
Maharashtra State Electricity Board, Bombay, I was told
(continued...)
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IV.1.1 Models.
The simple linear trend in the KWH sales was estimated 
using the form;
ITSALEt = ttoi  (4.1)
where,
ITSALEt = index of the quantity of electricity sold in the 
t“‘ year; (1962 was taken as the reference year), 
t = time variable.
€ = random disturbance term.
Second, a semi-log model with time as the explanatory 
variable in the following form was used;
lITSALEt =0to2 + 6^ 2  (4.2)
where,
lITSALEt = logarithmic transformation of the index of 
electricity sales to all consumers in t^ year, 
t = time variable.
Similar models were also tried for per capita electricity 
sales.**
IV.1.2 Results.
From the estimated relationships depicting the growth 
paths, it was observed that the electricity sales to all 
consumers and per capita electricity sale were better 
explained with the help of a semi-log growth model than 
with the simple linear growth model. From the data on the
**(.. .continued) 
that electricity demand in the state was forecast on these 
models. This forecasted demand was then used for the 
purpose of planning the supply.
** All the data used in this Chapter are explained in 
the Appendix to Chapter IV.
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index of electricity sales to all consumers and the index 
of per capita electricity sale, it appeared that there was 
a difference in the growth pattern over time and hence we 
derived growth-rates for two sub-periods using the semi-log 
growth model. The results of the semi-log growth model can 
be observed from Table IV.1.
Table IV.l
Annual average growth-rates of electricity sales and per capita electricity sale using the seni-log 
growth model, {model (4.2)}
Period Growth-rates (in percentages).
ITSALE IPCSe
1947-86 9.7 7.18
SE (0.0021) (0.002)
1947-72 11.7 9.0
SE (0.0018) (0.0017)
1973-86 5.8 4.8
SE (0.002) (0.002)
Note: ITSALE = Index of total electricity sales, 
IPCSe = Index of per capita electricity sale.
The estimates refer to the period mentioned in the 
first column. The equations were estimated by ordinary 
least squares. This suggested that in the period 1947 and 
1986, the index of electricity sales to all consumers 
increased at the compound rate of 9.79% per annum, whereas 
the index of per capita electricity sale increased at the 
compound rate of 7.18% per annum- Between the years 1947 
and 1972 the index of electricity sales grew at the annual 
rate of 11.7% and between the years 1973 and 1986 the index 
of electricity sales grew at the annual average rate of 
5.82%. The growth-rates for the two sub-periods are 
different from each other. Similarly the growth-rates of 
per capita electricity sale in two sub-periods are also 
different i.e., 9.0% in the first sub-period and 4.8% in 
the second sub-period. This slow down in the growth-rate of 
electricity sales may be either due to higher transmission
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and distribution losses or/and lack of capacity to generate 
electricity. Thus it may reflect the problem of failure to 
supply.
IV.2 Econometric models of electricity demand.
The analysis of the growth-rates of electricity sales 
to all consumers failed to explain why the consumers were 
consuming at a higher growth rate in the first sub-period 
compared to the second sub-period; and it is important to 
understand the reasons for the observed changes in 
electricity sales. As observed in the previous Chapter, 
micro-economic theory suggests that demand for any 
commodity is affected by the income of the consumer (i.e. 
the ability of the consumer to pay) and the price of the 
commodity. While the availability (and the increasing 
usefulness) of electricity set an immediate limit to 
requirements in a region, the actual level of demand at any 
given time depends on a number of socio-economic factors. 
The demand for electricity in India after Independence 
might also have been affected by economic variables like 
the price of the alternative resources, the reliability of 
supply, population growth, political factors like the 
attitude of the political party in power towards 
modernisation, institutional changes in regulating the 
industry, social factors like adaptability in the society 
etc, and also exogenous shocks like the war and the oil 
crisis. Any consumer would be interested in using a 
commodity that satisfies his needs and/or gives him comfort 
and/or facilitates his economic activity, but this is only 
if the consumer could afford to pay for the commodity. 
Thus, though the effects of the price of substitutes and 
other social and political factors on electricity demand 
would be interesting to study, the analysis in this and the 
following Chapter is restricted to the study of the effect 
of variables like consumers' ability to pay, the cost of
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electricity to the consumer and population growth, on 
electricity demand.
IV.2.1 Models.
Electricity demand was expected to be affected by the 
consumers' ability to pay and the price of electricity. An 
increase in the level of income increases the ability of 
the consumer to pay for electricity and as a result 
electricity demand is likely to increase. Therefore, a 
positive sign was expected for the income coefficient.
An increase in price on the other hand makes 
electricity more expensive for the consumer and may 
discourage electricity demand. At the same time, new 
potential consumers may find electricity so expensive that 
they may be discouraged from starting to use electricity 
even for their basic needs. Thus, a negative response to 
increase in price may be expected. But in most uses of 
electricity, once the consumers have substituted from any 
other source of energy to electricity, it is difficult and 
very expensive to switch back. For example, the decisions 
regarding consumer durables are taken among households in 
the longer run. Since the capital cost involved is high, 
once the appliances are in use, consumers may not stop 
using them just because the price of using them has gone 
up, or may not refrain from purchasing the durable goods 
which happen to be electricity intensive, just because 
electricity prices have changed (though the extent of use 
of some appliances, (e.g., air conditioners) may be 
affected by an increase in prices). It is quite likely that 
initially, consumers who substitute from alternative 
sources of energy to electricity are keen to enjoy the 
benefits of using electricity and take less notice of the 
costs of using it. After substituting for another energy 
source, they may find it more difficult and expensive to 
switch back and such "lock in" effect might be reflected in
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the coefficient of price. It is also possible that the 
electricity consumers might ignore prices in deciding their 
level of electricity demand. Hence it is interesting to 
observe empirically the price effect on electricity demand.
In order to incorporate the effects of population 
growth, one can include data on population as an 
independent variable. To avoid the problem of 
multicollinearity between the income and population, (if 
population is included as a independent variable along with 
income and price), one can incorporate the population 
growth by studying the per capita electricity sale. Thus, 
we studied the effects of per capita income and average 
price (per unit of electricity) on the per capita 
electricity sale (PCSe).
An econometric model that explained the growth path of 
per capita electricity sale was tried where the dependent 
variable used was the per capita electricity sale. The main 
explanatory variables were income and price.
All the variables were transformed into logarithmic 
form to give the following model;
log(IPCSet)=logÔo3 +fii3log(IPCIt) +B23log(RIAPet) +e«...(4.3) 
where,
IPCSOt = index of per capita electricity sale in t^ year, 
IPCIt = index of per capita income at constant (1970-71) 
prices,
RIAPet = index of the average price (in paise per unit of 
electricity) of electricity to all consumers deflated by 
the wholesale price index.
It was observed earlier that the per capita 
electricity sale grew at different rates: in the first sub­
period i.e. 1953-72, the growth-rate was found to be higher 
than the second period. In a growing economy, that already 
has a growing electricity sales and so a more or less non-
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substitutable source of energy by the year 1972, it is hard 
to believe that electricity sales were growing at a lower 
rate than the rate at which it grew before 1972. 
Technological change had already affected the economy to 
some extent by 1973 and the strategy adopted in the Second 
Five Year Plan boosted the electricity demand from 
industries as well, so it is all the more surprising to 
observe that in the second period electricity "demand" 
(KWH) did not grow at the same rate as it did in the first 
period, especially since the economy had not yet reached a 
level where there was no further scope for using 
electricity. One possibility is that the effects of changes 
in the price were different in two sub-periods. Another 
possibility is that consumers found more avenues for fuel 
substitution as a result of growing income in the first 
period compared to the possibility of substitution in the 
second period, and hence, the effect of income might be 
different in the two sub-periods. Thus, it was also 
important to observe whether the effect of above mentioned 
variables on electricity demand was different in the two 
sub-periods.
The oil crisis of 1972-73 may not have affected the 
electricity industry in India directly due to the low share 
of oil consumption in the production of electricity (due in 
turn to official discouragement after Independence), but it 
made the electric utilities in India aware of the 
increasing scarcity of energy. On the other hand, the 
increasing demand (KWH) for electricity from industries and 
other users helped the utilities to utilise their capacity 
but did not generate enough resources to enable the 
electric utility to create the capacity that was required 
to fulfil the projected demand for power (KW). This led to 
shortages in electricity supply and a rise in electricity 
prices particularly for industries after 1972. But whether 
the increase in prices led to any negative effects on
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electricity demand by the industries or not is yet to be 
seen. In order to analyse the difference in the effects of 
independent variables in two periods, dummy variables were 
used:
log(IPCSet) =Bo4 +B14D IPCIt) +&34log(PCIt*D)
+B*4log(RIAPet) tBg^log(RIAPet*D) +6 .^  (4.4)
where,
IPCSet, IPCIt, RIAPet are the same as defined earlier,
D is the dummy variable such that D=0 for the period 1953- 
1972, (period without electricity shortages, and D=1 for 
the period 1973-1986 (period during which electricity 
shortages were experienced).®^
IV.2.2 Results.
The effects of variations in the (real) average price 
of electricity (RIAPe) and the index of (real) per capita 
income (IPCI) on the index of per capita electricity sale 
(IPCSe) (i.e., model 4.3) are presented in the Table 4.1 in 
Appendix to Chapter IV .
The coefficients of income and price were 
statistically significant. The coefficient of income was 
found to be positive as expected. The coefficient of price 
was found to be negative as expected. From the numerical 
values of the coefficients, a 1% increase in the index of 
per capita income, increases the index of per capita 
electricity sale by 3.83% in the period 1953-86. The income 
elasticity was found to be more than one. Also a 1% 
increase in real prices led to a decrease in electricity 
consumed of 0.62%. Unfortunately, as can be observed from 
D-W statistic, there was a problem of auto-correlation and 
this makes the statistical significance of the coefficients
For explanation of the data used please refer to the 
Appendix to Chapter IV.
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less trustworthy.
When comparing the model without the dummy variable 
(i.e., model 4.3) with the model including the dummy 
variable (i.e., model 4.4) on the basis of their F- 
statistic, we gathered that the variations in per capita 
electricity sale were better explained by the model with 
the dummy variable. This would mean that the model without 
the dummy is not stable over the whole period. The result 
of the model with the dummy is presented in the Table 4.la 
in the Appendix to Chapter IV and the method to derive 
coefficients for the two sub-periods is also explained 
below the Table 4.1a. From the t-statistics of the
coefficients in the model with the dummy variable, we 
gather that the coefficients of income and price in the 
second period are statistically different from the 
coefficients in the first period. Further, the model with 
the dummy did not have any other problems, like auto­
correlation, that we had in the model without the dummy.
The income coefficients (Table 4.1b) in both the sub­
periods are significantly different from zero and positive 
as expected. The coefficient of price in the first sub­
period was significantly different from zero, whereas in 
the second period it is not significantly different from 
zero. Though the coefficients of price had a negative sign 
in both the sub-periods. As far as the numerical value of 
the coefficients are concerned, it was found that a 1%
increase in the index of per capita income led to a 5.57%
increase in the index of per capita electricity sale in the 
period 1953-72, but only a 2,25% increase in the period 
1973-86. Similarly in the period 1953-72, a 1% increase in 
the index of real electricity prices, led to decrease in 
the index of per capita electricity sale by 1.06%, and by 
0 .01% in the second period.
Despite the increase in the (nominal) average price of 
electricity after 1972-73, the effects of prices on
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electricity sales were found to be insignificant in the 
second period. In the case of industries, the fuel cost 
may/may not be a major component of costs and hence the 
decision regarding electricity demand may not necessarily 
depend upon electricity prices. As explained earlier, after 
substituting other fuel by electricity it was difficult to 
go back to the fuel used earlier or stop using the 
appliance. Thus, the "locked in" effect was found in the 
second period.
IV.3 Electricity demand by different consumer groups.
Graph IV.l
S h a r e  o f  e l e c t r i c i t y  s a l e  t o  
a g r i c u l t u r a l  a n d  i n d u s t r i a l  c o n s u m e r s . .
8 0
6 0
4 0
20
0
1 9 5 0 1 9 SO 1 9 7 0 1 9861 980
Tears
A g r i . I n d u s .
124
As can be seen from Graph IV.l, the share of 
electricity sales to different consumer groups in the total 
electricity sales changed over a period of time. It is 
important to know the growth rate of the electricity sales 
to different consumer groups. Though the electric utilities 
in India distinguish their consumers in 8 different 
groups*^ the analysis in the following section covers the 
analysis of electricity sales to industrial users, 
agricultural users and "other" consumers in a single 
category.
IV.3.1 Models.
The simple and semi-log growth models explained in 
section IV.1.1 were used.
IV.3.2 Results.
The indices of electricity sales to industrial, 
agricultural and "other" consumers were better explained by 
the semi-log model. The growth-rates of electricity sales 
to the three consumer groups are presented in Table IV.2.
Table IV. 2
Annual average growth-rates of electricity sales to industrial consumers, agricultural consumers 
and "other" consumers using the semi-log growth model.
Period Growth-rates of consumer groups in percentages. 
Industrial Agricultural Other.
1947-86 9.37 14.44 9.0
1947-72 12.08 16.44 9.67
1973-86 5.82 9.6 8.6
Electricity sales to industries were encouraged after 
independence. The annual average growth rate of electricity
The 8 consumer category as mentioned earlier are 1) 
Domestic, 2) Commercial, 3) Industrial (high tension), 4) 
Industrial (low tension), 5) Agricultural, 6) Public water 
supply, 7) Public lighting, and 8) Railways.
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sales to industrial consumers was 9.37%, it was 14.44% for 
agricultural consumers, and 9.0% for "other" consumers. 
Agricultural consumers experienced the highest growth-rate.
But like the growth of electricity sales to all 
consumers, the annual average growth rate of electricity 
sales to industries grew faster between the period 1947-72, 
at 12.08%, than between 1973-86, at 5.82%. In the first 
sub-period the index of electricity sales to agricultural 
consumers grew at the annual rate of 16.47% and in the 
second sub-period it grew at the rate of 10.46%. The annual 
average growth-rate of electricity sales to "other" 
consumers in the first sub-period was 9.67%, and 8 .68% in 
the second sub-period. The growth-rates in the first sub­
period for all consumer groups were significantly different 
from the growth-rates in the second sub-period for all 
respective consumer groups.
IV. 4 Models for electricity demand by the industrial 
consumer group.
IV.4.1 Models.
The energy requirement by different sectors depends on 
the growth of that sector and its relative importance in 
the economy. For exaftiple, if the industrial sector was 
growing faster, the energy requirement by industries is 
likely to grow faster. Or if agriculture was the main 
economic activity of the nation, the growth of agriculture 
may lead to faster growth of the energy requirement by the 
agricultural sector.
Electricity is a convenient and usually an inexpensive 
input for Indian industries. The effect of the price on 
electricity demand by industries depends upon 1) the 
importance of electricity in the process of production and 
the substitutability of electricity in the process of 
production and 2) the share of electricity cost in the
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total cost of production. It is important to know the 
importance of electricity cost in the industry's total 
costs. Table IV. 3 shows the cost of electricity as a 
percentage of gross value of output in some of the more 
electricity-intensive industries for 1966. For all 
industries taken together, the total cost of electricity 
consumed by industries, whether purchased or generated in 
their own plants, at the average market price of industrial 
electricity supplies,^' in 1966 came to only about two per 
cent of the gross value of output of the manufacturing 
sector. For some industries, of course, electricity costs 
were of greater importance than this.
Table IV.3
Cost of electricity consumed at market prices as a percentage of total value of output for selected 
industries in 1966: all-India.
Name of the Industry Cost of electricity
as a percentage of gross value of output.
1 2
Textiles 2.70
Iron and Steel 3.85
Basic Industrial Chemicals 9.40
Paper and Paper Pulp 6.82
Non-ferrous Basic Metals 12.64
Cement 9.27
All Industries 2.26
Source: Quantity of Electricity consumed by each industry and the gross value of output of industry 
from Annual Survey of Industries. Central Statistical Organisation, Government of India, 1966.
The Table IV.4 shows the "year to year elasticity" of 
the all-India industrial consumption of electricity with 
respect to the all-India industrial production for the 
period 1948-1986. This elasticity measures the relative 
change in electricity demand vis-a-vis the change in
Public Electricitv Supply - All India Statistics, 
Central Electricity Authority, Government of India, (New 
Delhi, 1965-66).
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industrial production.
Table IV.4
Incone elasticity of industrial denand over the period 1947-1986.
Year Elasticity Year Elasticity
1947 none 1967 -29.54
1948 0.39 1968 1.95
1949 -0.18 1969 1.28
1950 0.03 1970 0.83
1951 4.77 1971 1.65
1952 1.38 1972 0.33
1953 6.58 1973 0.44
1954 1.85 1974 0.31
1955 1.81 1975 3.15
1956 1.6 1976 3.47
1957 1.09 1977 0.2
1958 2.27 1978 1.73
1959 2.06 1979 -3.23
1960 1.22 1980 1.49
1961 2.22 1981 1.2
1962 1.39 1982 -0.04
1963 2.51 1983 1.44
1964 1.13 1984 1.79
1965 0.93 1985 0.766
1966 -19.72 1986 0.178
Elasticity = % change in electricity sale to industries 
% change in industrial production.
For most years, between the years 1947-86, this ratio was 
positive and greater than one, although it varied widely 
from year to year from 4.09 in 1957 to -29.54 in 1967. From 
the two time series of industrial production and of 
industrial use of electricity, it appears that in years of 
steadily growing industrial production, electricity demand 
also increased steadily at a somewhat higher rate. However, 
in the two years of a sudden setback to industrial 
production in this period, (1966-67) electricity demand did 
not decrease correspondingly and increased in absolute 
terms. Thus the relevant elasticity figures for these two 
years were found to be negative and very large.
These wide variations in the year-to-year figures of
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elasticity of electricity demand appear to suggest that 
cyclical variations in the trend of industrial production 
affect industrial use of electricity over and above the 
changes due to the secular trend of industrial production. 
In other words, the actual use of electricity would be 
affected not just by the long-term trend in industrial 
production, but also by the movement of industrial
production around this trend. This might be caused by the 
fact that electricity was not always a variable input
strictly related to the production level alone. It might, 
to a certain extent, also be a fixed input because
electricity was required for overheads such as lighting of 
office buildings, industrial townships, etc., none of which 
uses were affected by the actual industrial production
level in the short run. Partly also, the indivisibilities 
of electrically operated machines were reflected in 
industry's electrical consumption. Provided that an 
industry produced some non-zero level of output, its 
machines required some power for the initial triggering 
off, and this amount of power was the same whether the 
machine runs at full capacity or not. The cost of this 
power supply was a fixed cost to the industry so long as it 
was in operation. The electricity required thereafter to 
keep the machine going would be a variable cost. If the 
machine works at full capacity, the total electricity 
demand per unit would be much less than if it works less 
than full capacity or for less than the set time. 
Therefore, in periods of fast growing industrial 
production, electricity demand would grow more slowly than 
in periods of slow growth. At a time of an absolute fall in 
the industrial production, it might fall drastically. It is 
then possible that the generally greater than unity values 
of this elasticity might be a result of some fast and 
drastic cyclical changes in industrial output during this 
period. Its secular value might be one or less than one.
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This would imply that apart from the cyclical variations, 
electricity demand would have increased proportionately or 
even less than proportionately to industrial production.
In order to estimate this secular value of the 
elasticity of industrial demand of electricity, we assumed 
that the changes in electricity requirements of industries 
were determined by the changes in industrial production and 
the price of electricity. We need to calculate a variable 
which measures the variations in the time series of
industrial production from its secular trend. This was
called the "pressure of demand variable", since it
represented the influence of cyclical variations in
production due to changes in demand for industrial goods. 
A model for this was;
log(IISALEt) =logBo5 +6i5log(IIPt) tBasCPD) +6ts ....(4.5) 
where,
IlPt = index of industrial production at 1970 prices, 
IISALEt = index of industrial electricity demand,
PD = pressure of demand variable (explained in the Appendix 
to Chapter IV, page 146).
The growth of industrial production is likely to 
affect the electricity demand by industries. The growth of 
electricity demand by industries also depends on the nature 
of the industries. The modern production process in 
industries is more energy-intensive than the production 
process in agriculture. The flexibility of time for 
electricity demand is less in the continuous process 
industries compared to small scale industries and 
agriculture. Also, if the economy is primarily agricultural 
and if the agro-based industries are important in the 
industrial sector, the electricity demand by industries is 
more likely to be affected by the income in the economy as 
a whole rather than industrial production only. Thus, it is
130
important to observe the relationship between total income 
and the electricity demand by industries. The price charged 
to different consumer groups is different. Hence it is 
important to observe the effects of the price on their 
electricity demand. The effects of income and price on 
electricity demand can be analysed using the model:
lo g ( I IS A L E U )= lo g B o 6  + B i6 lo g ( IG D P t)  + 6 2 6 lo g (R I IA R t )  + e ^ . . ( 4 . 6 )
where,
IISALEt = index of electricity sales to industries,
IGDPt = index of gross domestic product in India at constant 
prices,
RIIARt = deflated index of electricity prices to industrial 
consumers.
In order to observe whether the effects of income and 
price remained the same in two sub-periods or not the 
following model, using dummy variables, was also tried.
log ( IISALEt )=logBo7 fB^^logC IGDPt) -^B^ d^* log (IGDPt)
+B*7log(RIIARt) tB^^D* log (RIIARt) ..... (4.7)
where IISALEt, IGDPt, RIIARt are the same as defined earlier 
and D is the dummy variable defined such that D=0 for the 
period 1953-72 and D=1 for the period 1973-86.
IV.4.2 Results.
The results are presented in Table 4.2 in the Appendix 
to Chapter IV. The coefficient of the pressure of demand 
variable (model 4.5), i.e. the difference between the 
estimated and the actual level of industrial production, 
was negative and greater than one in the first sub-period. 
This could be interpreted to mean that, in any particular 
year, changes in the requirements of industrial electricity 
depended not only on the changes in industrial production
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but also negatively, on how industrial production that year 
had moved vis-a-vis the secular trend.
If production grew at a rate less than its expected 
growth rate, then electricity requirements also grew 
slowly, but at a rate faster than the rate of growth of 
industrial production; whereas in the second period, a 
negative coefficient of the pressure of demand variable was 
observed, but it was found to be less than one. Thus, in 
this period, when industrial production increased faster 
than the expected or secular rate, electricity requirements 
grew at a rate much slower than the one indicated by the 
influence of changes in industrial production. This seems 
to support the contention that, to a certain extent, 
electricity was a fixed cost for industries and in years of 
better utilisation of capacity, its requirements per unit 
of production were considerably less than proportionate. In 
other words, electricity requirements of industries had 
been increasing at a rate faster than the rate of growth of 
industrial production. This increase in electricity 
intensity could not be fully explained by cyclical changes 
in industrial production. There were possible reasons why 
the overall electricity demand of Indian industries might 
have grown faster than the total industrial production in 
this period.®** To recollect the list of the reasons; i) The 
new industries which developed for the first time during 
this period fundamentally used a relatively more 
electricity-intensive technology. ii) Amongst older 
industries, the more electricity-intensive industries grew 
relatively faster, iii) Most existing industries were 
switching to a more electricity-intensive technology. In 
the case of India during this period, all three of these 
needs were realised.
The result of our attempt to study the effect of gross
Please refer to discussion in Chapter II Section
II.1.5 (under Utilisation).
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domestic product and price on electricity sales to 
industries (i.e., model 4.6), are presented in Table 4.3 in 
the Appendix to Chapter IV. From the t-statistics we gather 
that the coefficient of income and price were significantly 
different from zero. The coefficient of income was positive 
as expected. The average price of electricity to industries 
affected electricity sales to industries negatively, as 
expected. Despite the fact that the proportion of 
electricity costs in the total costs of the industries was 
low as seen earlier, in the period 1953 to 1986, the 
industrial electricity demand was price elastic.
Observing the numerical value of the coefficients, we 
gather that coefficient of income i.e. IGDP, is way above 
1%: a 1% increase in the index of GDP raised electricity 
sales to industries by 2.81%. This high income elasticity 
shows the underdeveloped state of the economy. There was 
much scope for electricity use in existing and new 
industries. The coefficient of price indicates that a 1% 
increase in the index of real price led to a decrease in 
the index of electricity sales of 1.05% in the period 1953- 
86. Thus, both the variables had the sign that we expected, 
and the effects of income and electricity price for 
industries were significant in the period 1953-86.
The results of the model with the dummy variable 
(model 4.7) that allowed for effects of electricity 
shortages on electricity sales are presented in Table 4.3a 
in the Appendix to Chapter IV. From the F-statistic 
comparing model without the dummy (model 4.6) and with the 
dummy (model 4.7), we gather that the model without the 
dummy is not structurally stable over the whole period. The 
effects of income and price in the first sub-period were 
significantly different from their respective effects in 
the second sub-period. The results on the t-statistics of 
the coefficients of income and price (in Table 4.3a in 
appendix) prove this point.
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Calculating the coefficients in the first and second 
sub-period (Table 4.3b) we gather that coefficient of 
income in the first and second period were significantly 
different from zero and had a positive sign as expected. 
The price coefficient in the first period was significantly 
different from zero and had a negative sign, but the price 
coefficient in the second period was not found to be 
significantly different from zero and did not have a 
negative sign. This again might be an indicator of the 
"lock in" effect in the second period.
Observing and calculating (from the formulas given 
with Table 4.1a and the calculated coefficients are 
presented in Table 4.3b) the numerical values of the 
coefficients we gather that income elasticity in the first 
sub-period was higher than in the second sub-period. A 1% 
increase in index of gross domestic product in the country 
led to a 3.25% increase in the index of electricity sales 
to industries in the period 1953-72, whereas in the period 
1973-86, a 1% increase in the index of gross domestic 
product in the country led to a 1.37% increase in the index 
of electricity sales to industries. A 1% increase in the 
index of real price led to a decrease in the index of 
electricity sales of 0.65% in the period 1953-72; whereas 
in the second sub-period, electricity demand was found to 
be price inelastic. Thus, we observe a remarkable 
difference in the effects of the independent variables on 
the dependent variable in the two sub-periods.
IV.5 Models for electricitv demand by the agricultural 
sector■
IV.5.1 Models.
The second Five Year Plan (1955-56 to 1959-60) gave a 
lot of emphasis to the heavy, basic, capital goods 
industries which were energy-intensive. Electricity sales
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to industries grew strongly as a result. But after the 
disturbed years in the mid sixties it was realised that 
agriculture continued to be dependent on irregular 
rainfall. The technology of the high yielding variety of 
seeds needed assured water supply. It therefore seemed 
important to provide the farmers with an assured water 
supply and this in turn meant the need for irrigation
facilities in the country. Since studies had shown that 
electrified pumpsets had benefits for the economy has a 
whole,®® the government offered subsidies on electrified 
pumpsets. The electric utilities provided the incentive to 
install electrified pumpsets by keeping electricity prices 
low, instead of the oil based pumpsets for which the fuel 
was more expensive. It was expected that the increase in 
the number of pumpsets would lead to increases in the
number of agricultural consumers, thus affecting the
electricity demand by the agricultural sector positively.
The ability of an agricultural consumer to install an 
electrified pumpset depended upon his income and the 
government's subsidy on the electrified pumpsets. The 
incomes of the farmers were usually generated not only from 
farm produce but also from other hand-crafts, services and 
other small business. Hence in a study of agricultural 
demand, it was important to take total income in the
country rather than the income from agricultural production 
only.
The government encouraged the electrification of 
villages to provide an infrastructure facility and thereby 
raise the standard of living in general. The effect of this 
policy of electrification could be captured by taking the 
number of consumers. The effect of the number of "new 
villages electrified" on the electricity demand by the
®® V.N. Kothari and M.M. Dadi, Economic Benefits of 
Rural Electrification in Guiarat. Department of Economics, 
M.S. University of Baroda, (Baroda, 1979).
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agricultural sector was expected to be positive. Including 
this effect would not reflect the electricity demand solely 
by the agricultural sector, for in the case of India, 
agricultural activities are mainly centred in the rural 
areas and it is very difficult to separate electricity 
supplied to households in rural areas from the electricity 
supplied specifically for agriculture purposes.
The need for electricity by agricultural consumers 
also depends on seasonal factors. For example in the years 
during which there was no or less than optimal rainfall, 
the need for pumpsets was higher. The period of use of the 
pumpsets depended also on the level of rainfall. But such 
seasonal factors were difficult to model due to the 
diversity in a vast country like India. Though electricity 
became an important input (to decrease agriculture's 
dependency on nature), agricultural consumers were flexible 
in their time of use of electricity.
Since the cost of using the pumpset, i.e., the 
electricity cost, forms an important element in the total 
cost of production for a farmer, the average price charged 
per unit of electricity was also an important factor that 
affected the level of electricity demand by the 
agricultural consumers. In contrast to the index of nominal 
average price for industrial consumers (which showed a very 
sharp rise after 1973), the index of nominal average price 
of electricity to agricultural consumers seems to have 
grown faster before 1973. But even after the policy to 
subsidise pumpsets and provide low electricity prices came 
in, it was still expensive for many small and marginal 
farmers to install electrified pumpsets. It was the group 
of rich farmers who benefited the most and these were 
capable of forming pressure groups, which in many states 
were successful in forcing the electric utilities to keep 
electricity prices for agricultural consumers low.
Thus, the agricultural demand for electricity was
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studied using the model:
log(IASALEJ =logBo. +6i«log( IGDPJ +B2«log(RIAPAt)
+B3slog( lANCt) +64slog( IVt) +e«  (4.8)
where,
lASALEt = index of electricity sale to agricultural 
consumers in t^ year,
IGDPt = index of gross domestic production at constant 
prices in t^ year,
RIAPAt = index of real average price from agricultural 
consumers; i.e 1961-62 = 100,
lANCt = index of number of electricity consumers in 
agriculture,
IVt = index of number of villages electrified-
In order to observe the structural stability of this 
model over the whole period, and to observe whether the 
effects of independent variables were the same in the 
period after 1972, the following model was tried:
log(IASALEt) =logÔo<» +B2,log(IGDPt) +B3,D*log(IGDPt)
+6.,log( RIAPAt) +Ô59D* log (RIAPAt) +6g,log(IANCt) 
+079D*log(IANCt) +6»,log(INVt) +6„D*log(INVt)
+ 6t9  (4.9)
where lASALEt, IGDPt, RIAPAt are the same as defined earlier 
and D is the dummy variable defined such that D=0 for the 
period 1953-72 and D=1 for the period 1973-86.
IV.5.2 Results.
In our attempts to model electricity sale to 
agricultural consumers, it was found that the gross 
domestic product is a good proxy for income. The results of 
model without the dummy (i.e., model 4.8) are presented in 
Table 4.4 in the Appendix to Chapter IV. The results show
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that variation in independent variables like income, number 
of villages electrified, number of consumers and price 
explained the variations in electricity sale to 
agricultural consumers significantly. The coefficient of 
income had positive effects on electricity sales to 
agriculture as expected. The effects of the number of 
consumers, which included the number of electrified 
pumpsets, was also positive in the period 1953-86. The 
number of villages electrified increased in the period 
1953-86, and it affected the electricity demand positively. 
Thus, the government's programme to offer a subsidy on 
electrified pumpsets (as can be seen from the effects of 
the number of consumers, as a proxy), and to promote 
electrification of villages in India, seemed to have 
positive effects on electricity sales to agricultural 
consumers in India in the period 1953-86. Though the extent 
of subsidy may differ in different states. The coefficient 
of price had a negative sign as expected. In reality, the 
actual electricity tariff schedules for different consumers 
in any region are designed by the State Electricity Boards, 
which were expected to follow the central government's 
policy.
Observing the numerical value of the coefficients, we 
gather that the coefficient of income is below 1 (unlike 
the coefficient of industrial consumers), a 1% increase in 
the domestic product led to a 0.66% increase in electricity 
sales to agricultural consumers. Also the coefficients of 
the number of villages electrified and number of consumers 
were below 1. As a result, a 1% increase in the number of 
agricultural consumers increased electricity sales by 
0.37%, whereas a 1% increase in the number of villages 
electrified, led to a 0.43% increase in the electricity 
consumed by agricultural consumers. A 1% increase in the 
index of real prices led to a decrease in electricity sales 
to agricultural consumers of 0.42%. The coefficients on
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income, real price, number of consumers and villages 
electrified were all found to be statistically significant 
at 1% the significance level.
Using the F-statistic to compare the model without the 
dummy variable (i.e, model 4.8) and the model with the 
dummy variable (i.e., model 4.9) that allows for the 
difference in the effect of the independent variables on 
the dependent variable in the two sub-periods, we gather 
that the model without the dummy (model 4.8) explained the 
variations in the dependent variable in a better way. The 
model without dummy was stable over the whole period. And 
the coefficients in the two sub-periods were not 
significantly different from each other.
IV.6 Models for electricity demand bv "other" conRnrnera.
IV.6.1 Models.
Sales in this consumer group included the electricity 
sales to railways, public lighting, public water works, 
commercial and domestic consumers. The demand for 
electricity by railways would more or less depend upon the 
technical relationship between fuel required, the speed, 
distance travelled, the efficiency, number of years for 
which the traction was used and the traction policy of the 
Department of Railways. Electricity demand from public 
water works and public lighting was not expected to be 
constant over time, as in the developed countries. Much of 
India was not served by electricity at Independence, and as 
the nation developed, the ability of the state to provide 
basic facilities increased and more people and larger areas 
gained this basic facility. Thus, electricity demand was 
expected to grow over time alongside the steady growth of 
the nation, and the nation's policy on such welfare 
measures. Electricity demand by domestic and commercial 
consumers was also expected to increase over time and was
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also subject to the influence of a number of other 
factors®® like the seasonal differences, the size of the 
house, the working pattern of the members living in the 
house and the number of appliances. Electricity demand by 
commercial consumers became very important in the Indian 
context only from early eighties, when the tertiary sector 
in the Indian economy seemed to be growing very fast. The 
production services - activities linked intimately to 
production like transportation, trade, repair and 
maintenance; business services like banking, insurance, 
advertising, accountancy, market research, computers for 
data processing and so on: and the consumer services -
education, health, travel and tourism, leisure and 
entertainment and media, have been growing very fast and 
played a very important role in the economy. But much of 
electricity demand from these commercial consumers was 
found to be difficult to separate from electricity demand 
from the domestic consumers. This was because the location 
of offices were not pre-planned and located away from the 
residential area. Small offices were found in residences.
Thus, it was found to be difficult to list various 
factors affecting this consumer group. Nevertheless, 
electricity demand by this consumer group was expected to 
respond to changes in national income, the average price of 
electricity charged and the number of consumers. To study 
the effects of income and price the following model was 
used:
log(IOSALEt) =logôoxo +Bxxolog(IGDPJ tB^iologCRIOARt) 
+B3xolog(I0NCt) +€tio ......... (4.10)
®® There are number of studies on the residential 
demand for electricity and factors affecting it. Since the 
main purpose of the study is not to study residential 
demand for electricity the references are not reviewed 
here.
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where,
lOSÀLEt = index of electricity sale to all the consumers 
except to the industrial and agricultural consumers; (1962 
=100),
IGDPt = index of gross domestic product at (1970) constant
prices; with the reference year 1962,
RIOARt = index of real average price charged to "other” 
consumers - all the consumers except the industrial and 
agricultural consumers, i.e., the index of average prices 
to this consumer group was deflated by the wholesale price 
index for all India,
lONCt = index of number of "other" consumers.
In order to find out whether the coefficients in the
two sub-period are different from each other or not the 
following model was tried:
log(IOSALEt) =logBon +BmD +6^^1og(IGDPt) +63nD*log( IGDP^ )
+64xilog(RI0ARt) +B5iiD*log(RI0ARt) 
+&«^lo9(I0NCt) +B^^D*log(IONCt) ..(4.11)
where lOSALE^, IGDP^, RIAPR^ and lONC^ are the same as
defined earlier and D is the dummy variable defined such
that D=0 for the period 1953-72 and D=1 for the period 
1973-86.
IV.6.2 Results.
The results of the model without the dummy (i.e.,
model 4.10) are presented in Table 4.5 in Appendix to 
Chapter IV. The coefficients of income and the number of 
consumers were found to be statistically different from 
zero at the 1% significance level. But the coefficient of 
price was statistically different from zero only at the 10% 
significance level. In our attempts to explain the
electricity sales to "other" consumers we observe that the 
coefficient of income was found to be positive, as
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expected. The index of number of consumers also had 
positive effects on electricity demand. The coefficient of 
price had a negative sign, as expected.
From the results we gather that the coefficient of 
income was below 1. A 1% increase in the index of gross 
domestic product increased the index of electricity sales 
by 0.65%. Also, a 1% increase in the index of number of
consumers led to a 0.7% increase in the index of
electricity demand. The non-deflated index of average price 
charged to "other" consumers was rising till 1977 but it 
fell after 1977 till 1983. A 1% increase in the index of 
real price of electricity led to a decrease in the index of 
electricity sales by 0.028%. Thus we can see that in the
period 1953-86, electricity sales to all other consumers
except agricultural and industrial were mainly affected by 
the gross domestic product and the number of consumers.
Comparing the model without the dummy (i.e., model 
4.10) and the model with the dummy (i.e., model 4.11), we 
gather that model without the dummy (i.e. model 4.10) is 
stable over the whole period. From the results of model 
4.11 we also gathered that the coefficients in two sub­
periods were not significantly different from each other.
IV. 7 SuTBTnary-
A perusal of the results mentioned brings out 
interesting features. The growth of electricity sales to 
the three consumer groups as well as for all taken together 
were better explained by the semi-log models. The t- 
statistics comparing the growth-rates of sub-periods show 
that the growth-rates for respective consumer groups are 
different in two periods. The effects of the explanatory 
variables were found to be significantly different in the 
first sub-period compared to the second sub-period, only 
for industrial electricity demand and per capita 
electricity sale; whereas in the case of agricultural
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consumers and "other” consumers the independent variables 
did not affect the electricity demand differently in the 
two sub-periods.
IV.7.1 Price and income elasticities.
Generally, the effects of income was found to be 
significantly different from zero in all consumer groups. 
Since all the models were log-linear, the coefficients of 
income in the restricted model, that did not allow for the 
difference in the effect of independent variables in the 
two sub-periods, show the income elasticities for the 
respective consumer groups. The income elasticities are 
summarised in Table IV.5.
Table IV.5
Incone and price elasticities: (All-India).
Income elasticities Price elasticities.
Consumer group Period Period
1953-86 1953-72 1973-86 1953-86 1953-72 1973-86
Per capita electricity
sale. 3.83 5.57 2.25 -0.616 -1.05 (-0.01)
Industrial consumers. 2.81 3.25 1.37 -1.05 -0.65 (+0.099)
Agricultural consumers. 0.663 - - -0.415 -
"Other" consumers. 0.651 - - -0.028^ -
Note: Income elasticities for all consumer groups and Per capita sale are statistically significant 
at 1% significance level. Figures in the brackets are statistically insignificant at 10% 
significance level.
§ Significant only at 10% significance level.
As can be seen from Table IV.5, the income 
elasticities for the agricultural consumers and "other" 
consumers in the period 1953-86 are below 1, and there was 
hardly any difference in the numerical value of the income 
elasticities of these two groups. The income elasticities 
of all sectors taken together and the industrial consumers 
were above one. Also, for per capita electricity sale and 
the industrial electricity demand, the income elasticity 
was higher in the period 1953-72 compared to income
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elasticities in the respective consumer groups in the 
period 1973-86. The difference in the income elasticities 
of industrial consumers and agricultural consumers is very 
large. This indicates that the income elasticity of 
electricity demand aggregated over different consumer 
groups can be very misleading and so disaggregation of 
electricity demand by consumer group is important for both 
the explanation and any consideration of policy 
implications. Similarly, aggregation of electricity demand 
by any consumer group over different regions could also be 
misleading and it is important, if possible, to observe the 
effect of income in a particular region on electricity 
demand in that region.
From the restricted models for respective consumer 
groups, the price elasticities can be observed directly by 
observing the coefficient of price. The price elasticities 
are also summarised in Table IV.5.
In the case of price elasticities we observe that in 
the period 1953-86, the numerical value of the price 
elasticities of the four groups is very different. The 
absolute value of the price elasticity was the highest in 
the case of the industrial consumer group and it was the 
lowest in the case of the "other" consumers. For the period 
1953-72, the price elasticities for industrial consumers 
and per capita electricity sale were significantly 
different from zero, but in the period 1973-86 the price 
elasticities for these two groups were not significantly 
different from zero.
Thus, it was difficult to generalise the possible 
reasons for the observed growth-rate in electricity sale to 
different consumers. But there are some similarities in the 
response of all consumers and individual consumer groups 
(three in our sample) to the independent variables like 
income and price. High and significant income effects on 
one hand and on the other low or negligible price effects
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indicate that electricity sale may continue to grow. And to 
fulfil growing electricity demand, the utilities may have 
to plan higher capacity.
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Appendix to Chapter IV.
Explanation of the data.
The index of total electricity sale:(ITSALE,), index of 
electricity sales to industrial consumers:(IISALEt ), index 
of electricity sales to agricultural consumers:(lASALEt ) , 
and index of electricity sales to "other**
consumers : ( lOSALEt) -
The index of electricity sales to all consumers 
included electricity sold to domestic and commercial 
consumers, agricultural consumers, low tension and high 
tension industrial consumers. It also included the 
electricity used by railways, public water supply, public 
lighting and electricity sold to bulk purchasers. It 
covered only electricity distribution by the public sector 
i.e., the electricity boards and the municipalities.
The annual data on electricity sales in million KWH to 
respective consumer groups were taken as dependent 
variables in the models for respective consumer groups. 
Electricity sales to industrial consumers included sales to 
the high tension as well as low tension industries. The 
data included electricity distribution by the public 
sector, and did not include electricity generation and 
distribution by the captive power plants owned by the 
industrial groups.
The electricity sales for agricultural purposes was 
very difficult to measure. Usually, in the rural areas the 
connection given for a strictly agricultural purpose i.e., 
an electrified pumpset-used for irrigation, was found to be 
used for domestic lighting as well, hence, it was very 
difficult to separate the electricity sales for domestic 
purposes in the rural areas from the electricity sales for 
agricultural purposes. Thus, electricity sales to 
agricultural consumers also had some element of domestic 
demand.
The data on the electricity sales to **other** consumers 
were derived by deducting the sum of electricity sales to 
agricultural and industrial consumers from the total 
(aggregate) electricity sales.
The data on electricity sales were taken from various 
reports published by Central Electricity Authority in their 
annual publication: Public Electricity Supply-All India
Statistics. The data on electricity sales to different 
consumer groups were converted into indices, taking 1962 as 
the reference year.
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Index of per capita electricity sales:(IPCSe).
The data on per capita electricity sales were taken 
from various reports published by Central Electricity 
Authority in their annual publication: Public Electricity 
Supplv-All India Statistics. According to the reports, the 
data regarding the per capita electricity sale were derived 
by dividing electricity sales to all consumers by the total 
population. Electricity sales to all consumers included the 
electricity supply by not only the public utilities but 
also the private sector i.e., the electric companies. 
These data were converted into an index taking 1962 as the 
reference year.
Index of per capita income:(IPCl^ ) -
Per capita income (PCI) refers to the per capita 
income in the country at 1970-71 (constant) prices. The 
data were taken from the Economic Survevs of various years. 
Data on PCI were converted into an index taking 1962 as the 
reference year. Like the IPCSe, the IPCI has a lower 
growth-rate compared to the Index of Gross domestic 
product.
Index of Industrial Production:(IIP^).
The index of industrial production was derived with 
the help of the data on industrial production at constant 
prices i.e., 1969-70 prices, and the data were then
converted into an index taking 1962 as the reference year. 
The data on industrial production were taken from the 
Economic Survev for the period 1947 to 1986. The index of 
industrial production has been growing steadily except for 
disturbances in the late sixties and in last two years of 
the seventies. It grew the fastest in the year 1985-86.
Gross Domestic Product:(IGDP^)-
The data on gross domestic product depicts the value 
of gross domestic product in India at 1970-71 prices. The 
series was converted into an index taking 1962 as the 
reference year. The data on gross domestic product includes 
agricultural production and industrial production. The data 
on gross domestic production were taken from the Economic 
Survey for the period 1947 to 1986.
"Pressure of demand variable":(PD^ ) .
First, the estimated log(IIP) was calculated by 
making IIP a function of time, and then the fitted values 
of IIP were taken. We find log(IIP) = 3.0671 + 0.0661t. (R^  
= 0.97). The fitted values of the index of industrial
production were deducted from the actual values of the
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index of industrial production to get the "pressure of 
demand” variable. i.e.[log(IIPt - estimated IlPt].
The Index of average price of electricity to all
consumers: (RlATRe^) -
Since the electricity prices differ for each state and 
union territories, and within the state for each consumer 
group, it was difficult to calculate the price charged per 
unit of consumption. Hence, the average revenue i.e., total 
revenue divided by the total electricity sales, was taken 
as a proxy for the price of electricity. This in fact
represented the weighted average of the prices paid by
different classes of consumers. Since electricity in this 
category was also an input in the process of production, 
the price index was deflated by the wholesale price index. 
The wholesale price index (all commodities) for all India, 
with 1962 as reference year, was used to deflate the index 
of the average price of electricity and the index reflects 
the real average price of electricity that the consumer had 
to pay. The index of the (nominal) average price of 
electricity charged to all consumers followed an upward 
path. A sharp increase in the nominal price was observed 
after 1981. The increase in the average electricity price 
was less than the increase in the prices of all
commodities.
The data on the total revenue earned were given by the 
Central Electricity Authority in their reports till the 
year 1977-78. After 1977-78 the information was available 
from the Central Electricity Authority though it was not 
published in their annual reports.
Index of real average price for the industrial 
consumers: (RllAR^), index of real average price for the 
agricultural consumers: (RIAAR^), index of real average price 
for "other" consumers:(RIOAR^).
To avoid one of the aggregation problems i.e. 
aggregation of revenues over the consumer categories, 
average revenue by each consumer group was calculated. The 
average revenue was taken as the proxy for the average 
price.
The data on average price charged to industrial 
consumers were converted into an index taking 1962 as a 
reference year. This index was then divided by the price 
index of industrial production. The outcome was the 
deflated index of average price charged to industrial 
consumers which was taken as a proxy for electricity prices 
for industrial consumers.
The data on real average prices charged to
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agricultural consumers were derived by dividing the index 
of average revenue from agricultural consumers by the price 
index of agriculture products in the economy.
The revenue earned from electricity sales to "other" 
consumers was derived by deducting the revenue earned from 
electricity sales to industrial and agricultural consumers 
from the total revenue earned. The average price charged to 
"other" consumers was derived by dividing the revenue 
earned from electricity sales to "other" consumers by 
electricity sales to "other" consumers. The index of the 
average price charged to "other" consumers was derived by 
taking 1962 as the reference year, and was deflated by the 
wholesale price index for all commodities in all India.
The data on revenue earned from respective consumer 
groups were also given by the Central Electricity Authority 
in their reports till the year 1977-78. After 1977-78 the 
information was available from the Central Electricity 
Authority though it was not published in their annual 
reports. The data on wholesale price index and price 
indices of agricultural and industrial production were 
collected from the Planning Commission in New Delhi.
Number of agricultural consumers : ( lANCt), number of "other" 
consumers : ( lONC^ ).
The number of agricultural consumers include all the 
consumers connected by the electricity boards for 
agricultural purposes, though electricity boards would come 
to know about the purpose only if the consumer informs the 
board and requests to be billed on the basis of 
agricultural tariffs.
The number of "other" consumers include the consumers 
connected by electricity boards where the electricity is 
used for commercial, residential, public lighting, public 
water works and railways. There are geographical areas in 
India that have electricity but are not legally connected 
by electricity boards and therefore do not have electricity 
meters. For example the slums in the cities do not have 
electricity meters and thus are not connected legally by 
electricity boards, but the population living in the slums 
do use electricity for various purposes including 
entertainment facilities (e.g. T.V. sets). However these 
consumers were not included in the number of "other" 
consumers. And to that extent it is an underestimation of 
the actual number of consumers using electricity.
The data on number of consumers were taken from the 
Public Electricity Supply-All India Statistics, a yearly 
publication by the Central Electricity Authority.
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Number of villages electrified:(INV^).
The Government of India in its objectives in all Five 
Year Plans included the objective of electrifying as many 
villages as possible. Therefore every year, many new 
villages were electrified. The data on the number of 
villages electrified include all the villages electrified, 
not just the new villages electrified in that year. These 
data were taken from the unpublished records of the Central 
Electricity Authority at New Delhi. The number of villages 
electrified does not necessarily reflect the number of 
potential consumers in the village. Sometimes even if only 
one connection was given to the village (for example to the 
Gram-Panchayat office for light and sometimes a fan during 
village council meetings) that village was considered as if 
the whole village was electrified.
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Results.
Table 4.1 
Model (4.3):
Log(IPCSe|.) =logbg^ +b 3^loq(IPCIj.) +b2 1^og(EIATE|.) +e^ .j 
Result:
Period 0^3 1^3 2^3 T 2 D-W statistic
1953-86
-16.86 3.83 -0.6164 0.9103 0.62238
SE (3.53) (0.38) (0.29)
T-stat. -4.7 9.9 2.1
RSSl = 1.28
Table 4.1a
Model (4.4):
Log(IPCSe^) = logb^j +b^^ ^^og(IPCI^) +bg^D*log(IPCI^) +b^ l^oc|(RIATR^ )
Result:
Period b04 bl4 2^4 *>34 *>44 *>54 D-W statistic
1953-86
-25.85 16.71 5.57 -3.31 -1.05 1.04 0.9575 1.9
SE (4.24) (5.2) (0.47) (0.64) (0.4) (0.51)
T-stat. -6.09 3.21 11.7 -5.16 -2.63 2.02
RSS2 =0.5158
F-statistic: RSSl - RSS2/no. of restrictions
RSS2/(no. of obs.- no. of explanatory variables).
1.28-0.5158/3
0.5158/28 
= 13.93
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In order to observe the sign of the coefficients and whether they are significantly 
(statistically) different fron zero or not, we can calculate the coefficient of income and price 
in the second period and their respective standard errors (fron which t-statistic can be 
calculated) in tte following manner.
(i)Coefficient of income in the second period =(624 +B34)
(ii)Coefficient of price in the second period =(6 ^^  +8^)
The SE(i) = [Var(&2 )^ +Var(03 )^ +2Cov(62 ,^63 )^]
and SE(ii) = [Var(6 ^^ ) +Var(8^) +2Cov(8^,8^)]
Alternatively, one can estimate the model in the following form,
Log(IPCCe^) = 8 3^3(0 1 ) +833 (^8 2 ) +823gDl*log(IPCI,.) +8333D2*log(IPa|.) +8 3^3Dl*log(EIAPe,.) 
+8 g3gD2*log(tnPe^) +£ 3^3... (4.3a)
where IPCCe^, IPCI^ and BIAPe^ are same as defined earlier and D1 and D2 are the dummy variables 
such that Dl=l for the period 1953-72, and D1=0 for the period 1973-86. D2 is such that D2=0 for 
the period 1953-72 and D2=l for the period 1973-86. 8233 and 8^33 refers to the coefficients of 
income and price respectively in the first period whereas ÉL3 and 8533 are the coefficients of 
income and price respectively in the second period. If the t-swtistic is statistically significant 
the coefficients are significantly different from zero, otherwise not. Both methods yield the same 
result but this method reveals the statistical significance of the coefficients more readily.
Table 4.1b
Calculated coefficients for two period and their respective T-statistics.
PCI RIATR
Period 1 (1953-72) 5.57 -1.056
T-st. 11.72 -2.6
Period 2 (1973-86) 2.25 (-0 .0 1 1 )*
T-st. 5.24 -0.033
* Insignificant coefficient.
Table 4.2 
Model (4.5):
Log(IISALE^) =logbgg +b3glog(IIP^) +b2glog(PD) +e|.g 
Result:
Period 0^5 1^5 2^5 D-W.
1947-72
S.E
T stat.
-4.5 2.00 
(0.19) (0.044) 
-23.7 45.2 
(0.40)* 0.99 
(0.26) (0.04) 
1.5 20.5
-1.35
(0.23)
-5.66
0.992 1.14
1973-86
S.E
T stat.
-0.87
(0.17)
-4.96
0.975 1.6
* Insignificant coefficient.
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Table 4.3 
Kodel (4.6):
Log(IISÀLE^) =logbgg +bjglog(IGDP^) fb^gloglRIIAP^)
Result:
Period »06 bl6 bgg D-W Statistic
1953-86
-3.6 2.8 -1.05 0.9823 1.67
SE (0.44) (0.073) (0 .1 1 )
T-stat. -8.24 38.7 -9.15
RSSl =0.4282.
Table 4.3a
Model (4.7):
Log(IISALE^)= logbgy +bjyD +b2ylog(IGDP^) +bgyD*log(IGDP^) +b^yloq(RIIAB^) +bgyD*log(RIIAR^) +e^ y 
Result:
Period b07 1^7 **27 **37 **47 **57 T 2 D-W Statistic
1953-86
SE
T-stat.
-7.35
(1.4)
-5.14
5.61
(1 .6 )
3,3
3.25
(0 .1 2 )
26.2
-1.87
(0.4)
-4.6
-0.65
(0 .2 1 )
-3.1
0.75
(0.35)
2.1
0.9906 1.72
RSS2 = 0.2059
F-statistic : RSSl - RSS2/no. of restrictions
RSS2/(no. of obs.- no. of explanatory variables) 
= RSS1-RSS2/3
RSS2/28 
= (0.4282-0.2059)/3
0.2059/28 
= 10.08.
Table 4.3b
Calculated coefficients for two period and their respective T-statistics.
IGDP RIIÀR
Period 1 (1953-72) 3.25 -0.65
T-st. 26.3 -3.1 ,
Period 2 (1973-86) 1.37 (0.099)
T-st. 3.52 0.357
* Insignificant coefficient.
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Table 4.4 
Kodel(4.8):
Loç(IASÀLE|.) =logbgg +bjgloq(IGDP^) +b2gloq(lÀNC^ ) +bgglog(INV^) +b^glog(RIÂAB^) +e^ g 
Result:
Period 0^8 bl8 2^8 *>38 *>48 D-W Statistic
1953-86
SE
T-stat.
-0.248
(0.99)
-0.24
0.663
(0 .2 0)
3.28
0.37
(0.08)
4.29
0.431
(0 .1 1)
3.67
-0.4151
(0.09)
-4.3
0.9974 1.739
RSSl = 0.1640.
Table 4.4a
Kodel (4.9): 
Loç(IASALE^ )=
Result:
logb«g + b,«D +b2«log(IGDPJ +bggD*log(IGDPJ 
+bggIoq(IHV^) +bygD*log(D&^) +bgglog(RIAARj.)
+b.glog(IAKCJ +brqD*log(IANCJ 
+bggD*log(RIÀAR^) +e^ g
Period bgg 1^9 2^9 *>39 *>49 *>59 *>69 *>79 *>89 *>99
1953-86
7.2
SE 2.3 
T- 3.1 
Stat.
-9.4
3.3
-2.8
-1.3
0.62
-2.1
1.8
0.95
1.9
0.63
0.1 0
6.1
0.32
1.12
0.28
0.5 -0.4 -0.4 0.15 
0.5 1.19 0.1 0.31 
5.0 -0.3 -3.6 0.5
R’^  = 0.9982
D-W statistic =1.559
RSS2 = 0.0933
F-Statistic RSSl - RSS2/no. of restrictions
RSS2/(no. of obs.- no. of explanatory variables) 
RSS1-RSS2/5 0.164-0.0933/5
RSS2/24 0.0933/24
= 3.6.
154
Table 4.5 
Kodel (4.10):
Log(IOSÀLE^) =logbQ^ Q +b^ g^log(IGDPj.) fb^ j^ g log(IOHC^) +b3jglog(RIOAR^) +e^ jg 
Result:
Period
^010 ^110 ^210 3^10 T 2 D-W Statistic
1953-86
SE
T-stat.
-1.53
(0.58)
-2.6
0.651
(0.16)
3.97
0.703
(0.05)
12.49
-0.028
(0 .0 2 )
-1.1
0.9988 1.2
RSSl =0.0298.
Table 4.5a
Kodel (4.11):
Log(IOSÀLE^) =logbQ33 '‘^11]? +b2^ 1og(IGDPJ +lK^D*log(IGDP^) tb^ ^^  log(IONC^) +bg33D*log(IOKC^)
^  ... .... - 'Ü1Result:
Period
^011 ^111 ^211 3^11 4^11 5^11 *>611 7^11
1953-86
-0.8 -1.0 0.33 0.48 0.81 -0.1 0.03 -0.09
SE (0 .6 ) (1 .0 ) (0 .2 ) (0.4) (0 .1 ) (0 .2 ) (0.04) (0.07)
T-stat. -1.3 -1.0 1.6 1.22 12.5 -0.7 0.76 -1.2
R“2 = 0.9994
D-W statistic = 1.76
RSS2 =0.0168
F-statistic : RSSl - RSS2/no. of restrictions
RSS2/(no. of obs.- no. of explanatory variables) 
= RSS1-RSS2/4
RSS2/26 
= 0.0298-0.0168/4
0.0168/26 
= 5.0.
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The data 
Table 1
Year Dependent variables 
ITSALE IPCSe 
(1) (2) (3)
Independent Variables 
IPCI RIATR 
(4) (5)
1947 17.97 21.03 n.a n.a
1948 19.92 24.74 n.a n.a
1949 21.4 25.77 n.a n.a
1950 22.25 32.16 83.24 n.a
1951 25.66 36.7 83.61 n.a
1952 26.79 39.17 84.99 n.a
1953 29.96 43.09 88.87 94.12
1954 33.47 47,42 89.44 91.47
1955 38.06 52.98 90.69 100.69
1956 42.61 54.43 93.74 101.12
1957 50.03 57.52 89.9 103.48
1958 57.38 63.29 95.42 108.01
1959 66.42 71.75 95.08 103.5
1960 74.09 78.76 99.82 104.7
1961 88.05 89.89 100.73 97.72
1962 100.0 10 0 . 0 1 00.00 100.0
1963 116.67 112.16 102.96 98.47
1964 129.66 118.55 108.57 98.0
1965 143.13 126.59 99.82 93.86
1966 155.93 136.49 98.51 95.14
1967 174.99 147.62 104.91 83.01
1968 199.97 160.61 105.23 77.23
1969 219.82 172.16 109.43 82.13
1970 234.08 185.15 113.04 95.78
1971 251.95 193.4 111.93 84.66
1972 262.79 198.55 107.91 89.28
1973 268.99 200.99 110.96 85.28
1974 281.77 204.10 110.32 74.17
1975 322.53 226.7 118.09 61.97
1976 356.59 246.14 116.02 65.51
1977 370.76 257.73 123.82 67.11
1978 413.79 269.97 127.86 66.72
1979 418.03 269.05 118.34 69.77
1980 440.96 272.86 124.74 62.29
1981 483.14 291.28 128.52 54.36
1982 511.74 303.19 128.88 65.14
1983 547,91 318.32 136.44 73.97
1984 610.67 347.46 138.37 75.85
1985 658.48 366.96 142.49 74.3
1986 728.52 393.79 145.03 79.9
ITSALE (2) = Total electricity sales in million units, (i.e., GWH, or million KWH.) 
IPCSe (3) = Electricity sale per consumer in Kilowatt hours.
IPCI (4) = Index of per capita income at 1970-71 prices.
RIATR (5) = Index of real average price charged to electricity consumers.
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Table 2
Years Dependent Variable 
IISALE 
(1 ) (2 )
Independent Variables 
IIP KIIAE 
(3) (4)
IGDP
(5)
1947 16.28 36.19 n.a 56.27
1948 18.67 47.64 n.a 69.62
1949 19.59 33.19 n.a 62.6
1960 19.86 46.34 n.a 66.1
1961 23.3 46.98 n.a 66.48
1962 24.46 48.67 n.a 68.87
1963 27.56 49.6 128.92 73.26
1964 31.09 63.03 126.12 75.24
1966 36.84 57.6 130.67 77.71
1966 40.6 62.28 116.7 81.94
1967 47.04 64.7 116.89 80.46
1968 66.1 69.67 126.69 87.26
1969 64.5 76.3 126.69 88.7
1960 73.1 83.48 121.88 94.74
1961 88.06 91.16 93.14 97.98
1962 10 0 . 0 1 00.0 100.0 100.0
1963 120.84 108.29 99.36 106.12
1964 132.56 117.6 88.19 113.28
1966 143.98 128.43 92.12 107.29
1966 166.64 127.9 100.37 108.37
1967 174.31 127.38 102.82 117.72
1968 197.49 136.04 102.32 120.96
1969 216.46 146.24 106.72 128.63
1970 226.62 163.68 107.6 136.84
1971 241.32 160.13 107.18 137.88
1972 246.96 169.36 106.66 136.39
1973 247.76 172.12 101.67 143.14
1974 249.36 176.66 117.83 144.8
1976 286.66 183.96 116.64 168.64
1976 317.36 189.64 127.46 169.87
1977 326.21 212.64 126.93 174.08
1978 364.06 227.14 142.24 174.47
1979 360.64 229.76 156.44 176.16
1980 366.66 236.82 139.02 189.19
1981 404.76 267.26 129.96 189.3
1982 404.02 267.26 149.01 199.26
1983 435.6 281.69 190.94 204.48
1984 480.7 297.98 192.62 220.83
1986 610.9 322.42 193.83 228.91
1986 646.36 444.12 214.66 240.67
IISALE (2) = Electricity sales to industrial consumers in million kilowatt hours,
IIP (3) = Index of industrial production at 1970-71 prices.
EIIAk (4) = Average revenue earned fron electricity sales to industrial consumer group (in paise), 
IGDP (5) = Index of gross domestic product at 1970-71 prices, reference year 1970 = 100.
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Table 3
Years Dependent Variable Independent Variables
lASALE BIÀAB INV lANC
(1 ) (2 ) (3) (4) (5)
1947 11.35 n.a. 7.21 n.a.
1948 11.02 n.a. 9.52 n.a
1949 13.06 n.a 10.27 n.a
1950 14.65 n.a. 12.68 8.17
1951 18,4 n.a. 13.93 10,32
1952 19.5 n.a 14.3 12.15
1953 19.4 76.32 16.19 13.51
1954 20.97 69.12 19.09 15.24
1955 23.09 83.32 20.64 19.74
1956 28.65 76.94 24.01 26.6
1957 49.35 64.16 30.01 31.85
1958 52.87 73.22 43.19 37.1
1959 68.32 63.8 62.95 44.92
1960 75.48 67.12 78.86 57.67
1961 89.82 75.15 82.45 82.92
1962 10 0 . 0 0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1963 104.5 113.55 103.54 108.48
1964 126.57 99.29 127.45 138.74
1965 171.44 85.22 141.04 169.0
1966 190.89 81.67 155.31 215.27
1967 234.28 68.9 187.54 262.05
1968 314.04 68.69 215.14 344.32
1969 342.01 81.2 253.67 456.27
1970 405.09 77.06 305.58 566.4
1971 453.61 75.76 361.01 646.93
1972 536.3 82.16 420.03 791.57
1973 571.83 73.07 480.1 909.52
1974 703.46 60.33 539.16 1012.1
1975 790.3 59.53 596.97 1109.9
1976 871.83 67.4 639.2 1160.7
1977 915.93 68.69 696.1 1278.7
1978 1090.0 62.73 746.03 1385.1
1979 1219.0 64.23 800.75 1507.7
1980 1313.0 62.13 859.33 1642.6
1981 1377.5 56.74 936.7 1791.7
1982 1614.6 60.25 1020.0 1928.6
1983 1652.3 61.87 1114.2 2072.1
1984 1899.5 55.19 1195.7 2209.7
1985 2122.5 53,95 1274.0 2365.6
1986 2557.1 53.39 1342.6 2567.1
IASÀLE (2) = Index of electricity sales to agricultural consuuers, 
RIÀÀR (3) = Index of real prices charged to agricultural consumers. 
IHV (4) = Index of number of villages.
IANC (5) = Index of number of agricultural consumers.
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Table 4
Years Dependent Variable Independent Variables.
lOSALE RIOÀR lOMC
(1 ) (2 ) (3) (4)
1947 24.66 n.a n.a
1948 26.08 n.a n.a
1949 28.8 n.a n.a
1960 31.16 n.a 28.7
1961 34.39 n.a 32.03
1962 36.47 n.a 36.22
1963 39.63 68.61 38.14
1964 43.66 67.1 41.38
1966 48.32 73.29 47.8
1966 61.94 86.49 63.7
1967 68.98 89.26 67.16
1968 66.19 93.87 60.6
1969 71.6 94.77 68.3
1960 76.66 99.32 76.73
1961 87.6 102.39 88.11
1962 100.0 100.0 100.0
1963 107.46 103.49 110.19
1964 121.9 114.06 126.27
1966 133.63 108.06 142.36
1966 148.47 103.66 158.7
1967 162.34 86.26 176.83
1968 179.06 80.77 190.24
1969 199.6 83.33 210.36
1970 216.66 107.12 229.18
1971 233.36 84.16 264.84
1972 244.66 91.66 279.07
1973 256.52 88.93 307.62
1974 272.72 77.18 329.43
1976 312.64 60.96 352.12
1976 344.47 61.86 369.24
1977 369.78 68.71 403.87
1978 392.73 61.1 438.22
1979 418.23 69.6 462.08
1980 443.69 49.46 603.32
1981 492.23 37.9 560.14
1982 666.47 36.97 698.3
1983 606.0 26.86 641.79
1984 673.79 31.37 702.88
1985 729.98 28.33 769.18
1986 814.42 30.04 826.3
lOSALE (2) = Index of electricity sale to other consimers, 
RIOAR (3) = Index of real prices charged to other consumers. 
lOMC (4) = Index of number of other consumers.
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CHAPTER V
ELECTRICITY DEMAND ANALYSIS: CASE STUDY II.
Electricity demand analysis at state level-
In a vast country like India the power situation in 
different parts was and continues to be diverse. There were 
differences in the availability of resources, in the growth 
of installed capacity to generate electricity, in the 
generation from the installed plants, and in the efficiency 
of the plants. The differences in the level of population, 
economic activity, living conditions and climate lead to 
differences in the pattern of electricity demand. Since the 
differences in the level of economic activity also affect 
the total income/output of each region, the effect of 
income on electricity demand is unlikely to be the same as 
that observed for "all India" in the previous Chapter. 
Similarly, the choice of the plant mix in each region is 
affected by the availability of primary energy sources in 
that region which in turn affects generation costs. In 
theory these cost differences should be reflected in 
prices. Thus, electricity prices in different regions are 
unlikely to be the same. In practice, the tariffs charged 
to electricity consumers in different regions were found to 
be different, and the effect of electricity price on the 
level of electricity demand may also vary across the 
different regions in India. This Chapter aims to find the 
effects of independent variables like income and price on 
electricity demand by two important consumer groups, 
agricultural and industrial, in four different states in 
India.
V.l Regional differences in the growth of electricity 
industry.
After Independence, the government of India decided to 
define each State's territory on the basis of language. It 
took quite some time for this to be achieved. By 1960-61
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most of the states had well defined geographical borders 
and also their own state governments with their own set of 
energy policies. There were some states in the North and 
North-East region which were formed after 1960-61. Table 
V.la and V.lb give data on the installed capacity, 
generation, peak load, system losses and per capita 
electricity sales in different states in India. There was 
considerable variation in the level of installed capacity 
in 1960-61, and this continued into 1970-71 and 1985-86. 
As can be observed from Table V.2, the average system 
losses, though they remained almost same in the year 1970- 
71 as in 1960-61, increased in the year 1985-86. On the 
other hand, the average peak load, installed capacity, 
generation and per capita electricity sales increased 
continuously in the period 1960-61, 1970-71 and 1985-86.
The coefficients of variation measured in percentages over 
the states in 1960-61, 1970-71 and 1985-86 for system
losses and per capita electricity sales reveal decreasing 
variance in per capita electricity sales, but not in system 
losses. Each of these indicators need to be discussed 
individually.
V.1.1 Installed CapacityiTICK
Capacity is installed on the basis of the requirement 
of power (KW) in the region. Installed capacity at the all 
India level increased at an average rate of 9.74% per 
annum. Out of the 16 states/union territories, for which we 
have the data, 7 of them had higher than average growth 
rates per annum. These states were Andhra Pradesh, Assam, 
Jammu & Kashmir, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka and 
Uttar Pradesh. In 1960-61 these states had very low 
installed capacity. And as a result of government 
intervention the investment in generating capacity was 
made, and hence we observe these higher than average 
growth rates.
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Table V.la
Installed capacity, electricity generation, peak load, system losses and per capita electricity 
sale in different states in India in 1960-61, 1970-71 and 1985-86.
State I.e. Genera- Peak System PCSe Of
tion. Load Losses Elect.
MW. 'GWH. MW. % of Gen KWH.
À.P.
1960-61 269.8 900.1 186.4 20.63 19
1970-71 656.9 3,244.1 660.6 24.77 55.66
1985-86 3,365.6 12,269.3 - 22.28 182.2
Assam
1960-61 19.4 36.3 10.9 16.14 4
1970-71 179.7 369.1 92.4 17.87 21.56
1985-86 432.2 844.6 - 24.27 52.57
Bihar
1960-61 350.9 1,596.8 307.9 10.88 41
1970-71 499.1 1,372.3 296.8 23.58 65.14
1985-86 1,594.4 3,348.1 - 15.77 94.08
Gujarat
1960-61 333.3 1,271.2 251.5 16.1 52
1970-71 696.8 2,967.5 597.9 16.59 138.02
1985-86 3,316.2 12,934.2 - 25.09 303.57
J.& K.
1960-61 13.0 43.5 8.5 21.84 14
1970-71 40.4 168.2 36.9 21.49 37.53
1985-86 205.5 877.7 - 38.97 128.85
Karnataka
1960-61 191.1 1,058.0 184.3 14.6 44
1970-71 863.7 4,690.6 844.6 14.28 104.26
1985-86 2,529.8 7,597.7 - 24.24 189.08
Kerala
1960-61 137.3 581.8 131.1 19,99 29
1970-71 548.1 2,137.0 523.9 12.1 75.54
1985-86 1,309.0 5,362.1 - 25.78 139,29
Madhya Pradesh
1960-61 267.5 477.0 132.7 14.1 20
1970-71 995.6 3,594.9 805.6 14.35 54.13
1985-86 2,943.8 11,478.6 - 19.55 168.32
Maharashtra ‘
1960-61 759.5 3,267.9 619.0 11.76 52
1970-71 2,329.4 10,343.0 2,117.6 13.1 158.43
1985-86 6,883.9 26,440.3 - 15,68 313.9
Orissa
1960-61 136.3 489.6 83.5 15,87 43
1970-71 529.8 1,522.9 351.9 5.48 95.68
1985-86 1,234.7 3,677.7 - 23.95 134.15
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Table V.lb
Installed capacity, electricity generation, peak load, system losses and per capita electricity 
sale in different states in India, in 1960-61, 1970-71 and 1985-86.
State I.e. Genera­ Peak System PCS Of
tion Load Losses Elect.
MW. GWH. MW. % of Gen. KWH.
Punjab
1960-61 277.1 1,003.6 245.9 23.2 33
1970-71 1,272.0 4,468.0 1,085.0 35.46 158.62
1985-86 2,449.3 10,688.9 - 18.27 423.23
Rajasthan
1960-61 70.7 108.4 25.8 24.24 11
1970-71 88.7 166.6 34.0 11.91 49.8
1985-86 1,229.9 4,746.6 - 26.18 142.98
Tanilnadu
1960-61 517.5 2,213.7 453.6 19.29 51
1970-71 1,965.5 5,038.0 1,739.7 17.21 129.53
1985-86 2,528.9 8,632.2 - 18.5 218.18
Ü.P
1960-61 397.4 1,252.3 267.3 17.33 15
1970-71 1,351.2 5,724.7 1,259.7 23.63 60.24
1985-86 4,354.7 12,326.8 - 21.12 117.29
H.B.
1960-61 753.7 2,318.7 567.3 7.21 84
1970-71 1 ,212.1 4,055.9 872.7 8.3 117.6
1985-86 2,694.4 8,004.1 - 19.32 131.33
Union Territories.
Delhi
1960-61 76.3 310.7 66.1 10.12 188
1970-71 314.3 1,353.3 283.4 9.62 285.5
1985-86 256.6 1,158.2 - 23.7 516.32
All India:
1960-61 4,579.1 16,937.1 3,545.9 14.67 38.2
1970-71 14,708.9 55,827.6 12,532.9 17.5 89.76
1985-86 46,769.3 17,0350.1 - 21.74 177.98
Source: Public Electricity Supply: All India Statistics, op.cit.
V.l.2 Generation,
The amount generated (column 2 in Table V.la and V.lb) 
depends mainly upon three factors, i) percentage of 
installed capacity available, ii) average capability of the 
available plants, iii) water availability affecting hydro­
electric plants and iv) load curve of the region. The first 
three factors affect the ability of the system to generate
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electricity at any time and the fourth factor allows the 
supply system to decide what the actual generation should 
be. Whichever is lesser of what can be generated and the 
demand for electricity is the amount actually generated. 
Due to technical reasons, what is actually generated is 
always less than the generation when installed capacity is 
fully utilised. At the "all India" level, generation 
increased at the average rate of 9.67% per annum.
Table V.2
Kean, Standard Deviation, Coefficient of Variation of installed capacity, electricity generation, 
peak load, system losses and per capita electricity sale in India; in 1960-61, 1971-72 and 1985-86.
I.e. Generation Peak
Load
System
Losses
PCSe Of 
Electricity.
N 16 16 16 16 16
Kean(1960-61) 285.7 1,058.1 221.4 16.45 43.7
1970-71 846.5 3,201.0 725.2 16.85 100.45
1985-86 2,333.1 8,149.2 
Standard Deviation
n.a. 22.67 203.46
1960-61 - - 4.75 42.2
1970-71 - - 7.29 63.23
1985-86
Coefficient of Variation.
5.35 121.45
1960-61 - - 0.28 0.96
1970-71 - - 0.432 0.629
1985-86 - - 0.236 0.597
n.a. = not available, - = not calculated.
Source: Calculated on the basis of the data presented in Tables V.la and V.lb.
Out of the 16 states, only five states had high annual 
average growth rates, these states were Andhra Pradesh, 
Assam, Jammu & Kashmir, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh which 
had all experienced high growth in capacity as well. But in 
states like Karnataka and Uttar Pradesh, though the annual 
average growth-rate of installed capacity was high, the 
annual average growth-rate of generation is very close to 
9.0% which is slightly below average.
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V.1.3 Peak load.
The rate of growth of peak load reflects the behaviour 
of consumers: whenever the demand for electricity by most 
of the consumers tends to increase at a particular hour, 
the peak load increases at a fast rate. Pricing policy can 
play a very important role here. A differential rate 
structure depending upon the time of demand can avoid the 
fast rising peak and thereby economise on the investment in 
creating additional capacity to meet the additional peak 
load demand (KW) and also spread load, with better 
utilisation of the capacity at off-peak times.
The electricity tariff policy in each state depends 
upon the State Electricity Board (SEE), for the consumers 
do not have a choice to select their supplier: there
prevails a "natural monopoly" in each state. If peak load 
pricing was tried and was effective, then, other things 
being equal, the peak load should have grown more slowly 
than installed capacity. The available data for peak load 
after 1972-73 may not represent the true peak demand (KW), 
since after 1972-73 only the restricted peak load was 
reported. So the actual rise in peak load is unknown to us. 
Nevertheless, after the early nineteen seventies oil 
crisis, the demand for electricity seems to have gone up in 
parallel with the restricted peak load of the system as a 
whole.
V.1.4 Svstem losses.
In the process of production and distribution of
electricity it is technically inevitable that some portion 
of electricity is lost. The difference between the 
electricity available in a system and the quantum of
electricity sold to the consumers (within the state and
outside the state) is the amount of loss incurred by the
system in the process of transmission, transformation and
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distribution.®^ System losses also included the electricity 
unaccounted for. However the extent of loss can be 
controlled and kept to an optimum level by proper planning 
and a technically sound distribution system. Apart from the 
loss due to technical reasons such as leakages, overloading 
of lines, lack of maintenance, lack of improvement of lines 
etc., there are other social reasons for such unaccounted 
loss of electricity in the course of its distribution. 
Unmetered or unauthorised use of electricity, theft of 
electricity by consumers (especially in the large and 
growing areas of slums in the large cities), use of energy 
by some of the staff of the electricity department without 
metering it, are just some of the other reasons for the 
difference between the quantum of electricity generated and 
sold. Part of such losses could be wiped out if proper 
vigilance is introduced and strict discipline is 
maintained.
The loss of electricity in the course of transmission 
and distribution causes loss in revenue to the State 
Electricity Boards. The system losses as a percentage share 
of generation at the "all India" level has increased at the 
average rate of 1.58% per annum. Out of 16 states, 10 
states experienced a rise at a higher rate than observed 
for India as a whole. In states like Orissa, Rajasthan and 
the union territory of Delhi, the system losses decreased 
till 1970-71, but it increased after 1971.
From the data on percentage loss of energy available 
in different states in India, it is very difficult to 
generalise the reason for decreasing/increasing system 
losses. System losses depend upon geographical location of 
despatch centres and load centres, economies of scale (for 
example, over long distances it is cheaper to transmit
®^ Energy Available = (generation by SEE + from the 
public utilities in adjoining states) - energy used by 
power station auxiliaries.
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electricity at high voltage) etc. These characteristics do 
vary across states. Therefore, though it is important to 
optimise the system losses in every state, it is not 
possible to generalise the possible reasons for high system 
losses.
V.1.5 Per Capita Sale of electricity :fPCSe).
Per capita electricity consumption is taken as one of 
the indicators of development by the World Bank. Per capita 
electricity sales in India as a whole increased at an 
annual average growth rate of 6.34%. In India, since 
Independence, one of the national objectives has been 
balanced regional growth. The coefficient of variation for 
per capita sale of electricity reveals that, though the 
disparity has decreased over the period, i.e. the 
coefficient of variation in per capita sale of electricity 
over the states was 96% in 1960-61, 63% in 1970-71, and was 
still as high as 59% in 1985-86 (Table V.2). In the states 
of Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, Madhya 
Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Kerala and Punjab, the 
per capita sale of electricity was lower than at the all- 
India level. Of these, Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, Madhya 
Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Kerala continued to have lower 
per capita sale of electricity even in the year 1985-86. 
There were three other states (Orissa, Bihar and West 
Bengal) that joined the group of states having lower than 
average per capita sale of electricity in the year 1985-86. 
Thus, the situation between states changed over the period 
under study but did not necessarily improve in all states 
over the same period.
In order to study the demand pattern and the effects 
of price and income on electricity demand in more detail, 
I have chosen four states from four different regions of 
India; Maharashtra from the Western region, Kerala from the 
Southern region, Bihar from the Eastern region and Punjab
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from the Northern region.*"
V.2 A Study of four States in India: Maharashtra. Kerala. 
Bihar. Punjab.
Bihar has a total geographical area of 1.74 lakh 
square Kilometres and ranks sixth in the country in terms 
of area. It is the second most populated state in the 
country. Even though the state is endowed with water 
resources, much of it has remained untapped. The cropping 
pattern in Bihar is dominated by food-grains. Rural 
electrification and agricultural activities have received 
increasing attention in recent years but, according to the 
Reserve Bank of India (RBI),** the power supply situation 
is a major constraint to the efficient utilisation of tube- 
wells. Even though several large-scale industrial units are 
located in the state, it largely remains a backward state. 
Apart from the large scale demand for power by the heavy 
engineering and steel units located in South Bihar, the per 
capita power demand in Bihar as a whole remained quite low. 
Two agencies look after the generation of power and its 
distribution in Bihar. These are the Bihar State 
Electricity Board (BSEB) and the Damodar Valley Corporation 
(DVC). The latter was established in 1948 and is 
responsible for the unified development of the Damodar 
Valley, covering an area of 2,423,559 Square Kilometres in 
the states of Bihar and West Bengal. Thus, the power supply 
in Bihar comes not only from the power plants under the 
BSEB, but also from its share in DVC.
Kerala is the smallest of the four Southern states. It
** Consistent data were not available for long periods 
from the states in North-Eastern region, hence it was not 
possible to include any state from the North-Eastern 
region.
** "Agriculture productivity in Eastern India", Report 
of the Committee on Agricultural productivitv in Eastern 
India. Reserve Bank of India, Volume II, (1984), p.251.
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has the advantage of abundant rainfall from the South West 
monsoon. It has the highest population density and the 
highest literacy rate in India. In 1976-77, the state 
government of Kerala completed a programme of rapid 
industrialisation. Nearly 10,000 small scale units, 
manufacturing a variety of products were started involving 
a total investment of around Rs. 150 crores (i.e. 1,500
millions). The state government also accelerated the tempo 
of electrification of irrigation pump-sets; 97% of its 
villages were electrified by the year 1986-87.
Maharashtra is the third largest state in India, both 
in area and population. It has the highest installed 
capacity and generation of electrical energy in the 
country. It accounts for one fourth of the industrial 
production and one-sixth of power demand by the industrial 
sector in the country. Since Maharashtra has attached 
special importance to the electrification of agricultural 
activities in order to wipe out its food deficit; demand 
for electricity from agriculture has been growing fast.
The present state of Punjab has shrunk in size by 
nearly half in terms of population, and more than half in 
terms of area since its reorganisation in 1966. But the 
compact state that was left after the formation of Haryana 
and enlargement of Himachal Pradesh, proved to be a 
prosperous one, with a high level of per capita income. The 
industrial advancement that has taken place in Punjab has 
so far been oriented towards small-scale and medium-sized 
industry. The hosiery and textile units in Amritsar, sports 
goods in Luthiana, the mini steel plants and engineering 
units all over the state contributed to the growth in 
industrial load in Punjab. Energy supply to agriculture 
has also been a top priority in Punjab, which is the first 
State to have achieved the green revolution in India.
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V.2.1 Installed capacity, plant mix and generation in the 
four states in the period 1961-86.
Installed capacity increased at the fastest rate 
(annual average rate), of 10%, in the state of Bihar. In 
Kerala the installed capacity increased at the rate of 9% 
per annum, in Maharashtra at 7.9% and in Punjab it 
increased by 5.9%. It is important to remember that the 
level of installed capacity for each one of the four states 
was not the same in 1960-61.
Graph V.l
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From Graph V.l, we can observe that the installed 
capacity was growing steadily in Kerala but in the year 
1961 Kerala had only 137.3 MW of installed capacity. In the 
remaining states the total installed capacity has also been 
growing steadily; but for various purposes the 
categorisation of the installed capacity under different 
ownership was changed. Hence we find that the installed 
capacity as reported under the ownership of the public
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sector did not have a steady but a misleading irregular 
increase. For example, Maharashtra had a fairly steady 
increase in installed capacity after 1964. The states of 
Maharashtra and Gujarat were combined states till 1960 but 
in May 1960 Maharashtra was separated from Gujarat. The 
power stations located in the region of Gujarat were 
counted as the property of the Gujarat Electricity Board 
and likewise for Maharashtra. The Tata Electric Company's 
(TEC) share of installed capacity was counted in the 
Maharashtra State Electricity Board (MSEB)'s total 
installed capacity till 1963 but not after 1963. After 
1963, TEC's share of installed capacity was considered as 
a part of the installed capacity of private undertakings. 
In Bihar for that matter, it was only after 1963 that the 
Damodar Valley Corporation (DVC) was considered as a 
corporation separate from the Bihar State Electricity 
Board (BSEB), and hence in 1963 BSEB started with only 50 
MW of installed capacity. Central Electricity Authority 
(CEA), decided to compare the maximum demand with the 
installed capacity but they could not split the data on 
maximum demand (KW) of such stations hence the reports^* 
till 1972-73, reported the installed plant capacity and 
generation of jointly owned projects under the state that 
had the maximum share. In the case of Punjab, the 
installed capacity of the joint hydro-electric plant was 
counted in the installed capacity of the Punjab State 
Electricity Board hence, the installed capacity appears to 
have decreased in the year 1974.
Public Electricity Supply: All India Statistics. 
Central Electricity Authority, Department of Power, 
Ministry of Energy, Government of India, New Delhi, (annual 
publication).
From the interviews with CEA officials in April 
1989, New Delhi, (India).
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Table V.3a
Plant nix in the four states; i.e., Maharashtra, Kerala, Bihar and Punjab. Percentage share of 
hydro-electric plants and coal based thermal plants in the total installed capacity.
Year % share of hydro plants.
Mahar- Kerala Bihar Punjab 
ashtra
% share of thermal plants. 
Mahar- Kerala Bihar Punjab 
ashtra
1961 37.1 96.5 12.5 91.1 58.3 0 82.2 2.8
1962 36.7 96.5 12.5 96.5 57.5 0 81.5 1.0
1963 51.7 97.5 0 96.3 43.6 0 61.3 1.6
1964 59.1 99.4 0 94.9 34.6 0 72.1 2.6
1965 48.6 99.5 0 94.8 46.7 0 74.9 2.6
1966 45.9 97.7 0 93.6 50.0 0 79.1 3.9
1967 52.1 99.0 0 95.0 45.0 0 88.6 3.1
1968 52.4 99.7 0 98.1 44.8 0 91.1 1.3
1969 51.5 99.7 0 98.3 47.0 0 93.1 1.1
1970 51.9 99.7 1.4 98,4 47.3 0 93.8 0.2
1971 44.2 99.7 2.0 98.4 55.0 0 94.7 1.1
1972 44.4 99.7 1.6 97.6 54.8 0 95.6 1.1
1973 44.0 99.7 2.3 95.2 55.8 0 94.8 1.1
1974 46.3 99.5 2.4 91.9 53.5 0 94.7 0.6
1975 41.3 99.5 2.4 80.6 58.7 0 94.8 12.9
1976 47.4 99.6 2.4 71.8 52.6 0 94.7 22.5
1977 45.2 99.8 2.1 73.5 54.8 0 95.9 23.0
1978 42.4 100 9.5 71.7 57.6 0 89.0 26.8
1979 38.4 100 9.5 70.1 61.5 0 88.9 28.9
1980 36.5 100 9.5 70.2 63.5 0 88.9 28.5
1981 33.0 100 15.9 70.4 67.0 0 82.7 28.6
1982 30.5 100 15.9 71.3 66.7 0 82.8 27.7
1983 27.1 100 14.2 66.4 67.9 0 84.6 25.8
1984 23.6 100 12.9 75.3 72.0 0 86.0 24.0
1985 22.0 100 10.9 62.4 73.9 0 88.6 37.1
1986 19.7 100 9.4 64.4 70.5 0 90.2 35.1
Source: Public Electricity Supply-All India Statistics, op.cit.
From Table V.3a and V.3b we can gather information 
regarding the plant mix in the four states.
The installed capacity in hydro-electric plants 
increased by 9.1% per annum in Kerala, by 5.7% per annum in 
Maharashtra and by 4.3% per annum in Punjab. The installed 
capacity in the coal-based plants increased at an average 
annual rate of 10.7% in Bihar, 9.5% in Maharashtra, 20.1% 
in Punjab. Bihar was a dry state and continues to be one.
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Table V.3b
Plant Mix in the Four states; i.e., Maharashtra, Kerala, 
plants and oil plants in the total installed capacity.
Bihar and Punjab. Percentage share
Year % share of gas plants. 
Mahar- Kerala Bihar 
ashtra
Punjab
% share of oil plants. 
Mahar- Kerala Bihar 
ashtra
Punjab
1961 0 0 0 0 4.5 3.4 5.2 6.0
1962 0 0 0 0 5.7 2.5 5.9 2.4
1963 0 0 0 0 4.5 2.5 38.6 2.1
1964 0 0 0 0 6.1 0.6 27.8 2.4
1965 0 0 0 0 4.6 0.5 25.1 2.5
1966 0 0 0 0 4.0 2.3 20.9 2.3
1967 0 0 0 0 2.9 0.9 11.4 1.8
1968 0 0 0 0 2.6 0.3 8.8 0.5
1969 0 0 0 0 1.4 0.3 6.8 0.5
1970 0 0 0 0 0.7 0.3 4.7 0.3
1971 0 0 0 0 0.7 0.3 3.3 0.3
1972 0 0 0 0 0.7 0.3 2.7 1.1
1973 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.2 2.7 3.6
1974 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.5 2.7 7.4
1975 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.5 2.7 6.4
1976 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.4 2.7 5.6
1977 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.1 1.9 3.4
1978 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 1.4 1.3
1979 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.9
1980 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.9
1981 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.9
1982 2.7 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.8
1983 4.9 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.6
1984 4.3 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.6
1985 4.0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4
1986 9.7 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4
Source: Public Electricity Sunolv-All India Statistics, op.cit.
From the pie charts (Graph V.2) for two diffe:
years i.e., 1961, and 1986 we can observe that the 
installed capacity in Kerala has been predominantly in 
hydro-electric plants, whereas in Bihar the coal-based 
plants have dominated the scene.
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Punjab in fact had very low (7.27 MW) capacity in 
coal-based plants in 1960 hence the high growth rate. 
Kerala did not have coal-based plants at all, while Bihar 
had few hydro-electric plants. The availability of coal led 
Bihar to concentrate its plant capacity in coal-based 
plants. Oil-based plants have never been important except 
in Bihar in the sixties but their share in the total 
installed capacity declined rapidly till 1973. Punjab had 
a major share of its installed capacity in hydro-electric 
plants but its share declined after 1973. This could be due 
to more expensive unit costs of generating electricity from 
any incremental hydro-electric plants. This could be due to 
either capital intensive hydro-electric projects or the 
potential sites for the hydro-electric plants may have been 
on those rivers where the flow of water was not expected to 
be flowing at a constant force in all seasons. In 
Maharashtra the share of hydro plants in the total 
installed capacity has been fluctuating between 20 to 50 
per cent of the total installed capacity until 1977, and 
has since been continuously declining as new investment has 
been mainly in the coal based plants. Except for 
Maharashtra (and there only after 1982), gas based plants 
have not been installed in any of the four states during 
the whole sample period.
As can be seen from Graph V.3, generation of 
electricity has been growing steadily in four states though 
at different rate. Generation of electricity has been 
growing at an annual average rate of 9.6% in Kerala. In 
Bihar, generation was growing by 8.4%, at 6.5% per annum in 
Maharashtra and at 6.5% per annum in Punjab. The installed 
capacity reflects the planned generation of electricity but 
as discussed in Chapter II, the ability to generate 
electricity depends upon the percentage availability of 
installed capacity, average capability of the plant and the 
amount of water coming down to hydro-electric plants. While
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the actual generation depends upon these three factors and 
the load curve. When there is no excess demand, generation 
reflects the characteristics of demand. Over a period of 
time the fuel used in different final activities gets 
replaced by electricity; and if there is excess demand, the 
full utilisation of the plants becomes possible and the 
generation reflects the availability of electricity supply. 
It is quite likely that economic activities in Maharashtra 
and Bihar led to increases in the peak load i.e., maximum 
demand (KW), rather than just increase in total energy 
supplied and that this led to fast increases in installed 
capacity.
V.3 Intensity of plant utilisation in the four states.
The supply of electricity from the electricity system 
depends very much on technical efficiency in production and 
distribution. The important parameters that are commonly 
used in discussing technical efficiency of the electricity 
generating plants are the "load factor", "plant factor" and 
"diversity factor". As discussed in Chapter II, it is
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important to recognise the fact that one can not compare 
these parameters in absolute terms and these parameters do 
not reflect technical efficiency unless compared with 
planned values of these parameters. Hence, we will discuss 
only system losses as a measure of technical efficiency and 
observe if optimising system losses would lead to any 
increase in social gain.
V.3.1 System losses.
As discussed in Section V.1.4, it is not possible to 
avoid system losses completely in any system. And it is 
difficult to generalise the reasons for the high system 
losses. But from Table V.4, we observe that the system 
losses in four states in India were very marked.
Graph V .4
S y s t e m  l o s s e s  ( %  o f  e n e r g y  a v a i l a b l e )
40
35
: 25
/\
/\
1 0
5
1961 19 70 i960 1906
f Ba I s
B I I b i  I i ia l i  B i l i Z B x l t i i  F m s j a b
177
From Graph V.4, we can observe that except in Bihar 
after 1977, and Maharashtra over the whole period, the rest 
of two states have not been successful in either optimising 
the losses or in maintaining a constant level of system 
losses.
Table V.4
System Losses in absolute terms and as percentage share of generation, in four states? i.e., 
Maharashtra, Kerala, Bihar and Punjab.
Year System Losses
In MKWH. (absolute terms)
System Losses as a percentage 
of energy available in the state.
Mahar­
ashtra
Kerala Bihar Punjab Mahar­
ashtra
Kerala Bihar Punjab
1961 520.5 134.7 272.5 240.5 15.9 21.3 15.07 23.9
1962 503.8 130.2 390.8 225.3 13.8 17.3 24.6 12.1
1963 561.7 140.5 145.9 310.0 13.9 18.3 10.2 13.0
1964 625.1 169.4 121.4 312.0 14.7 20.9 11.7 10.4
1965 754.1 213.5 175.5 365.0 14.8 23.9 14.2 11.4
1966 863.2 207.3 174.2 507.8 15.3 21.6 12.8 14.8
1967 1,098.7 248.9 200.6 541.8 17.3 21.4 12.6 14.2
1968 1,024.5 239.2 425.7 459.6 15.0 16.6 21.5 11. 0
1969 1,124.5 274.9 343.6 527.7 15.2 16.9 17.8 21.2
1970 1,019.0 321.3 453.1 587.6 12.5 15.7 19.7 18.7
1971 1,213.3 278.0 559.3 631.9 13.7 12.9 24.5 22.4
1972 1,276.1 394.1 652.1 756.2 12.6 17.3 15.2 24.2
1973 1,253.6 358.2 997.3 701.7 12.3 15.3 20.8 23.2
1974 1,737.9 428.1 932.6 725.3 16.3 16.8 24.7 20.7
1975 1,835.0 908.9 1,134.3 534.5 16.3 34.5 25.1 19.1
1976 1,978.2 464.1 908.1 625.8 17.1 16.7 18.4 15.0
1977 2,384.8 452.5 1,064.5 835.7 17.5 14.4 19.8 18.2
1978 2,568.6 534.9 963.5 758.3 16.9 1 2. 0 18.1 16.6
1979 2,986.3 637.8 957.4 1,019.7 18.3 12.3 16.8 16.7
1980 2,679.0 844.7 931.5 1,240.3 16.9 16.4 18.1 19.8
1981 3,147.3 783.8 836.8 1,070.3 17.9 14.9 16.9 17.1
1982 3,185.3 848.5 963.9 1,219.2 17.2 15.3 16.6 18.5
1983 3,411.9 939.2 972.1 1,340.2 17.3 20. 6 16.4 18.4
1984 3,729.3 1,104.7 933.4 1,498.0 17.1 29.3 15.4 18.5
1985 3,713.6 1,256.4 978.7 1,479.0 15.4 25.2 15.7 18.3
1986 4,254.4 1,435.6 1,089.7 1,859.7 15.7 25.8 15.7 18.7
Source: Public Electricity Supolv-All India Statistics, op.cit.
States like Punjab had system losses (as percentage of 
generation) as low as 11% in 1968, which shows the 
possibility of keeping the system losses to that low level,
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but a conscious effort and coherent policy to optimise 
system losses and maintain that level seem to be missing in 
these states.
In Section V.1.4, it was also discussed that there are 
technical as well as social reasons for system losses. From 
an economic point of view the losses due to social reasons 
could be regarded as transfer payments because the real 
unmetered electricity is still used for 
productive/consumable purposes. But the loss of electricity 
in the course of distribution causes loss in the revenue to 
the State Electricity Board and this revenue loss should be 
optimised.
It would be interesting to know, if the State 
Electricity Boards were successful in their efforts to 
optimise the system losses, what would be the effect on the 
social gain from using electricity?
In order to get an idea about the effects on social 
gain if system losses were reduced by for example 33% (or 
1/3), we need to know what would have been the extra supply 
of electricity as a result of reduction in system losses by 
one t h i r d . T a b l e  V.5 shows the extra supply as a result 
of reducing system losses by one third. This indicates the 
extent to which electric utilities in the respective states 
would have reduced electricity shortages. Using the nominal 
price of electricity in respective states over the years, 
we can calculate the gain in revenue of respective State 
Electricity Boards. This shows that the State Electricity 
Boards would be able to reduce the shortages in supply and 
also increase their earnings.
Usually electricity generated in any state is less 
than the electricity available in any state. This is so 
because different states get their respective share of 
electricity from the centrally owned power stations. But we 
can assume that the system losses as a percentage of energy 
available was the same as the system losses as a percentage 
of energy generated.
179
fable V.5
Extra supply of electricity (in HKWH) in four states and the nominal price of unit electricity in 
four states; i.e., Maharashtra, Kerala, Bihar and Punjab.
Year Extra Supply as result of reduction in 
System losses by one third.
In HKWH. (absolute terms)
Price charged per KWH in each State. 
(Paise per unit.)
Bihar Kerala Maharashtra Punjab Bihar Kerala Maharashtra Punjab
1961 80.21 44.9 173.2 80.17 14.95 11.95 14.54 9.5
1962 124.64 43.4 167.4 75.1 14.95 11.95 14.54 9.5
1963 5.00 46.8 187.9 103.33 14.95 10.3 15.96 9.5
1964 6.87 53.11 214.1 119.92 16.0 10.3 15.96 9.5
1965 10.21 71.17 250.7 121.67 19.9 13.4 15.96 9.5
1966 8.84 69.1 287.4 169.27 19.9 13.46 16.26 . 10.23
1967 17.57 82.97 365.2 180.6 19.9 13.46 13.13 10.23
1968 55.88 79.73 341.2 153.2 21.2 16.68 13.13 10.23
1969 37.22 91.63 388.3 175.9 21.24 16.68 17.62 10.23
1970 71.51 107.10 322.2 195.87 22.76 17.51 17.62 10.23
1971 112.07 92.67 361.9 210.63 22.76 17.51 17.62 10.23
1972 77.83 131.37 408.2 252.07 23.53 17.51 14.58 10.23
1973 142.18 119.4 405.8 233.9 23.53 17.82 18.56 10.16
1974 163.87 142.7 533.7 241.77 23.76 17.82 18.56 10.16
1975 180.17 302.97 586.5 178.17 30.4 18.42 20.7 19.19
1976 130.94 154.7 614.9 208.6 34.48 18.41 22.67 23.88
1977 162.71 150.83 741.6 278.57 34.32 19.46 22.67 23.88
1978 155.55 178.3 815.8 252.77 34.32 19.46 22.67 23.88
1979 138.48 212.6 944.9 339.9 34.32 23.23 32.82 28.41
1980 159.35 281.57 873.4 413.43 40.07 23.23 32.82 28.41
1981 128.48 261.27 1,054.0 356.77 51.85 29.7 38.67 32.11
1982 142.91 282.83 1,071.1 406.4 65.0 29.7 46.91 42.33
1983 150.51 313.07 1,161.3 446.73 65.5 33.45 52.0 45.28
1984 126.22 368.23 1,249.0 499.33 77.93 34.02 54.57 48.28
1985 145.36 418.8 1,215.4 493.0 77.93 35.18 57.64 48.28
1986 175.99 478.54 1,381.9 619.91 77.93 35.18 71.98 59.09
Source: Extra Supply in four states is calculated on the basis of the data presented in Table V.4. 
The data on price charged in four states were collected from unpublished sources of respective 
State Electricity Board.
The consumers would value each extra unit of 
electricity supply more than the price that they pay for 
one unit of electricity. This would be the case since the 
consumers would not have been able to get what they want at 
the price that they paid during shortages. So, the social 
gain of each extra unit of electricity would be more than 
the revenue earned by the SEBs for each extra unit of 
electricity supplied. Thus, the revenue gain as a result of
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reduction in system losses by one third gives us lower 
estimate of social gain.
Table V.6
The revenue gain to the State Electricity Boards in four states; i.e., Kaharashtra, Kerala, Bihar 
and Punjab, (in million Rupees).
Year Extra Revenue as a result of reduction in system losses by one third.
Bihar Kerala Kaharashtra Punjab
1961 11.99 5.36 25.18 7.62
1962 18.63 5.19 24.33 7.13
1963 0.75 4.82 29.99 9.82
1964 1.1 5.47 34.16 11.39
1965 2.03 9.57 40.01 11.55
1966 1.75 9,3 46.73 17.31
1967 3.49 11.17 47.95 18.47
1968 11.86 13.29 44.8 15.67
1969 7.9 15.28 68.42 17.99
1970 16.27 18.75 56.76 20.04
1971 25.5 16.22 63.77 21.55
1972 18.31 23.00 59.52 25.78
1973 33.45 21.28 75.32 23.76
1974 38.94 25.43 99.05 24.56
1975 54.77 55.8 121.42 34.19
1976 45.15 28.48 139.39 49.81
1977 55.84 29.35 168.11 66.52
1978 53.39 34.69 184.95 60.32
1979 47.53 49.39 310.14 96.56
1980 63.85 65.41 286.64 117.46
1981 66.61 77.6 407.57 114.56
1982 92.9 84.00 502.45 172.03
1983 98.58 104.72 603.88 202.28
1984 98.36 125.27 681.56 241.1
1985 113.28 147.33 700.56 238.02
1986 137.16 168.35 994.72 366.3
Source: Calculated from Table V.5.
Even if the reduction in system losses is achieved 
only by reducing electricity theft, the revenue to SEBs 
would increase. And the social gain would still be higher 
than the revenue gain, if the marginal value of electricity 
to thieves is less than the marginal value of electricity 
to those consumers who suffer from electricity shortages. 
Usually the marginal value of electricity would be more 
than zero. Whereas the marginal value of electricity to
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those who want to buy it, would be at least the price per 
unit that they are expected to pay. Thus, reduction in 
system losses by reducing theft would mean transferring 
electricity to those to whom it is worth at least the price 
they were expected to pay, from those to whom it is worth 
less than the price they were expected to pay.
Thus, irrespective of whether the utilities are able 
reduce system losses by reducing theft or by optimising 
losses while transmitting and distributing, there is bound 
to be some social gain. And the lower limit of this social 
gain is approximated by the revenue gain as shown in Table 
V.6 . Our examination of four states can now be summarised. 
The plant mix in the sample of four states was different 
and hence the cost of generation and distribution was also 
different. Also, the level and combination of economic 
activities were different leading to differences in the 
pattern of demand in each state. Hence, we find differences 
in the rate at which generation was increasing compared to 
the rate at which installed capacity was increasing. There 
were also some common features among the four states. The 
high and fluctuating system losses was the main common 
feature though the rate at which system losses were 
fluctuating was found to be different. This indicates the 
possibility of achieving a higher level of generation and 
reduce power shortages with the existing capacity by 
optimising system losses. This can be achieved by conscious 
and vigorous efforts by the State Electricity Boards.
V.4 Time-series analysis of electricity demand for the four 
States.
V.4.1 Growth of electricity sales to industrial and 
agricultural consumers.
In any large and diverse country like India, it is 
difficult to imagine uniformity in her regions. It is quite 
likely that industrial activity dominates the economy of
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one state and not the other. For example as can be observed 
from Table V.7, the share of electricity sales to 
industrial consumers declined over the period though it 
remained quite high in all four states, whereas the share 
of electricity sales to agricultural consumers increased 
over a period of time in all the four states, but at 
different rates.
Table Y.7
Share of electricity sale to industrial consumers and agricultural consumers in total electricity 
sale in the four states; i.e., Kaharashtra, Kerala, Bihar and Punjab.
Year % share of Industrial consumers. 
Hahar- Kerala Bihar Punjab 
ashtra
% share of agricultural consumers. 
Hahar- Kerala Bihar Punjab 
ashtra
1961 68.1 81.5 89.2 61.3 0.5 3.7 1.7 12.8
1962 69.4 83.6 82.5 80.0 0.4 3.0 1.9 7.2
1963 69.9 82.2 78.4 81.1 0.5 3.0 1.5 6.4
1964 77.0 83.4 79.8 86.7 0.7 2.3 1.3 5.0
1965 69.7 81.1 74.9 86.3 1.0 3.3 1.3 5.2
1966 69.9 80.4 77.4 81.5 1.8 3.2 1.5 8.9
1967 69.6 83.2 70.7 80.6 2.1 3.4 2.3 10.0
1968 67.3 84.6 68.3 84.9 2.6 2.6 4.2 6.7
1969 70.2 84.6 67.4 81.2 3.6 3.3 4.2 8.8
1970 69.4 83.9 67.5 74.5 4.3 2.8 4.2 14.6
1971 69.4 82.5 69.7 65.3 4.6 2.7 4.0 22. 0
1972 67.3 81.4 75.4 63.1 4.8 4.3 2.0 24.0
1973 67.9 80.4 73.8 59.8 5.1 4.5 2.7 27.2
1974 69.0 78.2 74.7 59.9 5.5 5.1 2.7 25.6
1975 66.9 76.2 75.9 53.7 7.1 5.6 2.6 31.3
1976 62.5 74.9 69.0 60.6 8.4 6 . 0 12.0 26.5
1977 62.1 74.6 71.3 59.3 8.5 4.8 10.9 25.8
1978 61.2 76.2 73.5 51.9 8.9 3.4 7.1 31.7
1979 60.4 74.9 78.0 50.5 10.7 3.4 4.6 35.4
1980 59.1 70.8 71.4 47.3 10.4 3.4 11.2 38.5
1981 57.9 70.1 71.4 47.1 12.2 2.9 11.5 37.0
1982 57.4 64.5 73.2 46.3 12.5 3.5 10.9 36.6
1983 53.4 61.1 71.0 46.1 15.2 3.6 13.0 36.4
1984 54.9 58.8 71.6 47.7 15.0 3.7 12.9 34.7
1985 52.5 62.2 72.4 45.0 17.6 2.9 11.9 34.3
1986 53.1 60.4 70.1 47.1 17.5 2.6 14.2 35.9
Source; Calculated on the basis of the data on electricity sales to different consumer groups.
Therefore it is important to observe the growth rate of 
electricity sales to different consumer groups.
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V.4.2 Models.
The growth-rates of the electricity sales to different 
consumer group were calculated using the simple and semi­
log growth models. As explained in Chapter IV, Section
IV.1.2, the following two models were used,
Isale^t = (%ioi +€iti ....(from 4.1)
lisaient = otioz .... (from 4.2)
where,
Isale = index of electricity sales,
t = time variable, i.e 1,2,..,26 for the years 1961 to 
1986, and
i refers to the state i.e. 1,2,3,4 for 4 states.
This is the general model therefore it can be used for both 
agricultural and industrial consumer groups.
V.4.3 Results.
Linear and semi-log time trends were fitted to the 
data^°^ for electricity sales to industrial and 
agricultural consumers. From the analysis it was gathered 
that electricity sales to the two different consumer groups 
in all four states were better explained by the semi-log 
models. The annual average growth-rates of electricity 
sales to both the consumer groups in the period 1961-86, in 
four states can be observed from Table V.8. Punjab had the 
lowest growth-rate of electricity sales to industries in 
the period 1961-86. The annual average growth-rate appeared 
to be much the same in the states of Maharashtra, Kerala 
and Bihar: they were statistically different from each
other but the economic difference is probably not 
significant. From the data on electricity sales to
For explanation of the data used please refer to the 
Appendix to Chapter V.
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different consumers in four states, a difference in the 
pattern of growth after 1973 was observed. The growth-rate 
in the first sub-period in the state of Bihar and Punjab 
was statistically not different from the growth-rate in the 
second sub-period in the respective states. However we 
observe a remarkable difference in the growth-rate between 
the sub-periods in the states of Maharashtra and Kerala, In 
both these states the growth-rate of electricity sales to 
industries was much higher in the period 1961-72 compared 
to the growth-rate in the period 1973-86.
Table V.S
Annual average growth-rates (in percentages) of electricity sales to industries and agricultural 
consumers in four states.
State
& consumer group
Period
1961-86 1961-72 1973-86
Bihar
Industrial 6.2 4.05 4.75
Agricultural 16.5 15.0 17.0
Kerala
Industrial 6.3 11.4 3.13
Agricultural 8.21 11.7 (0.006)
Maharashtra
Industrial 6.35 10.0 4.61
Agricultural 22.0 35.15 16.02
Punjab
Industrial 3.9 6.61 6.64
Agricultural 14.93 16.6 11.7
Note: Figures in the brackets are statistically not different from zero. i.e. insignificant 
coefficients.
Electricity sales to agricultural consumers in the 
period 1961-86 also grew at different rates in all four 
states. The growth-rate of electricity sales to agriculture 
was the highest in the state of Maharashtra and the lowest 
in Kerala. Also, the growth rates for the two sub-periods 
were estimated. Except for Bihar, in all other states
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electricity sales to agricultural consumers grew at 
different rates in the two sub-periods; and in those three 
states the growth rate of electricity sales to agricultural 
consumers was found to be higher in the first sub-period 
compared to the second sub-period. In the case of Kerala, 
in the period 1973-86, the electricity sales to 
agricultural consumers did not grow at all.
Differences in the growth-rates of electricity sales 
to both the consumer groups in two sub-periods reflect the 
effect of power cuts in the second period. Except in 
Kerala, electricity sales to the agricultural consumers in 
all states grew at a faster rate than electricity sales to 
industries.
The different growth rates of electricity demand in 
four states may have been due to differences in the growth 
rate of economic activity, and other, demographic 
characteristics of the state. We cannot assume that the 
effects of income and population or number of consumers was 
the same in all four states. Prices charged (average and 
marginal price of electricity) per unit of electricity were 
found to be different in all states. In order to observe 
the effect of prices, income and the number of consumers on 
electricity demand the econometric models specified below 
were used.
V.5 Models for electricity demand bv the industrial 
consumers.
The growth in electricity sales to industries in four 
different states were found to be statistically different 
from each other and there is no prior reason to assume that 
the effects of independent variables on the dependent 
variable will be the same in all four states.
As observed in Chapter IV, Section IV.4.2, generally, 
electricity demand by industrial consumers was expected to 
have been influenced by electricity prices and by income in
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the respective states.
If the data on electricity demand by different 
industries in different states were available, it would be 
ideal to study the effect of income and price on each 
industry in different states. Assuming that the technology 
in any particular industry would be similar all over India, 
if we study the effects of income and price on any 
particular industry in different states, there is no reason 
to suppose difference in the effects of the income variable 
and price on electricity demand of that particular industry 
in different states. This would be the case since there is 
no reason to suppose that a saw mill with some 
capitalisation in one state is particularly different from 
a saw mill with the same capitalisation in other state, or 
a freezer plant in one state is different from a freezer 
plant in another state. Also, we expect the behaviour of 
the entrepreneurs running them would be the same. Since we 
do not have the data on electricity demand by industry in 
our sample of four states, we have to study electricity 
demand aggregated over all industries in any state. We also 
have to use proxy variables.
Electricity sales to all the industries in the state 
is used as a proxy for the industrial demand for 
electricity. Similarly, either industrial production (i.e., 
production from all the industries in the state) or state 
domestic product is used as a proxy for the income 
variable. The proxy used for the income variable (either 
the gross state domestic product or the industrial 
production) depended on the nature of the industries in the 
state. It was expected that in a state where industries had 
already developed to a certain extent, the industrial 
production would be an effective income variable. If the 
industrial activity depended on other sectors of the state 
economy and had more backward linkages, (gross) state 
domestic product would be an effective proxy for the income
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variable affecting the electricity demand by industries in 
the state. We categorised four states in our sample on this 
basis. The state of Maharashtra was industrially developed; 
and Punjab, though not heavily industrialised, had 
experienced the growth of sports goods, hosiery and 
textile, and small steel and engineering industries which 
did not depend on the production of other sectors within 
the state. Hence, it is quite likely that in these two 
states industrial production might be the best proxy for 
the income variable in explaining electricity demand. In 
Bihar, a more or less a backward state, and Kerala, more of 
an agricultural state (except for one electronics industry, 
Keltron), industrial electricity demand may be better 
explained by the gross domestic product in the state. The 
proxy for the price variable in the analysis of electricity 
demand at state level was marginal price (i.e., the tariff 
charged) and not average price. The weighted average of the 
tariff charged to all industries in the state was used as 
a proxy for the price variable. The coefficients of the 
income variable and the price variable in different state 
would be different. And this would be due to the 
differences in the "mix of industries" in different states 
as well as due to imperfections of the proxy variables.
V.5.1 Models.
For the reasons explained in Chapter IV, Section
IV.2.2, it is likely at state level also, that the effect 
of the independent variables would be different in the two 
sub-periods. To see whether this is the case or not, we 
need to test the model without a dummy that reflects power 
shortages (i.e., a "restricted" model that assumes that the 
effects were the same irrespective of power shortages, 
throughout the period) against the model with a dummy 
variable (i.e., a "general" model that allows for different
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effects in two sub-periods) using an F-statistic.^" It is 
not necessary that all the four states will have different 
effects in the two sub-periods, but the possibility of the 
difference in the effects in two sub-periods needs to be 
explored by comparing the following two models for the 
respective states. For Bihar and Kerala, the models are:
log (Usaient) = &oi +6iilog( ISDPit) 4-62ilog(RIITTRit)
+€ti  (5.1)
log(lisaient) = 602 H-^a^logCISDPit) +<S32D*log(ISDPit)
+<!)42log(RIITTRit) +<!»52Ci*log(RIITTRit)
+Ct2  (5.2)
where,
i = 1,2 for states of Bihar and Kerala,
t = reflects that the analysis of the model would be only 
for period t, which in this Chapter would be 1961 to 1986, 
Usaient = index of electricity sales to industries in state 
i in the t"‘ year,
ISDPit = index of domestic product in state i in the t“* year 
at constant prices i.e. at 1970-71 prices,
RIITTRit = index of electricity prices (real) in state i in 
t"" year,
D = dummy variable such that D=0 for the period 1961-72 and 
D=1 for the period 1973-86. To allow for a difference in 
the effect in the two sub-periods of both independent 
variables, a multiplicative dummy is used.
The following set of equations should be analysed for 
the states of Maharashtra and Punjab:
log(lisaient) = <So3+5i3log(ISIPjt) zslog(RIITTRjt) te». .(5.3)
The method to compare two models using an F- 
statistic is explained in Appendix to Chapter V and it was 
also used in Chapter IV.
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log(IIsale^J = 5^ 4 +^^4^ 4-6^,log(ISIPjt) +a„D*log(ISIP,t)
+6 441 og ( RI ITTRjt ) +6^^d*log(RI ITTR^t )
+6t4  (5.4)
where,
j = 3,4 for states of Maharashtra and Punjab,
ISIPjt = index of industrial production in state j in the t^ 
year at 1970-71 prices,
RIITTRjt = index of electricity prices (real) in state j in 
the t^  ^year,
D = dummy variable such that D=0 for the period 1961-72 and 
D=1 for the period 1973-86,
Thus, generally, electricity sales to industrial 
consumers were expected to be affected positively by the 
income variable (i.e., gross domestic product in Bihar and 
Kerala and industrial production in Maharashtra and 
Punjab), and negatively by the price variable (i.e., the 
electricity price charged to industrial consumers). It will 
be interesting to compare the effects of the independent 
variables over the four states.
V.5.2 Results.
Results for the states of Bihar and Kerala.
The results for the state of Bihar and Kerala are 
presented in Table 5.1 and 5.1a in Appendix to Chapter V.
In the state of Bihar, as indicated earlier, 
electricity demand was studied using two independent 
variables, gross domestic product in the state and 
electricity prices. (The number of consumers as an 
independent variable was also studied, but the model was no 
better on the basis of the F-statistic, and the number of 
consumers was not a significant variable that affected the 
electricity demand in the state). From the F-statistic we 
gather that the model without the dummy is better, implying 
that the effects of independent variables are not
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significantly different from each other in two sub-periods. 
The effects of the independent variables were statistically 
significant at the 1% and 5% significance level for the 
income variable and price variable respectively. The gross 
domestic product in the state seems to have affected the 
electricity demand positively in the period 1961-86, and 
the electricity price charged to electricity consumers 
affected electricity demand in the state negatively as 
expected. Observing the numerical values of the 
coefficients we gather that a 1% change in the index of the 
income variable seemed to have increased electricity sales 
by 2.4% in Bihar. Whereas a 1% increase in the prices led 
to decrease in electricity sales by 0.38%. A high 
coefficient on income means that if income increases which 
is likely to be the case, electricity sale would increase
at a higher rate than the income.
From the F-statistic comparing the model without the 
dummy variable and the model with the dummy variable for 
the state of Kerala, we gather that the model with the 
dummy variable (i.e., model 5.2) explained the variations 
in electricity sales better, implying that the effects of 
the independent variables in the two sub-periods were 
different. The t-statistic from the coefficients conveyed 
that the effects of price and income were statistically 
significantly different from each other in the two sub­
periods. From the results presented in Table 5.1a in 
Appendix to Chapter V, one has to calculate the 
coefficients of income and price for the two sub-periods 
using the method explained below the Table 4.1a.
Calculating the t-statistic for the coefficients in the two 
sub-periods (Table 5.2b), we gather that the coefficients 
of income in the two sub-periods were significantly
different from zero. As far as the effects of price are 
concerned we gather that in both the periods the effects 
were statistically not different from zero. The main reason
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for insignificant price effects may be low variation in 
real prices over the period under study. Income 
coefficients had a positive sign in both the periods as 
expected. The coefficient of price in the first period is 
positive implying that the rise in prices led to an 
increase in the electricity demand in the period 1961-72. 
Insignificant but positive price effects could be due to 
imperfection in the proxy variable (i.e. average revenue) 
for price of electricity to industrial consumers in Kerala. 
But in the second period the sign of price elasticity is 
negative, as expected.
Observing the numerical value of the coefficients of 
income for the two sub-periods we gather that a 1% increase 
in income in the period 1961-72 led to an increase in 
electricity sales by 2.5% and 1% increase in income in the 
period 1973-86 led to an increase of 1.6% in the 
electricity sales.
Results for industrial consumers in Maharashtra and Punjab.
As explained earlier, in Maharashtra, industrial 
production was thought to be a better proxy for the income 
variable. It was very difficult to model the electricity 
sales to industrial consumers in Maharashtra. The model 
without the dummy explained the variations in electricity 
sales well (results are presented in Table 5.2 and 5.2a in 
the Appendix to Chapter V). Also the t-statistic on the 
income and the price variables suggested that both the 
coefficients were significantly different from zero. Also, 
the sign of the coefficients were found as expected, but 
there was a problem of auto-correlation. And hence, the 
coefficients become less trustworthy.
When comparing the model with the dummy and the model 
without the dummy (using the F-statistic), we gather that 
the model with the dummy seemed to explain the variations 
in the electricity sales better. Though the t-statistics of 
the coefficients imply that the coefficients of price in
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the two sub-periods were not significantly different from 
each other, the coefficients on the income variable in the 
two sub-periods were significantly different from each 
other. Calculating the t-statistics for the coefficients of 
income in the two sub-periods (Table 5.2b), we gather that 
the income coefficients were significantly different from 
zero in both the sub-periods, whereas the coefficients of 
price in both the sub-periods were not significantly 
different from zero. The coefficients of the income 
variable in both the sub-periods were positive as expected 
(though the sign of the price coefficients in both the 
periods was positive which is again very surprising).
Observing the numerical value of the coefficients in 
the two sub-periods we gather that a 1% increase in the 
index of industrial production in the period 1961-72 led to 
a 2.2% increase in electricity demand; whereas in the 
period 1973-86, a 1% increase in the index of industrial 
production led to an increase in electricity sales to 
0.78%.
The state of Punjab was formed in 1966, and reliable 
data are available only for the period after 1966. From the 
F-statistic comparing the model without the dummy and the 
model with the dummy, we gather that the model without the 
dummy explained the variations in the electricity sales 
better than the model with the dummy. The t-statistic for 
the coefficients, we gather that the coefficients of income 
and price were statistically different fro zero at 5% 
significance level. The sign of the income coefficient in 
that model is positive as expected, but the sign of the 
price coefficient is positive, which is very surprising. A 
1% increase in the index of industrial production in Punjab 
led to a 0.18% increase in the index of electricity demand. 
A 1% increase in the price led to an increase (instead of 
a decrease) in electricity sales by 0.69%. The positive 
price coefficient in Punjab clearly indicates that there
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was something wrong. It is not possible to explain the 
reason econometrically but it could be due to the fact that 
the electricity price for industrial consumers was mis- 
specified in Punjab. It would be interesting to work out 
the extent of mis-specification of electricity prices and 
its implications for the financial performance of the 
electricity board, but due to lack of data on costs we have 
to restrict our study to electricity sale analysis.
Income and price elasticities for industrial consumer 
group.
Since the data on independent and dependent variables 
were transformed into logarithms (i.e., all the models are 
log-linear models), the coefficients can be interpreted as 
elasticities. Comparing the elasticities, we gather from 
Table V.9 that the income elasticity in the period 1961-86, 
was highest in the state of Bihar and lowest in the state 
of Punjab. As far as the price elasticity in the same 
period is concerned, it can be observed from Table V.9 that 
the pricing policy in Bihar was more successful compared to 
other states in discouraging electricity sales.
Table V.9
Income and price elasticities for industrial consumers.
Income elasticities Price elasticities.
State Period Period.
1961-86 1961-72 1973-86 1961-86 1961-72 1973-86
Bihar
2.4 - - -0.38 - -
Kerala
2.22 2.5 1.65 (0.13) (0.48) (-0.28)
Maharashtra
1.48 2.2 0.78 -0.36 (0.22) (0.1)
Punjab
0.18
(1966-86)
- - 0.69 - -
Note: Figures in the bracket represent statistically insignificant elasticity.
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At the other extreme, any increase in the prices in Punjab 
led to an increase in electricity sales in Punjab.
Comparing the effects of income and prices in the sub­
periods, in the state of Kerala and Maharashtra, we gather 
that the income elasticities in the first period were 
higher than in the second period in the respective states. 
However, the price elasticities in both states in both the 
sub-periods were not significantly different from zero. The 
numerical values in absolute terms were found to be less in 
the second period compared to the numerical value of the 
price elasticities in the first period.
V.6 Models for electricity demand by the agricultural 
consumers_
Electricity sales by agricultural consumers as 
observed in Chapter IV, Section IV.5.1, were influenced by 
the income of agricultural consumers and the government 
policy of electrifying villages and encouraging farmers to 
use subsidised electric pumpsets.
As with industrial consumers, there is no prior reason 
to assume that the effects of the independent variables on 
agricultural consumers will be the same in all states. 
Though all the four states were expected to aim at 
electrifying the maximum number of villages every year and 
at encouraging agricultural consumers to use electricity, 
the state electricity boards in the four states did not use 
the same policy measures to encourage agricultural 
consumers to use electricity. For example, in states like 
Bihar, the state electricity board tried to encourage more 
electricity demand by offering low electricity prices to 
agricultural consumers, whereas, Kerala state electricity 
board tried to encourage agricultural consumers by 
electrifying all villages. Punjab electricity board 
implemented a different (flat rate per pumpset) pricing 
policy to encourage electricity use in the agricultural
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sector.
At the state level, it was observed that there was a 
high correlation between the number of consumers, the 
number of villages electrified and the number of 
electrified pumpsets. We assumed the number of consumers to 
be the best proxy for the number of connections since the 
number of consumers includes the number of electrified 
pumpsets and it also reflects the number of villages 
electrified (i.e. unless the village was electrified, 
agricultural consumers could not choose to consume 
electricity for domestic or agricultural purposes).
As far as the income variable is concerned, as 
explained in Chapter IV, at state level also we assumed 
that the ability of an agricultural consumer to install an 
electrified pumpset depended not only on his income from 
farm produce but also on the (state) government's subsidy 
on the electrified pumpsets. The income of farmers was 
assumed to be generated not only from farm produce but also 
from other small business and hand-crafts. Therefore 
(gross) state domestic product was thought to be a good 
proxy for the income variable in the model for electricity 
demand by agricultural consumers. But in the case of 
Kerala, the state government subsidy on electrified 
pumpsets was not a successful measure in itself, since it 
did not provide an incentive to farmers to install an 
electrified pumpset. This was so because the farmer found 
it difficult to afford the variable cost (i.e. electricity 
bills and maintenance of the pumpset) of an electrified 
pumpset in a region where electricity supply was found to 
be unreliable in dry years (particularly when the farmer 
would need to make use of the pumpset). The availability of 
electricity at the time when the farmer needed electricity 
supply was one of the major factors affecting the decision 
of the farmers to install the electrified pumpset. In some 
of the villages that I visited in Kerala, electricity was
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supplied only for couple of hours during the night (i.e., 
from 02.00hrs to 04.00hrs). The non-availability of 
electricity when the farmers wanted to use electrified 
pumpsets discouraged the farmers from installing 
electrified pumpsets. Also, the incentive for a farmer to 
consume more electricity depended not only on his income 
from farm produce, for farmers on the coastline of Kerala 
were involved in subsistence fishing. Electricity demand by 
agricultural consumers in Kerala was assumed to be affected 
by the income from agriculture rather than state (gross) 
domestic product. Also, differences in the crop pattern, 
climate and other irrigation facilities led to differences 
in the irrigation requirement for electrified pumpsets. 
Though it was very difficult to include all these variables 
in the model, the difference in agricultural activities, 
climate and the policy of the electricity boards led to 
differences in the factors that affected the demand for 
electricity in each state.
V.6.1 Models.
For the reasons explained in Chapter IV, Section
IV.2.2, at state level also, it is likely that the effects 
of the income variable, price variable and number of 
consumers in the respective states may be different in two 
sub-periods. To know whether this is so, we need to test 
the model without a dummy variable against the model with 
a dummy variable that allows for different effects in two 
sub-periods. Thus, the possibility of differences in the 
effects of independent variables need to be explored by 
comparing the following set of equations for agricultural 
consumers in Bihar, Maharashtra and Punjab;
log(IAsale«t) = Sos +5i5log(ISDP.t) H-^gglog(RIATTP.^)
+635log(IANC«J +€«  (5.5)
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log(IÀsale„t) = 6^ +626log(ISDP.t) +(!>36D*log( ISDP.^)
+&46log ( RIÀTTIU ) +6^D*log ( RIÀTTR^ ) 
+65slog(INC,J + 6^ ^D*log(IANC.t) +€« ..(5.6)
where,
m = 1,3,4, for states Bihar, Maharashtra and Punjab, 
lAsale^ = index of electricity sales to agricultural 
consumers in the t^ year,
ISDPt = index of domestic product in the t^ year at constant 
(1970-71) prices,
RIATTRt = index of electricity prices (real) in t^ year, 
lANCt = index of number of agricultural consumers,
D = dummy variable such that D=0 for the period 1961-72 and 
D=1 for the period 1973-86.
In case of Kerala, we need to compare the following 
set of equations:
log(IAsale„t) = +(^ i7log(IADPkt) +6 2?log ( RIATTR^t )
+«537log(IANCKt:) +Et7 ............ (5.7)
log(IAsalekt) = 5o« +52«log( lADPkt) +<Î3«D*log( lADPkt)
+ 6 *,log ( RIATTRkt ) + S «D*log ( RIATTRkt ) 
4-fsglog(IANCkt) +&M,D*log(INCwJ +6^ ..(5.8)
where,
k = (2) for Kerala state,
lAsalext = index of electricity sales to agricultural 
consumers in the t^ year in Kerala,
lADPkt = index of agricultural production in Kerala in the 
t^ year at constant (1970-71) prices,
RIATTRkt = index of electricity prices (real) in t^ year in 
Kerala,
lANCkt = index of number of agricultural consumers in Kerala 
in t^ year.
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D = dummy variable such that D=0 for the period 1961-72 and 
D=1 for the period 1973-86.
V.6.2 Results.
Results of agricultural consumers in Bihar, Maharashtra and 
Punjab.
The results for the model without the dummy and the 
model with the dummy for agricultural consumers in Bihar, 
Maharashtra and Punjab are presented in Table 5.3 and Table 
5.3a respectively in Appendix to Chapter V.
In the state of Bihar, from the F-statistic we gather 
that the model without the dummy is better, implying that 
the effects of independent variables are not significantly 
different from each other in two sub-periods. The 
coefficients of income and price in the model without the 
dummy were statistically different from zero at the 1% 
significance level, whereas the coefficient of the number 
of consumers was statistically different from zero only at 
the 25% significance level. The gross domestic product in 
the state seems to have affected the electricity sales 
positively in the period 1961-86, as expected. The number 
of consumers in the agricultural sector also affected 
agricultural electricity sales positively, as expected and 
the electricity price charged to agricultural consumers 
affected agricultural consumers negatively as expected.
Observing the numerical values of coefficients we 
gather that a 1% rise in income led to an increase in 
electricity sales to agricultural consumers by 3.6%. And a 
1% increase in electricity prices (real) led to a decrease 
in electricity sales to agricultural consumers of 0.577%.
In Maharashtra also, the F-statistic proved that the 
model without the dummy explained the variations in 
electricity sales to agricultural consumers better than the 
model with the dummy. It is quite likely that the variation
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(the increase) in the independent variables like income and 
number of consumers is very high in the second period which 
led to a sharp increase in electricity sales in the second 
period. All the coefficients were statistically different 
from zero at the 1% significance level. In the period 1961- 
86, the income variable and the number of agricultural 
consumers variable affected the electricity sales to 
agricultural consumers positively as expected. The price 
variable affected electricity sales negatively in this 
period, as expected. A 1% increase in the income variable 
in this period led to an increase in electricity sales by 
1.1%. A 1% increase in the number of agricultural consumers 
variable led to an increase in electricity sales by 0.84%, 
whereas a 1% increase in real prices led to a decrease in 
electricity sales to 0.28%.
In Punjab, though agricultural electricity sales were 
thought to be influenced by the income in the state, the 
number of consumers and electricity prices for agricultural 
consumers, we gather that the number of consumers did not 
have significant effects on electricity sales and hence, 
the preferable model on the basis of F-statistic was the 
one with only two independent variables, income and price. 
From the F-statistic comparing the model without the dummy 
and the model with the dummy, we gather that the model with 
the dummy explained the variations in electricity sales to 
agricultural consumers better. This implied that the 
coefficients in two sub-periods are significantly different 
from each other in the two sub-periods, but it is difficult 
to trust the coefficients of the first sub-period since the 
first sub-period in the case of Punjab is only from 1966 to 
1972. Hence we have to ignore the coefficients in the first 
period. The coefficient of the income variable in the 
second sub-period was statistically different from zero at 
the 1% significance level, whereas the coefficient of the 
price variable was not significantly different from zero.
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Insignificant, price effects during the period 1973-86 are 
not very surprising since the pricing policy in Punjab was 
on the basis of capacity of the pumpset and not the total 
energy consumed per pumpset. The coefficient on the income 
variable in the second sub-period had positive effects as 
expected and the coefficient on the price variable had 
negative effects as expected. A 1% increase in income in 
this period led to a 2.16% increase in electricity sales to 
agricultural consumers. High income effects are not very 
surprising in case of Punjab, since the effects of the 
green revolution were realised to a great extent and, the 
assured water supply was an important factor. As and when 
farmers, were able to consume electricity on the basis of 
his income, they were encouraged to use electrified 
pumpsets since water was essential.
Results of agricultural consumers in Kerala.
In the case of Kerala, income from agriculture in the 
state was assumed to be a better proxy for the income 
variable. The results are presented in Table 5.4 and 5.4a 
in Appendix to Chapter V.
From the F-statistic comparing the model without the 
dummy and the model with the dummy, we gather that the 
model with the dummy explained the variations in 
electricity sales to agricultural consumers better than the 
model without the dummy. This meant that the effects of the 
independent variables in the two sub-periods were 
significantly different from each other. But, from the t- 
statistic on the coefficient of income, we gather that the 
effects were not statistically different from each other. 
Similar was the case of the price coefficients. But the 
numerical values of the coefficients on the independent 
variables were very different from each other in the two 
sub-periods. The coefficient on the income variable in the 
first sub-period was significantly different from zero, but 
in the second sub-period it was not statistically different
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from zero, though the coefficients of the income variable 
in both the sub-periods had a positive sign as expected. In 
the first sub-period the coefficient on the number of 
consumers variable was significantly different from zero 
and had a positive sign. But in the second period it had a 
negative sign and it was not significantly different from 
zero. The coefficient on the price variable in the first 
sub-period was not significantly different from zero. And, 
contrary to our expectation, the coefficient on the price 
variable in the first sub-period had a positive sign.
On the basis of our calculation (Table 5.4b), with the 
help of the results of the model with the dummy, we gather 
that in the first sub-period, a 1% increase in agricultural 
production led to an increase in electricity sales to 
agricultural consumers by 3.0%. In the second period a 1% 
increase in prices discouraged electricity sales by 0.54%. 
A 1% increase in the number of consumers in the first sub­
period led to an increase in electricity sales to 
agricultural consumers by 0.25%.
Comparing the coefficients of the income variable and 
number of consumers in the model with the dummy and the 
coefficients in the model without the dummy, we can say 
that the effects in the first sub-period dominate the 
effects in the whole period. For example, the model without 
the dummy suggests that a 1% increase in income led to an 
increase in electricity sales by 2.75%, and a 1% increase 
in the number of agricultural consumers led to an increase 
in agricultural electricity sales by 0.23%. The effects of 
the price variable in the second sub-period dominated the 
effects in the whole period. In the period 1961-86, a 1% 
increase in real prices charged to agricultural consumers 
led to a decrease in agricultural electricity sales of 
0.56% which is similar to the effects of prices in the 
second sub-period in the model with the dummy.
Thus, we find that in the states of Kerala and Punjab
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the effects of the independent variables on electricity 
sales to agricultural consumers were significantly 
different from each other in the two sub-periods whereas in 
the states of Bihar and Maharashtra this was not so.
Income and price elasticities for agricultural consumers.
In case of agricultural consumers also, the 
coefficients of the income and price variables can be 
considered as income and price elasticities since the log- 
linear models were analysed. Comparing the income 
elasticities for agricultural consumers in four states from 
Table V.IO, we gather that in the period 1961-86, the 
income elasticity is the highest in Bihar and the lowest in 
Maharashtra. As far as the price elasticities are concerned 
we observe that the price elasticity is the highest in 
Bihar in this period. Bearing in mind that Punjab is a 
special case, the price elasticity is minimum in case of 
Maharashtra. Thus, Bihar and Maharashtra represent two 
extreme cases in the sample of four states.
Table V.IO
Income and price elasticities for agricultural consumers.
State
Income elasticities 
Period
1961-86 1961-72 1973-86
Price elasticities. 
Period
1961-86 1961-72 1973-86
Bihar
3.6 - -0.57
Kerala
2.75 3.0 0.85 -0.56 (0.37) -0.54
Maharashtra
1.1 - -0.28 -
Punjab
2.99
(1966-86)
2.16 (0.26) - (-0 .0 1 )
Mote: Figures in the bracket represent a statistically insignificant elasticity.
The analysis for the sub-periods is valid only in the
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State of Kerala and Punjab. Due to few observations not 
much can be said about Punjab in the first sub-period. In 
Kerala, the income elasticity in the first period is higher 
than in the second period, whereas the price elasticity has 
the correct sign and is significant in the second period.
V.7 Conclusion.
Despite the differences in plant mix and in economic 
activities in the four states that led to differences in 
installed capacity and generation, we found similarities in 
the high and fluctuating system losses.
Similarly while comparing the income effects on 
industrial consumers and agricultural consumers we gather 
that, in the period 1961-86, except for Maharashtra, the 
income elasticities are higher in the case of agricultural 
consumers compared to industrial consumers.
Comparing the price effects on electricity sales to 
agricultural and industrial consumers we gather that except 
in Punjab the (absolute values of) price elasticities are 
also higher in the case of agricultural consumers compared 
to industrial consumers.
Keeping in mind the possible effect of electricity 
shortages after the early 1970s and the oil crisis of the 
early 1970s on electricity sales, it was important to test 
the structural stability of the model. We tried to check 
the structural stability of the models for both the 
consumer groups in four states in India by comparing models 
with and without the dummy variable (i.e. multiplicative 
dummy was used) for the 1973 effect. But we found that 
though the growth-rates in sub-periods were different for 
some states (for example Maharashtra and Kerala) for both 
the consumer groups, the effects of the independent 
variables were not statistically different in the two sub­
periods (for example in Maharashtra especially for 
agricultural consumers). In this case, the effects of
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variations in the dependent variables due to variations in 
the independent variables remained the same before and 
after the electricity cuts and oil crisis. Thus, 
differences in the growth rates of electricity sales were 
more responsive to the price variable and the income 
variable in the state than any other factor.
Comparing the coefficients of the income variable and 
the price variable in two sub-periods where it is 
applicable, i.e., where the model was not found to be 
stable for the whole period, for example Kerala, we found 
that income effects in the first sub-period in both the 
consumer groups were higher than in the second sub-period, 
whereas the price effects for the industrial consumer group 
in Kerala were not significantly different from zero in 
both the sub-periods.
We can conclude that on the whole the agricultural 
sector in the period 1961-86 was more sensitive to changes 
in the income variable and the price variable compared to 
the industrial consumer group. Also, variations in income 
dominated the variations in electricity sales to both the 
consumer groups. The positive price elasticity (for example 
in the case of industrial consumers in Punjab), indicates 
the possibility of mispricing in the electricity industry, 
though the non-availability of data on costs of generation 
and distribution in the four states do not allow us to know 
the extent of mispricing and the consequences of mispricing 
electricity. From this analysis it is also not possible to 
say anything about whether the independent variables 
affected electricity sales differently at different times 
of the day or not.
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Appendix to Chapter V.
A Note on Data.
There are two main sources of data regarding 
electricity generation, total electricity consumption and 
electricity consumption by consumer groups.
The State Electricity Boards (SEBs) are one of the two 
sources and the data that I gathered from the respective 
State Electricity Boards covered, 1) total electricity 
consumption, 2) Electricity consumption by consumer groups, 
3) The revenue earned from electricity sales to different 
consumer groups.
The Central Electricity Authority is the second source 
of data. The Central Electricity Authority (CEA) publishes 
a report called. Public Electricity Supply; All India 
Statistics, every year and it includes data at the All 
India level and at state level on installed capacity,
generation, utilisation, technical data on plants, etc.. In 
the section on utilisation, the reports include data on the 
sale of electricity to different consumers in the state by 
the respective State Electricity Boards and also the total 
sale of electricity in the state, i.e., not only by State 
Electricity Boards.
Thus I have three sets of data on the sale of 
electricity to consumers:
A) Estimation of electricity sales to the consumers 
within the state by the respective State Electricity
Boards.
B) CEA's estimation of electricity sales in the state 
by SEBs.
C) CEA's estimation of electricity sales to consumers 
in different states (i.e., not only by the State 
Electricity Boards).
Ideally the first and the second set of data should 
match exactly; not least because CEA is a central body 
that collects data from the individual State Electricity 
Boards. The data on electricity demand by major consumer 
categories does match exactly but the total electricity 
demand by SEBs as calculated by SEBs is not the same as 
recorded by CEA.
In the second set of data the "energy available"
includes 1) Net generation in own power houses (other than
jointly owned central government projects).
2) Generation from utilities within state/jointly owned 
central government projects except DVC and BBMB.^°®
3) Electricity from other state electricity boards (i.e., 
other than the one under consideration)/Electric 
undertaking including BBMB/ DVC and other countries.
4) Electricity generation from self generating plants.
"Energy sold" is the difference between the energy
DVC: Damodar Valley Corporation, BBMB: Bhakra Beas 
Management Board.
206
available and energy losses. Energy sold includes 1) 
Energy sold to consumers, 2) To licensees in the states, 3) 
To other Boards/countries. Which means that the energy sold 
includes something more than the total sum of energy 
consumption by different consumers in the state, i.e., it 
includes exports for which the consumers within the state 
have not paid. On the supply side i.e., energy available, 
it includes the electricity exchanged through State 
Electricity Boards, from self generating plants, from 
outside the state and from jointly owned projects. In 
reality not all electricity consumption from outside gets 
exchanged through the SEBs hence there is underestimation 
of the actual energy availability in the state. And on the 
consumption side, the energy sold is an overestimation of 
the energy consumed within the state by various consumers.
The third data set [set(c)] estimates energy available 
as the sum of 1) Net generation in own power houses (other 
than the jointly owned projects and central government 
projects), 2) Total power supply in the state from jointly 
owned and central government projects, 3) total power 
supply in the state from the self generating industries, 4) 
Power supply from other states and outside the country. The 
energy sold to the consumers in the state is the difference 
between available energy and not only the losses but also 
the energy sent to other states.
Since the third data set appears to be closer to the 
supply and demand of energy for the consumers within the 
state, we prefer to use that data set consistently 
throughout the analysis.
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Explanation of the data used.
Index of electricity sales to industrial 
consumers: (Ilsalet,), index of electricity sale to 
agricultural consumers:(lAsale^ ).
The annual data on electricity sales to industrial 
consumers in million KWH in each of the four states were 
taken as the dependent variable in the model for the 
industrial sector. The data included electricity sales (by 
electric utilities) to the high tension as well as the low 
tension industries. It did not include electricity 
generation and distribution by the captive power plants 
owned by the industrial groups.
The annual data on electricity sales to agricultural 
consumers in million KWH for respective states were taken 
as the dependent variable in the model for the agricultural 
sector. The electricity sales to agricultural consumers had 
some element of electricity sales to domestic consumers as 
well, since it is difficult to separate the KWH sales for 
irrigation and for domestic purposes when only one 
connection is used for both purposes. It has been observed 
that in many villages in India, even if the connection was 
given to only one consumer (as may be just to the Gram- 
Panchayat office), that village was included in the total 
number of villages electrified. But in reality there may be 
many more potential consumers in the same village. It was 
extremely difficult to know the unfulfilled demand for 
electricity from agricultural consumers.
The data were available from the respective State 
Electricity Boards as well as the Central Electricity 
Authority. To maintain consistency in the source of data we 
have taken the data from CEA for the period 1961-1986. 
Reliable data for Punjab were only available for the period 
1966-1986.
Index of state domestic product: (ISDPt), index of industrial 
production and agricultural production:(ISIP^) .
The data on state domestic product (SDP) were in lakh 
Rupees (i.e. 100,000) at 1970-71 prices for the period
1961-1986. The data on state domestic product were 
converted into an index by taking 1961-62 as the reference 
year, and taken as an indicator of the level of economic 
activity in the respective states.
The data regarding industrial production were 
calculated for the respective states at 1970-71 prices and 
were converted into an index taking 1961-62 as the 
reference year. Thus, data on the index of industrial 
production in Maharashtra and Punjab were used as an
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indicator of industrial activity in the respective states.
The data regarding agricultural production were 
calculated for the respective states at 1970-71 prices and 
were converted into an index taking 1961-62 as the 
reference year. Data on the index of agricultural 
production in Kerala was used as an indicator of income in 
that state.
The data on state domestic product, industrial 
production and agricultural production were taken from the 
publication by the Central Statistical Organisation (CSC) 
in India for the Planning Commission in India, known as 
State Domestic Product.
Electricity price for industrial and agricultural 
consumers : (RIITTR^ ) # (RIATTR^ ) -
Though the data on revenue earned from different 
consumers in the four states under study were available 
from 1969 to 1986 from CEA in unpublished form, we have 
tried to construct an index of the tariff charged to 
industrial consumers in the four states rather than taking 
the total revenue data from CEA.
The data on the tariff charged to different consumer 
groups in the four different states were taken from various 
issues of Average electric rates and duties in India, 
published by the CEA. The data were converted into an index 
taking 1961-62 as the reference year. The index of the 
tariff charged to industrial consumers (in each of the four 
states) was deflated by the index of prices of industrial 
production in India.
The data on the tariff charged to agricultural 
consumers in the four different states were taken from 
various issues of Average electric rates and duties in 
India, publication by CEA. The data were converted into an 
index taking 1961-62 as the reference year. The index of 
the tariff charged to agricultural consumers in each states 
was deflated by the index of prices of agricultural 
production in India.
The data on the price indices of industrial and 
agricultural production were taken from various issues of 
the Economic Survey.
Number of agricultural consumers: (lANCt)-
Data on the number of agricultural consumers in each 
state were taken from CEA for the years 1961-1986.
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Results.
Table 5.1
Results of the model without dummy for industrial consumers in Bihar and Kerala.
Loq(IIsale^^) = Cq^  +c^ l^oq(ISDP-^) +C2jlog(RIITTR^^) +e^ ^
State 
& period "0 "1 ^2
D-W stat. RSS
Bihar
1961-86
S.E
T-statistic
-18.1
(2.7)
-6.4
2.4
(0.28)
8.4
-0.384
(0 .2 2 )
-1.7
0.84 1.1 1.01
Kerala
1961-86
S.E
T-statistic
-6.27
(1.15)
-5.4
2.22
(0 .1 2 )
17.9
(0.13)*
(0.15)
0.85
0.94 0.79 0.34
* S t a t i s t i c a l l y  
Table 5.1a
i n s i g n i f i c a n t  c o e f f i c i e n t .
Results of the model with dummy for industrial consumers in Bihar and Kerala.
Loq(IIsale^^) = Cqj + c ^ 2 * ^ + C g 2D*log(ISDP^^) +c^2M(RIiTTKit^ +Cg2D*log(RIITTRj
State Cq Cj C2 Cj c^  c^  D-*. RSS 
& period
Bihar
1961-86
S.E
T-statistic
-0.42
(4.1)
-0.1
-1.3
(5.3)
-0 . 2
0.92
(0.64)
1.43
0.77
(1 .2 )
0.62
0.23
(0.72)
0.32
-0.42 0.86 
(0 .8 6 )
-0.49
1.5 0.72
Kerala
1961-86
S.E
T-statistic
-9.3
(1 .2 )
-7.5
7.8 
(2 .0 )
3.9
2.5
(0.25)
9.9
-0.84
(0.42)
-1.9
0.48
(0.32)
1.4
-0.78 0.96 
(0.43)
-1.7
1.6 0.51
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Table 5.2
Results of the model without dummy for industrial consumers in Maharashtra and Punjab. 
Loq(IIsalej|.) = +c^^log(ISIPjJ +C23log(RIITTRj^) fe^ ^
D-W stat, RSS 
0.96 0.48 0.24
State 
& period "l "2
Maharashtra
1961-86 -0.40 1.48 -0.36
S.E (0.43) (0.06) (0 .1 )
T-statistic -0.9 21.5 -3.3
Punjab
1966-86 0.573 0.18 0.69
S.E (0.45) (0 .1 0 ) (0 .
T-statistic 1.26 1.7 5.9
2.6 0.26
Table 5.2a
Results of the model with dummy for industrial consumers in Maharashtra and Punjab.
Log(risalej|.) = Cq^  tc^ D^ +C2 1^og(ISIPj|.) +C3^D*log(ISIPj^) +c^^loq(RIITTRj^) +Cg^ D*log(RIITTRj|.) +e^ ^
D-W. RSS
1.15 0.04
State 
& period
Cl C2 C4 C5
Maharashtra
1961-86 -6.57 7.74 2.2 -1.4 0.22 -0.12
S.E (1.9) (1.9) (0.11) (0.17) (0.33) (0.34)
T-statistic -3.3 3.8 18.4 -8.2 0.69 -0.36
Punjab
1966-86 -5.34 4.12 0.53 0.14 1.67 -1.27
S.E (11.66) (18.78) (1.3) (1.3) (1.3) 1
T-statistic -0.45 0.21 0.4 0.1 1.25 -0.94
0.82 2.9 0.2
(1.3)
Table 5.2b
Calculated coefficients for two period and their respective T-statistics for industrial consumers 
in the states of Kerala and Maharashtra.
Income Price
Period 1 
(1953-72)
Period 2 
(1973-86)
Period 1 
(1953-72)
Period 2 
(1973-86)
Kerala 2.5 1.6 (0.48)* (-0.28)*
T-st. 9.9 4.78 1.48 -0.99
Maharashtra 2.2 0.78 (0 .2 2 ) (0 .1 0 )*
T-st. 18.4 6.3 0.69 1.18
* Statistically insignificant coefficients.
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Table 5.3
Results of the model without dummy for agricultural consumers in Bihar, Maharashtra and Punjab. 
Log(IAsale*^) = Cgg +c^glog(ISDP.^ ) +C2glog(RIATTR^ |.) +(y^ log(IAMC^^) ie^ ^
State 
& period
"l "2 3^ T 2 D-W stat. RSS
Bihar
1961-86
S.E
T-statistic
-10.5
(3.0)
-3.4
3.6
(0.7)
5.0
-0.577
(0.22)
-2.5
(0.15)*
(0.13)
1.16
0.90 1.44 3.51
Maharashtra
1961-86
S.E
T-statistic
-2.9
(1.06)
-2.7
1.1
(0.17)
6.36
-0.28
(0.10)
-2.6
0.84
(0.03)
26.9
0.99 2.3 0.21
Punjab
1966-86
S.E
T-statistic
-10.58
(2.32)
-4.5
2.99
(0.29)
10.29
(0.26)*
(0.24)
1.09
- 0.90 1.0 1.38
* Statistically insignificant coefficients. 
Table 5.3a
Results of the model with dummy for agricultural consumers in Bihar, Maharashtra and Punjab. 
Log(IÀsaleit) = Coe +CigD -fCjelogflSDPit) +C36D*log(ISDPit) 4C4«log(RIATEit) 4Cs«D*log{RIAITRit)
+C7eD*log{IAHCit)
+c„log(UMCit)
State Co 
k period
Cl C, Cl c. Cs C6 C, T " D-H RSS
Bihar
1961-86 10.14 
S.E (8.2) 
T-stat. 1.2
-23.5
(8.8)
-2.6
0.53
(2.17)
0.24
-0.48
(3.44)
-0.14
-1.85
(0.9)
-2.06
1.65
(0.93)
1.75
0.1
(0.26)
0.4
2.5 
(1.6)
1.6
0.93 1.7 2.14
Maharashtra 
1961-86 -0.50 
S.E (3.24) 
T-stat. -0.15
-6.62
(3.72)
-1.77
0.23
(0.84)
0.27
-0.7
(1.15)
-0.61
-0.05
(0.29)
-0.19
0.28
(0.36)
0.79
0.96
(0.1)
9.02
1.08
(0.49)
2.18
0.99 2.5 0.13
Punjab
1966-86 -52.4 
S.E (18.4) 
T-stat. -2.8
47.4
(18.6)
2.5
7.86
(2.27)
3.46
-5.69
(2.3)
-2.4
4.77
(1.89)
2.5
-4.78
(1.9)
-2.5
- - 0.93 1.5 0.76
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Table 5.4
Results of the model without dummy for agricultural consumers in Kerala.
L oq (IÀ sa lej^ ^ ) = + C y lo g (IA D P j^ J  +C2ylog(RIATTRjj|.) +C2ylog(IANC,^^) +e^^
State 
& period "o 1^ "2 3^
D-W stat. RSS
Kerala
1961-86
S.E
T-statistic
-7.5
(4.4)
-1.7
2.75
(0.77)
3.5
-0.56
(0.37)
-1.5
0.232
(0.08)
2.8
0.92 0.99 0.83
Table 5.4a
Results of the model with dumy for agricultural consumers in Kerala.
Log(IAsalekt) = Co* 4Ci,D -fCjelogflSAPkt) +C38D*log(ISAPkt) +c*8log(RIATI8fct) ^ 5eD*log(RIAT%t) +C6@log(%t)
+C78D*log(IANCkt) +eet
State Co Cl Cj Cg c* Cg Cg c, D-W StatisticRSS
i period
Kerala
1961-86 -12.29 16.71 3.0 -2.15 0.37 -0.92 0.25 -0.27 0.95 1.8 0.38
S.E (8.4) (11.1) (1.59) (2.09) (0.71) (0.78) (0.2) (0.22)
T-stat. -1.4 1.4 1.88 -1.02 0.53 -1.18 1.23 -1.22
Table 5.4b
Calculated coefficients for two period and their respective T-statistics for the agricultural consumers in the states 
of Kerala and Punjab.
Incooe
Period 1 Period 2 
(1953-72) (1973-86)
Price
Period 1 Period 2 
(1953-72) (1973-86)
Kerala 3.0 (0.86)* (0.38)* -0.55
T-st. 1.88 0.633 0.53 -1.68
Punjab (1966-72) (1973-86) (1966-72) (1973-86)
7.86 2.16 4.77 (-0.01)*
T-st. 3.46 5.39 2.52 -0.04
* Statistically insignificant coefficients.
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Data.
Table 1.
Bihar State (1): Analysis of electricity sales to industries and agricultural consumers.
Year Ilsale^ lAsalej SDPj RIITTE^ EIATTRj lAHCj
1961 117.3 98.9 98.2 98.0 100.1 62.47
1962 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1963 125.18 108.3 101,9 96.9 97.7 100.87
1964 152.12 105.4 102.4 124.9 92.2 110.95
1965 162.79 121.1 105.4 112.3 76.4 121.04
1966 186.7 158.8 91.0 105.0 70.6 198.93
1967 187.06 266.7 99.9 98.0 60.0 201.95
1968 121.38 330.7 102.9 99.9 61.4 203.41
1969 133.15 367.7 105.7 97.1 55.7 933.12
1970 141.61 386.7 117.1 114.1 61.6 1,067.5
1971 148.79 374.4 120.3 106.5 59.6 1,230.5
1972 258.62 303.3 123.7 99.3 60.1 1,381.3
1973 249.4 406.4 123.3 86.0 59.7 1,638.7
1974 250.23 399.8 121.1 76.9 47.3 1,822.3
1975 272.9 406.9 126.8 84.8 36.0 2,019.0
1976 324.04 2,460.0 135.7 109.8 31.3 2,215.7
1977 364.35 2,434.0 142.1 107.3 31.1 2,469.2
1978 386.04 1,621.1 149.3 104.9 28.2 2,612.1
1979 423.88 1,109.3 152.7 104.7 28.7 2,707.9
1980 350.96 2,405.3 144.4 135.3 13.8 2,899.4
1981 334.5 2,353.7 165.9 151.4 12.4 2,966.4
1982 411.57 2,674.3 168.9 179.6 40.2 3,233.8
1983 418.93 3,347.7 165.0 180.9 23.6 3,436.7
1984 444.94 3,500.6 179.7 204.7 46.5 3,565.8
1985 456.8 3,269.7 188.9 212.4 43.4 3,657.2
1986 491.7 4,330.6 197.0 204.1 42.5 3,837.4
Ilsale^: Index of electricity sale to industrial consumers in Bihar,
lAsale.: Index of electricity sale to agricultural consumers in Bihar.
SDPjT index of State doestic product in Bihar.
EIIiTKj: Index of real tariff charged to industrial consumers in Bihar.
EIATTEj: Index of real tariff charged to agricultural consumers in Bihar.
lANCj: Index of number of agricultural consumers in Bihar.
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Table 2.
Kerala State (2): Analysis of electricity sales to industries and agricultural (xmsumos.
Year llsaleg lAsalej ISDPj IAP2 R11TT%2 RlATTJj lANCj
1961 78.1 100.5 98.6 103.7 98.1 100.1 88.2
1962 1 00 . 0 100.0 100.0 100 . 0 100.0 1 00.0 1 0 0 . 0
1963 99.2 100.8 103.7 103.2 108.2 97.7 112.9
1964 104.9 81.8 105.8 104,2 105.5 92.2 156.88
1965 108.5 121.9 110.3 105.9 132.76 101.8 200.79
1966 118.9 132.1 111.4 104.9 124.13 94.1 229.6
1967 147.8 167.4 117.2 111.5 115.91 80.0 292.32
1968 198.3 169.1 125.0 117.3 135.01 70.8 379.87
1969 220.3 237.5 131.1 122.7 131.25 74.3 456.16
1970 234.4 217.9 136.8 128.6 133.88 77.0 581.06
1971 248.3 224.8 145.7 125.2 124.94 74.5 620.58
1972 247.8 367.8 153.6 130.5 116.53 75.15 757.9
1973 265.0 419.1 157.3 130.4 100.9 74.6 895.68
1974 276.5 504.0 156.6 128.3 88.21 59.1 1,016.9
1975 275.1 560.5 158.3 130.4 72.9 48.4 1,190.7
1976 295.3 662.0 165.3 135.6 71.88 52.3 1,364.6
1977 313.4 564.8 163.3 128.3 82.73 64.7 1,756.9
1978 346.4 431.8 165.5 126.9 80.89 58.7 1,947.1
1979 349.2 453.1 169.1 127.8 80.75 59.7 2,187.7
1980 328.9 442.8 176.5 128.5 85.28 63.0 2,570.7
1981 381.3 439.2 188.7 127.6 96.03 66.1 3,016,2
1982 381.1 577.3 185.7 126.8 91.3 58.8 3,445.7
1983 353.4 589.1 187.1 127.3 100.21 56.0 3,576.4
1984 292.8 514.2 188.3 118.4 96.23 49.2 3,811.9
1985 413.4 538.5 197.0 132.2 96.77 45.9 4,119.2
1986 447.3 555.1 207.2 134.6 90.24 44.9 5,021.9
IIsalBg: Index of electricity sale to industrial consuners in Kerala.
lAsale,: Index of electricity sale to agricultural consuners in Kerala.
SDPg: index of State doestic product in Kerala. 
lAPg: Index of Agricultural production in Kerala.
RlliTEg: Index of real tariff charged to industrial consumers in Kerala.
H1ATTP2‘ Index of real tariff charged to agricultural consuners in Kerala.
lANCj: Index of number of agricultural consumers.
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Table 3.
Eaharashtra State (3): Analysis of electricity sales to industries and agricultural consumers.
Year llsalej lAsale^ IIP3 ISDP3 R11TT%3 %1ATT%3 IÀNC3
1961 86.2 105.6 92.94 100.1 98.1 100.1 81.7
1962 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 10 0 . 0
1963 111.5 127.4 103.02 102.9 105.4 107.5 103.2
1964 127.3 186.4 108.46 107.3 102.7 101.4 182.4
1965 138.9 336.3 114.79 110.7 99.5 84.0 261.6
1966 153.5 640.7 121.6 106.8 99.7 77.6 518.8
1967 167.8 812.6 124.35 112.4 93.1 66. 0 728.2
1968 180.6 1,108.5 129.03 118.3 90.4 58.4 1,031.2
1969 208.9 1,689.9 136.73 125.7 101.5 61.3 1,397.1
1970 228.9 2,187.4 145.24 129.4 96.5 56.5 1,792.7
1971 247.2 2,550.7 152.28 133.4 90.0 54.6 2,342.4
1972 264.3 2,948.4 155.88 137.1 85.9 71.5 2,554.2
1973 278.5 3,268.1 161.16 130.0 74.5 70.9 3,067.1
1974 283.0 3,488.3 160.71 145.6 65.1 56.2 3,619.8
1975 292.0 4,778.3 169.58 159.3 100.7 61.4 3,958.6
1976 276.2 5,742.3 180.85 167.3 99.3 66.3 4,297.5
1977 312.3 6,571.7 198.62 176.3 97.1 65.8 4,892.8
1978 334.7 7,547.7 213.06 191.7 94.9 59.6 5,329.9
1979 362.7 9,879.7 237.93 203.7 94.7 60.7 5,867.3
1980 355.7 9,612.7 241.83 207.8 90.4 44.1 6,480.4
1981 378.5 12,332.2 243.75 206.8 114.5 39.6 7,249.7
1982 398.9 13,440.7 249.59 216.6 138.6 35.2 7,832.0
1983 382.9 16,777.0 261.63 223.8 153.0 40.3 8,634.6
1984 432.2 18,178.6 268.26 234.6 152.2 35.4 9,325.1
1985 466.1 24,133.6 270.27 235.9 131.0 32.9 10,171.5
1986 518.5 26,231.7 302.13 248.8 187.9 21.5 11,044.0
Ilsale^: Index of electricity sale to industrial consuners in Maharashtra. 
lAsale,: Index of electricity sale to agricultural consuners in Maharashtra. 
lAPy Index of industrial production in Maharashtra.
SDPy Index of State doestic product in Maharashtra.
EllTTMy Index of real tariff charged to industrial consuners in Maharashtra. 
PlATTMy Index of real tariff charged to agricultural consuners in Maharashtra. 
lAMCy Index of nunber of agricultural consuners in Maharashtra.
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Table 4.
Punjab State (4): Analysis of electricity sales to industries and agricultural consumas.
4Year llsale^ lAsale^ IIP, ISDP4 RIITTÎ4 KIATTE,
1961 18.6 35.5 n.a n.a n.a n.a
1962 57.5 47.3 n.a n.a 98.71 125.4
1963 72.9 52.8 n.a n.a 95.65 122.6
1964 102.1 53.7 n.a n.a 93.21 115.7
1965 108.0 59.2 n.a n.a 90.23 95.8
1966 1 0 0 . 0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100 . 0
1967 107.6 121.9 104.9 107.4 93.37 85.0
1968 94.7 68.1 107.6 120.7 90.62 69.5
1969 95.7 94.6 119.6 127.4 88.1 72.9
1970 97.2 174.1 126.1 135.7 83.75 67.2
1971 71.8 219.9 128.6 137.9 78.15 64.9
1972 76.4 263.9 131.8 142.6 72.89 65.6
1973 71.4 295.7 145.8 147.3 63.14 65.1
1974 86.7 336.6 144.3 151.5 55.18 51.6
1975 62.2 330.0 143.7 156.7 65.76 6 6. 0
1976 106.9 425.5 168.1 170.2 93.9 97.2
1977 111.1 439.9 184.4 181.1 91.78 96.5
1978 92.9 516.8 205.6 196.3 89.73 87.5
1979 122.9 783.2 216.1 201.8 89.58 88.9
1980 121.4 899.4 215.7 210.9 109.36 48.6
1981 122.9 877.4 230.8 2 12.0 91.72 43.5
1982 123.0 882.2 239.7 236.1 136.57 38.8
1983 139.7 1,003.1 247.6 249.1 145.26 39.9
1984 156.5 1,035.7 254.1 253.5 146.64 35.0
1985 149.6 1,035.7 249.0 276.2 135.77 32.6
1986 189.5 1,313.1 255.9 294.6 187.54 31.9
Ilsale^: Index of electricity sale to industrial consuners in Punjab. 
lAsale.: Index of electricity sale to agricultural consuners in Punjab. 
lAP^ : index of industrial production in Punjab.
SDP.: Index of State doestic product in Punjab.
Ellm^: Index of real tariff charged to industrial consuners in Punjab. 
ElATTP^: Index of real tariff charged to agricultural consuners in Punjab.
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Table 5.
All India: Price Index
Year Wholesale Price Index of 
Indus, commodities
Price Index 
Of Agri. 
Commodities
1961 99.84 101.96 98.0
1962 1 0 0 . 0 100.0 100.0
1963 103.8 103.2 102.3
1964 1 10.2 105.9 108.4
1965 122.3 109.4 130.9
1966 131.6 117.0 141.7
1967 149.9 125.3 166.6
1968 167.3 129.1 188.2
1969 165.4 132.8 179.4
1970 171.6 139.7 194.8
1971 181.1 149.7 201.4
1972 191.24 160.5 199.6
1973 210.4 185.27 201.05
1974 252.99 2 12.02 253.7
1975 316.74 256.55 309.69
1976 313.3 260.2 286.7
1977 319.82 266.28 288.9
1978 336.48 272.36 318.6
1979 336.48 272.8 313.34
1980 394.07 327.99 343.96
1981 465.97 391.06 383.7
1982 509.43 411.28 431.09
1983 522.83 413.56 452.6
1984 572.27 449,58 515.49
1985 612.84 485.6 552.68
1986 647.97 520.71 564.34
Source: Constructed fron the data given in Economic Survey, Government of India, New Delhi, for the 
years 1971-72, 1981-82 and 1988-89.
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CHAPTER VI
ELECTRICITY DEMAND ANALYSIS: CASE STUDY III.
Time Varying Responses in Guiarat. 
Introduction.
For the detailed hourly analysis of demand, we need to 
know electricity demand for a particular region over the 24 
hour period, i.e., the load curve. We also need to observe 
if this "load curve" has a particular shape that remains 
the same over the years, over different months (or weeks) 
of the years and different days of the week. An attempt is 
made to study the pattern of demand in the first three
sections below and the final section studies the factors
that may have had an effect on the load curve.
VI.1 The scope of demand management.
In the absence of seasonal variations, if the load 
curve has any of the following characteristics; (1) a deep 
trough at night, (2) a sharp climb from low to high demand 
in the morning, (3) fairly pronounced peaks and (4) sharp 
falls and rises occurring together between the two peak 
levels, there would be a major and unavoidable impact on 
the total costs of meeting demand. If the consumers could 
be influenced towards removing these features and taking 
their electricity more evenly throughout the 24 hours of 
the day; (i.e., if load factor could be raised) then 
significant savings would be made.
Influencing a utility's customers in this way is 
essential for successful demand management. The cost saving 
associated with this reshaping of demand occurs mainly in 
three areas: (i) reduced depreciation and interest on the 
lower capacity required to meet the necessary generation, 
(ii) reduced manpower and other works costs due to carrying 
less capacity, (iii) reduced fuel costs due to higher 
technical efficiency, less off-load heat and lower 
consumption of the scarce and most expensive fuels.
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Policies can be pursued by utilities which are designed to 
optimise the use of expensive capital, plant, fuel and 
labour in support of more efficient and economic supply 
operations.
The variations in consumer demand for electricity dis­
play markedly regular patterns over daily and seasonal 
cycles. The following three aspects are particularly 
important: i) the absolute values of the peak demand, since 
these affect the capacity of the plant which must be 
installed; ii) the duration of the peaks, as this affects 
the plant utilisation; and, iii) the maximum peak rates of 
change of demand, as these influence the plant operating 
characteristics that are required.
The first of these, the absolute value of peak demand 
is the main determinant of installed capacity. Any 
additional capacity above forecast peak demand provides a 
margin for breakdowns or other unforeseeable conditions.
The scope for demand management varies with the level, 
character and location of the demand over successive 
periods. It is important to know the number of each type of 
consumers, and their average consumption, and even more 
important to know the predominant categories of consumers 
affecting the load in each area. These constituent demands 
constitute total demand and in practice the scope for 
successful demand management is circumscribed by the 
utility's ability to influence these constituent demands. 
Similarly, the shape of the system's load curve is 
determined by the shape of its constituent consumer groups' 
load curves.
In order to observe electricity demand in a particular 
region (i.e. Gujarat), one has to study the patterns of 
demand over 24 hours and whether they remain the same in 
different seasons or not. In order to examine ways to 
influence the consumers' demand for power at different time 
of the day, one has to study the factors that affect the
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consumers' decision to demand different levels of 
electricity at different times of the day.
The present supply system does not keep and maintain 
records of the hourly electricity supply to different 
categories of consumers. The transmission and distribution 
system is such that it is impossible to separate the supply 
provided to different groups of consumers from the total 
electricity supply. Hence, this study is restricted to the 
analysis of demand at different time of the day by all 
consumers and not extended to the analysis of demand at 
different times of the day by different consumer groups.
VI.1.1 Concent of "unrestricted demand".
From the reports published by the Gujarat Electricity 
Board and Central Electricity Authority, we can get the 
information on "energy requirement” .
The "energy requirement" is defined as the sum of 
total electric energy consumption by the consumers within 
the system and the line losses (also known as system 
losses) in supplying power to these consumers during a 
fiscal year. It is equal to the total energy generation 
within the state plus imports of energy from outside the 
system minus the energy requirements of power station 
auxiliaries and exports of energy outside the system during 
the year.
This data on energy requirement has two 
characteristics: 1) since it gives information regarding 
energy requirement in a particular year, it is an 
aggregation of energy required at each point of time in a 
year and therefore it conceals the fluctuations occurring 
in the power required at each hour of the day in the whole 
year. 2) "energy required" represents the demand from the 
electricity supply system's point of view. We notice that 
in the reports after the year 1971-72 the level of "energy 
required" is the same as "energy available". If we assume
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that the "energy requirement" does represent the true 
demand picture, this would indicate that in Gujarat state 
there was a surplus until the year 1970-71 and thereafter 
there has not been either any surplus or any deficit. On 
the other hand a number of electricity cuts were 
experienced after 1972-73 by different consumer groups, and 
hours of load shedding were also recorded.
The data regarding the "energy requirement" represent 
the demand excluding the restrictions. Therefore data on 
"energy requirement" are essentially the electricity supply 
by the electricity industry rather than the demand. Thus, 
it becomes important to know the demand without the 
restrictions. If the supply system had been able to supply 
electricity to all customers without any restrictions and 
the supply system had been capable of taking care of the 
fluctuations in the level of the demand at different times 
of the day, there would have been no reliability 
constraint. The absence of a reliability constraint might 
itself have effects on the demand. The "spontaneous demand" 
at the consumer end might be affected adversely or 
favourably by such a reliability constraint. The existence 
of the constraint might make the consumer feel insecure and 
uncertain about the supply. The consumers might over­
estimate their demand to get the level they need after the 
'cuts'. On the other hand the less reliable supply system 
might force the consumers to have either a standby or an 
additional source of energy which could be more expensive 
to society as a whole, compared to the cost of supply from 
the electricity utilities i.e., compared to what the 
consumers pay for the supply from the utilities. But for 
industries it may work out less expensive compared to the 
loss in the production due to frequent power 'cuts' in the 
electricity supply from the electric utility. Thus the 
consumers might be willing to accept the level they are 
offered without revealing true demand which could be higher
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or lower. In either case the load curve would shift 
downwards or upwards depending upon the strength of the 
effects of the above mentioned factors.
It would be very interesting to calculate and observe 
the level of "spontaneous demand" and pattern of the load 
curve if the data were available. But due to lack of data 
we will restrict the analysis to the study of "unrestricted 
demand" i.e., the calculated demand in the absence of 
restrictions.
The Gujarat Electricity Board (GEB) recognised the 
need to know the demand from the consumers' end in the 
absence of the forced planned (load shedding) and unplanned 
(sudden power cuts) restrictions. The Gujarat Electricity 
Board adopted a method to calculate the level of 
"unrestricted demand" (demand in absence of restrictions). 
According to the method, they calculate the level of 
"demand" at any hour (e.g. hour i) by simple addition of 
the power demand fulfilled at that hour (e.g. hour i) of 
the day and the restriction imposed at that hour (e.g. hour 
i) on the previous day. The result of this simple addition 
of the two is called (by GEB) "unrestricted demand", i.e. 
"unrestricted demand" at hour i = (The demand fulfilled (or 
supply) at hour i) + (The restrictions imposed on previous 
day at hour i). Using this method, G.E.B calculates the 
"unrestricted demand" at each hour (i.e. i=1..24).
The calculation of the "unrestricted demand" by G.E.B 
does not take into account the second factor mentioned 
above (i.e., demand in the absence of reliability 
constraint). For the present analysis we assume that the 
"unrestricted demand" represents the true demand.
Using the data on "unrestricted demand" we studied the 
hourly pattern and seasonal pattern. The data on 
"unrestricted demand"(or demand) were collected personally 
from the unpublished records of GEB for the years 1985-86 
to 1988-89.
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VI.2 Hourly pattern of unrestricted demand.
Considering the time past midnight to midnight of the 
next day (i.e. Ol.OOhrs to 24.00hrs), a typical load curve 
had two peak and three trough periods in 24 hours. The 
first peak period before midday, is lower than the second 
peak, after midday. On the other hand, the first trough 
period before midday is deeper than the trough during noon 
and before midnight.
Graph VI.1
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Graph VI.1 depicts the average load at each hour in 4 
years, and consistency in the load pattern can be observed 
over all four years. From the analysis of variations in 
load around the arithmetic mean at each hour it can be 
observed that the standard deviation around the mean at 
each hour also had a similar pattern. This meant that the 
variations in load around the average load at trough 
periods is less than the variations around the average load 
at peak periods.
In order to differentiate between the peak hours and
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off-peak hours, one can calculate the range (above and 
below 1 standard deviation around the arithmetic mean) at 
one particular hour, for example at the hour that has the 
lowest average demand in 24 hours, and observe the average 
load at different hours in relation to this range of trough 
load (since the range is calculated around the minimum 
average load we can call it the range of trough load). If 
the average load at any other hour falls within this range, 
it would mean that the load at that hour is not 
particularly (statistically) different from the trough 
load. Hence, we can categorise the hours at which the 
average load falls within "the range of trough load", as 
trough hours; and the rest as peak hours.
The minimum average load was experienced at 04.00hrs. 
Using the average load at 04.00hrs and the standard 
deviation at 04.00hrs, the range of trough load can be 
calculated. It ranged between 1,585.09 and 2,303.55 KW. 
Comparing the average load at different hours in relation 
to this range we gather that the average load at the hours 
01.00 to 06.00 (both inclusive), and hours 23.00 and 24.00 
fell within this range. If we label these hours as trough 
hours then there were only two trough periods in the day, 
whereas from the graph we observed three trough periods.
In order to check whether this load pattern remains 
the same on different days of the week, we need to analyse 
the load pattern on different days of the week. The load 
pattern did not change over different days of the week. The 
average load at each hour on different days of the week 
were also not particularly different from each other (Graph 
VI.2).
Similarly in order to check whether the load pattern 
remained the same at different times of the year, we need 
to analyse the load pattern in different weeks of the year 
or different months of the year. Though the analysis of the 
load pattern over different weeks (i.e. 1 to 52 weeks of
Graph VI.2
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the year) may reveal a fuller picture, for convenience we 
analysed the load pattern over 12 months in 4 years. The 
minimum average load was experienced at 04.00hrs. and the 
range of trough hours covered the first 6 hours of the day 
and the last two hours of the day.
From Graph VI.3a and Graph VI.3b we can observe the 
average load over 24 hours in the first 6 months and the 
last 6 months of the calendar year respectively. Though the 
load pattern (in 24 hours) was not different, the level of
average load at different hours in different months was
different from each other (unlike the analysis of average 
load on different days of the week). This implies some 
seasonality.
We also observed (from Graph VI.1) that the demand 
(unrestricted demand) increased in the fourth year except 
during 23.00hrs to 06.00hrs. From the analysis on the
average load on different days over four years, it was
observed that during the hours 23.00 and 24.00, there was 
hardly any increase in the average load between 1987-88 and
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1988-89 except on Fridays. On Fridays the average load at 
23.00hrs and 24.00hrs in the year 1988-89 increased 
(compared to the year 1987-88). Over time, we would expect 
the average load at all hours of the day to increase but 
the average load at each hour on any particular day of the 
week did not increase during the first 6 hours of the day 
on any day. At night time, it did not increase on any day 
except Fridays. This could have happened if the consumers 
continued to spend time on recreation activities on Friday 
nights as they used to in the previous year). This could be 
the result of the failure on the part of the pricing policy 
to encourage demand at trough hours.
VI.3 Seasonal pattern of unrestricted demand.
So far we have assumed that there are no seasonal 
variations but we observed that the average load in 
different months is different from each other at any hour. 
Hence the above assumption need to be questioned.
In order to observe the seasonal pattern, one has to 
decide on what basis of time one would like to form 
"seasons". It could be weeks and/or months. On the basis of 
average load in a week (average of load over 24 hours, in 
7 days), and/or average load in a month (average of load 
over 24 hours, in 28 or 30 or 31 days), one can 
differentiate the peak period in the year using the same 
method (calculating the confidence intervals using standard 
deviations around the arithmetic mean) as in the hourly 
analysis.
We can observe the average load in each week of four 
years from Graph VI.4. Keeping in mind that week 1 starts 
in April, we observe the average begin to fall after week 
5 compared to average load in first four weeks. Again, from 
week 21, the average load appears to be higher than the
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average load in weeks 5 to 20 (approximately).
We take the month as a unit to differentiate seasons 
of the year as generally in India, farmers do use months as 
a unit of time to differentiate seasons of the year. In 
Gujarat, June, July and August are the months of monsoon, 
when the farmers may not require electrified pumps for 
irrigation. Thus, the demand in monsoon is expected to be 
less. But there was drought in Gujarat during the years 
1985-86 to 1988-89 (four consequent years), and it is 
likely that the farmers did require to use the pumpsets for 
irrigation. Hence we can not assume that the demand would 
be less in these months. In the calculation of unrestricted 
demand as we have seen earlier, not only demand factors but 
supply factors are also equally important. If there is 
drought, the hydro-electric plants may find it more
Note that there is exception of week 28 in 1985-86. 
In week 28 (i.e., last week of October 1985-86), the
average load is very low.
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difficult to operate depending upon the level of water as 
was the case in Gujarat in this period.
Graph VI.5
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If we observe the average load in each month of the 
four years (from Graph VI.5), we observe that the months of 
June, July and August did have lower average unrestricted 
demand (MW) than the rest of the months, but as we are not 
aware of the relative importance of the demand and the 
supply factors, it is still very difficult to accurately 
differentiate the seasons.
VI.4 Demand analysis by Time-Of-Day.
Since demand characteristics vary by the type of 
consumer, geographic area and time period, a knowledge of 
loads at the disaggregate level is required. The properties 
of the aggregate demand at the system level may be quite 
different from the characteristics of the individual loads. 
Disaggregated loads are important in the system planning 
process. In generation planning, the system may be modeled 
as one source feeding a single lumped load. In the design
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of transmission networks, the characteristics of demand by 
region and by principal load centre, such as a city, become 
important. Ultimately, for planning distribution grids, a 
detailed knowledge of demand at each load centre is 
required. In the second section an attempt is made to study 
the non-structural KW demand models.
VI.4.1 Review of KW demand studies.
In the non-structural KW demand models, the cyclical 
pattern of consumption depends on climate, the price of 
electricity, the price and availability of substitute 
fuels, the income of consumers, the level and type of 
business activity, equipment stocks and other economic, 
demographic and geographic factors. Two issues concerning 
load curves are important. The first concerns the peaks and 
valleys of the curve (i.e., load factor) and the second 
concerns the peak or the highest point on the curve (i.e., 
the capacity requirement).
The literature on structural determinants of KW demand 
consists of few studies. The first attempt at structural 
analysis of KW demand was Cargill and Meyer's (CM) study of 
the deseasonalized monthly average hourly demands of two 
utilities from 1965 to 1968.^°’ In that study, the forty- 
eight monthly averages of each hour's KW demand were 
explained by the ratio of the average price of electricity 
to the average price of gas, per capita income, employment 
levels in manufacturing, and time. Separate equations were 
estimated for each hour and for each utility. The short-run 
price elasticity was found to be negative but less than 
unity, and the elasticity during the off-peak hours was 
higher than during the peak hours. This peak/off-peak
107 ,p p Cargill and R.A. Meyer, "Estimating the Demand 
for Electricity by Time-of-Day", Applied Economics. Vol.3, 
No.4 (December 1971), pp.233-246. The authors were not 
permitted to reveal the name of the two utilities.
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elasticity differential is consistent with a priori 
expectations, since electricity consuming activities during 
peak periods are generally expected to be more inflexible 
than during off-peak periods.
Cargill and Meyer recognised that their preliminary 
estimates must be interpreted with care. For example, their 
income elasticities were negative and insignificant, 
implying that income did not have an important effect on 
electricity consumption, and what effect it did have was in 
the opposite direction to that expected. Since nearly all 
KWH demand studies have indicated that income is an 
important and positively correlated determinant of demand, 
CM's result on this matter is highly doubtful. Also the 
effect of electricity rates on demand in any one hour was 
assumed by them to be independent of its effects on demand 
during all other hours. Since equipment substitution would 
affect demand in all hours and peak/off-peak load shifting 
is likely, this condition, too, certainly does not hold. 
Finally, because declining block rate structures mean that 
average revenue declines as volume increases, CM's average 
price measure will result in a simultaneous estimation bias 
which will tend to increase the absolute value of the price 
coefficient and decrease the coefficients of other 
variables. In addition, the system-wide price measure may 
introduce further biases if the weights of the different 
customer classes change over time. For example, if 
industrial consumption grows faster than residential 
consumption, the systemwide average price would decrease 
even though the rates for each class remain constant. But 
CM's study indicates how altered rate levels may have an 
indirect impact on hourly demand by influencing the 
acquisition of electric equipment.
In the late 1970s there was much discussion in the 
United States about moving toward time-of-day pricing of 
electric power. Such a move had been advocated by peak load
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pricing theorists much earlier (in the 1950s) and 
implemented in Europe in the 1960s, but there was some 
reluctance to implement it in U.S. without some notion of 
what effects it might have. There had been virtually no 
experience with time-of-day tariffs and, hence, it was 
difficult to predict these effects. In developing countries 
like India too, there has been no experience with time of 
day tariffs and hence it is difficult to predict the 
effects of the time-of-day pricing of electricity. But so 
far, electricity demand at different times of the day has 
not been studied in any one region/state in India. The 
possible effects of existing pricing policy on demand at 
different times of day has not been studied either.
A promising approach to quantification of the effects 
of explanatory variables upon class load curves is 
contained in the Koenker and Hendricks s t u d y . K o e n k e r  
and Hendricks used hourly demand for forty load sites in 
the Commonwealth Edison service area (U.S.A) for the 120- 
hour weekday (working days of the week only) period during 
the peak week in 1972 and 1973. Each site contained from 10 
to 350 residential customers without electric space 
heating. The climate influence was captured by current 
temperature and the temperature at that hour on the 
proceeding two days. The economic and geographic variables, 
taken from the 1970 census, included per capita income, 
appliance stocks, pressure of air conditioning, household 
size, and age and size of the dwellings. The price of 
electricity was not included because all customers paid the 
same marginal price for electricity.
They found that although the simple elasticity of 
demand with respect to income was positive and less than
R.Koenker and W. Hendricks, "Estimation of the 
residential Demand Cycle for Electricity", in J.W. Boyd, 
ed. Proceedings on Forecasting Methodoloav for Time-of-Dav 
and Seasonal Utility Loads. Electric Power Research 
Institute, Special Report 31, (Palo Alto, March 1976).
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one(indicating that electricity was a normal, but not a 
superior good), the partial elasticity (holding the stock 
of electrical appliances constant) was of ambiguous sign. 
Higher income families did not utilise their appliances 
more than low income families, or, if they did, they bought 
more efficient appliances in the first place. The pattern 
of electricity usage was very similar across six classes of 
residential users (as measured by their monthly 
consumption).
It is fairly difficult to evaluate the model and 
results obtained by Koenker and Hendricks. The data were 
transformed three times^°* to obtain a random error term in 
addition to the transformation required by the periodic 
spline approximation. It is quite possible that since each 
of these transformations only approximated the true 
correction, subtle biases were introduced each time. Also 
there was a high degree of multicollinearity among the 76 
explanatory variables used in the equation. While many of 
the individual coefficients were insignificant, F-tests 
applied to groups of variables were significant. Finally, 
the economic and demographic data were based on estimates 
made two to three years previously, which Koenker and 
Hendricks believe may have affected the coefficients.
Panzar and Willig^^° made an attempt to develop a 
forecasting methodology which, in principle, allows one to 
predict the industrial demand for electricity under time- 
of-day pricing using data generated under uniform prices.
Heteroscedasticity was eliminated by multiplying 
each variable by the square root of the number of customers 
in the site. Autocorrelation was removed by second order 
differencing of each term. Contemporaneous correlation was 
controlled by generalised least squares methods.
John C. Panzar and Robert D. Willig, "Theoretical 
determinants of the industrial demand for electricity by 
time of day". Journal of Econometrics. 9, (1979), pp.193-
207.
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But the methodology works the best when electricity is a 
relatively unimportant input and when its time-of-day price 
differential is small.
Patricia M. Davis^ "^  ^ found that it was important to 
communicate the changes in cost to the utility's customers. 
Pricing electricity to reflect the utility's costs by time- 
of-use (TOU) should encourage customers to reduce their 
usage when it is most costly for the utilities to produce 
electricity.
According to Alexander^^ the technique of economic 
cost-benefit analysis provides an acceptable approach to 
evaluation of time-of-use rates. This type of analysis must 
be undertaken if welfare changes are to be measured. 
However, the approach is very difficult to implement with 
any acceptable degree of certainty. Expensive and time- 
consuming experiments are required to get adequate 
estimates of demand functions. The degree of interclass 
homogeneity must be considered to determine the need for 
studies of distribution of costs and benefits.
Albert Yin-Po Lee^^^ argued that peak demand for 
electricity had been one of the major concerns of public 
utilities for at least two reasons. First, suppliers were 
legally obliged to meet this demand on any day and at any 
hour. Second, the cost of a kilowatt hour of electricity 
taken at the peak is usually much higher than that of the 
same amount of power consumed during the off-peak period.
Patricia M. Davis, "Time-of-use Electrical Demand 
Pricing", Public Utilities Fortnightly. (December 4, 1980), 
pp.23—25.
Barbara J. Alexander, "The Welfare Analysis Approach 
to the Time-of-day Pricing Decision", Public Utilities 
Fortnightly. (December 4, 1980), pp.26-32.
Albert Yin-Po Lee, "Voluntary Conservation and 
Electricity Peak Demand: A Case Study of the Modesto
Irrigation District", Land Economics. Vol.57, No.3, (August 
1981), pp.436-447.
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In his paper he presented the empirical evidence of a two- 
year conservation experiment conducted by the Modesto 
Irrigation District. The Modesto and Turlock Irrigation 
Districts (MID and TID) are two adjacent, publicly owned 
utilities located in the Central Valley of California, 
supplying water and electrical power to consumers within 
their respective service territories. The purpose of the 
study was to provide a quantitative measure of the 
effectiveness of the conservation program by using an 
analysis-of-covariance technique. He calculated daily 
savings in the system peak usage for each period during 
which the voluntary conservation program was implemented. 
The results were quite impressive. However, the entire 
amount of savings could not be attributed to the voluntary 
conservation efforts, since the price of electricity and 
the level of household income did not stay constant during 
these years. He concluded that rather than relying slowly 
on voluntary conservation as the solution to the problem of 
peak demand, it should be reinforced or substituted by 
other measures such as changes in working hours etc.
Tishler^^“ developed and estimated a model of demand 
for electricity by a firm subject to time-of-use (TOU) 
pricing of electric power. In the application he used a 
quadratic production function and directly incorporated 
into the production process the restrictions that some 
inputs cannot vary over the day. He showed that the TOU 
structure implies a unique set of parameter restrictions 
across the demand functions for inputs.
According to Schwarz^^® time-of-day demand and energy
Asher Tishler, "The industrial and commercial demand 
for electricity under time-of-use pricing". Journal of 
Econometrics. North-Holland, (1983), pp.369-384.
Peter Schwarz, "The estimated effects on industry 
of time-of-use demand and energy electricity prices", The 
Journal of Industrial Economics. Vol.XXXll, (June 1984), 
pp.524-539.
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charges could have differing effects. The peak energy 
charge encourages, within the peak hours, a reduction in 
the area beneath the load curve, that is, a reduction in 
peak energy (KWH) use. It does not explicitly encourage a 
rearrangement of the load pattern within this interval, and 
so may not reduce the maximum intrapeak demand. The peak 
demand charge encourages a reduction in the maximum demand; 
this could be accomplished directly by flattening the peak 
period use, or less directly by reducing the use at each 
instant within the peak. Hence, the peak demand charge has 
its primary effect on the pattern of use, while the energy 
charge primarily affects the level of use. In the study the 
effects on industrial customers of two types of peak load 
prices were presented. The peak energy charge was expected 
to reduce peak energy use, intrapeak maximum demand, and 
coincident demand. The peak demand charge was expected to 
reduce the intrapeak maximum demand, but the effect of the 
price on peak energy use or coincident demand could not be 
determined ”a priori”. The estimated effects of the charges 
showed the peak demand charge reduced peak energy use, 
intrapeak maximum demand, and coincident demand, while the 
peak energy charge caused a significant reduction in 
coincident demand only. The peak energy charge is likely 
to reduce utility system coincident demand and peak energy 
use, since its effects on each sector should be the same as 
for the industrial sector.
Bosworth and Pugh^^® observed that the literature on 
both peak load pricing of electricity and shift work have 
tended to assume a single rhythmically varying price. 
Empirical evidence suggested that this assumption was 
unrealistic, and will result in an inherent bias. Most, if 
not all firms, face both shift premiums of TOU electricity
Derek Bosworth and Clive Pugh, "Industrial and 
Commercial Demand for Electricity by Time of Day", The 
Enercv Journal, Vol.6, No.3, (1985), pp.101-107.
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pricing, and take their combined effects into account when 
planning the timing of their production operations. The 
author felt that important data deficiencies restricted the 
testing of the multiple rhythmically varying price model. 
However, casual empirical observations suggested that the 
concept might be important.
VI.4.2 Models for unrestricted demand in Guiarat.
Given the difficulties associated with previous 
attempts to estimate the demand for electricity, an attempt 
was made to estimate the demand for electricity following 
Cargill and Meyer. A total of 24 demand equation 
estimates were used to estimate demand over the entire 
hourly load curve with primary emphasis placed on economic 
variables. The demand variables in the model refer to 
monthly time periods built up from hour to hour load for a 
four year sample period.
The hourly demand for electricity is composed of the 
demands of seven principal classes of customers: i)
Domestic, ii) Commercial, iii) Industrial, iv) Agricultural 
consumers v) Public lighting and Public water works, vi) 
Railways, vii) Bulk supply to non-industrial consumers. The 
data represent total demand for electricity by hour (i.e., 
the integrated demand over a 60 minute interval of time) 
for groups i) to vii). It would be more desirable to have 
a separate model for the major components of demand by 
class of customer but detailed data are not fully available 
at the present time.
The costs of generating electricity were increasing 
due to various reasons like the scarcity and deteriorating 
quality of coal, increasing labour cost, increasing repairs 
and maintenance cost, increasing capital cost. It is well 
known that the cost of providing electricity at peak hours
T.P. Cargill and R.A. Meyer, op.cit.
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is much higher than the cost of providing electricity at 
trough hours. If the electricity authority failed to 
reflect the increasing cost feature in its pricing policy, 
and also failed to reflect the higher generating cost at 
peak hours, it might have given wrong signals to the 
consumers. If the electricity board were successful in 
designing a pricing policy that reflected these features of 
costs, it would give the right signals to the consumers and 
even under uniform pricing policy (i.e., in the absence of 
time-of-day tariffs), the price elasticities should be 
negative and significantly different from zero. Failing to 
provide electricity at the time when consumers want, the 
electricity board became more unreliable in supplying 
electricity. The failure to provide electricity may have 
arisen due to the failure to create additional capacity, 
which could again be the result of lack of funds to invest 
due to poor financial performance.
From the hourly analysis in Section VI.1.2 and VI.1.3, 
we gathered that during the first 6 hours and last 2 hours 
of the day, unrestricted demand is lower compared to the 
rest of the hours of the day in all seasons of the year. 
The possible reasons for this pattern could be variation in 
temperature in 24 hours of the day, the level of industrial 
and agricultural activities, working hours in the offices, 
sunset and sunrise timings, living style of the people, the 
price of electricity etc. If the temperatures are 
significantly lower after 22.00hrs till morning, the 
electricity use for airconditioning, coolers or fans would 
be less during the night hours compared to their use during 
the day.
If all industries were running for 24 hours a day, the 
electricity consumption by industries would be constant 
over 24 hours. It is unlikely that all industries, 
including continuous and non-continuous process industries, 
large or small industries and seasonal industries, would
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run for 24 hours a day. And it was so in Gujarat. Only the 
continuous processing industries were running for 24 hours 
a day in all seasons. There are industries like the ice- 
making industry, Khandsari, that run only for 7 to 8 months 
in a year. Also, there are small factories and 
manufacturing units that run for less than 24 hours 
depending upon the demand for their product in the market. 
So long as the manufacturing units in the non-continuous 
process industries are not fully utilised, the rise in 
demand for their product may lead the managers (to decide) 
to use the manufacturing units more extensively. And to use 
the units more extensively, they may employ more workers 
and use the same manufacturing units for more hours a day.
The agricultural consumers may decide to use 
electricity for pumping the water from underground, if the 
rainfall is not sufficient for the crop at that time of the 
year. Agricultural use of electricity can be flexible as 
far as the time of the day for using electrified pumpsets 
is concerned. But usually the farmer would like to use it 
during the day time due to convenience. Agricultural 
electricity use is more likely to get affected by the time 
of the year (i.e. the month) and the extent of rainfall and 
the crop pattern.
The working hours at offices also affect electricity 
use at different time of the day. In Gujarat most public 
offices, educational institutions and research 
organisations keep lO.OOhrs to 17.00hrs as working hours. 
The sunset and sunrise timing affect the load through the 
electricity used by the public lighting. The difference in 
the sunset and sunrise timings in Gujarat over the year 
does not vary as much as it does in countries like U.K. 
Roughly the variation in sunrise and sunset timings^" is 
45 minutes above or below the average time of 06.00hrs for
As noted by GEB for the purpose of lighting the 
street lights in the state.
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sunrise and 18.30hrs for sunset. Also, electricity 
consumption by residential consumers is affected by working 
hours, the sunset and sunrise timings and living style. If 
the sources of entertainments are electricity-intensive 
(for example, cinema, T.V., V.C.R., radio etc.) the
frequency of their use and time of their use may affect the 
load pattern.
If we assume the average price of electricity to be 
the same at any hour of the day, it might still have 
different effects on consumers at different hours. Average 
price of electricity is the cost to the consumers for extra 
electricity consumption. The consumers derive some benefits 
(utility) from consuming the electricity. If the benefit of 
using electricity at any particular hour is more than the 
cost of using electricity at that hour, the consumers would 
continue using the electricity at that hour. Even if the 
cost (i.e. the price) of consuming the electricity at any 
particular hour changes, the consumers would continue 
consuming electricity at that hour at least while he 
derives positive benefit. Unless the changes in the cost 
(i.e. price) of consuming electricity at that hour lead to 
a situation where the benefit of using electricity at that 
hour becomes less than the cost, and the consumer decides 
to consume electricity at some other time (hour) of the 
day, he may not be affected by the changes in the costs 
(i.e. the price of electricity). In these circumstances, 
the price of electricity would affect electricity 
consumption at different times of the day.
Though all the above mentioned factors affect the load 
pattern in one or the other way, factors like agricultural 
use of electricity and seasonal industries affect the load 
in different seasons but the rest affect the load pattern 
i.e. the effect of these variables may be different at 
different times of any day.
Though all the factors were thought to be important in
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their effects on electricity demand, it was found to be 
difficult to include all of them while studying the effects 
of such variables on the load at different times of the 
day. In order to capture the effect of agricultural 
consumers' use in different seasons, a dummy variable was 
included. Since, on the one hand, the agricultural 
consumers' use of electricity depends upon the season and 
on the other hand electricity consumption by agricultural 
consumers affected electricity load in different seasons, 
we expected a significant effect of the dummy variable. But 
the effects of seasons were not expected to vary over 
different times of the day hence, the values of the 
coefficient of the dummy variable at different times of the 
day were not expected to vary.
To incorporate the effects of seasonal industries, and 
whether the non-continuous industries use their 
manufacturing units for 8 hours a day (one shift) or more 
than 8 hours a day in different months, employment in the 
manufacturing sectors was assumed to be a good proxy. Since 
industries were thought to be employing more people as they 
used their manufacturing units more extensively, depending 
upon the demand for their respective product in the market, 
we expected a positive effect of employment on load at all 
hours. The employment variable was expected to affect load 
at different hours of the day differently at that hour when 
the industries would start the third shift, because once 
the people were employed for one shift between 08.00hrs and 
16.00hrs, employment would not affect the electricity load 
differently within this period. It was only between 1*^  and 
2"*, and between 2”* and 3'^  shift and between 3'^  and 1®^  
shift, that the effect of employment would change and not 
within the 1®*" and/or 2"'* and/or 3’"'^ shift. As noted earlier 
the price of electricity was the same at different hours of 
the day, so we included average revenue as the proxy for 
average price. The average price was expected to affect the
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load differently at different hours of the day and 
negatively at all hours but I was not too sure about the 
effect of price at the peak hour. It is quite likely that 
the consumers continue using electricity even if the price 
increases over time since the increase in price over time 
may not have been sufficient to lead the consumers to 
perceive negative benefits at that hour.
Though it may be useful, it is difficult to study the 
effects of the above explained economic variables on the 
power demand at every hour on each day of four years. Also, 
the data on independent variables for every hour on each 
day of four years is almost impossible to get (unless we 
studied only a few industries). Thus, though there is a 
need to study the load at different times of the day (i.e. 
every hour of the day) it is not necessary to study every 
day. It is possible to take average load at each hour, on 
a number of days. The number of days depends upon whether 
we take a week as a unit or a month as a unit. We found it 
more convenient to take the average over a month. On this 
basis, we get 48 observations for the dependent variable 
i.e. "unrestricted demand". The data on the independent 
variables are not different for each hour (i.e. for each 
one of the 24 hourly equations). Therefore the estimates of 
"unrestricted demand" from the 24 equations would give us 
an idea about whether the effect of the independent 
variables on load at different hours were the same or 
different.
log(UDi„) = cTiiSD„ +CT2ilog(PE„) +a3ilog(M«) +u^t  (6.1)
i= 1...24; and, n= 1,2,..48. 
where,
UDin = unrestricted demand (load) at i hour in Kilowatts in 
n^ month.
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SDn = seasonal dummy in n*"^ month such that month 6, 1, 8 =1 
and 0 otherwise,
PE„ = average price (in Paise) per kilowatt hour in n^ 
month,
M„ = employment of production workers in manufacturing 
sector in n^ month, 
t = time i.e. months 1...48.
(Note: The data sources are given in the Appendix to
Chapter VI. If average revenue data is derived from the 
total revenue data and total sales, then all revenue from 
"services" provided is lumped together so that fixed 
elements of two part tariffs and charges are included in 
the total revenue. Although it may then appear that one is 
regarding price as a term calculated by total revenue 
divided by quantity- this can be avoided if monthly data on 
total revenue and sales is used to compute average revenue, 
which can be treated as the constant price over time of the 
day.
We can employ the assumption that supply is perfectly 
elastic at the tariff price, as done by Baestra and 
Nerlove.^^^ This assumption is based on the regulated 
nature of the industry, not from "a priori" supply-demand 
analysis. Each form must meet whatever demand arises from 
a specified tariff up to its capacity limitations. Such an 
assumption implies that we may interpret each estimated 
equation as the demand function.
Since the same exogenous variables enter each equation 
and no lagged endogenous variables appear, it can be sho#n 
that a consistent and efficient estimator for the equations 
considered simultaneously is equivalent to single equation, 
ordinary least squares, applied equation by equation.
P. Baestra and M. Nerlove, "Pooling Cross Section 
and Time series Data in the Estimation of a dynamic Model: 
The demand for Natural Gas", Econometrica. 34, (1970),
pp.585—612.
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VI.4.3 Results.
Special care should be taken in drawing conclusions 
from any estimates on at least two points, a) The price for 
a kilowatt hour of electricity is an average, due to 
aggregation over all classes of customers, which covers up 
demand mix changes. Such mix changes are not irrelevant 
when calculating average revenue. In addition, different 
mix patterns imply different degrees of system loss because 
delivery is made at different points in the distribution 
network, b) Demand at each hour may depend to some extent 
on prices prevailing at other hours. The present system of 
tariffs afforded a simplification in the estimation 
procedure since there is only one average revenue figure 
associated with all 24 hours of a given observation.
The results of 24 equations for the analysis of 
unrestricted demand are presented in Table 6.1 in the 
Appendix to Chapter VI. We expected a significant effect of 
seasonal dummies on the average unrestricted demand at all 
24 hours. From the t-statistic of the dummy variable in the 
24 equations (Table 6.1 in the Appendix to Chapter VI), we 
can observe that the effect of the seasonal dummy variable 
was significant at all hours. This implied that seasonal 
variations did affect the average unrestricted demand in 
any month at different hours but the effects were not 
different from each other i.e. the values of d^ are not 
significantly different from each other at different hours. 
This confirms that the hourly pattern remained the same in 
the trough months and peak months but the average 
unrestricted demand at any hour in trough month was 
significantly different from the average unrestricted 
demand at the corresponding hour in the peak months.
We also observed the expected positive sign of the 
coefficients of employment. Due to the transformation of 
variables into logarithms we can consider the coefficients 
of employment as elasticities: employment elasticities at
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all 24 hours were significantly different from zero at the 
1% significance level.
While comparing the values of employment elasticities 
at different times of the day (from Table VI.1), though 
they appear to be similar. But only the elasticities at 
hours 02.00 and 03.00, 13.00 and 14.00 are not
statistically different from each other. Except these two 
times, the elasticities are different from each other. 
Generally, employment elasticities during Ol.OOhrs to 
OS.OOhrs and 22.00hrs to 24.00hrs are lower from the values 
of employment elasticities between 09.00 and 22.00hrs. 
Since employment elasticities between 09.00 and 22.00hrs 
were higher than the rest of the hours we can say that 
employment during 09.00 to 22.00hrs affected electricity 
consumption to a greater extent than during 01.00 to 09.00 
and 22.00 to 24.00 hours.
As shown also in Table VI.1, the price elasticities 
between the hours 01.00 to 04.00 and 21.00 to 24.00 were 
significantly different from zero (at 5% significance 
level); whereas during the rest of the period (i.e. between 
hours 05.00 and 20.00 both inclusive) the price 
elasticities were not significantly different from zero. 
This indicated that the consumers may not respond to the 
changes in the prices at least within the range charged 
during the period.
We expected the price of electricity to affect the 
unrestricted demand negatively i.e. negative sign of the 
price coefficient. As can be observed from the values of 
dzi, except at hour 19.00, the signs of dg^  are negative. As 
indicated earlier it is quite likely that so long as the 
consumers derive positive net benefit, they would continue 
to consume electricity despite the increase in the prices. 
At hour 19.00, due to other factors i.e., lock-in effect 
for example after the sunset at about 18.30hrs, the 
lighting requirement in all households is unavoidable. The
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use of other electrical equipment, either for cooking 
purpose or for entertainment, and the electricity required 
to switch on the public lighting (though the share of 
public lighting was very small) led to a sharp rise in 
demand which may not respond to the increase in electricity 
pricing.
Table VI.1
Employment and price elasticities at different hours.
Hours (i) Elasticities.
Employment Price
1 1.096 -0.2774
2 1.0874 -0.3051
3 1.0826 -0.3125
4 1.0786 -0.3195
-0.2478*5 1.0896
6 1.1073 -0.246*
-0.1893*7 1.1277
8 1.1357 -0.1709*
9 1.1636 -0.0844*
10 1.1509 -0.1313*
11 1.148 -0.146*
12 1.1424 -0.1786*
13 1.1393 -0.1916*
14 1.1407 -0.171*
15 1.1456 -0.1662*
16 1.1511 -0.1495*
17 1.1535 -0.1383*
18 1.1515 -0.1385*
19 1.1864 0.1274*
-0.1808*20 1.1541
21 1.1499 -0.225
22 1.1408 -0.2317
23 1.1189 -0.29
24 1.1 -0.3334
Note: @ indicates that elasticities are significantly different from zero at 10% significance 
level.
And * indicates that elasticities are not significantly different from zero.
Source: From Table 6.1 in Appendix to Chapter VI.
We do not expect households and the public lighting to 
switch back to oil/kerosene lamps. Such a lock in effect 
may be reflected in the positive price coefficient at 
19.OOhrs.
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The second important feature is the absolute values of 
the coefficients of the price variable in the 24 equations. 
We can observe (from Table VI.1) that between hours 01.00 
to 06.00 and 21.00 to 24.00, the values of the price 
coefficients ranged between 0.22 and 0.333. Between hours
07.00 and 20.00, the price coefficients ranged between 0.08 
and 0.192. In comparison to the absolute values of price 
coefficients in the hours 01.00 to 06.00, 21.00 to 24.00, 
the absolute values of the hours 07.00 to 20.00 are 
smaller. The higher night time values of the price 
coefficients imply that consumers respond to the changes in 
prices to a higher extent compared to the response that the 
consumers would have at the hours when the absolute values 
of the price coefficients were less. It is quite convincing 
that during the trough hours electricity demand responds 
more easily than at peak hours. From the hourly analysis in 
Section VI.1.2, we observed that hours 01.00 to 06.00,
23.00 and 24.00 were the trough hours. And at least during 
these hours we would have expected the consumers to respond 
to changes in the prices. What is worth noting is that 
during the hours 21.00 and 22.00 also, the consumers were 
responding to the changes in the prices more than between 
the hours 07.00 to 20.00.
As noted earlier, the estimated values of price 
coefficients can be interpreted as price elasticities since 
the equations were estimated after transforming the data 
into logarithms.
If a time-of-day pricing policy were adopted and if 
the consumers were charged more between hours 01.00 to
04.00 and 21.00 to 24.00, the consumers would respond and 
consume less electricity. The decrease in cost of consuming 
electricity would lead them to derive a net benefit from 
consuming electricity at that time of the day. On the other 
hand the price elasticities between the hours 05.00 and
20.00 were not statistically different from zero. This
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implies that the consumers may not respond to changes in 
the prices (under time-of-day tariffs). The consumers' net 
benefit from consuming at the peak hour may not only be 
positive but also very large and hence their response to 
increases in prices would be slow and/or negligible. In 
order to discourage the consumers from consuming 
electricity at peaks, the increase in price may have to be 
sufficiently large that the consumers have negative benefit 
from continuing to consume at peaks. At hour 19.00, though 
price elasticity was positive, it is not significantly 
different from zero, and hence the consumers' response to 
an increase in the price of electricity at that hour may 
continue to be insignificant but at least they would not 
consume more electricity simply because the electricity 
prices at that hour went up. It is quite likely that a high 
price of electricity at that hour would not affect the 
significance level of the elasticity.
The relative range of prices between which the 
consumers may respond may differ with the respective hours 
between the period 05.00 to 20.00 hours. For example, 
between 09.00 to 11.00 hours, the range of prices between 
which the consumers may respond may be larger than the 
price range between 05.00 and OS.OOhrs.
On the whole, from the price elasticities at different 
hours, we can observe two things. First, even if there is 
uniform price over different times of the day, the 
consumers' response to prices was found to be different in 
different periods of the day and different hours. Second, 
the response to the changes in the prices, though negative 
for 23 out of 24 hours, was significantly different from 
zero for only 8 out of 24 hours. This implied that for 16 
hours out of 24 hours of the day, the price of electricity 
was not a significant factor that affected the decision to 
consume electricity.
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VI,5 Conclusion,
If we accept that the price of electricity is one of 
the instruments to manage demand effectively, we can say 
from this analysis that pricing as an instrument was not 
properly used by Gujarat Electricity Board in the period 
1985-86 to 1988-89. This might have affected the
electricity board in two related ways. Firstly, its
financial performance, and secondly its reliability. If GEB 
wants to use pricing as an effective tool to manage demand 
in such a manner that the existing plants would be utilised 
in a better way and thereby reduce the extent of power cuts 
and fulfil the existing demand for electricity, then the 
existing pricing policy may not help. Thus, it is important 
to observe GEB's pricing policy and the financial
performance over the years.
250
Appendix to Chapter VI.
Explanation of the data used.
Unrestricted demand:(UD^).
As explained in Section VI.1.1, the data on 
unrestricted demand include the calculation of demand in 
the absence of restrictions imposed by Gujarat Electricity 
Board. It is measured in MW. The data were collected from 
the unpublished sources of Generation department and Load 
Despatch Centre of Gujarat Electricity Board, for the years 
1985-86 to 1988-89.
Employment in the manufacturing sector in Gujarat: (M.).
The data on employment in the manufacturing sector in 
Gujarat includes employment only by companies registered in 
Gujarat. Only quarterly data were available. The data were 
collected from unpublished sources of the Planning 
Commission of India,(New Delhi) for the period 1985-86 to 
1988-89.
Average price of electricity in Gujarat:(PE.).
The data on the average price of electricity in 
Gujarat were derived by the simple division of revenue 
earned (in million Rupees) in each one of the 48 months in 
the period 1985-86 to 1988-89 by the sale of electricity 
(in million KWH) in the corresponding month. The data on 
sales and revenue were collected from unpublished sources 
of the Planning and Commercial department of the Gujarat 
Electricity Board for the period 1985-86 to 1988-89.
Results.
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Table 6.1
Model:Loq(ÜD^) = d^^SD^ fd^ iloglPE^) +d^ .log(M^ ) +d^ t^ +e-j
Hour:i dli <*2i % d4i T 2 D-W
1 0.155 -0.2774 1.096 0.0094 0.584 1.35
S.E 0.033 0.1559 0.0242 0.0025
T-st 4.69 -1.778 45.3 3.73
2 0.157 -0.3051 1.087 0.0101 0.582 1.34
S.E 0.0343 0.1618 0.0251 0.00262
T-st 4.595 -1.8856 43.318 3.84
3 0.1526 -0.3125 1.0826 0.0105 0.5546 1.354
S.E 0.0366 0.1729 0.0268 0.0028
T-st 4.164 -1.8073 40.35 3.74
4 0.158 -0.3195 1.07 0.0106 0.569 1.39
S.E 0.036 0.1709 0.0265 0.00277
T-st 4.379 -1.87 40.68 3.828
5 0.154 -0.2478 1.0896 0.0097 0.5767 1.45C5
S.E 0.0355 0.1676 0.026 0.0027
T-st 4.35 -1.478 41.9 3.57
6 0.1466 -0.246 1.1073 0.00901 0.5415 1.35
S.E 0.0351 0.1659 0.0257 0.00269
T-st 4.173 -1.483 43.01 3.35
7 0.182 -0.1893 1.1277 0.008806 0.6723 1.36
S.E 0.0296 0.14 0.0217 0.00226
T-st 6.139 -1.3527 51.92 3.5524
8 0.189 -0.1709 1.1357 0.00763 0.6883 1.2?%
S.E 0.0292 0.1377 0.0214 0.00223
T-st 6.48 -1.2407 53.15 3.41
9 0.1715 -0.0844 1.1636 0.00519 0.6352 1.066
S.E 0.0286 0.1348 0.0209 0.002186
T-st 6.0 0 -0.6259 55.62 2.37
10 0.1463 -0.1313 1.1509 0.00695 0.6393 1J357
S.E 0.0282 0.1331 0.0206 0.002158
T-st 5.18 -0.9865 55.74 3.22
11 0.1368 -0.1461 1.1488 0.007217 0.6281 LQ373
S.E 0.0281 0.1327 0.0206 0.0021
T-st 4.869 -1.1013 55.81 3.35
12 0.1447 -0.1786 1.1424 0.00743 0.6137 1.1481
S.E 0.029 0.137 0.0213 0. 0 0 2 2
T-st 4.987 -1.3037 53.74 3.344
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Hour:i dli 4% <31 <41 T 2 D-W
13 0.1536 -0.1916 1.1393 0.007112 0.5823 1.35
S.E 0.0306 0.1446 0.0224 0.00234
T-st 5.015 -1.3251 50.78 3.033
14 0.1417 -0.171 1.1407 0.007279 0.607 1 .2
S.E 0.029 0.1367 0. 0 2 1 2 0.0022164
T-st 4.8935 -1.2514 53.79 3.28
15 0.1453 -0.1662 1.1456 0.007076 0.6108 1.2215
S.E 0.0287 0.1356 0 .021 0.002198
T-st 5.06 -1.2255 54.456 3.21
16 0.1407 -0.1495 1.1511 0.00684 0.609 1.14
S.E 0.0284 0.134 0.0208 0.00217
T-st 4.9564 -1.1156 55.35 3.14
17 0.1355 -0.1383 1.1535 0.006774 0.6062 1.112
S.E 0.0283 0.1337 0.0207 0.002167
T-st 4.7855 -1.0347 55.62 3.12
18 0.1378 -0.1385 1.1515 0.00713 0.6356 1.16
S.E 0.0278 0.1315 0.0204 0.002132
T-st 4.948 -1.0536 56.45 3.34
19 0.1956 0.1274 1.18 0.00265 0.7053 1.14
S.E 0.0274 0.1293 0 .0201 0.00209
T-st 7.14 0.9851 59.13 1.26
20 0.15 -0.1808 1.154 0.00765 0.7128 1.27
S.E 0.0243 0.1146 0.0178 0.001858
T-st 6.179 -1.578 64.92 4.11
21 0.0926 -0.225 1.1499 0.00838 0.6302 1.268
S.E 0.0247 0.1166 0.0181 0.00189
T-st 3.749 -1.9293 63.55 4.4337
22 0.118 -0.2317 1.14 0.008239 0.5906 1.219
S.E 0.0276 0.1304 0. 0 2 0 2 0.0021145
T-st 4.0485 -1.777 56.38 3.89
23 0.1342 -0.29 1.1189 0.009107 0.5627 1.133
S.E 0.0313 0.1476 0.0229 0.00239
T-st 4.2929 -1.965 48.85 3.8
24 0.152 -0.3334 1.1 0.009718 0.5591 1.14
S.E 0.0334 0.1576 0.0245 0.00255
T-st 4.553 -2.1151 44.99 3.8
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SECTION III: ELECTRICITY PRICING IN GUJARAT.
Introduction.
The financial performance of one Electricity Board 
i.e. Gujarat Electricity Board (GEB) is evaluated. Pricing 
policy could have been one of the reasons for the present 
poor financial status of GEB, and features of the tariff 
structure in Gujarat were examined with the help of the 
tariff schedules for different consumer groups.
The present pricing policy was considered inadequate 
and, the need to re-design a pricing policy emerged. Hence, 
the literature suggesting different approaches to 
electricity pricing was reviewed and the principle for 
pricing leading to maximum welfare was derived.
Based on this principle, optimal electricity prices 
were calculated and compared with the actual prices.
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CHAPTER VII
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE AND ELECTRICITY PRICING 
IN GUJARAT ELECTRICITY BOARD,
VII.1 Financial performance of Guiarat Electricity Board.
VII.1.1 Government directives.
For proper evaluation of the performance of public 
utilities, it is essential to compare their performance in 
pricing with the desired pricing. According to the Power 
Finance Corporation,"* the performance of any public 
enterprise, and more so of power utilities, should be 
evaluated in terms of the success achieved by the 
management in the following objectives and in the order of 
importance indicated below:
(i) Furthering of non-commercial objectives of the 
utility as specified by the Government. These were fairly 
well defined in the Electricity Supply Act, which enjoins 
upon the Boards to arrange for the supply, transmission and 
distribution of electricity in the most efficient and 
economical manner, with particular reference to those areas 
which, for the time being, do not have access to 
electricity supplies or have inadequate and unreliable 
electricity supplies.
(ii) Furthering of commercial objectives of the 
utility and maximisation of profit subject to fulfilment of 
non-commercial objectives and within the constraints of 
Government directives.
(iii) Improving the quality of services; and
(iv) Effecting economy and efficiency in the use of 
resources.
Seminar on Financial Performance of State 
Electricity Boards. organised by Power Finance Corporation 
Ltd. and Tata Energy Research Institute, 20-21 February, 
1989, (New Delhi, 1989), p.20.
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Often there are conflicts within these stated 
objectives. The SEBs are not only expected to perform a 
developmental role and fulfil service obligations, but also 
at the same time to function as commercial enterprises. 
They are expected to provide a substantial volume of 
services which are not commercially justified or 
remunerative.
Also, unlike many Western utilities, the above 
mentioned general objectives were not translated into 
specific performance targets, except that a standard was 
set up for an annual rate of return on invested capital or 
assets.
The criterion of adequate return to generate the
required amount of internal resources for partial self-
financing of investment is beset with uncertainty and
fluctuation from year to year. An investment programme on
this basis is necessarily resource-constrained rather than
need-based. Resource generation also depends upon the
capital structure, financing terms and rate of increase of
capital assets. (Such a set of criteria would be difficult
to set up and monitor.)
Prior to the recent amendment of the Act in June 1978,
the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 had laid down in Section
59 that the Electricity Boards shall not, as far as
practicable, carry on its operations at a loss and shall
adjust its charges (tariffs) accordingly from time to time.
The Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 was amended in June 1978
to make the State Electricity Boards commercially viable
and to earn a net return on their investments.
In the Statement of Accounts of GEB of each year
during the period 1979-86 it was mentioned that,
"Section 59 of the Electricity (Supply) Act,
1948, as amended by the Electricity (Supply) 
Amendment Act, 1978, provides that the Board 
shall, after taking credit for any subvention 
from the State Government under Section 63 ibid, 
carry on its operations under this Act and adjust
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its tariff so as to ensure that the total 
revenues in any year of account shall after 
meeting all expenses properly chargeable to 
revenues including operating, maintenance and 
management expenses, taxes (if any) on income and 
profit, depreciation and interest payable on all 
debentures, bonds and loans, leave surplus, as 
the State Government may from time to time 
specify. The State Government has not specified 
the amount of such surplus for the year ....
Thus, the Act gave some directions to GEB (and all 
other SEBs), but left it to GEB to evaluate its own 
financial performance and adjust tariffs such that it earns 
a positive rate of return. No rate of return was mentioned 
and it was left to the State Government to decide. 
According to the directives GEB was and still is mandated 
to charge rates so as to cover the full cost of operation, 
including depreciation as well as a stipulated rate of 
return by the Government of Gujarat. During the period 
1961-86, the Government of Gujarat did not specify the 
amount or percentage rate of r e t u r n . B u t  from time to 
time the Government of India set up Committees to comment 
on energy issues in India. These Committees also reviewed 
the electricity prices charged by different State 
Electricity Boards (SEBs).
A Working Group set up by the Planning Commission in 
1963^^^ on the Price Policy of the State Electricity 
Undertakings had recommended that the State Electricity 
Boards should earn a return of 12% (including electricity 
duty) on capital investments, after providing for operating 
expenses and depreciation. The Energy Survey of India
The Annual Statement of Accounts. Gujarat 
Electricity Board, (Baroda, 1986).
122 Ibid, For the years 1961-86.
As referred in Report of the Energy Survey of India 
Committee. Planning Commission, Government of India, (New 
Delhi, 1964), p.157, also known as Venkataraman Committee 
report.
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Committee^^“ in 1964 had recommended that the State 
Electricity Boards should earn a return of 11% on the 
capital employed, if not immediately, at least within a 
period of 10 years. This return was to be computed after 
providing for operating cost and depreciation but included 
receipts from electricity duty which were estimated to be 
about 1.5% of the capital. The required net return was 
about 3% after providing for interest charges (6%), 
transfer to general reserve fund (0.5%), and after 
excluding receipts from electricity duty (1.5%), 
representing the revenues to the State Government.
The Report of the Fuel Policy Committee^® in 1974, 
examined the rate of return proposed by the Energy Survey 
of India Committee and again emphasised the 11% gross rate 
of return or 3% net rate of return on average "capital 
base", i.e., 3% net return, after the payment of
depreciation, finance and interest charges, and excluding 
the electricity duty. The average "capital base" was 
defined as the average of depreciated capital at the 
beginning of the year and at the end of the year. Thus, as 
the assets are depreciated, the required return also goes 
down.
The Committee on Power, in 1980, recommended a 15% 
gross rate of return on the average capital base i.e. after 
providing for operating expenses and depreciation.^^® On 
this basis the net returns of the Electricity Boards as a 
whole would be roughly 6% of the average capital base after 
meeting interest on the loan capital both in respect of the 
completed works and works-in-progress. The gross return of
Ibid. p.160.
Report of the Fuel Policy Committee, op.cit, (New 
Delhi, 1974), also known as the Chakravarty Committee 
Report.
Report of the Committee on Power, oo.cit. (1980),
p.79.
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15% was recommended on the assumption that the average
composite lending rate (i.e. weighted average of the
interest rates being charged by the Government and other
lending institutions) to all State Electricity Boards was
7%. If the interest rate rose or was higher in the case of
a particular State Electricity Board, then the Committee
recommended that the required return of 15% should be
increased correspondingly.
The Committee gave directions on how to calculate the
rate of return. According to the Committee,
"... the return should be calculated by taking 
the gross revenue receipts of the Board 
consisting of revenue from tariffs, subsidy from 
the government and miscellaneous receipts like 
meter rents, licence fees etc. (excluding 
receipts from electricity duty) and subtracting 
from it-operating cost consisting of fuel cost, 
cost of power purchases, administration and 
establishment charges, operation and maintenance 
charges and provision for depreciation of fixed 
assets in use; and dividing this net revenue 
figure by the capital base. .
According to the Committee, the capital base should be 
defined as the average at the beginning and the end of a 
financial year of the total of the gross value of the fixed 
assets in operation and working capital to the extent of 
1/6^ of the administrative and operating costs for the 
fiscal year reduced by the amount of accumulated 
depreciation, and consumers' contributions to fixed assets.
The rate of return on assets suffers from the problem 
of historical value and may not generate adequate resources 
for asset replacement. Under inflationary conditions, the 
historic value of assets falls way behind the replacement 
cost very soon, and thus the prices charged for electricity 
are not the appropriate economic prices and the return 
earned is not adequate to finance future investments. The 
rate of return on fixed assets gives a higher yield on debt
Ibid. p.78.
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financed assets than on equity financed assets, as the 
surplus is the residual after charging all expenses 
including interest.
While keeping in mind the above mentioned limitations, 
it is interesting to observe the actual rate of return 
earned by Gujarat Electricity Board as a proportion of its 
average capital in the period 1961-86.
There are two main problems in calculating the return 
(particularly for Gujarat) as recommended by the Committee 
on Power. The first problem is related to the amount of
interest charges. To avoid the confusion regarding
different interest rates in Gujarat compared to 7%
Committee target, it is better to include interest charges 
in the fixed cost of GEB and hence include it in the
calculation of total cost which should be deducted from the 
total revenue to derive the net return on capital base.
The second problem is that information on the subsidy 
by the State Government is not available. If the
Electricity Board is expected to run on commercial 
principles and earn a positive rate of return on capital 
investment, the rate of return on investment calculated on 
the basis of the revenue, including the subsidies from the 
State, may not give the correct picture. In my opinion, it 
would be appropriate to exclude the subsidies from the 
State from the total revenue. Thus total revenue would 
include the revenue from electricity sales and other 
miscellaneous receipts only. Deducting the total cost 
(including variable cost i.e, power generation and
purchase, administration, repairs and maintenance, and
fixed cost i.e. the depreciation charges, total wage bill
and the interest charges), from the total revenue would 
give us the net difference or the net return in absolute 
terms. Dividing this net revenue by the capital base should 
give us the ratio of return to capital base. Though the 
'expected rate of return' remained the same throughout the
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period, the 'expected return' (in absolute terms) changed 
every year depending upon the value of the capital in each 
year. The actual return can be compared with the 'expected 
return' in each year.
VII.1.2 Cost analysis.
In this section GEB's total, average and marginal cost 
functions are estimated. It is known that these functions 
are related in such a way that, given the total cost 
function, one should be able to derive the average and 
marginal cost functions. (Both the total and marginal cost 
functions are also deducible from the average cost 
function. But, given the marginal cost function, one cannot 
infer the particular average and total cost functions, 
unless a point on either curve is known or one knew the 
constant of integration in advance. Nevertheless, the 
general form of the functions can still be determined.) 
This section is based on this premise. In estimating the 
functions, a distinction is made between fixed (capacity) 
cost and variable (operating) cost. (The operating cost 
included the administration cost, cost of repairs and 
maintenance, cost of generating power and purchasing power 
from the plants owned by the central government or from the 
neighbouring States.) The main reason for this is that, in 
public enterprise pricing, particularly when variable loads 
are involved, a knowledge of capacity cost to be allocated 
between peak and off-peak load is necessary. The costs also 
differ in their nature: variable (operating) costs tending 
to vary with output (and possibly with some other variables 
as well) while fixed (capacity) costs do not. In estimating 
the costs, two approaches are used, one simple and the 
other involving econometric methods.
(i) The simple approach.
This approach assumes that, in each period (i.e. a
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year), both average and marginal costs are constant. Given 
this, average cost (AC) is the ratio of total cost and^^ 
output while marginal cost (MC) can be computed according 
to the following formula:
Ct -
MCt  --------------
Xt - Xt_i
where C = total costs, X = output (electricity sales) and 
t = time period.
So, marginal variable (operating) cost (b) is given by,
OC^ - 0C^ _^  
b.  ------------
Xt - Xe-x
And marginal fixed (capacity) cost (B) is
CCt - CCt_i
3^   ---------------
Xt - Xt_x
where OC = total variable (operating) cost and CC = total
fixed (capacity) cost. Note that, MC^ =bt +5%.
The results are presented in Table VII.la and VII.lb. 
Before commenting on them, two points are noteworthy. One 
is that total fixed (capacity) cost is approximated by the 
sum of depreciation charges, wage bill and interest 
charges. The other is that output refers to sales. Ideally, 
electricity output should equal electricity sales since 
electricity is supplied on demand. However because of 
transmission and distribution losses, sales are often less 
than output. Electricity sales are preferable in 
determining cost since the losses are costs to GEB.
As can be seen from Table VII.lb, the average variable
(operating) cost ranged between 8.0 paise in 1966 and 56.8 
paise in 1986. Whereas the average fixed (capacity) cost 
ranged between 5.1 paise in 1963 and 26.7 paise in 1986.
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Table VII.la
Electricity sales and costs in Gujarat Electricity Board.
Year GTS DGTS TVC DTVC TFC DTFC
1961 441.1 - 38.4 - 23.4 -
1962 509.0 67.8 48.2 9.7 29.7 6.3
1963 576.6 67.6 58.7 10.5 29.2 -0.5
1964 656.8 80.2 72.1 13.4 43.6 14.3
1965 764.1 107.3 86.0 13.9 44.4 0.8
1966 945.3 181.2 75.9 -10.2 68.7 24.3
1967 1,174.7 229.4 111.2 35.3 107.0 38.3
1968 1,403.7 228.9 134.1 22.9 127.5 20.4
1969 1,752.1 348.4 154.0 19.9 143.5 16.0
1970 2,013.2 261.0 182.6 28.6 157.8 14.3
1971 2,346.4 333.3 258.3 75.6 180.8 23.0
1972 2,469.5 123.1 239.7 -18.5 198.4 17.5
1973 2,948.5 478.9 289.2 49.5 247.1 48.7
1974 3,144.1 195.6 347.8 58.6 255.3 8.2
1975 3,678.0 533.9 587.3 239.5 304.4 49.2
1976 3,974.7 296.6 691.1 103.8 343.9 39.4
1977 4,692.5 717.8 707.3 16.1 562.6 218.7
1978 5,155.1 462.6 718.9 11.7 668.8 106.2
1979 5,883.6 728.5 1,057.2 338.2 821.9 153.1
1980 6,243.8 360.2 1,337.0 279.8 954.0 132.1
1981 6,516.7 272.9 1,751.8 414.8 1,071.3 117.2
1982 7,047.2 530.5 1,996.1 244.3 1,288.7 217.5
1983 7,240.1 192.9 2,741.1 745.0 1,484.5 195.7
1984 8,080.4 840.3 3,323.9 582,8 1,655.0 170.5
1985 8,578.1 497.7 4,238.6 914.6 1,900.1 245.1
1986 9,015.2 437.1 5,122.7 884.1 2,404.1 504.0
GTS = Total electricity Sales in Gujarat in million KWH (or GWH).
DGTS = GTS-GTS(-l)
TVC = Total variable cost in million Rupees,
DTVC = TVC-TVC(-l)
TFC = Total fixed cost in million Rupees.
DTFC = TFC-TFC(-l).
Marginal fixed cost had the wrong sign once and the 
marginal variable cost had the wrong sign on two occasions. 
Marginal fixed cost and marginal variable cost fluctuated 
a great deal. For instance, the marginal variable cost 
ranged between -15.0 paise in 1972, and 386.2 paise in 
1983. This result is not satisfactory. The Table (i.e 
VII.lb) also shows that total marginal cost (i.e. the sum 
of both: marginal fixed and variable, costs) fluctuated in 
the period from -0.8 paise in 1972 and 487.0 paise in 1983.
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In contrast, the total average cost increased after 1972.
Table m . l b
Estimated average and marginal costs (using simple approach) in Gujarat Electricity Board, (paise 
per KWH)
Year MVCS MFCS MTCS AVCS AFCS ATCS
1961 - - - 08.7 05.3 14.0
1962 14.3 09.2 23.6 09.5 05.8 15.3
1963 15.6 -00.7 14.9 10.2 05.1 15.2
1964 16.7 17.9 34.6 11. 0 06.6 17.6
1965 13.0 00.7 13.7 11.2 05.8 17.1
1966 -05.6 13.4 07.8 08.0 07.3 15.3
1967 15.4 16.7 32.1 09.5 09.1 18.6
1968 10.0 08.9 18.9 09.6 09.1 18.6
1969 05.7 14.6 10.3 08.8 08.2 17.0
1970 10.9 05.5 16.4 09.1 07.8 16.9
1971 22.7 06.7 29.6 11.0 07.7 18.7
1972 -15.0 14.2 -00.8 09.7 08.0 17.7
1973 10.3 10.2 20.5 09.8 08.4 18.2
1974 29.9 04.2 34.1 11.1 08.1 19.2
1975 44.8 09.2 54.1 15.9 08.3 24.2
1976 35.0 13.3 48.3 17.4 08.6 26.0
1977 02.2 30.5 32.7 15.1 12.0 27.0
1978 02.5 22.9 25.5 13.9 13.0 26.9
1979 46.4 21.0 67.5 17.9 14.0 31.9
1980 77.7 36.7 114.4 21.4 15.3 36.7
1981 151.9 43.0 194.9 26.9 16.4 43.3
1982 46.0 41,0 87.0 28.3 18.3 46.6
1983 386.2 101.5 487.7 37.9 20.5 58.4
1984 69.4 20.3 89.7 41.1 20.5 61.6
1985 183.7 49.2 233.0 49.4 22.1 71.6
1986 202.3 115.3 317.6 56.8 26.7 83.5
HVCS= Marginal variable cost (in paise) using simple approach, i.e. (DTVC/DGTS)*100. 
MFCS= Marginal fixed cost (in paise) using simple approach, i.e. (DTFC/DGTS)*100. 
MTCS= Total marginal cost (in paise) i.e. MVCS+MFCS.
AVCS= Average variable cost (in paise)i.e. (TVC/GTS)*100.
AFCS= Average fixed cost using simple approach, i.e. (TFC/GTS)*100.
ATCS= Total average cost (in paise) i.e., AVCS+ÀFCS.
By and large, the main problem with the results is the 
fluctuating marginal costs. One simple solution is to 
approximate the marginal costs by their corresponding 
average costs. This follows from the fact that if, at any 
instant, average cost is constant, then it is equal to 
marginal cost. So, given our initial assumption of constant
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marginal and average costs over all years, marginal 
operating costs should equal average operating cost at 
least once and marginal capacity cost should equal average 
capacity cost in each year. But how reasonable is the 
assumption of constant costs? The assumption may be 
plausible for marginal capacity cost since capacity cost is 
generally independent of output. With regard to marginal 
operating cost, what the assumption boils down to is that 
there are constant returns to scale, a feature hard to come 
by in an electric utility. A single plant exhibits 
increasing returns to scale for a substantial range of 
output (or decreases slowly). So, if the utility has only 
one plant, marginal cost will decrease with output over 
that range. With more than one plant, and a rational 
utilisation policy, plants are used in decreasing order of 
their running efficiency or increasing order of cost 
implying that the system's marginal cost is most likely to 
be increasing. So, at least, the nature of GEB's operating 
cost needs investigating.
(ii) The Econometric approach.
With this approach, we attempt to estimate GEB's total 
operating cost function and from the function, to derive 
the average and marginal variable cost functions. The main 
issues are (1) The variables to include, (2) the form of 
the function, and (3) the estimation technique to use. On 
the first, economic theory suggests that total cost depends 
on output and input prices. So, ideally, one should 
estimate a cost function whose explanatory variables are 
output and input prices. The main problem is that, in 
reality, the inputs used are many and heterogeneous and 
aggregation is at best tedious and rough. The second 
problem is that the input prices utilised by GEB are not 
available for a sufficient number of periods. One way of 
resolving this problem is to assume that input prices
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increased with time and use a trend term to approximate 
them.
A plot of cost on output between 1961-1986 suggests 
that the variable (or operating) cost function is basically 
exponential.^^® So we fitted a function of the form:
_ gOOl + alXt + aZlXt + «tl  ^y  ^  ^
where TVC is total (nominal) variable cost measured in 
million Rs. and X is output measured in million KWH. This 
function is equivalent to the function.
Log TVCt = Uoi +aiit H-a^ iXt +u^i ...............(7.1a)
The OLS technique was applied to above function. The result 
is,
Log TVCt = 3.3803 +0.1410% +0.0001463X%........ (7.2)
T-statistic(45.01) (9.61) (3.64)
D-W statistic = 1.68 
"R = 0.9945
All the coefficients are statistically significant. 
Expressing (7.2) in form of (7.1a), we have,
tpYQ — g3.3803 +0.1410t -t-0.0001463Xt
_ gBt + 0.0001463Xt  ^y  g  ^
Where B% = 3.3803 + 0.141%  (7.4)
From (7.4), the average variable cost function is.
For data on cost and output between 1961-86 see 
Table VI.la.
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1
AVCt =  gBt + 0.0001463Xt  (7.5)
Xt
The marginal variable cost function is
MVCt = 0.0001463e^'' ^  o.oooi«63xt ...............(7.6)
So, to obtain the total variable cost function and, 
therefore, the average and marginal variable cost functions 
for each year, all we need to do is specify the value of Bt 
for the year and substitute Bt and Xt into (7.5) and (7.6). 
Bt can be derived from (7.4). Note that t=l in 1961 and t=26 
in 1986.
The usefulness of this approach is illustrated by 
estimating the total, average and marginal operating costs 
between 1961 and 1986 at the actual output level. The 
estimates together with actual total operating costs are
presented in Table VII.2. Firstly, average cost increased
from 9.42 paise in 1961 to 10.02 paise in 1965, but then
decreased to 8.87 paise in 1969. After 1969 it increased
monotonically. In contrast, marginal cost increased 
monotonically throughout the period. Secondly, average cost 
was higher than marginal cost before 1982 but less 
thereafter. Thirdly, the actual and estimated total costs 
can be used to determine the actual and estimated 
regressions between 1961 and 1986. Both the functions 
indicate that a proportionate increase in output requires 
a more than proportionate increase in cost to supply that 
output.
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Table VII.2
Estimated average and marginal costs (using the econometric approach) in Gujarat Electricity Board.
Year TVC »t Xt AVCE HVCE TVCE
1961 28.4 3.66 0.064 09.42 0.61 41.54
1962 48.1 3.8 0.074 09.49 0.71 48.31
1963 58.7 3.94 0.084 09.74 0.82 56.18
1964 72.1 4.08 0.096 09.97 0.96 65.45
1965 86.0 4.22 0.111 1 0.02 01.12 76.55
1966 75.9 4.36 0.138 09.58 01.32 90.51
1967 111.2 4.5 0.172 09.18 01.58 107.78
1968 134.1 4.65 0.205 09.14 01.88 128.32
1969 154.0 4.8 0.256 08.87 02.27 155.47
1970 182.6 4.93 0.294 09.24 02.72 185.98
1971 258.3 5.07 0.343 09.58 03.29 224.84
1972 239.7 5.21 0.361 10.68 03.86 263.59
1973 289.2 5.35 0.431 11.04 04.76 325.52
1974 347.8 5.49 0.46 12.27 05.64 385.69
1975 587.3 5.63 0.538 13.06 07.03 480.16
1976 691.1 5.78 0.581 14.53 08.45 577.38
1977 707.3 5.92 0.686 15.74 10.81 738.4
1978 718.9 6.06 0.754 17.65 13.31 909.71
1979 1,057.2 6.2 0.861 19.81 17.05 1,165.2
1980 1,337.0 6.34 0.913 22.66 20.7 1,414.2
1981 1,751.8 6.48 0.953 26.02 24.8 1,694.7
1982 1,996.1 6.62 1.031 29.94 30.87 2,108.7
1983 2,741.1 6.76 1.059 34.51 36.56 2,497.5
1984 3,323.9 6.9 1.182 40.26 47.6 3,251.7
1985 4,238.6 7.05 1.255 46.97 58.94 4,026.7
1986 5,122.7 7.19 1.318 54.86 72.35 4,942.5
TVC= Total variable cost in million rupees.
Bt= 3.3803 +(0.141*t).
Xt= 0.0001463*GTS.
ÀVCE= Average variable cost estimated using econometric approach, i.e., 1/GTS +0.0001463% 
KVCE= Marginal variable cost estimated using econometric approach, i.e., 0.0001463*e®^ +O.C001463*Xt 
TVCE= Total variable cost estimated using econometric approach.
VII.1.3 Comparison of the actual rate of return with the 
expected rate of return.
Table VII.3 shows the revenue earned from sale of 
electricity and return earned from other sources.^'*
These sources include interest on staff loans and 
advances, investments, loans and advances to licensees, on 
advances to suppliers/contractors, from trading, delayed 
payment charges from consumers and other charges paid by 
the consumers for repairs etc.
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Table VII.3
Total costs and total revenue of Gujarat Electricity Board, actual and expected net return of 
Gujarat Electricity Board. (Rupees in million).
Year ER OR Total
Rev.
Total
Cost
Capital
base
Expected Expected 
return return
(3%) (6 %)
Actual
return
(TR-TC)
(1 ) (2 ) (3) (4) (5) (6 ) (7) (8 ) (9)
1961 55.5 4.5 60.0 61.9 231.8 6.9 13.9 -1.9
1962 65.7 5.8 71.5 77.8 265.4 7.9 15.9 -6.4
1963 75.0 11.8 81.0 87.9 346.7 10.4 20.8 -6.9
1964 91.7 6.8 98.5 115.6 511.2 15.3 30.7 -17.1
1965 110.5 7.7 118.2 130.4 669.0 20.1 40.1 -12.1
1966 114.6 12.2 126.7 144.5 738.8 22.2 44.3 -17.8
1967 142.4 21.5 161.3 218.2 795.9 23.9 47.7 -56.9
1968 169.1 20.9 185.4 261.6 880.9 26.4 52.8 -76.2
1969 217.5 26.5 237.5 297.5 964.7 28.9 57.9 -60.0
1970 252.6 28.4 274.8 340.5 1,068.2 32.0 64.1 -65.7
1971 328.6 113.0 354.7 439.1 1,203.3 36.1 72.2 -84.4
1972 363.1 24.2 378.8 438.1 1,351.4 40.5 81.1 -59.3
1973 445.2 25.5 461.3 536.3 1,634.0 49.0 98.0 -75.0
1974 501.9 27.4 522.3 603.1 1,898.0 56.9 113.9 -80.7
1975 745.1 34.2 776.0 891.8 2,042.7 61.3 122.6 -115.8
1976 857.8 44.9 898.1 1,035.0 2,174.9 65.2 130.5 -136.9
1977 1,158.3 42.1 1,206.7 1,269.9 2,758.3 82.7 165.5 -63.2
1978 1,311.3 63.7 1,374.7 1,387.8 3,494.7 104.8 209.7 -13.0
1979 1,592.8 157.4 1,749.9 1,879.1 4,164.9 124.9 249.9 -129.2
1980 2,046.9 67.1 2,113.8 2,291.0 4,897.4 146.9 293.8 -177.2
1981 2,363.3 489.8 2,453.2 2,823.1 5,462.1 163.9 327.7 -369.8
1982 3,163.2 153.3 3,262.8 3,284.8 6,220.7 186.6 373.2 -22.1
1983 3,959.2 268.7 4,082.3 4,225.6 7,561.2 226.8 453.7 -143.3
1984 4,875.8 183.2 5,040.5 4,979.0 9,000.7 270.0 540.0 61.5
1985 5,592.2 649.5 5,773.4 6,138.7 10,190.6 305.7 611.4 -365.3
1986 6,314.4 1,150.0 6,387.8 7,526.8 11,240.7 337.2 674.4 -1139.0
Note: ER = Revenue earned from sale of electricity.
OR = Revenue from other sources.
The total revenue earned by GEB which is an addition of the 
revenue from electricity and other sources in the period 
1961-86 is also given in the Table. The Table also shows 
the total cost that GEB incurred to provide electricity in 
Gujarat. This includes the variable (i.e repairs and 
maintenance, administrative, power generation and power 
purchase) and fixed (i.e. depreciation, interest charges 
and the wages) costs. The difference between revenue and
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costs is the net return earned by Gujarat Electricity 
Board. The "expected return” in Table VII.3 is calculated 
on the basis of the recommendations of the two Committees: 
a 3% net rate of return on capital base as recommended by 
the Energy Survey of India Committee, and a 6% net rate of 
return as recommended by the Committee on Power. It can be 
clearly observed that the actual profit/loss (a negative 
sign shows losses) is way below the target minimum return 
of both Committees. This definitely should not only worry 
GEB but also the Government of Gujarat.
VII.1.4 Comparison of actual and expected average revenue.
In the method suggested by the Pricing Policy for 
Electricity Undertakings (1963), the expected average 
revenue is decided first and then the average revenue of 
each consumer group is fixed in such a manner that the 
arithmetic mean of the average revenues to different 
consumer groups yield the expected average revenue, i.e., 
in short, cost plus pricing such that the electricity board 
can earn the expected rate of return on its investment. We 
can use this method to calculate the expected average 
revenue from electricity sales to different consumers. 
Using the data on the average fixed cost (using the simple 
approach as explained in Section VII.1.2), from Table 
VII.lb and average variable cost (using the econometric 
approach as explained in Section VII.1.2), from Table 
VII.2, we can derive the total expected average cost. From 
the expected total net return as per the recommendations of 
the Energy Survey of India Committee Report (calculated as 
3% rate of return on capital base), and the Committee on 
Power (calculated as net rate of return of 6% on capital 
base), one can calculate expected return per unit of 
electricity sold i.e. by dividing the total return on 
capital by the electricity sales. Using the data on 
expected return given in Table VII.3, and on electricity
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sales in Table VII.la, one can derive the expected return 
per unit. Addition of the total average cost and expected 
return per unit would give us the expected average revenue.
Graph VII.1
1961 19 70 1980
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Comparing the expected average revenue with the actual 
average revenue earned by GEB from Graph VII.1, we gather 
that the actual average revenue has always been lower than 
the average revenue target implied by the recommendations 
of the Energy Policy of India Committee (in 1964) that the 
Electricity Boards should earn a minimum of 3% rate of 
return on their capital base. The actual revenue is, of 
course, also lower than the return recommended by the 
Committee on Power in 1980, i.e. rate of return of 6% on 
capital base.
Thus, we can observe that GEB needed to revise its 
electricity prices in order to avoid deficits.
Consequences of low/negative rate of return.
1) The recurring losses incurred by GEB, even two
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decades after its formation, has placed a heavy burden on 
Government of Gujarat. Demand on the other hand has 
increased and this calls for substantial investments. The 
failure of GEB to raise adequate resources has generally 
resulted in a slowing down of the pace of investment in the 
power sector. Power being an essential input for economic 
development in the state, this affects the development of 
the state in longer run. Lack of resources and pressure to 
invest in creating more capacity together discourage 
expenditure on maintenance of the existing system. This in 
turn affects the reliability of supply. Reduced reliability 
of supply leads to inconvenience to consumers, loss in 
production, interruptions in services and/or encouragement 
for the private generation sets that consume expensive oil 
by generating electricity on a very small scale.
Poor financial performance led to limited resources 
also for the labour force. Keeping down wages meant that 
only people with low skills would seek employment in 
Electricity Boards.
The inability of the Boards to earn adequate 
surpluses to meet their commitments has resulted in the 
requirements of the power sector being largely met from 
public taxation. This has led to a transfer of resources 
from the tax payers (who are not necessarily all consumers 
of electricity) to those who consume electricity, without 
the objective or principle underlying such transfers having 
been established.
The low internal resource generation of the power 
sector could pose problems of finding sufficient resources 
for the sector from external sources. The funds that can be 
attracted from financial institutions within and outside 
the country will obviously depend upon the ability of the 
power supply undertakings to generate adequate returns on 
their investments. If the level of returns that are 
generated by undertakings continues to be as low as it is
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now, it will become increasingly difficult for the 
undertaking to attract investment from financing agencies.
Possible causes of poor rate of return.
There have been sharp increases in the costs of all 
inputs going into the power industry-plant, wages, coal, 
fuel, oil, cement, steel, aluminium and transportation. 
Partly due to resistance from the State Government or 
partly just lack of awareness of even relatively simple 
economic realities, the case for evolving a rational tariff 
structure has neither been studied nor does it seem to be 
a cause of concern, either to the State and to GEB. The 
realisation that, as things stand, the Centre has no option 
but to bail out improvident Boards has been a contributing 
factor to their financial indiscipline.
There were cases of thefts of electrical equipment 
like transformers and switch-gear belonging to the State 
Boards, so the high and fluctuating losses were not just 
due to technical inefficiencies. The substantial delays 
that take place in executing projects and commissioning has 
added substantially to the interest paid on works-in- 
progress and led to significant increases in costs on 
account of inflation.
The absence of uniformity in the preparation of annual 
accounts, the obvious errors in computing profit and loss 
accounts, delays of more than a year in preparing balance 
sheets and the near absence of a management information 
system which can focus the attention of management at 
various levels on the critical problems facing GEB, lead to 
gross inefficiency in operation. There are no statistical 
or economic cells which can advise on matters such as 
pattern of load growth or, tariff fixing, or carry out 
inter-division comparisons. The result is a failure to 
control costs and operate as an efficient industry.
According to the Committee on Power (1980), there are
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today no principles guiding the power tariff structure and 
decisions are made largely on grounds of political 
expediency coupled with some uninformed thinking on the 
link between cheap power and the economic development of 
the State. In particular, there is considerable evidence to 
suggest that in rural areas the beneficiaries of the power 
subsidies are the larger and more affluent farmers who 
could well afford to pay the real cost of their power 
supply. The case for indiscriminate subsidies of rural 
consumers as a class has no rationale in a situation where 
the number of people below the poverty line is large and 
growing year after year and they are getting little or no 
benefit from such subsidies.
In one respect pricing policy did not provide 
appropriate signals to consumers, since it was too low. 
When on historical costs it is making a loss, it would have 
made a huge loss on replacement cost. Therefore tariffs 
were a lot less than average up to date accounting costs 
and there is a strong presumption that tariffs were less 
than marginal economic costs. In a simplistic way, having 
shown tariffs are low in general, let us now look at 
particular features of tariff structure.
VII.2 Aspects of pricing.
The pricing of commodities supplied by public 
enterprises in general, and of electricity in Gujarat in 
particular, involves three broad and sequential procedures. 
The first is the identification of the criteria (or 
requirements) of tariff policy. As the policy need not be 
"good” or optimal (especially in practice), the criteria 
can range from the "no criteria" situation in a fully 
arbitrary pricing system to a set of criteria in an optimal 
system. The second procedure involves the approach or 
methodology adopted in utilising the criteria to determine 
the optimal pricing rules. A large choice is also available
274
here, ranging from the arbitrary to the analytical approach 
adopted by economists. The last is the determination of the 
prices which emerge from the criteria and approach. A 
detailed treatment and understanding of the pricing policy 
of an electric utility must examine these three aspects of 
pricing.
It is clear that, given the approach to pricing policy 
as well as prices, it is possible to deduce the criteria on 
which a pricing policy is based. In the same way, it should 
be possible to infer at least some of the criteria used by 
GEB from its pricing methodology and tariff structures. 
Since the criteria of Gujarat Electricity Board (GEB)'s 
pricing policy were not explicitly mentioned, we will try 
to infer criteria from its pricing methodology and tariff 
structures. But first we should discuss the directions to 
GEB (or any other State Electricity Board) by the 
government.
VII.2.1 Government directives.
The Electricity (Supply) Act 1948 directives on 
electricity tariffs divide into two major categories, 
namely those relating to the magnitude of the tariff and 
those dealing with the institutional procedure for 
establishing or changing it. As discussed in Chapter II, 
the State Electricity Boards were established under the 
Electricity (Supply) Act 1948, and were given full 
responsibility for taking all the decisions necessary to 
run the electricity utilities in the respective States. As 
far as the magnitude of the tariffs is concerned, the Act 
did not indicate any specific range within which the 
tariffs for different consumer groups had to be charged. 
And this may be due to differences in the plant mix, 
utilisation of plants and cost of generation in different 
States, where a uniform range for different consumers in 
different regions would not have helped.
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In 1964, The Energy Survey of India Committee^^° held 
the view that
for a relatively risk-free public utility 
in India the rate of return should not be less 
than 10% and are glad to know that SEBs are being 
encouraged to aim at that rate of return on 
their investments when fixing their 
rates....
The report“  ^ on Pricing Policy for Electricity 
undertakings estimated that, if the average price of 
electricity was to equal the average cost including the 
necessary interest charges during the construction period, 
an average price of 11.56 paise per KWH was necessary. They 
recommended that this should be distributed between various 
users by taking into account the specific costs of 
providing service to these users. The average prices that 
they recommended were as given in the Table V11.4.
Table VII.4
Average prices for providing electricity to various consumer groups recommended in "Price Policy 
for Electricity Undertakings".
Consumer group Paise/KWH
Industrial Power 07.5
Small Industrial Power 1 1 . 2
Domestic Light and Power 32.1
Commercial, Irrigation and 
Public Lighting 20.1
Average for all groups 11.56
Source: Ibid, Table 169, page 158.
The Energy Survey of India Committee in 1964 mentioned 
the recommendations of the "Price Policy for Electricity
Report of the Energy Survev of India Committee. 
(1964), OP.cit.
Ibid. p.157.
As referred in the report by The Energy Survey of 
India Committee. (1964), op.cit.
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Undertakings" but did not fully agree with it. The 
Committee envisaged considerable cost reductions as the 
result of higher thermal efficiencies, larger plants and 
fuller use of transmission and distribution systems. Their 
calculation suggested that, consistently with earning a 10% 
return, SEBs should be able to provide electricity at an 
average cost of 10.8 paise per KWH. Also the Committee 
recognised the importance of tariffs as incentives to use 
energy economically and suggested that serious 
consideration should be given to tariffs that reflected 
both the fixed costs involved in the service and the 
marginal costs in providing marginal consumption.
The implication throughout was that electricity 
consumers as a group should not be subsidised by the 
general taxpayers. However uniform rates need not prevail 
across consumer classes.
As reported in the Fuel Policy Committee R e p o r t , t h e  
committees which have examined the pricing of power in 
India have all recommended that the revenues collected by 
the electricity boards by sale of power should allow a fair 
return on the investments made on power generation, 
transmission and distribution. Also the Report of the 
Committee on Power recommended that "no single class of 
consumers should be sold power at less than "cost" of 
providing them this power, i.e. at most the 15% rate of 
return could be waived. Thus, it was generally believed 
that electricity prices should be set up in such a manner 
that they should at least cover cost.
It is the responsibility of the Commercial Department 
of GEB to design new tariffs or changes in the existing 
tariff. The Commercial department of GEB along with the
Report by the Fuel Policy Committee. (1974) op.cit.
pp.64.
Report of the Committee on Power. (1980), op.cit.
p. 81.
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accounts department reviews the anticipated financial 
performance for the current and the next year at prevailing 
tariffs. Whether modifications and adjustments in tariffs 
are required for meeting the statutory ratio (i.e. return 
on capital as recommended by the Committees) is decided by 
the commercial department. (The commercial department has 
to interact with other departments to decide the 
modifications and adjustments in tariff.) Formal proposals 
are discussed by the Board and decisions are made on tariff 
changes needed. (The State government has a representative 
on the Board. ) Proposals then are sent to the State 
Government (i.e., Minister/Secretary of Ministry of Energy) 
for concurrence or modification, though this is not 
required legally. Discussions are held with various 
consumer interest groups, for example. Chambers of 
Commerce, or agricultural organisations. The proposal is 
revised after the discussions with consumer interest groups 
and after receiving comments from the State Government, and 
the revised proposal is again sent to the State Government 
for approval. The Board approves the final proposal. Also, 
notices are given in the newspapers detailing revisions of 
tariffs. Thus, a new tariff or change in the existing 
tariff is implemented after the approval of the Board and 
the Government of Gujarat. It should be noted that GEB 
represents one side of the bargain, while the Government of 
Gujarat represents the other side.“ ®
I was also informed that the general approach is to 
modify existing tariffs for various categories like 
industrial and commercial so as to earn the required net 
return in the following financial year. For this, 
anticipated KWH sales and KW demands for each category are 
assessed. Effect on sales of likely revisions are also
The information here is presented on the basis of 
interviews with several GEB officials particularly in the 
Commercial Department of GEB.
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allowed for on a judgemental basis. Effort is also made to 
incorporate some desirable features, e.g., for demand 
management, though it is much too limited.
Much attention is paid to the likely reactions from 
politically strong groups e.g., the agricultural lobby, 
small industries etc.. This often disturbs tariff studies 
and usually inhibits the earning of the required return. 
Tariff revisions also required attention to expected costs 
of operations and aspects like transmission and 
distribution losses, fuel efficiency, wages, interest 
charges etc. For this, the revised estimates of tariffs are 
extrapolated and little or no credit is taken for likely 
improvement.
The institutional procedure for establishing a new 
tariff design is such that much time is likely to be 
consumed and time is very important in tariff adjustment. 
The period of adjustment should not be too long to make the 
underlying conditions for changing the tariff redundant or 
subject to further change.
VII.2.2 Basic methodology.
From the previous Section it will be evident that 
GEB's pricing methodology, the second of the three broad 
aspects of pricing, in theory consists of a financial 
constraint to determine the average revenue for the 
electricity industry and the arbitrary structuring of 
prices across consumer classes in such a way as to yield 
the average revenue for the electricity industry. But 
whether this financial constraint approach was ever 
implemented is a question to be investigated.
In one of the interviews with GEB official I was 
told that "rule of thumb" is the method used to reach 
decisions regarding changes in the existing tariff as well 
as the extent of change.
279
VII.2.3 Particular features of tariff structure in Guiarat.
From the analysis of the tariff structure in the 
period 1961 to 1986, four main characteristics can be 
noticed. They are: classification of consumers, block
tariff, multi-part tariff and differential pricing. The 
important question is what is the rationale for these 
characteristics and what can be said about the
characteristics as implemented by GEB?
Classification of consumers.
The consumers were classified on the basis of voltage 
difference, for example, low and medium voltage and high 
voltage. Within these groups the consumers were further 
classified into sub-groups on the basis of their
behavioural pattern; for example, low and medium voltage 
consumers were classified mainly into 7 groups: 1) service 
for lights and fans, 2) service for refrigerators, small 
cookers, heaters, 'X' ray machines 3) service for cinemas, 
theatres, 4) motive power service including water works, 5) 
service for educational institutions, research and 
development laboratories, 6) motive power services 
contracting for a load of 50 KW and above but not more than 
100 KW at low voltage and 7) service used for agricultural 
purposes. This classification remained more or less the 
same throughout the period 1961-86. These 7 sub-groups 
under the low voltage consumers had meters and they paid an 
energy charge i.e. rate per KWH. Three out of seven sub­
groups, [i.e., category 4), 6) and 7)] paid a demand (KW)
charge too. The consumers who had to pay a demand charge 
had decreasing block energy (KWH) charge.
Amongst the sub-groups in the low voltage consumers, 
major changes in the tariff structure for different sub­
groups were experienced at different times. For example, 
agricultural consumers experienced a big change in 1967, 
but thereafter the tariff structure was not changed, though
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there has been an increase in the schedule from time to 
time. In 1967 agricultural consumers were offered two 
options to choose from. Though the amount of demand (KW 
capacity) charge to be paid was the same in both the 
options, in the first option the consumers had to pay a 
uniform energy (KWH) charge for all units consumed, whereas 
in the second option the consumers were charged on the 
basis of a decreasing block i.e., electricity consumption 
after the first 75 units had a lower rate than the first 
block.
Domestic and Commercial consumers were charged a 
uniform energy (KWH) charge till 1976; and, after 1976, 
they were charged on the basis of an increasing block 
tariff, i.e., for the first block of energy consumption the 
consumers had to pay less compared to the subsequent 
blocks. A demand (KW) charge was introduced, in 1980, to 
the domestic and commercial consumer group using heaters, 
refrigerators, x-ray machines etc.. Consumers were offered 
a prompt payment discount at 3 paise per rupee, if the 
payment of the bill was made in full within 15 days from 
the date of b i l l i n g . T h e r e  was a further change in the 
structure in 1981. Till 1981, electricity consumption by 
domestic and commercial consumers for heaters, 
refrigerators, x-ray machines etc. and for lights and fans 
was considered separately. After 1981, GEB stopped 
considering electricity consumption by domestic and 
commercial consumers for different purposes separately. 
Hence from 1981, there were only 6 categories of sub-groups 
under this category.
Between 1961 and 1967, industrial consumers (low and 
medium voltage) were charged on the basis of decreasing 
blocks. The blocks for industrial consumers were changed in 
1971 but the principle of a decreasing block charge was
This discount did not apply to meter rent, any other 
charges including excise duty and electricity duty etc.
281
maintained. A demand charge was introduced for the low 
voltage industrial consumer group in 1980.
For all industrial consumers (including low, medium 
and high voltage), two different tariff schedules were 
introduced in 1984 for two periods in a year. The demand 
and the energy charges during the period May to October 
were less than the demand and energy charges during the 
period November to April. Also, some seasonal consumers 
(i.e. who used power supply for ice factory, ice candy 
machines, ginning and pressing factory, oil mill, rice 
mill, salt factory, sugar factory, Khandsari, cold storage 
plants (including such plants in the fisheries industries), 
tapioca industries manufacturing starch or for such other 
industries as may be approved by the Board from time to 
time) were given concessions on a yearly basis. Seasonal 
consumers in low and medium voltage industrial consumers 
and all high voltage consumers had to pay delayed payment 
charges if the bill was paid after 15 days from the date of 
billing."'
Those industries (irrespective of voltage level) that 
started on or after 1®’" November 1978 in the developing 
areas only (the list of areas was given in the Tariffs for 
Supply of Electricity, published by GEB) and took power 
supply (from a separate point if a sister concern having 
separate legal entity) only from the GEB, were eligible for 
a concession. After 1980, a concession was given to all 
industrial and agricultural consumers for the use of 
electricity exclusively during night hours. The consumer 
had to request the Board for application of the concession 
and it was "subject to verification of his claim by the 
Board for use of electricity exclusively during night hours 
from the metering arrangement made by the Board at his
The delayed payment charge was calculated at the 
rate of 30% per annum from the date of billing till the 
date of payment.
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premises, the consumer shall be eligible for concession at 
the rate of 5.0 paise per unit on the consumption.
High voltage industrial consumers had to pay 
additional charges of 6 paise per unit of energy consumed 
during the two peak periods, i.e. 7.00 hrs to 11.00 hrs. 
and 17.00 hrs. to 21.00 hrs. But nowhere was it mentioned 
how GEB could measure the consumption during the peak 
periods and off-peak periods in the absence of time of day 
meters.
Block tariff-
GEB adopts a decreasing block tariff for industrial 
consumers: the greater the consumption, the lower the per 
unit (KWH) charge. Several reasons have been advanced in 
defence of such a tariff. Firstly, there is the argument 
that if returns to scale are increasing, and if the exact 
nature of the marginal cost curve is unknown, then the 
decreasing block tariff could be seen as a method of 
approximating marginal cost. But, the decreasing block 
tariff is not always appropriate. This is because in an 
electric utility having several plants and with an optimal 
utilisation policy such that plants are used in increasing 
order of their running cost, the system's marginal cost is 
most likely to be increasing even though the marginal cost 
for each plant may be decreasing.(And this fact is borne 
out by GEB's marginal cost function estimated in the cost 
analysis.) Secondly, there is the argument that a public 
utility should encourage consumption in order to realise 
economies of scale in production. Yet persistent and 
significant (planned and unplanned) power shortages have 
plagued the industry, especially since 1973. A policy of
Tariffs For Supply of Electricity. Gujarat 
Electricity Board, (Baroda, 1981), p.12.
See Ralph Turvey, (1968), op.cit. p.102.
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sales promotion is rational only if there is excess supply. 
Electricity sales should be promoted if at all, only at 
particular times i.e., at off-peak hours. The existing 
tariff does not do so: it encourages electricity sales at 
any hour of the day. Thirdly, it is argued that a public 
utility can recover most of its fixed cost when consumption 
is low by pricing the initial slabs more highly. The
counter-argument here is that fixed costs can be more 
effectively covered through other means rather than through 
a block tariff. For instance, consumer costs can be 
recovered through a variety of single or recurrent fixed 
charges. By and large a decreasing block tariff is
difficult to justify.
Multi-part tariff.
The third feature of GEB's tariff structure is that it 
is multi-part. GEB's multi-part tariff is complex. Firstly, 
charges are divided into two, namely demand (power) charge 
(or KW capacity charge) and energy charge (or operating KWH 
charge). Secondly, for most of GEB's tariffs, both the
energy and demand (power) charges are further broken down 
into a fixed charge (the minimum charge) and a set of 
variable charges. Thirdly, the fixed and the variable
charges vary across consumer groups. Thus, GEB's multi-part 
tariff is a complex form of the two-part tariff. For 
example, from Table VII.5 we can observe the changes in 
tariffs for one consumer group over the period 1961-1986.
High tension industrial consumers were further 
distinguished in 1980, on the basis of the voltage of 
supply. Consumers supplied at more than 33 KV were charged 
more than the consumers consuming electricity at 33 KV or 
lower. Also, the number of blocks within the energy and 
demand charge were modified. The energy charge was made 
uniform, though it remained different for different 
consumers depending on their voltage level.
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Table VII.5
Tariffs for high tension industrial consumers in the period 1961-86.
Consumer category Demand Charge Energy Charge
HTP-1 (High tension Block 
industrial consumers)
Rate Block Rate
In 1961 to 1967.
0-200KVA 10.0 0-100 0.07
201-500 09.0 101-400 0.06
601-2000 08.0 401-900 0.05
2001-5000 06.0 901-above 0.0475
In 1986.
A) Hay to October
I Supply < 33KV
i) up to contract demand.
Per KVA 39.0 0-10000 * 
next 330*
0.30
0.34
next 250 0.30
all extra 0.27
ii)above contract demand.
Per KVA 72.0 Same as above
II) Supply > 33 KV 
i) up to contract demand.
Per KVA 38.0 0-10000 0.30 
next 330* 0.335
next 250 0.295
all extra 0.265
ii)above contract demand.
Per KVA 72.0 Same as above
B) November to April.
I Supply < 33KV
i) up to contract demand.
Per KVA 43.0 0-10000 g
next 330* 
next 250 
next 150 
All extra
0.32
0.37
0.32
0.30
0.29
ii)above contract demand.
Per KVA 112.0 Same as above
II) Supply > 33 KV 
i) up to contract demand.
Per KVA 42.0 0-10000 g
next 330*
0.32
0.365
next 250 0.315
next 150 0.295
All extra 0.285
ii)above contract demand.
Per KVA 112.0 Same as above
J^ The energy charge is for the units consumed in the particular block, per connected BHP per month.
The units are measured in thousands.
Source: Tariff books, Department of Commerce, Gujarat Electricity Board, Baroda, for the respective 
years.
But the demand charge was changed, and it was on the basis 
of the maximum demand (which could be either under/equal to 
contracted demand, or in excess of contracted demand). 
Generally, the consumers having maximum demand in excess of
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the contracted demand were charged at a higher rate than 
the consumers consuming at/below contracted demand. This 
was mainly to encourage the consumers to estimate their own 
power demand much more efficiently and reveal it to GEB. 
With more awareness of the power and energy requirements 
from the consumers' end, GEB can plan more efficiently 
compared to the planning without precise knowledge about 
consumers' requirements. In 1981, the blocks for the demand 
and energy charge were again modified. The energy charge 
was changed such that consumers found it more expensive to 
consume electricity in the second block compared to the 
first. But the movement from the second block to the third 
was cheaper for the consumers. Since the movement from a 
lower to a higher block of electricity consumption provided 
assured utilisation of plants the decreasing block tariff 
can be justified but in a situation of power shortages 
especially at peak hour, there is no question of higher 
utilisation at that time and hence the decreasing block 
tariff is difficult to justify.
Differential pricing.
In principle, there are three main reasons for 
differential pricing across consumer groups. The first is 
differences in the cost of supply. Cost varies across 
consumer groups because consumers are supplied at different 
voltages. Since supply cost varies with supply voltage, it 
must be true that GEB incurs the highest cost on the 
agricultural consumers and the lowest cost on industrial 
consumers. GEB takes account of differences in cost but in 
an inappropriate way. One consumer pays a lower price than 
another if it has a low load factor, contrary to what 
should happen. The second factor is electricity demand. 
Ceteris paribus. an examination of the structure of
This includes GEB's marginal cost function which may 
be an increasing function.
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electricity demand according to consumer classes between 
1961 and 1986 shows that, for most of the years, commercial 
consumers had the lowest demand while industrial consumers 
had the highest demand. But a more important thing is to 
know the cost of electricity supply to any particular 
consumer at the level of the consumer's demand. Even if the 
consumer's demand is low, if it happens to be at peak (of 
the system) hours, it is more expensive to the system to 
provide electricity supply. So, it is impossible to 
determine the appropriate ranking of the prices which 
should have been paid by the consumer groups unless the 
relevant cost and demand functions are known. Since we do 
not have the information on the costs, it is impossible to 
determine the appropriate ranking of the prices. The third 
factor is differences in government subsidy to the consumer 
groups, on the basis of their relative roles in economic 
growth and development or other factors.
The major difference across the sub-groups of low- 
medium voltage consumers was between domestic and 
commercial consumers and industrial consumers. Industrial 
consumers were charged on the basis of decreasing block 
whereas domestic and commercial consumers were charged on 
the basis of increasing block. Agricultural consumers were 
subsidised despite the recommendation of the Committee on 
Power not to subsidise any consumers. Though the Committee 
realised there was no need to subsidise electricity to 
power-intensive industries and that they should be charged 
at least the full cost of power plus the prescribed return, 
industrial consumers in Gujarat were charged on the basis 
of decreasing block, though the cost of providing 
electricity was rising. However, the Committee suggested 
that commercial and domestic consumers should be charged 
inverted block tariffs (i.e. rates should increase as the 
quantum of power taken increases), and this was adopted by 
GEB.
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VII.2.4 Criteria for electricity pricing in Guiarat.
It can be seen that, though the tariff structure for 
different consumer groups of GEB has changed since it was 
established in 1961, the main three criteria that dominated 
GEB's pricing policy are as follows:
(i) The cost of operation. From the government
directives stated earlier, it is obvious that the relevant 
cost concept was the total cost. This included
depreciation, which could be regarded as a measure of the 
capital cost of capacity attributable to a particular year. 
Thus, total cost is the sum of the total variable
(operating) cost and the total fixed (capital) cost
incurred in a particular year. Other reasons for GEB's 
adherence to the policy of full cost recovery may be a) 
avoid the subsidising of electricity consumers by 
taxpayers, b) meet a revenue target so as to contribute 
towards the financing of system expansion, c) minimise 
waste of consumption of electricity.
If GEB adopts a policy of full cost recovery, why did 
GEB incur losses on historical cost? There has been a 
difference in what GEB intended to do and what it actually 
did. It seems that the pressure groups affected the 
proposed tariffs to a great extent.
If GEB adopts a policy of full cost recovery, why is 
it that electricity price increases have so much lagged 
behind the rate of inflation in the country, as depicted in 
Graph VII.2.^= It is possible that the cost of procuring 
GEB's inputs increased at a much lower rate than the rate 
of inflation. This may be true for some of the inputs, 
especially fuel, whose price may have been, by government
Data on Wholesale Price Index and Coal Price Index 
were taken from various issues of Economic Surveys. 
Ministry of Finance, Government of India. Electricity Price 
Index was derived from the data on tariffs to all consumers 
given in various issues of Tariffs For Supply of 
Electricity. Gujarat Electricity Board, Baroda.
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policy (since coal industry is also under public sector in 
India), kept lower than world prices. For some other inputs 
like labour, this is not true. Thus, even if the change in 
the cost of procuring GEB's inputs had lagged behind the 
rate of inflation, the difference could not be sufficient 
to explain the enormous disparity between the trends of the 
electricity price index and the wholesale price index for 
all India. According to a calculation by the Power Finance 
Corporation, the subsidy due from the Government of Gujarat 
was over 10% of revenue in the year 1 9 8 5 - 8 6 . Sometimes, 
the amount being very large, non-payment of subsidy leads 
to a resource crunch not only for implementation of 
projects but even for day-to-day commercial operations. And 
still the benefits of subsidies on electricity prices may 
not reach consumers like the small and marginal farmers, 
landless labourers, artisans and urban slum dwellers.
Seminar on Financial Performance of SEBs, organised 
by the Power Finance Corporation and Tata Energy Research 
Institute, New Delhi, held on 20-21 February, 1989.
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The question therefore is whether it is legitimate to 
subsidise electricity prices for any consumer group in a 
capital short country like India, where there are also high 
transmission and distribution losses, gross inefficiencies 
in operation, and wastage of electricity. In fact there is 
a need for a pricing policy that charges consumers the real 
cost of what they consume. Their awareness regarding the 
real cost may leads to less wastage. Such awareness lead to 
consistent signals to consumers and producers.
(ii) GEB implicitly takes into account the aggregate 
demand for electricity and the capacity constraint it 
faces. Electricity sales in any given year were forecast by 
using the trend model of electricity consumption in the 
previous years to forecast electricity sales in particular 
years. Forecasts have to be subject to the supply 
conditions of the industry, which in this case is the 
capacity constraint. One comment about the demand concept 
is noteworthy. The demand concept as used by GEB in any 
given year is one not related to price in that year, since 
the determination of output precedes the determination of 
price. In other words the demand is "restricted demand". 
The "unrestricted demand" would be very difficult to know.
We should also note that the relative impact of the 
'demands' of the various classes of consumers on capacity 
is important for price structuring. Ceteris paribus, the 
consumer group that has the lowest plant utilisation factor 
pays the highest charge per unit. This partly explains the 
fact that the highest average revenue till 1980 was earned 
from the domestic and commercial consumers, since they 
utilised plant the least.
(iii) Other factors include the administrative 
capabilities of GEB, which obviously must have been 
compatible with its pricing policies. This does not imply 
administrative efficiency since minimum administrative cost 
is not implied. It includes the administrative ability to
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implement the tariff structure that reflects the real cost 
of electricity to its consumers and allows the consumers as 
well as the producers to make decisions consistently 
without facing excessive political pressures on their 
policy on electricity prices.
GEB's pricing policy is based on two other 
considerations. The first is the financial constraint and 
the second is GEB's administrative capabilities. On the 
first, ceteris paribus. there is nothing to choose between 
two pricing policies which incorporate the same financial 
constraint. But on the second, one tariff policy is 
preferred to another if it can be implemented at a lower 
cost. In evaluating GEB's tariff policy along this line, 
one must be sure that the proposed alternative tariff 
policy can be implemented in the first instance and, given 
this, that its administrative costs will at most be as high 
as GEB's.
The next question is to examine the approaches to 
electricity pricing in theory that may lead to maximum 
welfare of the society, keeping in mind the need to make 
the consumer aware of the cost of providing electricity and 
also earn minimum rate of return on capital investment to 
make future investment possible.
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Appendix to Chapter VII,
Table 7.1
Tariff for all consumers (except street lighting) in the period 1961-1966. (in Rupees)
Consumer category Demand Charge Energy Charge
Block Rate Block Rate
Rate LF.I 0.31
Rate DSII - 0.15
Rate C - 0.25
Rate LPT.l Per BHP 5.0 0-75*
76-above
0.16
0.12
Rate LPT.2 • 0.175
Rate LPT.3 
Rate Ag
Per KW 7.0 0-150*
151-above
0-75*
76-above
0.13
0.09
<100 KVA 60.0 0.15
0.12
Rate TH/HTP-1 0-200KVA 10.0 0-100** 0.07
201-500 09.0 101-400 0.06
501-2000 08.0 401-900 0.05
2001-5000 06.0 901-above 0.0475
Rate TH/HTP-2 0-200KVA 10.0 0-100* 0.15
201-500 09.0 101-400 0.12
501-2000 08.0 
2001-5000 07.0 
5001-above 06.0
401-above 0.10
Rate TH/HTP-3 Per KVA 10.0 
of the 
contracted demand
0.12
j The energy charge is for the units consumed in the particular block, per connected BHP per month. 
First 150 units per KW of connected load per month and likewise for other blocks.
The units are measured in thousands.
Source: Tariff books, Department of Commerce, Gujarat Electricity Board, Baroda, for the respective 
years.
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Table 7.2
Tariff for all consumers (except street lighting) in the period 1984-86. (in Rupees) 
Energy Charge 
Block Rate
Consumer category Demand Charge 
Block Rate
Rate LFD
(i) Reside- 
ntial premises
Additional charge
(ii)Commercial
Premises
Rate C;
1 phase 
supply per 
installation 
3 phase 
supply per 
installation
1 phase 
supply per 
installation 
3 phase 
supply per 
installation
Per install-
2.0
5.0
5.0
15.0
0-10 0.24
11-100 0.44
101-300 0.54
301-above 0.74
0-10 -
11-above 0.12
Same as above
ation 30.0 1-350 0.47
351-above 0.54
LPT-1:
a ) Installation up to 10 BHP
i Water Works per BHP 4.00 Per unit 0.31
ii)Others Per BHP 6.0 Per unit 0.36
B) Contracting Load exceeding 10 BHP
i) Water Works 1-10 BHP 4.00 Per unit 0.36
11-50 5.50
51-above 11.0
ii) Others 1-10 M P 6.00 Per Unit 0.37
11-50 7.50
51-above 11.0
LPT-2:
- - Per unit 0.44
LPT-3:
A) Hay to October
i) up to contract demand
Per KW 41.0 0-200 0.30
201-above 0.28
ii) in excess of contract demand
Per KW 76.0 0-200 0.30
201-above 0.28
B) November to April
*i) up to contract demand
Per KW 46.0 0-200 0.32
201-above 0.30
i) in excess of contract demand
Per KW 126.0 0-200 0.32
201-above 0.30
Rate Ac:
Option I
0-5 BHP 1.55 Per unit 0.14
6-15 1.80
16-25 2.05
26-above 2.30
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Option II
Sane as above
HTP-1:
A) May to October 
I Supply < 33KV 
i) up to contract denand,
Per KVA
ii)above contract demand,
II) Supply > 33 KV 
i) up to contract demand,
Per KVA
Per KVA
ii)above contract demand,
B) November to April,
I Supply < 33KV 
i) up to contract demand.
Per KVA
Per KVA
ii)above contract demand,
II) Supply > 33 KV 
i) up to contract demand,
Per KVA
Per KVA
ii)above contract demand,
HTP-2:
A) Hay to October 
i) up to contract demand.
Per KVA
ii)above contract demand,
B) November to April 
i) up to contract demand.
Per KVA
ii)above contract demand,
0-500 KVA 
501-1000 
1001-10000 
All extra
'Per KVA
HTP-lb;
A) May to October 
I Supply < 33KV
i) up to contract demand.
0-500KVA
501-10000
39.0
72.0
38.0
72.0
43.0
112.0
42.0
112.0
0-500KVA 39.0
500-10000 KVA 44.0
All extra 48.0
72.0
43.0
48.0
50.0
54.0
72.0
39.0
44.0
0-50
51-1050
1051-above
0.19
0.15
0.09
0-10000
next 330' 
next 250 
all extra
0.30
0.34
0.30
0.27
Same as above
0-10000 a
next 330* 
next 250 
all extra
0.30
0.335
0.295
0.265
Same as above
0-10000 0.32
0.37
0.32
0.30
0.29
0.32
0.365
0,315
0.295
0.285
next 330' 
next 250 
next 150 
All extra
Same as above
0-10000 a
next 330* 
next 250 
next 150 
All extra
Same as above
0-200 0.37
200-above 0.40
Same as above
0-200 0.39
201-above 0.42
Same as above
0-10000 a
next 330*
0.30
0.34
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All extra
ii)atx)ve contract denand,
Per KVA
II) Supply > 33 KV
i) up to contract demand,
ii)above contract demand,
B) November to April.
I Supply < 33KV
i) up to contract demand,
0-500KVA 
501-10000 
All extra
'per KVA
ii)above contract demand,
II) Supply > 33 KV
i) up to contract demand.
0-500KVA 
501-1000 
1001-10000 
All extra
'per KVA
ii)above contract demand.
0-500KVA
501-9000
1000-above
'Per KVA
Additional Charge
Per KVA
48.0
72.0
38.0
43.0
47.0
72.0
43.0
48.0
50.0
54.0
112.0
42.0
47.0
53.0
112.0
0.10
next 250' 0.30
All extra 0.27
Same as above
Same as above 
Sane as above 
Same as above
Same as above 
Same as above
Same as above 
Per Unit 0.04
Classification of consumers.
Ignoring street lighting, the consumers were 
categorised under three groups by 1985-86:
1) Supply of electricity at low and medium voltage,
2) Supply of electricity at high voltage (3.3 KV, 11 
KV, 22 KV, 33 KV, 66 KV and above, 3 phase 50 cycles).
3) Supply of electricity at high voltage (3.3 KV, 11 
KV, 22 KV, 33 KV, 66 KV and above, 2 phase 50 cycles). 
Under the first two categories, there were sub-groups. The 
change in the tariff policy of the sub-groups under the 
main three consumer categories and in the tariff schedules 
charged to the sub-groups will be discussed under each main 
category of the consumers.
1) Supply of electricity at low and medium voltage.
The tariffs to consumers under this category were 
grouped under 7 sub-groups :
i) Rate LF-1: The tariff was applicable to service for 
lights, fans, radios, etc. (residential as well as 
commercial).
Nowhere the meaning of short-forms was mentioned.
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ii) Rate DS-11: The tariff was applicable to service for 
refrigerators, small cookers, heater, 'x' ray machines, 
battery charging equipment and small motors up to 5 HP 
attached to domestic appliances, when metered on a separate 
circuit (residential as well as commercial).
iii) Rate C: The tariff was applicable to combined lighting 
and power service for cinemas, theatres and such other 
institutions and organisations as may be approved by the 
board.
iv) Rate LPT-1: This tariff was applicable to motive power 
service (including water works)
v) Rate LPT-2: This tariff was applicable to educational 
institutions and research development laboratories for 
motive power service where machines and appliances are 
primarily used for demonstration/research purposes.
vi) Rate LPT-3: This tariff was applicable to consumers 
using electricity for motive power services and contracting 
for a load of 50 KW and above but not more than 100 KW at 
low voltage.
vii) Rate AG: This rate was applicable to motive power 
service used for agricultural purposes and other purposes 
permitted by the Board.
2) Supply of electricity at high voltage (3.3 KV, 11 KV, 22 
KV, 33 KV, 66 KV and above, 3 phase 50 cycles).
There are two sub-groups under this category.
i) Rate HTP-1: The rate was applicable for supply of 
energy to electricity consumers using electricity at high 
tension (H.T. consumers), contracting for not less than 100 
KVA and who required power for industrial purposes, water 
works, pumping, for irrigation. After 1984, this tariff was 
applicable to the supply of energy to H.T. consumers 
contracting for not less than 100 KVA but below 500 KVA and 
requiring power for industrial purposes.
ii) Rate HTP-2: This tariff was applicable for supply 
of energy to H.T. consumers, contracting for not less than 
100 KVA and requiring power for railways (other than 
railway workshops). Hospitals, Hotels, Military 
Installations, Aerodromes, Cinemas, Auditoriums, 
Cantonments, Banks, Offices, Educational Institutions, 
Studios, Film production. Residential Colonies and 
townships requiring and given separate point of supply and 
such other establishments as may be approved by the Board 
from time to time. This tariff was also applicable to the 
H.T. consumers for temporary supply and construction 
purposes. It was not applicable for resale of power.
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3) Supply of electricity at high voltage (3.3 KV, 11 KV, 22 
KV, 33 KV, 66 KV and above, 2 phase 50 cycles).
(i) Rate HTP-lb:
This category of consumers was distinguished only 
after 1984. This tariff was applicable for supply of energy 
to H.T. consumers contracting for 500 KVA and above, who 
required power for industrial purposes, water works 
pumping, and irrigation.
We can observe from Table 7.1 and 7.2, that the tariff 
structure for all the consumer group became quite 
complicated in 1986 compared to what they were in 1967.
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CHAPTER VIII 
ELECTRICITY PRICING; THE LITERATURE AND 
DERIVATION OF MARGINAL COST BASED PRICING PRINCIPLE FOR
GUJARAT,
"Long before the decision to invest in electric 
power is made, broader issues must be faced. They 
involve the total future energy needs, 
availability of supply and the optimal mix of 
different sources to be developed. Ideally, the 
• energy sector investment and pricing policies for 
the entire region should be analysed and 
determined within an explicit integrated 
framework"
Three basic energy policy decisions are reguired. 
First the appropriate level of demand for energy that must 
be served to achieve social goals, such as development, 
growth and basic human needs, should be determined. Second, 
the optimal mix of energy sources must be established that 
will meet the desired demand, based on several national 
objectives, such as minimum cost, independence from foreign 
sources, conservation of resources, environmental 
considerations and price stability. Third, closely 
associated with and following the investment decision, is 
the pricing policy which will be based on criteria such as 
economic efficiency in resource allocation, sectoral 
financial requirements, social equity considerations and 
other political constraints.
VIII.1 Pricing in electric utilities.
The objectives considered by Mohan Munasinghe^*® in his
Mohan Munasinghe, "Integrated National Energy 
Planning (INEP) for the Developing Countries", National 
Resources Forum. Volume 4, (October 1980) pp.359-73. Also 
reprinted in Mohan Munasinghe, Electric Power Economics ; 
Selected Works. (Aug,1990).
Mohan Munasinghe and J. War ford. Electricity 
Pricing, Theorv and Case studies. John Hopkins Press, 
(Baltimore, 1982).
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analysis of designing optimal electricity prices are as 
follows.
(a) First, national economic resources must be 
allocated efficiently, not only among different sectors of 
the economy, but also within the electric power sector. 
This implies that prices that reflect costs must be used to 
indicate to the electricity consumers the true economic 
cost of supplying their specific needs, so that supply and 
demand can be matched efficiently. One also needs to state 
the efficiency concept that is being adopted, since by 
efficiency one could mean static or dynamic efficiency, 
allocative and/or nonallocative efficiency.
Second, as for equity, it is useful to state whether 
or not emphasis is being placed on interpersonal, 
intertemporal or interjurisdictional equity.
Thirdly, one should state the aspects of the 
stabilisation objective that are being considered. More 
specifically, one needs to know whether an electric utility 
is obliged to pursue the objectives of price stability, 
full employment and balance of payments equilibrium.
b) Certain principles relating to fairness must be 
satisfied, including allocating costs among consumers 
according to the burdens they impose on the system, and 
providing a minimum level of service to persons who may not 
be able to afford full cost. Also, the rates should 
discourage waste and promote all justified uses of utility 
services.
c) Power prices should raise sufficient revenues to 
meet the financial requirements of the sector.
d) The structure of electric power tariffs must be 
simple enough to facilitate the metering and billing of 
consumers.
e) Finally other economic and political requirements 
must also be considered. These might include, for example, 
subsidised electricity supply to certain sectors to enhance
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growth or to certain geographic areas for regional 
development.
VIII.1.1 The objectives of electricity pricing in Gujarat.
The objective in a developing country such as India, 
is obviously to utilise national resources as economically 
as possible to achieve the state economic goal of improving 
productivity and increasing national income, subject to 
considerations of equity. Apart from economic 
considerations, it is obviously not desirable for the 
electricity sector to continue to sustain financial losses 
as great as it has been doing so far. If the electric 
utility suffers financial losses, the losses have to be met 
from the state's budgetary resources, which would either 
come from additional taxation, or from other public expen­
diture, which is given up at the margin. The social and the 
economic consequences of such an income transfer from non­
electricity users to electricity users, are difficult to 
quantify, but are nevertheless real.
Hence, two important objectives would be that the 
electric utilities should raise sufficient revenues to meet 
the financial requirements of the sector and to distribute 
costs fairly among consumers.
The concern for 'fairness' arises from the possibility 
of misuse of monopoly power by electricity undertakings. 
The criteria for fairness obviously depend on several 
considerations, including the magnitude and behaviour of 
national economic variables. Fairness in distribution of 
costs among different consumers results from the genuine 
concern that, as far as possible, the buyer should pay the 
cost of the services provided.
Now the question is to find the method by which one 
can derive electricity prices that fulfil these objectives.
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VIII,2 Public utility pricing: the literature.
There are two noticeable features of the literature of 
public enterprise pricing, namely its vastness and its long 
history.
VIII.2.1 The emergence of marginal cost pricing in the 
context of welfare economics.
The essence of marginal cost pricing in the public 
sector is that producers should price their products at the 
marginal cost of production; without regard to whether or 
not total costs are covered by receipts from sales. The 
system thus necessarily involves subsidising all producers 
who operate under conditions of decreasing costs.
VIII.2.1.1 In the pre-War period.
Marshall^? reasoned that maximum satisfaction could be 
achieved by taxing commodities which are produced under 
conditions of increasing costs and paying bounties on 
commodities which are produced under conditions of 
decreasing costs.
Pigou further developed this argument in his early 
book "Wealth and Welfare".^* He argued that under a system 
of free exchange, however, the marginal "private" net 
product rather than the marginal social net product will 
determine the point where production will take place. 
According to him, decreasing cost industries would operate 
at a point below the social optimum, since in such 
industries the marginal social net product would be greater 
than the marginal private net product. For these industries
A. Marshall, Principles of Economics. 8"" edition. 
Book III, (1936), p.468, in Nancy Ruggles, "The Welfare 
Basis of the Marginal Cost Pricing Principle", Review of 
Economic Studies, Volume XVII (1), (1949-50), pp.29-47.
In Allyn Young's, "Pigou's Wealth and Welfare", 
Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol. XXVII, (1913), pp.672- 
86.
301
a bounty was advocated; in order to increase production and 
thereby reduce marginal social net product to that of 
resources in general.
Allyn Young, in his review of "Wealth and Welfare"^^^ 
did not let this analysis pass unchallenged. He pointed out 
that the basic causes of changes in costs were not 
symmetrical for increasing and decreasing cost industries.
Ten years later, this subject was reopened by J.H. 
Clapham.^"* But it was Robertson^®^ who criticised the 
analysis with regard to decreasing cost industries. 
Robertson divided the causes of decreasing costs into two 
groups; i) internal economies in some industries appearing 
as external economies in other industries and ii) dynamic 
factors of improvement such as inventions and changes in 
technology. Robertson argued, on the basis of the as­
sumption that Pigou intended his analysis to apply to the 
static case only, that all external economies could be 
reduced to internal economies elsewhere in the system. For 
this reason he not only favoured taxing increasing cost 
industries, but also opposed subsidies for decreasing cost 
industries.
At about the same time, F.H. Knight in a much more 
elaborate analysis^®^ demonstrated that in the static case 
external decreasing costs are purely the result of internal 
decreasing costs in some other industry. He pointed out
Ibid.
J.H. Clapham, "Of Empty Economic Boxes", Economic 
Journal. Vol. XXXII, (1922), pp.305-14.
D.H. Robertson, "Those empty Boxes", Economic 
Journal. Vol. XXXIV, (1924), pp.16-31.
H.F. Knight, "Fallacies in the Interpretation of 
social cost". Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol. XXXVIII, 
(1923), pp.582-606.
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here, and in a later a r t i c l e , t h a t  decreasing costs mean 
monopoly, but it is highly significant that he took no part 
in the discussion of whether or not these decreasing cost 
industries should produce at marginal cost.
The major writers in the field gradually began to 
focus on internal rather than external decreasing costs.
Early evidence of this transition was an article by 
H.D. Dickinson, on price formation in a socialist 
economy. His proposal was that all industries with 
increasing costs should have added to their costs a uniform 
unit tax and that all industries with decreasing costs 
should have a deduction from costs in the form of a 
subsidy. The amount collected from the tax or increasing 
cost industries would go into a "marginal cost equalisation 
fund" and from this fund subsidies would be paid to the 
decreasing cost industries. The balance would provide a 
surplus or deficit to be added to or made up from general 
taxation funds. This procedure would, according to 
Dickinson, provide the maximum amount of production for the 
economy.
The first attempt to examine the effects' of the 
taxation which would be required to subsidise decreasing 
cost industries was made by L.M. F r a s e r . H i s  particular 
treatment was not very useful, however, for several 
reasons. One of the major difficulties is that Fraser 
believed it to be in the self-interest of entrepreneurs in 
decreasing cost industries to expand to the socially most
H.F. Knight, "On decreasing cost and Comparative 
Cost", Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol. XXXIX, (1925), 
pp.331-33.
H.D. Dickinson, "Price Formation in a Socialist 
Community", Economic Journal. Vol. XLIII, (1933), pp.237- 
50.
L.M. Fraser, "Taxation and Returns", Review of 
Economic Studies, Vol. I, (1933-34), pp.45-59.
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desirable point. Mrs. Robinson's reply^®® pointed out the 
obvious fact that a firm with decreasing costs will operate 
at the socially most desirable point only when it receives 
a subsidy equal to the difference between average and 
marginal cost, so that it can charge marginal cost to its 
customers and at the same time cover its total expenses.
Chamberlin, in the first edition of his book^ ®"^  pointed 
out that the monopolistic influence was generally toward 
prices higher than they would be under pure competition, 
and that the effect of monopoly on the individual's 
adjustment characteristically would lead to smaller scales 
of output. Chamberlin was always very careful not to draw 
any sweeping conclusions from these observations, but 
others were not. Lerner^^® seized upon the divergence 
between price and marginal cost as a measure of the social 
loss caused by a monopolist.
A synthesis of decreasing-cost industry arguments and 
the monopolistic competition arguments was provided by 
R.F.Kahn.^^® Kahn could state that decreasing cost 
industries, such as public utilities, should be subsidised 
in order to permit them to expand and operate at the point 
where price equals marginal cost. Kahn made one further 
advance over his predecessors; he drew attention to the 
fact that if all industries have similarly decreasing costs 
or similarly imperfect competition, the payment of
Mrs. J. Robinson, "Mr. Fraser on taxation and
returns". Review of Economic Studies. Vol. I, (1933-34),
pp.137—43.
Edward Chamberlin, Theory of monopolistic
competition. First ed., (Cambridge, 1933), pp.10-77.
A. P. Lerner, "The concept of monopoly and
measurement of Monopoly Power", Review of Economic Studies. 
Vol. I, (1933-34), pp.157-75.
R.F. Kahn, "Some notes on Ideal output". Economic 
Journal. Vol. XLV, (1935), pp.1-35.
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subsidies or bounties would not be useful or successful and 
there would be no case for interference.
About the same time, Meade also advocated the 
principle of marginal cost pricing.^* Meade proposed both 
the control of monopoly so as to force production to take 
place at the point where marginal cost is equal to price, 
and also the extension of subsidies to all those cases 
where marginal cost pricing would not cover total costs. 
From Meade's point of view, the principle of marginal cost 
pricing was by this time no longer a controversial 
question, but rather something to be explained in a popular 
manner. Thus, by 1938, the marginal cost pricing principle 
had by stages evolved out of the original Marshallian 
premise with reference to increasing and decreasing cost 
industries.
VTII.2-1.2 The controversy.
Up to 1938, the development of the marginal cost 
pricing principle had for the most part been on a highly 
theoretical plane. During 1938, the emphasis of the 
discussion shifted to more concrete considerations of 
pricing systems. This shift was to a large extent due to 
Hotelling, since much of the later work in the field was 
stimulated by his article. Hotelling did not refer at all 
to the development of the marginal cost pricing principle 
in the period just prior to that in which he wrote. He 
chose to go back to the work of an engineer, Jules 
Dupuit,^®^ who wrote on the subject of utility in about the 
year 1844, in connection with an analysis of such public
J.E Meade, An Introduction to Economic Analysis and 
policy. Second Edition, (1937).
Collected and reprinted with comments by Mario di 
Bernardi and Luigi Einaudi "De 1 'utilité et de sa mesure". 
La Riforma Soziale. Turin, (1932), in H. Hotelling, "The 
relation of prices to marginal costs in an optimum system", 
Econometrica. Vol. 7, (1939).
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works as roads and bridges. Dupuit's argument was based 
upon a concept of measurable utility and free interpersonal 
comparison. Hotelling maintained that by virtue of the 
analysis made possible by modern mathematical methods, the 
essence of Dupuit's propositions could be substantiated 
without any necessity for such dependence.
The controversy regarding the idea of pricing at the 
marginal cost is well discussed by Nancy Ruggles 
According to Nancy Ruggles, the advocates of marginal cost 
pricing maintained that in any situation in which all 
prices are not equal to marginal cost the general welfare 
can be increased by setting these prices equal to marginal 
cost. This argument had been put forth throughout the 
development of the marginal cost pricing principle. 
Marginal cost pricing would make necessary the payment of 
subsidies to producers with decreasing costs, since 
otherwise they could not cover their total costs. Many of 
the supporters of marginal cost pricing failed to consider 
this question. Lerner, Meade, Troxel, Reder and Vickery, 
all fell into this group.
It was argued by Frisch, that if prices were 
proportional to rather than equal to marginal cost, the 
marginal conditions of exchange would be satisfied and also 
it would be possible to cover the total cost. Hotelling, in 
his reply to Frisch^®^ agreed that proportionality is all 
that would be necessary. This was again proposed by Fleming
Nancy Ruggles, "Recent Developments in the Theory 
of Marginal Cost Pricing", Review of Economic Studies. Vol. 
17, (1949-50), pp.107-26.
Ragnar Frisch, "The Dupuit taxation theorem", 
Econometrica, Vol. 7, (1939), pp.145-50.
H. Hotelling, "The relation of prices to marginal 
costs in an optimum system", Econometrica. Vol. 7, (1939), 
pp.151-155.
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in answer to Meade, and Meade agreed. But Lerner^*® and 
Samuelson^®® pointed out that Frisch and Hotelling were both 
wrong on this point. Unless the prices paid to the factors 
of production, as well as the prices paid for consumers' 
goods, are included in the set which is raised 
proportionally to marginal cost, the marginal conditions 
with respect to the factors of production would be 
violated.
A practical question concerning the workability of 
marginal cost pricing was brought up by Wilson.^®’ He raised 
the objection that in making investment decisions under the 
marginal cost pricing system there would be no test of the 
accuracy of the forecast. Because of the difficulty in 
raising the revenue required to finance the subsidies, 
pricing systems which would in themselves meet total costs 
have been proposed as alternatives to marginal cost 
pricing. Price discrimination was suggested by Clemens, 
Lewis and Coase. All such proposals represented
departures from marginal cost pricing.
VIII.2.1.3 Postwar period.
Ian Little^^ insisted that "nationalised industries
A.P. Lerner, The Economics of Control. (New York, 
1914), pp.102-104.
P. A. Samuelson, The Foundations of Economic 
Analysis. (Cambridge, 1947), p.240.
167 T. Wilson, "Price and Output policy of state 
enterprise;A Comment", Economic Journal, Vol. 50, (1945),
pp.454-461.
E.W. Clemens, "Price discrimination in decreasing 
cost industries", American Economic Review. Vol. 31, 
(1941), pp.794-802.
W.A. Lewis, "The two-part tariff", and "Two-part 
tariff:A reply". Economica, Vol. 8, (1941), pp.249-70 and
399-408.
Ian Little, A Critique of Welfare Economics. Oxford 
University Press, (1957).
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should at least aim to cover total costs" and it is this 
conclusion that typifies the standpoint of all those who 
oppose the view that marginal cost pricing principle leads 
to higher welfare.
Similarly Jan de Graff's devastating survey of the 
"new" welfare economics in 1957^^^ returns again and again 
to the impossibility of separating efficiency from equity 
because of the impracticability of lump-sum redistribution 
of income or wealth. Like Ian Little, de Graff rejects 
marginal cost pricing on second best grounds,
"...It seems fairly clear that the conditions 
which have to be met before it is correct (from 
the welfare viewpoint) to set prices equal to 
marginal costs in a particular industry are so 
restrictive that they are unlikely to be 
satisfied in practice. The survival of the 
marginal cost pricing principle is probably no 
more than an indication of the extent to which 
the majority of professional economists are 
ignorant of the assumptions required for its 
validity. How else can we account for the glib 
advocacy of the principle in a society where the 
marginal rate of income tax is certainly not 
zero, where optimum taxes are certainly not 
i m p o s e d  on b o t h  i m p o r t s  a n d  
exports.......... "172
Wiseman's argument^^^ ig based essentially on the fact 
that there exists no method of implementing the marginal 
cost pricing rule for decreasing cost industries - which 
for him comprise the typical case, - that does not entail 
a system of financing the resulting deficit, thus altering 
the distribution of income, which alteration however cannot 
be evaluated according to the "new" welfare economics. In
171 Jan de Graff, Theoretical Welfare Economics. 
Cambridge University Press, (1957).
17^  Ibid. p.154.
173 Wiseman, "The theory of Public Utility Price: An 
Empty Box", Oxford Economic Papers. Vol. 9, 1973.
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short, decreasing cost industries provide the outstanding 
example of how pricing rules based on principles of 
allocative efficiency necessarily imply a simultaneous 
decision about income distribution.
The early 1960s witnessed a new twist to the marginal 
cost pricing debate, which seemed to answer Wiseman's 
criticism that the marginal cost pricing principle requires 
a decision on the length of the run over which marginal 
costs are defined and yet provides no basis for such a 
decision. The answer takes its clue from the well-known 
theorem that short-run and long-run marginal costs coincide 
when capacity is optimally adjusted to demand from which it 
follows that any difference between the short-run and long- 
run implications of marginal cost pricing is a sure sign 
that capacity is not adjusted to its optimal level. If 
there is excess demand at a price determined by short-run 
marginal costs, marginal cost pricing tells us that prices 
must be raised until demand equals capacity. At the same 
time, however, capacity should be raised to meet the demand 
that would be forthcoming at the price that is optimal on 
the basis of long-run marginal costs. In other words, if 
there is an optimal investment policy, there is no 
contradiction between short-run and long-run marginal cost 
pricing, and if there is such a contradiction, it forms a 
criticism not of the marginal cost pricing principle but of 
the investment policy that is being pursued.
This argument is the gist of the contributions of a 
number of French economists, particularly Marcel, Boiteux 
and Pierre Masse, who were connected with Electricité de 
France in the late 1940s and 1950s. They noted that in 
electricity pricing at any rate, there was little 
alternative to pricing based on long-run marginal costs.
The theoretical rationale for setting prices equal to
For details see R. Turvey, "Marginal Cost", Economic 
Journal. vol 79, 1969.
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marginal cost in an electric utility has been well 
explained by many writers. Munasinghe & Warford^^ 
e x p l a i n e d  
the net benefit in mathematical terms as,
NB =/o“ p(q)dQ - MC(q)dq.
where p(Q) and MC(Q) are the equations representing the 
demand and supply curves respectively. Maximising NB:
d(NB)/d(Q) = p(Q) -MC(Q) =0.
showing the point of interaction of the demand and marginal 
cost curves. (Prices po, quantity demanded & supplied Qo. )
In actual practice, of course, adequate information 
regarding the demand curve may not be available, though the 
marginal cost curve may be estimated more accurately. 
Therefore, the establishment of the equilibrium point, or 
market clearing price, will be an interactive process. 
However, the conceptual basis for setting price equal to 
the marginal cost, and increasing the supply of electricity 
until the market clears, remains valid.
From the point of view of society in general, it can 
be stated that the purpose of pricing should be to allocate 
national resources efficiently by providing appropriate 
signals to consumers. Prices act as signals to consumers 
who see them as costs of using the commodity, which in this 
case is electricity. If the price of electricity is fixed 
below its marginal cost of production, consumers will think 
that the cost of an additional unit of electricity is less 
than the cost to society (and act accordingly). In this 
case, more resources would be devoted to electricity 
production than is socially efficient. (This argument
Mohan Munasinghe and J. Warford, (1982), op.cit.
p. 16.
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presupposes the absence of "externalities” such as 
pollution costs etc. and also that all costs are measured 
in terms of social costs. Strictly speaking, marginal costs 
are marginal social costs.)
It may be objected that, while the above logic is 
valid for new consumers, there is no justification for 
charging marginal costs to existing consumers yet, all 
consumption is new in the economic sense. Just as B, a new 
group of consumers, may impose on the electric utility the 
need to add to system capacity because of their (new) 
additional requirements of electricity, so can an existing 
group A impose this need on the utility by continuing their 
consumption. Marginal cost pricing in electricity therefore 
involves a tariff structure so framed that the cost to any 
consumer of changes in the pattern/level of his consumption 
equals the cost to the electricity industry as a 
consequence of his action. Such pricing will cause 
individual consumption decisions to conform to the national 
interest if (a) consumers are well informed and rational,
(b) the distribution of income is taken as given, (c) the 
cost to industry of responding to consumption changes 
coincides with social costs, i.e. the value to the economy 
of the resources involved. (This means absence of 
economies/diseconomies. Examples of externalities in the 
electricity industry are atmospheric pollution caused by 
thermal stations, and environmental problems of hydro 
electric projects), (d) prices of substitutes/complements 
for electricity, are equal to their marginal (social) 
costs; and a similar condition exists in the case of prices 
of goods using electricity in production.
The theory of optimal capacity of French engineers- 
cum-economists has been vigorously taken up by Ralph Turvey 
in his writings on the pricing problems of the British
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electricity industry. In his major study^^® Turvey defines 
long-run marginal costs in present value terms as "the 
greatest worth of all system costs as they will be with the 
investment in load which is to be costed, less what they 
would be without that increment" and shows that information 
about the structure of marginal costs is provided as a by 
product of the calculations required for national 
investment planning. Elsewhere too, Turvey has come down 
firmly on the side of marginal cost pricing as a second 
best pricing rule arguing that the prices of public 
enterprise products sold within the public sector should 
equal their long-run marginal costs, while those sold 
outside the public sector should be proportional to long- 
run marginal costs, the mark up over marginal costs being 
determined by the prices of their private sector 
substitutes/^^
VIII.3 Approaches to electricity pricing.
For many years economists have discussed the merits of 
relating prices to the marginal or incremental costs of 
supply in electric utilities, but the concept has been slow 
to win acceptance except in France and Britain.
The traditional approach (By Dupuit and his followers) 
begins with a comprehensive stocktaking & evaluation of all 
assets, old & new, from which by application of certain
R. Turvey, Optimal Pricing and Investment in the 
Electricity Industry, Allen and Unwin, (1969).
R. Turvey, "The Second Best Case for Marginal Cost 
Pricing", in J Margolis and H.Guitton (eds). Public 
Economics: an analysis of public production and consumption 
and their relations to the private sectors. Proceedings of 
a Conference held by International Econoic Association, 
(1969).
Ralph Turvey and Dennis Anderson "Electricity 
Economics-Essavs and Case studies". A World Bank Research 
publication, (Washington D.C., 1981).
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depreciation rules, the annual "capacity-related" or 
"kilowatt-related" costs are derived. There is an 
evaluation of various running fuel and other "energy- 
related" or "kilowatt-hour" related costs. Some costs, such 
as those for maintenance, have fixed and variable 
components and are allocated to capacity & energy-related 
costs respectively. Finally, there are some costs, such as 
those for metering and billing, that are "customer-related" 
and not correlated with either capacity or energy demands, 
(leading to "three-part cost tariffs").
The procedure then is to allocate these costs as 
"equitably" as possible among consumers through the tariff 
structure. With research into consumer demand patterns, the 
more advanced enterprises are able to find out how much 
each consumer class is contributing to the peak & thus to 
the capacity-related accounting costs. Then energy and 
consumer-related costs are added in and a 'cost-based' 
tariff is formulated for each consumer class.
The first limitation of this "accounting" approach is 
that, except by chance, prorated accounting costs are quite 
different from the costs relevant to resource allocation. 
Prices are amounts paid for extra consumption and need to 
be related to the incremental costs of meeting extra 
consumption. If new consumers are connected to the system, 
or if existing consumers increase their consumption, 
additions to generating and network capacity may be 
required. It is important therefore, that prices should 
signal to consumers the costs of such consumption changes. 
Prices should be related to the value of resources used or 
saved, and the valuation of these resources -the estimation 
of costs- requires a forward looking estimate. In addition 
if the past holds a number of poor projects, passing on the 
sunk costs to the consumer of extra consumption is not 
efficient.
Secondly, this approach generates tariffs which relate
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to average rather than to marginal costs. But for efficient 
resource allocation, prices should be related to the 
resource costs of changes in consumption. And therefore 
pricing should be based on marginal rather than average 
cost. The addition of a new consumer or an increase in the 
consumption of an existing consumer will impose additional 
costs on the enterprise, while a reduction in consumption 
will save costs. These alterations in costs are the ones 
that need to be reflected in tariffs.
This brings us to the third limitation of the 
accounting approach. Fairness or equity in the approach is 
couched in rather narrow terms: consumers should pay for 
their allocated share of accounting costs. These accounting 
costs may very well differ from the costs that consumers 
are causing the enterprise to incur.
The fourth limitation of the accounting approach stems 
from its neglect of the incentive effects of tariffs. In 
being inadequate as a signalling device, the accounting 
approach ignores the incentive effects of tariffs. Tariffs 
give incentives to consumers by telling them when 
electricity is cheap, e.g. during off-peak hours, and when 
it is expensive, e.g. during peak hours. Incentive effects 
are obviously relevant in regulating electricity demand in 
accordance with requirements of the undertaking, which 
incurs different costs during different periods of the 
daily cycle. The average accounting costs, being unrelated 
to the incremental cost of supply in different periods, are 
thus inadequate in this respect.
Economists are now generally agreed that the 
accounting approach is inadequate for efficient resource 
a l l o c a t i o n . T h e  economic argument goes as follows. 
Accountants are concerned with the recovery of historical 
or sunk costs, whereas resource allocation emphasises the
Ibid. Chapter 2.
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actual resources saved or used by every consumer decision.
Also, tariffs often have to be simpler than the cost 
structure they represent. And how do we simplify without 
nullifying the aims of tariffs? This depends upon the aims 
of the tariffs. Simplified tariffs designed with only 
accounting aims in mind may differ enormously from those 
suggested by economic analysis.
Stiglitz and Atkinson dealt with the issue of Public 
Sector pricing and production. They addressed the issue 
of whether public sector prices should be equal to marginal 
cost and if not, how should they deviate? They did not 
discuss the definition of marginal costs and related 
questions such as peak load pricing; nor did they allow for 
uncertainty. They did consider the departures from marginal 
cost pricing that may be implied by the need to finance 
deficits, by the existence of monopoly elsewhere, and by 
redistributive goals.
They explained the simplest situation of a single 
public enterprise; producing one final product in quantity 
(Z), (in per capita terms) in an otherwise competitive 
economy (where the vector of per capita private outputs is 
denoted by X). Identical utility functions for all 
individuals U(X,Z,L) are assumed where L is the quantity of 
labour supplied per person. The production constraint was 
assumed to be of the form:
n = F(X) +C(Z) -L =0  (8.1)
where,
F(X) = labour requirement in the private sector,
C(Z) = the labour requirement in the public sector,
L = quantity of labour supplied per person.
J. Stiglitz and A.B. Atkinson, Lectures on Public 
Economics, Mcgraw Hill Book Company (U.K.) Limited, (1980), 
pp.457-481.
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It was assumed that the production set is convex. The 
condition for profit maximisation in the private sector 
implies that private sector profit,
7T = q.x -F(X)  (8.2)
(i.e., value of net output minus labour costs), is 
maximised. (Note: q.x = value of net output, F(X) = cost of 
output.)
A necessary condition for this is that qi = Fi where 
the latter denotes the derivation of F with respect to X^. 
It is assumed at this stage that there are constant returns 
to scale in the private sector and so ir=Q.
The public enterprise is assumed to determine its 
price P, to maximise social welfare, as measured by the 
indirect utility function of the representative consumer, 
denoted by V(q,p) where, q denotes the vector of prices of 
private sector products and p indicates the prices of the 
public output.
The enterprise is constrained by the profit condition 
(per person):
pZ -C(Z) +T >7T°  (8.3)
where T denotes the subsidy provided by the government and 
7T° the profit target. The subsidy is assumed to be financed 
by lump-sum taxation, so that T enters the indirect utility 
function. It is assumed that there were no other taxes at 
this stage. The solution to the pricing problem is seen by 
forming the Lagrangean;
L  = V(q,p,T) +X[pZ -C(Z) +T -JT°] ............. (8.4)
The first-order condition with respect to p may be written 
using the properties of the indirect utility function (the
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assumption of constant returns to scale in the private 
sector means that the only change in V is that arising from 
P) :
-aZ +A[Z +(p+C')6Z/6p] =0 ............... (8.5)
where a is the private marginal utility of income.
Suppose first that T is freely variable, so that lump­
sum taxation can be employed to finance any deficit. The 
first-order condition with respect to T (using the fact 
that 5V/5T=-a) is that;
-a =0  (8.6)
From (8.5) it follows that (provided 6 Z / 6 p  =y6^0) a
necessary condition for optimality is that;
p = C'(Z) .......................... (8.7)
i.e., price equals marginal cost. This is an illustration 
of the standard argument for marginal cost pricing.
Where there were constraints on the use of T, and the 
enterprise has an effective profit target, then the pricing 
rule must be modified. Suppose that T<0, and that with 
marginal cost pricing this is not sufficient to allow the 
enterprise to satisfy (8.3).
In practice, public enterprises produce more than one 
product, and this introduces degrees of freedom into the 
choice of pricing policy. Suppose that there are two 
products Zi, Zz. There are typically many combinations of 
the prices p^ , p^ that will satisfy the profit constraint. 
As seen earlier there are mainly two schools of thought 
explaining how the firm should depart from the marginal 
cost principle. One view is that the mark-up over cost 
should vary according to "what the market can bear", i.e..
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inversely with the elasticity of demand. Opposed is the 
position that prices should be proportional to marginal 
cost, advanced by, among others, Frisch and Allais, In 
order to consider the merits of these rival views, they 
modified the earlier analysis, so the maximisation problem 
is now represented by the Lagrangean;
~  V(g, Pi,P2 , T ) [PiZi +P2 Z2 ""C(Zi, %2) ].«(8.8)
VIII.4 Derivation of marginal cost based pricing principle.
The requirements in an optimal electricity tariff, 
(keeping in mind the important two objectives, i.e., 
raising sufficient revenues and fair distribution of costs 
among consumers ) are :
(a) Marginal cost pricing and the revenue objective. 
In most countries, developed as well as developing, 
the utilities are faced with a revenue objective as well, 
usually in the form of a required rate of return on capital 
investment. The revenue objective (i.e. a required rate of 
return on the capital base of the utility) is an accounting 
concept, and is thus based on the relationship between 
average accounting (usually historical) costs and price. It 
has been pointed out earlier that no a priori relationship 
exists between average accounting costs and marginal costs 
in a real life electric utility, with its mix of different 
types of plants.
Marginal cost pricing may, therefore, result in a 
deficit, or a surplus that is smaller or greater than a 
predetermined target, depending upon the actual situation 
in the electric utility concerned. The conflict may arises 
because average accounting costs are an average of
Criteria stated here can be found in Turvey(1968) 
op.cit. Turvey and Anderson (1977, chapter 9) op.cit. 
Munasinghe (1979) op.cit, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, 
Lecture 15) o p .cit.
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different types and ages of plant, and marginal cost is the 
incremental cost of new plant at current prices. The 
observed difference between average accounting costs and 
marginal costs, can therefore, very often be substantially 
accounted for by inflation and the firm's accounting 
practices. In the short run situation of excess capacity 
(i.e. where demand is below the available capacity when 
electricity is priced at marginal running cost), a 
financial deficit can arise with marginal cost pricing, as 
capacity costs are not covered by the short run rule. 
However there is no question of excess capacity in the long 
run.
The problem then becomes one of reconciling the 
objectives of resource allocation and the required rate of 
financial return, the latter being regarded as overriding. 
Originally, many utility managers and engineers saw in this 
conflict the necessity for some sort of average cost-plus 
pricing, which alone could ensure the achievement of the 
revenue objective.
From the accounting point of view, long-run marginal 
cost would include the opportunity cost of capital. What 
economists are advocating is that long-run marginal cost 
should be the starting point of any pricing policy, and the 
revenue surplus (i.e. over and above average accounting 
costs) objective, should be considered when making 
deviations from marginal cost based prices.
In this connection, reference must be made to the 
important contribution of Baumol and Bradford. These 
authors demonstrated for the first time, in a systematic 
fashion, how, in theory, the demands of resource allocation 
can be reconciled with the requirements of the revenue 
objective. Where marginal cost pricing yields an overall
182 W. Baumol and D.F. Bradford, "Optimal Departures 
from Marginal Cost Pricing", American Economic Review' 
Vol.60, (June, 1970). pp.129-142.
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deficit, the revenue constraint would require upward 
revisions in marginal cost-based prices. If we assume that 
the revenue constraint is overriding, then the problem 
becomes one of 'optimal' deviations from marginal costs, 
i.e. such deviations as would cause the least changes in 
consumption of different categories, from that dictated by 
marginal cost-based prices. This would imply pricing 
according to the 'inverse elasticity' rule, i.e. maximum 
deviations in prices of those consumer categories with the 
least elasticities of demand. In the case of revenue 
surplus arising from marginal cost pricing, the reverse 
procedure applies.
(b) The specification of the marginal cost of 
electricity output. The factors which affect the position 
of the cost curve should also be examined. A change in 
important factors like nonallocative efficiency, input 
prices and technology would lead to a change in marginal 
cost. Also, the plausibility of marginal cost 
disaggregation should be examined. For example, on 
technical grounds, it may be necessary to disaggregate 
marginal cost according to geographical area (or level of 
development, e.g., urban and rural), supply voltage (or 
consumer group, especially if different groups are supplied 
at different voltages), and season of the year, 
particularly in hydro systems. If marginal cost is defined 
as the cost of supplying an extra unit of electricity (e.g. 
KWH), as is usually the case, rather than the cost of 
supplying an extra unit to a new consumer then consumer 
costs such as the cost of metering and billing should be 
separately dealt with as fixed costs.
(c) The specification of the demand for electricity. 
This involves a determination of the aggregate demand 
function as well as its structure, where necessary. The 
disaggregation of demand is partly based on time and it 
involves answers to the following questions: (1) Are demand
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loads variable with time or not? (2) If demand loads are 
variable with time, are the different loads independent of 
one another? Are they also of equal duration?
On the basis of the analysis in Chapter IV and V, we 
can say that the demand aspect of electricity pricing is 
one of the most difficult to handle. The demand aspect is 
even more complicated if the marginal cost is 
disaggregated. In that case, it is necessary to 
disaggregate demand even further on the same bases as those 
upon which marginal cost is disaggregated."^ Thus, demand 
can be disaggregated according to geographical area and 
supply voltage or consumer group.
The constraints that need to be dealt with when 
determining an optimal electricity tariff are;
(i) A financial constraint. A distinction should be 
made between constraints imposed on current and capital 
accounts. The constraints on capital account are mainly 
limits to borrowing, the rate of interest at which an 
electric utility can borrow and the sources of finance 
including the proportion of total finance to be accounted 
for by retained earnings. The constraint on current account 
is usually in the form of a rate of return on investment 
target or net revenue target. It turns out that most 
governments do impose the constraints as a method of 
financing anticipated deficits or as a way of imposing a 
limit on the surplus which can be earned.
(ii) The other constraints which the electric utility 
faces. One of the most significant of such constraints is 
the administrative framework of the electric utility 
including the ease with which information can be procured. 
In terms of administration, two basic questions should be
An exception occurs if both marginal cost and demand 
vary with the seasons of the year. In that case, demand 
would need to be disaggregated on that basis, independent 
of the disaggregation of cost.
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answered : ( 1 ) Can the management cope with the requirements 
of an efficient organisation of production including the 
marketing of its inputs and outputs? In other words, can it 
meet an optimal quantity target at minimum administrative 
cost? ( 2 ) Can management estimate and administer at the 
minimum cost an optimum tariff policy arrived at after 
taking all the essential factors into consideration?
If the answers are affirmative, then administration 
need not be a constraint. Usually, there is administrative 
inefficiency and consequently, a first-best price-quantity 
combination can rarely be met. Sometimes the cause is 
external, especially when a utility has to conform with 
prescribed constitutional or bureaucratic procedures before 
policies can be approved. One should bear in mind the 
administrative framework when determining tariff policies 
for an electric utility. It is futile to derive and 
recommend a tariff policy which the administrative 
machinery is unable to implement.
Some of the above requirements and constraints are 
interrelated. For example, the net revenue target set by 
regulatory agencies may depend on the objectives of the 
marginal cost function and is partly dependent on 
administrative efficiency. So, each of the factors should 
not be seen in isolation too rigidly. Secondly, it is too 
difficult to take all the requirements into account in one 
formulation, and we have to be content with a few 
simplifications. The major simplifications centre around 
the demand and cost functions.
Following Atkinson and Stiglitz, we can design an 
optimal pricing rule for Gujarat Electricity Board. In 
determining the optimal pricing rule, we shall, for 
convenience, adopt a two-stage procedure. The first stage 
examines the optimal pricing rule in a world where the 
relevant objectives and constraints are taken into 
consideration but where some simplifying assumptions about
322
the demand and cost functions are made. The second stage 
examines the plausibility of the assumptions as well as 
changes in the optimal pricing rule if some or all the 
assumptions are relaxed.
VIII.4.1 Assumptions.
For the purpose of the next section, we shall make the 
following assumptions;
(a) GEB's production technology is such that plant is 
perfectly divisible. This implies that capacity can be 
increased in infinitesimal amounts. However, the relevance 
of this assumption is contingent upon the nature of 
capacity. If there is no capacity limitation, there will be 
no need for increasing capacity so, if we assume that there 
is no capacity limitation, it becomes irrelevant whether or 
not plant is divisible. But, if capacity is constrained, 
the assumption of perfect divisibility becomes important. 
The capacity constraint makes SRMC vertical at capacity 
output.
The short-run marginal cost (SRMC) need not be uniform 
across consumer groups, particularly because GEB's 
generating plants include hydro-electric plants whose costs 
are affected by rainfall variations. But we shall assume 
that it is uniform. Thus, for instance, the SRMC is assumed 
to be uniform irrespective of whether supply is to 
residential, commercial or industrial consumers. Secondly, 
it is assumed that the technology involved in electricity 
generation is homogeneous. It is also assumed that the SRMC 
is invariant with the seasons of the year.
(b) Demand is of uniform load throughout a demand 
cycle. This means that the problems of peak-load pricing do 
not arise; or there are no problems of allocating joint 
costs among the demand loads belonging to a demand cycle. 
It also implies that the problems of inter-dependent 
demands is limited to those between commodities.
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(c) The public enterprise operates in a world of 
certainty. The major implication of this assumption is that 
both the demand and cost functions are known for sure. 
Consequently, all the variables in the welfare function and 
the revenue constraint are also known. Moreover, GEB's 
investment and production plans are uninfluenced by 
uncertainty.
VIII.4.2 Analysis of the basic model.
The Basic Model:
Given the assumptions, the basic model consists of 
equations;
Max either W, = (Pt) + Et “ .........(8.9a)
or Wt = B J x J  - C\(Xt) ............. (8.9b)
such that Rt - C“t(Xt) ^   (8.10)
where W is welfare, S is consumers' surplus, £ and x are
the vectors of price and output respectively, R is revenue, 
C" is the minimum cost incurred in earning the revenue, n° 
is the net revenue target, B is benefit, i.e. the sum of 
the consumers' surplus and revenue, and t is the pricing 
period. Since the minimum cost concept is adopted, the 
model is compatible with the achievement of both allocative 
and non-allocative objectives as well as the revenue 
constraint faced by GEB. And if the shadow marginal cost 
concept is adopted in deriving the optimal pricing rules, 
it also takes into account the distortions resulting from 
market failures in the rest of the economy.
The model can be criticised. First, since the model is 
static, the "t"s can be deleted from it. Secondly, since 
the producer's surplus (i.e. the difference between revenue 
and cost) is constant, it suffices to maximise the 
consumers' surplus in so far as the budget constraint is 
binding. Nevertheless, the analysis below will be based on
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the maximisation of both the consumers' and producer's 
surpluses. The reasons are: (1) both approaches yield
identical results if the budget constraint is binding, and
(2) from the pricing rule obtained from the maximisation of 
both surpluses, it is easier to derive the optimal pricing 
rules if the budget constraint ceases to be binding. By and 
large, the approach opted for is more general than that in 
which only the consumers' surplus is maximised. Given this, 
the choice between the welfare functions in (8.9a) and 
(8.9b) can now be made. The latter is preferred for two 
reasons: (1) it requires no definition of consumers' 
surplus and, therefore, of the demand concept being adopted 
and (2) the optimal pricing rules are easier to derive from 
it.
A third comment is regarding the budget constraint 
related to definition of cost. Cost excludes consumer costs 
(e.g. cost of meters) most of which are traceable to 
particular consumers and should therefore be charged to 
them accordingly. So, the pricing rules derived (in this 
Chapter) are those over and above such charges.
Given the above comments, the basic model becomes.
Max W = B(x) - C(x) ....................(8.11)
such that R-C”(x) > tt°..... .............. (8.12)
where B is total benefit with the property that 5Bx/5x = P;
and X is electricity sales.
VIII.4.3 Optimal Pricing Rule.
The Lagrangian expression for (8.11) and (8.12) is,
£  = B(x) - CT(x) + i [ R  - C(x) - j r ° ] ;  X>0..... (8.13)
where X is the Lagrangian multiplier or the shadow price of 
the budget constraint. It should be noted that dB/dx = P;
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where P is price. After differentiating (8.13) with respect 
to P and X and then solving for P, we have
{ (1+X)  |e" |  }
------------------- * c"'; I =7^0  (8.14)
{ [ ( 1 + X )  |€<*| ] - X}
{(1+A)|e-|)
Letting a =    (8.15)
{ [ ( l + X )  |e- |  ] - X } ,
» P = aC"'  (8.16)
Differentiating (8.13) with respect to P and X, we 
have the following first order conditions
6 L  6 x  6 x  6 x  S x
——— = P ——— — c" +P — C  ) =0(8.13a)
6P 5P S P  6 P  6 P
and S1./SX = R - C”(x) - 7r° = 0  (8.13b)
where C“' = S C “/ 6 x  is marginal cost.
From (8.13a), (l+A)(P-C^)6x/6P = - X x .
Dividing both the sides by (l+l)x, we have
S x 1 — X
( P—C' ) — — * ——  = ...   (8.13c)
S P  X l + X
Multiplying both the numerator and denominator of the 
L.H.S. of (8.13c) by P, we have 
[(P-C^)/P]*ed = - X / ( l + X )  
where e** = P/x * S x / S P  is the price elasticity of demand. 
So, (P-C"')/P = -X/[(1+X)e‘*]
» [P-C"']/P = X/[(l+X) le”! ]  (8.13d)
Solving for P we get,
P={(l+X)*|e’‘| )/{[(l+X)*|e'| ]-X> *c"'.................. (8.14)
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which, more fully, is
P(x,(p) = aC“'(x,0)  (8.17)
where tp and © represent demand and supply parameters 
respectively. Notice that both ^ and P (or x) can be 
determined from (8.13b) and (8.17). Output (or price) is 
then determined by substituting price (or output) into the 
demand equation. Notice also that from (8.14), it is 
possible to deduce the first best result. Setting X=0, i.e. 
assuming the budget constraint is not binding, (8.14) 
becomes
(1+0) |e^ |
p  =   c " '
( 1 + 0 )  l e ^ l - O
= C"'
So, if the budget constraint is not imposed, or it is not 
binding, the marginal cost pricing result is optimal.
Having derived the optimal pricing rule for the basic 
model, the immediate task is to interpret the rule and 
examine its implications. The interpretation is dealt with 
first. From (8.15), a>l“® since, as indicated earlier ^ >0. 
Assuming that the budget constraint is binding (i.e. %>0), 
then a>l. It is then clear from (8.17) that price exceeds 
marginal cost. The rule is illustrated in Figure VIII.1.
In the figure, C'(x,0) is the marginal cost curve, AC 
is the average cost curve and P(x,^p) is the demand curve. 
Consequently, A is the first-best optimum at which optimal 
price-quantity combination is (Po, Xo). With this
For a to be less than unity, the profit target must 
be maximum. If it is, X in (8.13a) is preceded by a 
negative sign and a in (8.15) becomes
a = ---------------
(1-X)|e-| +X 
So, 0 < a < l i f 0 < > , < l .
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Figure VIII.1
combination, the net benefit of commodity x is area AGF, 
i.e. the difference between total benefit (OFAXo) and cost 
(OGAXo) or between consumers' surplus (APqF) and the 
producer's deficit (APqG) . Now suppose the regulatory 
authority feels the producer's deficit is too much and, 
consequently, it imposes a revenue target which reduces the 
deficit (but does not necessarily eliminate it). Then, 
there exists a curve such as aC'(x,©) in the figure. The 
equilibrium point is then at C and the optimal price- 
quantity combination is (Pi ,Xi). This implies that the 
target reduces output and raises the optimal price. But 
what is the effect of the budget constraint on welfare? At 
C, the producer's deficit is (OGBXi - OPiCXi) = PiGH - HCB, 
and the consumers' surplus is reduced to PiFC. Therefore, 
the net benefit of Xi is (PiFC - PiGH +HCB) = FCBHG. So, the 
welfare loss resulting from the budget constraint is area 
ABC.
Why should a government impose a regulation which
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reduces welfare? The answer involves a comparison between 
two economic states. The first state is a combination of 
first-best pricing and the need to finance any deficit or 
utilise the surplus through the central government. The 
second state is summarised by the basic model, implying 
that it combines efficient pricing with limits on the 
financial performance of the enterprise thereby resulting 
in a second-best optimum (C in the figure). On efficiency 
grounds, the government is rational in imposing a budget 
constraint if it turns out that the net benefit of 
commodity x in state 2 exceeds that in state 1 and vice- 
versa. There is indifference if the net benefits are equal.
State 1 will be preferable if there exists a system of 
lump-sum taxes which can be imposed to cover the deficit. 
In that case, the marginal conditions remain unchanged. So, 
welfare will still be correctly measured by the area AGF in 
Figure VIII.1, which exceeds the net benefit at second-best 
optimum. However the problem is that one rarely comes by 
such a system of taxes. Usually, a welfare loss is 
associated with the policies designed to solve the 
financial problem. So, with state 1, even though the net 
benefit of commodity x is initially as large as possible, 
some inefficiencies creep in when the financial problems 
are incorporated. The effective net benefit of commodity x 
is the sum of the consumers' and producer's surpluses when 
priced at marginal cost, less the welfare cost associated 
with the management of the financial state of the public 
enterprise. On efficiency grounds, it is irrational to 
impose the budget constraint if the welfare loss is less 
than area ABC in the Figure VIII.1.
One needs to know whether marginal cost refers to the 
SRMC and/or the LRMC. From the nature of the pricing 
decision, i.e. one of pricing in a pricing period or at a 
point in time, it is obvious that the SRMC is appropriate. 
None the less, the LRMC is also appropriate if plant
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capacity is optimal at the level of output determined by 
(8.17), in which case, the LRMC equals SRMC. It should be 
noted that, since a SRMC and a LRMC curve cannot intersect 
at more than one level of output,^®® and since the budget 
constraint leads to a second rather than first-best 
optimum, the level of capacity implicit in (8.17) must be 
different from that prevailing in a first-best world if the 
LRMC must equal the SRMC. By and large, even though the 
SRMC is the one directly relevant to the pricing problem, 
it is quite possible for the LRMC to do the same job even 
in the face of the budget constraint.
One implication of the pricing rule is that public 
enterprises are justified in adjusting their prices in line 
with the rate of inflation. This is because the cost 
concept in the pricing rule is the current marginal cost. 
Therefore, revenue adjustment to inflation should be fully 
automatic. However in practice, there are problems in 
adjusting prices to inflation. The first is attributable to 
the fact that the prices for the supplies of a public 
enterprise cannot be varied continuously in line with 
inflation. Price is normally allowed to remain steady over 
a period. Consequently, the problem is how to fix prices 
for the period so as to reflect the rate of inflation 
during the period. Various techniques are available for 
forecasting the rate of inflation. They range from guesses 
to sophisticated forecasting techniques. The problem is 
that most techniques are subject to error. So, the 
adjustment of prices to inflation would normally be 
imperfect.
The second problem involves the treatment of 
depreciation of fixed assets, inventories (of inputs only 
since electricity is supplied on demand) and capital gains 
(including those stemming from net monetary liabilities and
186 This is because both curves are at best convex from 
below, the SRMC cutting the LRMC from below.
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assets) in an inflationary period. Notice that the problem 
of how best to treat these quantities exists even without 
inflation, in which case inflation merely accentuates the 
problem. Given this observation and assuming for the 
moment that we are only concerned with inflation, a useful 
approach is to index the various quantities. For instance, 
depreciation allowances can be calculated on a replacement 
cost basis, different indices being applied to different 
classes of assets. However two main problems should be 
noted on this approach. The first is that other objectives 
may demand measures which exclude full indexation. For 
instance, the need to stimulate investment may require a 
policy of initial depreciation allowances rather than the 
replacement cost-based depreciation. The second problem is 
the choice of index. These and other problems often prevent 
a public enterprise from adopting measures which are ideal.
VIII.4.4 Multi-part tariffs.
According to the pricing rule derived above, unless 
the production technology exhibits constant returns to 
scale, the tariff is essentially a variable charge. Thus, 
consumption is open to all at a variable charge per unit 
consumed. The charge varies positively with demand.
For some enterprises, an alternative tariff policy is 
possible. It is a multi-part tariff, or two-part tariff. 
The main traditional case for this type of tariff was the 
possibility of covering cost without simultaneously 
distorting the efficiency of resource utilisation. In other 
words, it was thought to be a device for improving the 
efficiency of public enterprise pricing when the technology 
exhibits increasing returns to scale.
A.R. Prest and N.A. Barr, Public Finance in Theory 
and Practice. Chapter 16 (explanation regarding the 
treatment of depreciation of fixed assets, inventories and 
capital gains with and without persistent inflation).
(1979) .
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À two-part tariff is designed in such a way that one 
part is a variable charge. This implies that this part is 
levied according to the use of the facilities. The other 
part of the tariff is a fixed charge and, as a result, is 
invariant with the volume of transactions. This part is 
contingent upon the need to meet a certain revenue 
requirement. (It is alternatively known as the licence fee 
or the admission charge for the right to purchase. In 
theory, the fixed charge would be the same for all 
consumers irrespective of the quantity supplied to each 
consumer.)
The exact magnitudes of the variable and fixed parts 
depend upon the assumptions made. If there is no change in 
the number of consumers as a result of changes in the fixed 
charge, given GEB's objective of efficiency, and revenue 
constraint in (8.10), the variable part of the tariff 
equals marginal cost and the fixed part can be determined 
as under: Let the level of output at which demand equals 
marginal cost be Xq. At x^  the revenue constraint is
R - C“(Xo) = 7T°.
With a two-part tariff
R = C"' Xo + fN
where c"' is marginal cost, f is the fixed charge and N is 
the number of consumers. Substituting this into the budget 
constraint, we have
C“'Xo + fN - C”(Xo) = 7T°.
Hence,
+ C“ (Xo) -  C”'Xo
f  -----------------------
N
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I.e.
f  ----+
N
(AC(X.) - C-'(X.))X.
N
(8.19)
Suppose GEB is directed to cover costs, then 7T° =  0 and
(AC - C"')Xo
f  ---------------- --------
N
This is illustrated in Figure VIII.2.
Figure VIII,2
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In the figure, C"'(x) is the marginal cost curve, AC is 
the average cost curve and D is the demand curve. Without 
the budget constraint, equilibrium is at B. So, the 
variable part of the tariff is C“'o- At the equilibrium 
point, the enterprise incurs a deficit to the tune of the 
shaded area, i.e. ABC"'oF. Given that costs should be 
covered, the deficit is financed by levying a fixed charge
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on each consumer. The charge equals the quotient of the 
deficit and the total number of consumers. Notice that the 
levy is not the same as ÀB which is the quotient of the 
deficit and the optimal quantity. The fixed charge will 
equal AB only if the number of consumers equals the optimum 
quantity; that is, if each consumer purchases only a unit 
of commodity. If at least one consumer purchases more than 
one unit, then Xo > N implying that, given the size of the 
deficit, the fixed charge will exceed AB.
How suitable is the two-part tariff device as an 
alternative to the single-part tariff specified in (8.17)? 
Since the single-part tariff achieves a second-best optimum 
and a first-best optimum is impossible under a revenue 
constraint, the two-part tariff is at best as good as the 
single part tariff. Both types of tariff do adhere to the 
benefit principle and both involve distortions or 
departures from marginal cost pricing. The departure of the 
multi(two)-part tariff would yield an equilibrium at E (in 
Figure VIII.2) when a cost covering policy is pursued. For 
the two-part tariff, the ultimate equilibrium will not be 
at B. This is because the fixed charge is not truly lump­
sum. We define a lump-sum charge as one in which the 
consumer cannot affect the size of the charge by modifying 
his behaviour.
The fixed charge can be affected by consumers. This is 
because a move from marginal cost pricing position to one 
in which price exceeds marginal cost is likely to crowd-out 
the marginal consumers. If one consumer backs out, that 
implies a change in the number of consumers and, therefore, 
a change in the fixed charge. The main point here is that 
the imposition of a fixed charge is likely to distort the 
choice whether or not to consume the service at all. For 
the second-best optimum, demand will decrease until, with 
the cost covering case, it intersects the marginal cost 
curve at a point that corresponds to x^  in the figure. The
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variable charge is then equal to C"'(Xj) and the fixed charge 
may be determined according to (8.19) with Xi replacing Xo.
The two-part tariff has several limitations compared 
to the uniform tariff. Firstly, a major characteristic of 
the fixed charge is that it is regressive (though we need 
not discuss this here since equity is not the concern at 
the moment). Secondly, a two-part tariff is only applicable 
where it is possible to determine the number of consumers. 
This requirement is easily satisfied by some enterprises 
such as electricity e.g. GEB. Thirdly, a two-part tariff is 
applicable mainly in decreasing cost industries. This is 
because (1) in practice, the fixed charge is usually 
positive and (2) operations need to be optimal. As noted 
earlier, the fixed charge is given by
(AC - C')x
f  =  + -------------
N
Suppose 7T° = 0, then
f > 0 if AC > C',
i.e., if average cost is decreasing. In principle, there is 
no basis for restricting the sign of the fixed charge. It 
is therefore possible to apply the two-part tariff in 
increasing cost industries. In essence, it is possible to 
achieve a second-best optimum even with a negative fixed 
charge. However, in designing tariffs, principles have to 
be adopted to practical possibilities. In this regard, it 
seems the only stable practical possibility is for the 
fixed charge to be positive. To the extent that a negative 
fixed charge is inadmissible, the two-part tariff can only 
be applied to those enterprises whose technologies exhibit 
increasing returns to scale over some range of output.
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VIII.4.5 Extension of the basic model.
The basic model needs to be extended to incorporate 
GEB's other features. First, the plausibility of the 
assumptions need to be examined. Second, the optimal 
pricing rules are determined if some rules are relaxed. 
Thus, in turn, we examine the following assumptions: 
capacity constraint and plant divisibilities, marginal cost 
structuring, peak-load pricing and uncertainty.
VIII.4.5.1 The capacity constraint and plant 
indivisibilities.
One of the assumptions underlying the analysis in the 
previous section is that GEB faces no capacity constraint. 
This implies that plant is of flexible capacity and any 
load demanded could be met without confronting the 
technical difficulty (or impossibility) imposed by maximum 
output. In fact, at any instant, most public enterprises, 
(including GEB) face a completely rigid capacity. Hence, it 
is necessary to modify the basic model for which (8.17) is 
the optimal result.
The problem is to maximise (8.11) subject to (8.12)
and X < "x  (8.20)
where ”x is capacity output. The Lagrangian expression is
jC = B(x) - C”(x) + i [ R  - C"(x) - TTo] - r[x-x]; t > 0 . ( 8 . 2 1 )
where r is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the 
capacity constraint, i.e. the rental charge arising from 
power outages. After differentiating (8.21)“ * and solving
“ * Differentiating (8.21), with respect to price, we
have
(continued...)
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for P we get.
®^®(. . .continued)
<SL S k  S k  6k S x  Sx
——— = p——— — c* ——— + JL^ P”*”*” “ C" ———] — 7'— — —  = 0
SP SP SP SP SP SP
Sx Sx
» (1—X) (P—C“')----  -Xx + T .
S P  S P
Dividing through by x, we have
S x  1 S x  1
( l+X ) ( P—C“^ ) ——— * ——— = —X + T——— * ———
5P X <5p X
Multiplying both the numerator and denominator of the first 
and last expression by P, we have
P-C"' T6^
(l+X) {----- ) e** = -X + --
P P
where is the price elasticity of demand. This implies
P (1+X)e‘* P
P re**
p = c"' + -------- [ —X + -----  ]
(1+X)e** P
X r
= C"'  --------P + ------
(1+X)e< (l+X)
(l+X) I 6-1 |£-|
= ----------------- C"' + ---------------- T ... (8.21a)
(l+X) |e-| - X (l+X) |e-| - X
(l+X) I 6-1
Letting a  ---------------- ,
(1+X)|€**1 - X
a
then, P = aC"' +  r  (8.22)
(l+X)
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a
P = aC”' + ------ T  (8.22)
( 1+A)
The first expression on the R.H.S of (8.22) is the
same as that in (8.17) except that C"' should now be
interpreted as the marginal operating or running cost. If 
the level operation is below capacity, r = 0, and the same 
result as in (8.17) is arrived at. But if the level of 
operation is at capacity output, r>0 and the optimal price 
exceeds aC“'. So, the influence of the capacity constraint 
is to potentially increase the optimal price by increasing 
the SRMC through the shadow price of the capacity 
constraint.
Since the effect of capacity is on cost, it is useful 
to examine the components of SRMC if the shadow price of 
the budget constraint (i.e. 1) is zero. In that case, a = 
1 and (8.22) becomes
P = C"' + r. ................ (8.23)
So, price equals the SRMC, i.e. the sum of the running cost 
and the shadow price of the capacity constraint or the 
rental charge arising from excess demand. Since it is also
known that the LRMC is the sum of the running cost and the
marginal capacity cost (B), the relative magnitudes of the 
LRMC and the SRMC depend on the relative magnitudes of the 
shadow price of the capacity constraint and the marginal 
capacity cost. So, SRMC = LRMC if r = 6, SRMC > LRMC if t  
>6 and vice-versa. The optimal result in (8.23) and the 
relationship between the SRMC and the LRMC are illustrated 
in Figure VIII.3.
In the figure, the initial level of demand is Do, the 
equilibrium is at Eq and the optimal price is at Pq* As 
output is less than capacity, r is zero. So, the optimal 
price is equal to the running cost. Now suppose demand 
increases to Di. Optimality now occurs at Ei and the
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Figure VIII.3
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equilibrium price at . Since capacity is fully utilised, 
T assumes a positive value. In fact, with demand at D^ , its 
value is E^ G. So, optimal price, , equals the sum of the 
running cost GXi and the shadow price of the capacity 
constraint, r = E^ G. At the same level of output, 3 equals 
FG if the LRMC is LRMC'^, E^G if the LRMC is LRMCi, and DG 
if the LRMC is LRMC",. Therefore, with LRMC',, 3 < r and 
SRMC > LRMC; with LRMC,, 3 = r and SRMC =LRMC; and with 
LRMC",, 3 > T  and SRMC < LRMC.
A knowledge of the exact relationship between SRMC and 
the LRMC is useful for determining whether or not capacity 
should be expanded.^®® The rule is that r>3, there is 
overinvestment and capacity should be contracted.
O.E. Williamson, "Peak Load Pricing and Optimal 
Capacity Under Indivisibility Constraints", American 
Economic Review, Vol. 56, No. 4, pp.810-827, (1966), also
reprinted in R. Turvey, ed. Public Enterprise; Selected 
Readings. Penguin Books, (1968).
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Equilibrium occurs when r=B or when SRMC=LRMC. In this 
sense, Ei (in the figure) is indeed in both short- and long 
- run equilibrium. This result is based on the assumption 
that the budget constraint is not binding.
The assumption is in fact perfect plant divisibility. 
It implies that the SRMC is continuously smooth. But for 
most public enterprises, including GEE, plant 
indivisibility or lumpiness of investment is the rule. In 
fact, additions to capacity tend to be very large in 
electric utilities. So, the assumption of perfect plant 
divisibility will normally be violated in practice. 
However, plant indivisibility may or may not be important 
depending on the degree of interconnection of the system of 
electricity generation and the relative size of each plant 
to the t o t a l . I f  the interconnections are extensive and 
each generating unit represents an insignificant fraction 
of total capacity, plant indivisibility would be 
insignificant.
The indivisibility constraint has two major effects. 
(1) there is a need for more careful interpretation of 
marginal cost. The need for re-interpretation can be 
explained with the help of Figure VIII.4.
In the figure, P is the price, x is the output, C“' is 
the SRMC curve and D is demand. The initial level of demand 
is Dq. At this level of demand, the optimal price and output 
are Po, Xo. Now suppose demand increases to Di. With capacity 
constraint x^ , the optimal price rises to P^ . Part of this 
price is the shadow price of capacity constraint which
H. S. Houthakker, "Electricity Tariffs in Theory and 
Practice", Economic Journal, Vol. 61, No. 241, 1-25.
(1951).
In case of GEB, plant indivisibility is important
i.e. not insignificant. And this can be proved using the 
data on proportionate share of different plants in the 
total capacity and proportionate share of generation and 
installed capacity of GEB in the regional grid.
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Figure VIII.4
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equals BC in the figure. If BC exceeds the marginal 
capacity cost then the expansion of capacity is signalled. 
As investment is lumpy, there will be a sharp spike (BFF if 
investment is instantaneous) in the SRMC curve. Thus, with 
plant indivisibility, strict marginal cost pricing rule 
requires that development cost should be borne by existing 
consumers (e.g. price is at E) . As soon as investment is 
completed, the cost becomes a sunk cost and the marginal 
cost curve adapts to its old trend line. After this 
adjustment, the optimal price is < P/ when demand is . 
The general effect of plant indivisibility is that it 
creates a practical problem - unacceptable price 
fluctuations - if marginal cost is not defined 
appropriately. This problem can be solved by adopting the
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LRMC approach^*^ thereby averaging capacity cost over the 
useful life of the plant.
The second effect of the plant indivisibility is that 
capacity output can only assume integer multiplies of 
output units. Thus if there are n plants each capable of 
producing Xi units of output, then total capacity "x can be 
expressed as:
5T = nXi.
So, the capacity constraint is:
X < X = nxi.
However, this is of no major effect to the basic model. It 
only imposes a bound on the values which capacity output 
can assume.
What are the combined effects of plant 
indivisibilities and capacity limitations? The joint 
effects are illustrated in Figure VIII.5. Without both 
indivisibility and capacity limitation, the SRMC is 
ABCDEFG. With plant indivisibility, the SRMC is ÀBJCDKEFG. 
The need to keep price steady implies that plant costs 
should be averaged over the entire life of the plant. If 
this is done, the relevant cost is the LRMC. If instead of 
plant indivisibility, output were constrained to x, then 
the relevant cost is SRMC, i.e. ABCDEFMN. This implies that 
the SRMC is kinked at capacity and is indeterminate unless 
demand is known. Combining both features, we have a dual
This is typical World Bank approach. See, e.g. Mohan 
Munasinghe, Electric Power Pricing Policy. World Bank Staff 
Working Paper no. 340, (1979), (p.13), and R. Turvey and D. 
Anderson (1977), o p .cit. p.358, H.Hotelling, "General 
Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation and Railway and 
Utility Rates", Econometrica. Vol.6, No.3, (1938), p.264
suggested similar solution.
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rule. At levels of operation below capacity, the relevant 
cost is the LRMC, i.e. HM. On the other hand, if the level 
of operation is at capacity output, the appropriate cost is 
MN, i.e. part of vertical portion of the SRMC curve. 
Therefore, marginal cost is the greater of the short- and 
long-run marginal costs, i.e. HMN.
VIII.4.5.2 Marginal cost structure.
The final assumption is that marginal cost (i.e. the 
LRMC and also SRMC) is uniform across consumer groups, 
generating plants and seasons of the year. This assumption 
is implausible. The LRMC is likely to vary across consumer 
groups mainly because they are supplied at different 
voltages. Given the nature of electricity transmission and 
distribution, the LRMC varies inversely with supply 
voltage. Thus, it must be true that GEB incurs the highest 
LRMC on agricultural consumers and the lowest LRMC on the 
industrial consumers. In any case, the important thing is
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not the ranking but the variations of LRMC across consumers 
when grouped according to supply voltage. Consumers can 
also be classified on other bases, especially according to 
geographical area - e.g. rural and urban. The LRMC is also 
likely to vary across GEB's generating plants. This is 
because plants differ in type and location as well as age. 
These differences imply that plants are most likely to 
differ in their running efficiency and therefore, in their 
costs. Given this, if GEB's management is rational the 
plants will be used in the order of their running 
efficiency, implying that the system's marginal cost may be 
upward sloping. So, the technical diversity affects the 
shape of the supply curve. This is in fact the only effect 
if one assumes that demand, if disaggregated, is such that 
the demand periods coincide with the optimal running times 
of the different types of the plants, an assumption that 
will be made here. So, the pricing rule is unaffected, 
though the optimal prices will be if demand is 
disaggregated.
The plausibility of a uniform demand LRMC across 
seasons is partly dependent on variation in demand loads. 
It should be noted that whenever the LRMC is disaggregated 
according to consumer groups, whether by supply voltage, 
geographical area or whatever, demand should also be 
disaggregated likewise for meaningful derivation of the 
optimal pricing rules. (The converse is not necessarily 
true. For instance, the optimal pricing rules can be 
derived from a combination of uniform LRMC and a demand 
disaggregated into peak and off-peak loads).
VIII.4.5.3 Peak load pricing.
The crucial demand assumption on which the basic model 
is based is that demand is of uniform load with respect to 
time, implying that there was no problem of peak-load 
pricing. But the assumption is clearly untenable. It should
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be noted that variable demand is not sufficient to cause a 
peak-load problem. Given variable demand, a peak load 
problem arises when the commodity supplied is non-storable 
or when the storage costs are prohibitive. In that case, 
the commodity is supplied on demand. The non-storability 
condition explains the prevalence of the peak load problem 
in such utilities as electricity. For those enterprises 
whose products are storable, the uniform load assumption 
does not alter the basic results and is therefore 
acceptable.
Whenever the peak-load problem exists, the general 
problem to be solved is how to apportion the joint capacity 
cost among different loads in a way consistent with 
efficiency or, more specifically, with the minimisation of 
excess capacity during the off-peak periods. The general 
strategy is to induce consumers to shift their demands from 
peak to off-peak periods by charging a lower price during 
the off-peak periods. Optimality is achieved when the price 
structure is such that the demand structure is compatible 
with minimum excess capacity in the off-peak periods.
Unfortunately, so far in India, demand is not metered 
according to the time of day. Also it is difficult to 
separate the costs: hence, it will be impossible to try and 
calculate the price for off-peak and peak periods.
VIII.4.5.4 Uncertainty.
There are three main areas through which uncertainty 
exerts significant influences on the activities of a public 
enterprise. On the demand side, the extent to which random 
changes in incomes, tastes and the prices of other 
commodities influence demand is usually unknown. Hence, 
demand is normally stochastic. The second area is plant 
capacity. In the short-run, the random variations in 
capacity can be due to equipment failures, strikes and the 
like. In the long-run, it may be due to such factors as
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errors in forecasts used as bases for capacity expansion, 
slippage in construction schedules and unplanned equipment 
outages. (Uncertainty will affect capacity, be it the 
existing (i.e. actual) one or the optimal one (i.e. the one 
that would prevail if GEB priced its supplies as if 
capacity were optimal). The third major area is the 
marginal operating cost. The random disturbances here are 
mainly due to changes in the prices of the inputs (e.g. 
fuel and labour) which GEB utilises.
Uncertainty is of significance to pricing precisely 
because, in practice, the pricing decision is taken prior 
to the beginning of a pricing period, i.e. before demand, 
operating and capacity costs are known for sure. 
Uncertainty in itself is not sufficient to present a 
problem for public enterprise pricing. It is the need to 
set prices over a specified immediate future that 
necessitates the use of anticipated demand and costs rather 
than the actual. In light of this what is the degree of 
implausibility of the uncertainty assumption? There are 
three main issues which should normally be considered. The 
first is the characteristics of uncertainty, e.g. its 
extent and variability, which in statistical terms are 
summarised by the mean and variance of the random 
disturbance. The second is the duration of the pricing 
period. There are two contradictory points. On the one 
hand, one can say that the longer the pricing period, the 
greater the influence of uncertainty since more unexpected 
events are likely in the long- than in short-run. But it 
can also be argued that a variable is likely to assume its 
permanent, long-run or trend value the longer the period 
involved, and, therefore, is likely to be more predictable. 
(This is the same as saying that the unexpected events are 
more likely to cancel out in the long- than in short-run). 
Which of the assertions is valid depends on whether or not 
things happen to cancel out. And whether they cancel out
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depends on the factors involved. The third factor is the 
quality of the forecasting techniques adopted by a public 
enterprise to determine demand and costs. The better the 
quality of forecasting techniques, the smaller the 
difference between anticipated and actual demand and costs. 
This factor is a very important one. The influence of 
uncertainty on errors in pricing decisions based on the 
pricing rules above can be reduced to an insignificant 
minimum. So, the assumption of certainty may not be 
implausible. With this background, the approach that will 
be adopted in this study is the use of appropriate 
forecasting techniques to determine expected demand and 
cost for a given period. Therefore, the influences of 
uncertainty which are not taken into account by this 
approach are assumed away. (Actually the lack of awareness 
regarding the expected demand without a supply constraint 
will not lead us to predict demand appropriately. Hence, by 
assuming the appropriateness of demand prediction, the 
study is of limited use).
VIII.5 SuTmnary.
The procedure started with the basic model, i.e. the
maximisation of the consumers' and producer's surpluses
(based on uniform and smooth demand and cost) subject to
the revenue constraint. The optimal price is one which
(h
equates demand price with the product of a scaljer factor (a 
> 1) and marginal cost. This type of tariff belongs to the 
class of single-part tariffs. However, for such a tariff, 
an equivalent two-part tariff can be derived. This consists 
of a variable charge which equals marginal cost, and a 
fixed charge which is the quotient of the deficit at the 
level of output where price equals marginal cost and the 
number of consumers. The fixed part is invariant with 
respect to the quantity consumed. Historically, such a 
tariff was thought to be capable of covering cost without
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simultaneously distorting the efficiency of resource 
utilisation. However, since the fixed charge is not truly 
lump-sum, it is highly unlikely that a two-part tariff will 
achieve a first-best optimum. The applicability of a two- 
part tariff is also largely limited to decreasing cost 
industries since the fixed charge is usually positive.
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CHAPTER IX
ELECTRICITY PRICES IN GUJARAT AND MARGINAL COST PRICING -
Having derived the optimal pricing rules for GEB's 
electricity supply in the previous chapter, the next step 
is to estimate "optimal" electricity prices.
In determining electricity prices, a knowledge of 
electricity demand is indispensable.
Let the general form of the demand function"'^ for the 
consumer class be,
Ph = Ph(Xh)  (9.1) .
where,
P = price and,
X = quantity demanded.
The consumer class could be determined by a number of 
factors including the role of the consumer in the 
production process (e.g. residential, commercial, 
industrial etc.) demand period (i.e. peak and off-peak 
periods) and geographical area. So, a consumer class can be 
the residential consumers in rural areas during the off- 
peak period. If there are n consumer classes, n demand 
functions are required.
The second requirement for price determination is the 
budget constraint. With more than one consumer class, it is 
given by,
n
S[Rh - Ch(Xh) ] = 7T°  (9.2)
H
or
n
2 [ P gXg — Cg ( Xg ) ] = 7T ...................(9.3).
H
As discussed in Chapter IV, demand for electricity 
is a derived demand, and how far the data is representative 
of true demand is a big question.
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where,
R = revenue,
C = cost of earning the revenue and,
7T° = profit target.
Substituting the demand function (9.1) into (9.3) we have, 
either
n
S[Ph(Xh)Xh - Ch(Xh)] = 7T° ................. (9.4)
H
or
2 {PhXh(Ph) - Ch[Xh(Ph)]> =  (9.5).
H
The difference between (9.4) and (9.5) is that the former 
is expressed in terms of quantity while the latter is 
expressed in terms of price. However, both yield identical 
price-quantity combinations, since, for a given price, 
quantity can be uniquely determined and vice-versa.
The last requirement for price determination is the 
condition for the welfare optimum. If 7t° is minimum, the
welfare optimum condition for the consumer class is
given by,
Ph - Ch X.
** ^ ^
p. (1+X)|e/|
If r° is maximum, it is given by,
Ph - C'h X.
Ph (1-X)|€h-
where,
6d = own-price elasticity of demand,
C' = marginal cost and,
X = shadow price of the budget constraint.
There should be n of either equation (9.6) or equation
(9.7). These n equations together with (9.4) yield a system 
of (n+1) equations in (n+1) unknown (i.e. n prices and the
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shadow price of the budget constraint). So , the system is 
complete.
The solutions of the system of equations can be 
derived in two main ways. The first is the use of 
mathematical programming to solve the original problem from 
which the equations are derived. The second method, and one 
adopted in this study, is to solve the system of equations 
directly. This is by first using aggregate demand and cost 
functions to determine potentially "optimal” aggregate 
quantities which satisfy (9.4) equation. Notice that the 
number of potentially "optimal” outputs depends on the 
nature of the demand and cost functions.
IX.1 Derivation of electricity prices on the basis of LRMC 
in Guiarat:the requirements.
There are three main problems due to shortage of data. 
The first is the impossibility of determining the cost 
function relevant to each consumer class. The data are all 
aggregative. And we know that if cost is not disaggregated, 
demand disaggregation for pricing purposes is effectively 
limited to that between peak and off-peak loads. This 
brings us to the second problem, namely difficulties in 
estimating demand in peak and off-peak periods. Thirdly, 
there is the problem of estimating shadow costs or prices. 
This is mainly attributable to lack of public information 
on all of the GEB's inputs between 1961 and 1986.
The consequence of the first two difficulties is that 
one is compelled to limit the estimation of electricity 
prices to charges for all consumers taken as a group. Even 
with these charges much can be said about GEB's pricing 
policy. The consequence of the third difficulty is that, at 
best, one can only be sure that the estimated prices are 
"optimal" when there are no distortions in the economy.
The period of the analysis throughout is a financial 
year i.e. April 1 to March 31; i.e., 1979 would represent
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the period April 1978 to March 1979. So, the demand and 
cost functions as well as the profit targets and prices all 
refer to a twelve month period.
IX.1.1 Demand for electricity.
In this chapter the main purpose is to derive prices 
on the basis of the marginal cost principle, explained in 
Chapter VIII. The cost analysis is possible only at 
aggregate level. In this case, it is inappropriate to 
analyse electricity sales at disaggregate level. There are 
two points to be noted. One concerns the nature of Gujarat 
Electricity Board, in that not everyone willing to pay has 
access to electricity. This implies that there is a certain 
amount of suppressed demand and, consequently, it is 
impossible to provide a reasonable estimate of the demand 
function which incorporates potential and actual consumers. 
Given this, one must limit the demand function to existing 
electricity consumers. There is also a related problem of 
power shortages which makes the quantity demanded by 
connected consumers unobservable. What is in fact observed 
is actual electricity sales as constrained by outages. 
Therefore the observed data reflect sales and not demand. 
But for convenience we assume that electricity sales is 
electricity demand.
The second problem concerns the identification of the 
demand function. In a nutshell, this problem boils down to 
the question: how can one be sure that|^e is estimating the 
demand function and not the supply function? A less 
technical approach is to ask: are there any explanatory 
variables in the supply function (e.g. input prices) which 
are not included in the demand function. If the answer is 
yes, demand is identified.
As observed in Chapter III, economic literature showed 
a great variety of price variables that are included in the 
demand function for electricity.
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(1) the marginal price,
(2) the average price, also called the ex-post average 
price,
(3) the intra-marginal price,
(4) a combination of two of those variables.
In Chapter IV, for the analysis of electricity sales 
at all India level, average price was used as a proxy for 
the price variable. In Chapter V, for the analysis of 
electricity sales at state level, marginal price was used 
as a proxy for the price variable. The choice of the 
marginal or average price variable in both the chapters 
depended upon data availability. In the case of Gujarat, it 
is possible to use both average price and marginal price. 
It is interesting to estimate the demand for electricity 
using a demand function which contains different sets of 
price variables and observe whether using one of the prices 
(average or marginal) in the absence of the other will lead
in general to an upward bias in the estimate of the price
elasticity, if average and marginal price are positively 
correlated, as is likely to be the case. In this section, 
we have tried to include an income variable, the
electricity tariff charged to electricity consumers i.e. 
marginal price, and average revenue earned per unit of 
electricity in Gujarat in one equation. We can observe the 
effects using the following model.
Log(GTsalet) = a^logC SDPg^) +a2ilog(NCgt) +a3ilog(MPgt)
+ a 4 x l o g ( A P g t )   ( 9 . 7 )
We can also observe the effect of average and marginal 
price on electricity demand individually in separate 
equations along with the income variable using the
following models.
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Log(GTsalet) = B^jlogC SDPgt ) +622log(NCgt ) +632log(MPgt)
+ 6 t 2   ( 9 . 8 )
Log(GTsalet) = BialogCSDPgt) +B23log(NCgt) ^BaslogCAPgt)
+€«  (9.9)
where,
GTsalet = electricity sales in Gujarat in million KWH, 
SDPgt = state domestic product at 1970-71 prices in Gujarat 
in million rupees,
NCgt = number of consumers in millions,
MPgt = marginal price of electricity in paise per KWH, 
deflated by the wholesale price index (India),
APgt = average price of electricity in paise per KWH, 
deflated by the wholesale price index (India), 
t = 1,2,...26 for the period 1961 to 1986.
Results.
The parameters of the income variable and number of 
consumers (See Table IX.1) have the right (i.e. positive) 
sign as expected in all the three equations. From the t- 
statistic it can be observed that the values of all the 
coefficients are significantly different from zero. The 
values of the parameters of income and number of consumers 
also are not significantly different in the three 
equations. In equation 1 the parameter of the marginal 
price has the wrong sign and that is due to the high 
correlation between the average price and marginal price. 
It can be deduced that the absolute value of the parameter 
of the average price variable decreases if the marginal 
price variable is eliminated from equation 1. Eliminating 
the average price from equation 1, i.e, model (9.8), leads 
to parameter estimates on marginal price which have the 
right sign and are also statistically significant. It is 
quite remarkable that the estimated value of the parameter
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on average price in equation 3,(baa) is almost equal to the 
sum of the parameters on average price and marginal price 
from equation 1. In other words, baa ~ bai+b^ .^
Table IX.1
Results of demand function in Gujarat for the period 1961-86.
Equation 1:
Log(GTsale^) = bjjloq(SDPg^) +b2jlog(HCg^ ) +b311og(APg^) +b^ jlog(HPg|.) +e^^ 
Equation 2:
Log(GTsale|.) = b^gMISDPgi-) +b22log(NCg^ .) +b^2M(*P9t^ ®^t2*
Equation 3:
Log(GTsale^) = b^^log(SDPg^) +b22log(NCg^) tb^^loglAPg^) +e^.
Equation
No.
i
Income
bli
Number of 
Consumers
b2i
Average Marginal 
Price Price
‘*31 •’«i
D-W
Stat.
1 0.723 0.774 -0.6487 0.3771 0.99 2.1
SE (0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) (0.13) (0.13)
T-st. 44.6 47.1 -4.3 2.1
2 0.733 0.736 - -0.225 0.99 1.4
SE (0 .0 2 ) (0 .0 2 ) (0.08)
T-st. 34.6 35.9 -2.59
3 0.712 0.749 -0.32 - 0.99 1.7
SE (0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) (0.06)
T-st. 42.7 47.2 -4.7
The parameters on average price have higher t-ratios. 
Equations 2 and 3 are restricted forms of equation 1. 
Therefore, we can compare equation 1 with equation 2, and 
1 with 3 using an F-test. The results of the F-test show 
that Equation 1 explains variation in demand better than 
equation 2 at the 1% significance level, whereas equation 
1 is better than 3 only at the 5% significance level. (And 
comparison of equation 2 and equation 3 is not possible.) 
Thus, the results which are obtained so far suggest 
statistical reasons for taking the average price variable 
over the marginal price variable. Including both the 
variables, i.e. average and marginal price, leads to biases 
in the parameter estimates and the parameter of the 
marginal price variable has the wrong sign. Hence, equation 
3 is preferred.
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For easy application of the demand function to price 
determination, the following transformation of equation 3 
is useful. We can write the function as,
Log(GTsalet) = 0 .71031og(SDPgt) +0.7421og(NCgt)
-0.3315(NAPgt/It) .
where,
NAPgt = the nominal value of average price of electricity 
and, It is the wholesale price index in India.
This implies,
log (GTsalet) = log {( SDPgt*"" *NCgt**” *It*’^ ^)/NAPgt‘” }.
If we rename, NAPg as P, GTsale as x, and SDPg as Y, we 
get,
Xt = *NCgt*^ “ *It‘^ V^Pt‘*” )
If Yt^*” *NCgt**^  ^ *It^” = At,
we can say that, Pt = [At/Xt]^ *^"” ................ (9.10)
At serves two purposes. First, it is the shift parameter in 
the demand function thereby determining the levels of 
demands in different periods. Secondly it indicates the 
quantity demanded when nominal price is unity, a fact that 
is deducible from (9.10).
IX,2 Estimated "optimal" prices.
In this section, we estimate "optimal" electricity 
prices in Gujarat between 1961 and 1986 given the 
circumstances under which GEB operated, except, in the 
main, those arising from distortions in the rest of the 
economy, that is those which make shadow pricing necessary.
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One of the circumstances faced by GEB is the budget 
constraint recommended by the Government Committee. As 
discussed in Chapter VII, GEB never actually achieved the 
return on capital as recommended; in fact the net return 
was negative for most years. We seek to answer the 
question: how much should GEB have charged to achieve the 
targets and should electricity prices have been different 
even if earning actual profit?^®* The emphasis is on the 
single-part tariff.
IX.2.1 Sinale-part Tariff.
A modified form of budget constraint (9.3) is,
P(x)x -C(x) - F = 7T° ................ (9.11)
where,
P(x) = aggregate demand function,
C(x) = aggregate cost function,
F = total fixed (capacity) cost and,
7T° = return on capital target.
In the case of GEB, total revenue consists of the revenue 
from electricity sales and from other sources as explained 
in Chapter Vll, Section Vll.1.3.
Hence the function (9.11) can be further modified as,
{[P(x)x]+OR) -{C(x)> - F = 7T°................ (9.12)
where,
OR = revenue from other sources,
F = fixed costs,
7T° = targeted rate of return on capital,
The second aspect of this question is posed in 
recognition of the fact that more than one price-quantity 
combination can yield the same profit but different 
consumer surpluses.
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C(x) = operating cost function,
P(x) = price per unit or in other words, the demand 
function in terms of price. And when P(x) is multiplied 
with X, it gives us the revenue earned from electricity 
sales.
The condition for a welfare optimum (from 7.13d), if 
7T° is a minimum, is
P-C' X.
P (1+X)|6-|
and, if is maximum, the condition is,
P-C' X
P (1-X)|e-|
where,
€** is the price elasticity of demand and,
X  is the shadow price of the budget constraint.
In estimating electricity prices, the first step is to 
substitute GEB's demand and variable cost functions into
(9.12) and then solve it for potential outputs. If there is
more than one potential output, (9.13) and (9.14) are used 
to estimate the value of X  for each level of output. X  is 
estimated by computing price, marginal cost and price 
elasticity of demand associated with each output and 
substituting them in either (9.13) or (9.14). The output 
with the lowest value of X is that which maximises welfare. 
If there is one potentially "optimal" output, that output 
maximises welfare.
Thus, using (9.12), we can derive the level of output 
first and then, using that level of output, one can derive 
prices.
Using the transformed demand equation (9.10), and the 
cost function in (6.3) we can rearrange (9.12) as,
{[(A^/x)^^^]*x} = {7T° +F -OR}............... (9.15)
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Dividing by e®’' we get,
{[(At/x)^/®” ]*x) {7To +F -OR}
-----------------  _e=2xt = --------------
e®^  e®":
If we name (tt® +F -OR}/e®^ = E, and [ ( ] /e®^  = G,
we can rewrite as,
Q*^ l-l/b33 _ g-2xt = E  (9.16)
After rearranging (9.16) and setting z' = l-l/b^^,
G = Ex*' + x*'e“^ ^^  (9.17)
Notice that equation (9.17) is an exponential equation 
and has a unique solution for x.^ *^  %n order to calculate 
the output and then prices, we need to first calculate G, 
and E. To calculate E and G, it is necessary to have 
knowledge of the parameters, F (fixed costs), OR (revenue 
from other sources), (expected rate of return), P(x) (the 
demand function expressed as the price per unit) and C(x) 
(the variable cost function). The data on revenue from
other sources were given in Table VII.3 under the heading 
(OR) and the data on expected profit are also given in 
Table VII.3 for expected returns of both 3% and 6% on the 
"capital base". In the case of a capital-short country like 
India, the 6% rate of return on capital base is perhaps 
more appropriate and hence that was used. The total 
variable cost was also estimated in Chapter VII, Section 
VI1.1.2, and the result is given in equation (7.2). The 
demand function is estimated in Section IX.1.1, and the
result of the third equation can be used to calculate the
output and price at the expected rate of return. On the 
basis of the data on income (Yt or SDPgt), number of
It can be proved that the equation has a unique 
solution. For explanation please refer to the Appendix to 
Chapter IX.
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consumers(NCgt) , and the wholesale price index (1%) (as 
shown in Table 1 of Appendix to Chapter IX), and the value 
of their coefficients as given in Table IX. 1 (for the 
equation 3), we can calculate the demand parameter At. Using 
the calculated value of At and e®^ , we can calculate the 
parameter G. The value of z' can also be calculated using 
the value of b^  ^from the Table IX. 1.
Substituting values of the parameters^®® in equation 
(9.17), for each year, we can solve for x.^ ®? using the 
value of X for each year (i.e., new level of output, 
incorporating the target of return on "capital base"), and 
values of A for each year, and substituting in (9.10), one 
can derive the "price" that should have been charged in
each year. Using the estimated level of output, one can
calculate the marginal variable cost. If we add the 
marginal fixed cost of production (given in Table VII.lb), 
we have the total marginal costs at the level of output 
considering the expected return. With LRMC-based pricing, 
the industry may make losses or profits. The difference 
between the total marginal costs and the price at the 
estimated level of output gives us some idea about whether 
the government was implicitly subsidising or taxing the 
industry by allowing it to earn the expected return and 
continue pricing on the basis of long run marginal costs. 
If the ratio of price to total marginal cost is less than 
one, the government would have to subsidise the product in 
order to allow the industry to continue charging on the
basis of LRMC, and still earn the expected return. The
results for each year are presented in Table 9.1a in 
Appendix to Chapter IX.
Similarly, using the values of actual profit, one can
®^® The results of the parameter A, G, and E are given
in the Table 1 of the Appendix to Chapter IX.
®^® Though a mathematical solution is not possible, it
is possible to solve the equation geometrically.
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calculate the values of parameters A, G and E. Substituting 
the values of the parameters^"* using the actual profit in 
equation (9.17), one can estimate the level of output and 
the nominal price that should have been charged to sell 
that output. Also, the level of total marginal cost at the 
estimated level output corresponding to the actual return 
can also be calculated. The results are presented in Table 
9.2a in Appendix to Chapter IX.
IX,3 Comparison of electricity prices in Guiarat,
We have not been able to determine optimal prices for 
the various consumer classes and hence it is not possible 
to compare these with prices actually charged. But it is 
true that the arbitrary policy of deciding charges for 
various consumer groups is unlikely to be optimal and 
should be dispensed with as much as possible. It results in 
unintended cross-subsidy as well as random discrimination 
among consumer groups. Though GEB should charge consumer 
groups differently, the prices should be determined in such 
a way that correctly reflects differences in the bases for 
the distinction. If the bases for distinction are cost, 
difference in price should reflect differences in cost.
We can compare electricity prices at aggregate level. 
The market prices, GEB's average prices and corresponding 
output and marginal (total i.e. variable and fixed) costs 
are presented in Table IX.2.
We can observe that the market prices are higher than 
the actual price for the period 1961-86. The estimated 
output is lower than actual output except for 4 years, 
i.e., 1965, 1974, 1982 and 1983. Also the marginal cost
associated with estimated output is also less than the 
marginal cost of actual output.
®^* For the values of the parameters. A, E and G, please 
refer to Table 2 in the Appendix to Chapter IX.
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Table n.2
Actual and estinated "optimal" prices, output and marginal costs using the target rate of return 
on capital base (i.e., 6 %).
Years Estinated Actual
output "optimal" marginal Output Price Marginal
price cost charged Cost
6WH Paise per KWH GWE Paise per KWH
(1 ) (2 ) (3) (4) (5) (6 )
1961 341.461 19.90 5.81 441.14 12.58 5.92
1962 403.376 20.19 6.42 509.02 12.91 6.54
1963 491.978 18.69 5.75 576.63 13.01 5.89
1964 600.038 20.71 7.44 656.81 13.97 7.59
1965 810.176 17.69 6.78 764.14 14.00 6.93
1966 881.761 20.30 8.4 945.32 12.12 8.59
1967 1,034.17 22.00 10.46 1,174.7 12.13 10.69
1968 1,233.92 22.05 10.68 1,403.7 12.04 10.96
1969 1,196.99 25.59 10.05 1,752.1 12.41 10.47
1970 1,497.75 23.34 10.08 2,013.2 12.55 10.56
1971 2,043.67 20.25 10.5 2,346.4 14.01 11.0
1972 2,396.81 20.43 11.42 2,469.5 14.7 11.89
1973 2 ,201.2 26.45 12.22 2,948.5 15.1 13.14
1974 3,189.04 21.5 13.18 3,144.1 15.97 13.76
1975 3,200.83 24.51 14.17 3,678.0 20.26 15.3
1976 4,015.63 23.35 16.23 3,974.7 21.00 17.1
1977 4,258.73 30.07 21.06 4,692.5 24.68 22.8
1978 4,731.62 32.9 24.17 5,155.1 25.44^ 26.29,
1979 5,342.69 34.61 28.03 5,883.6 27.07^ 31.02
1980 5,822.87 40.12 32.62 6,243.8 32.78 35.98
1981 6,462.1 42.85 37.85 6,516.7 36.27 41.24
1982 7,447.5 47.05 46.4 7,047.2 44.89 49.15
1983 7,304.9 54.82 52.6 7,240.1 54.68 57.06 .
1984 7,819.8 60.74 60.23 8,080.4 60.34 68.08
1985 8,443.5 6 8.22 72.04 8,578.1 65.19 81.1'
1986 7,916.6 84.14 80.99 9,015.2 70.04 99.0.
Source; Estimated "optimal" output and price are calculated using the method explained in this 
Chapter. The detailed data are presented in Table 9.1 and 9.1a in Appendix to Chapter IX.
The estimated "optimal” price (column (2)) approached 
marginal cost (column (3)) over time. The price marginal 
cost ratio decreased from 2.93 in 1961 to 1.00 in 1984. 
This implies that, by the marginal cost pricing principle, 
the distortions resulting from the budget constraint 
decreased with time. The estimated "optimal" price (column
(2)) was greater than the associated marginal cost (column
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(3)) except in 1985. The actual price charged (column (5)), 
exceeded marginal cost (column (6)) up to 1977 and 
thereafter fell, - implying that, from an initial position 
of marginal cost pricing, GEB "subsidised" electricity 
consumers between 1977 and 1986.
What factors prevented GEB from achieving its targets 
even though the targets were taken into account when 
determining prices?
One of them could be underestimation of cost. If cost 
were underestimated and output is not greater than forecast 
output then a chosen target will not be achieved. The 
method of trend extrapolation used in making the forecasts 
may be one of the reasons for costs to be underestimated. 
A lot of unforeseen events, which do not necessarily cancel 
out, may affect cost. As shown in Chapter VII, the total 
operating cost is an exponential function.
The GEB fails to take consideration of demand and cost 
functions while determining the grand average revenue, and 
this leads to incorrect estimation of average revenue 
itself. Also, by predetermining output before price 
determination, GEB limits the price-output options to one, 
an option that may never yield the desired target. And even 
if we assume that the cost and demand functions are rightly 
considered by GEB in determining the grand total average 
revenue, mispricing of a given output could be the third 
alternative reason for GEB not being able to meet the 
targets.
We fail to isolate the relative importance of the 
above mentioned factors. But since they all led to 
underpricing, it can be said that GEB's pricing policy was 
partly responsible for the consequent net welfare loss. Of 
course the high system losses also led to financial losses. 
Comparison of output and prices using the actual profit 
earned by GEB.
The estimated "optimal" prices and GEB's charges as
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well as their associated costs and outputs are presented in 
Table IX. 3. From the table, we can observe that the 
estimated "optimal" price was consistently greater than the 
actual price. The optimum output was less than the actual 
output except in the years 1965, 1972, 1974, 1976, 1982 and 
1983.
The estimated "optimal" price approached marginal cost 
over time. Though the price-marginal cost ratio fluctuated 
in the period 1961 to 1986, it reached 1 in 1974.
Also, the estimated "optimal" prices were consistently 
greater than the associated marginal cost till 1984, 
whereas (as we observed before) the actual price exceeded 
marginal cost only up to 1977 and fell thereafter.
Thus, we can say that there were a number of faults 
with GEB's pricing policy. They include the factors on 
which electricity prices were based, the approach adopted 
and some of the features of the tariff policy, for example, 
differential pricing. Also, the prices resulting from GEB's 
pricing policy were in most cases different from what they 
were intended to be, judging from the disparity between the 
targets and the actual return the GEB earned. Though we 
could not figure out the amount of welfare loss to society, 
there is no doubt regarding the existence of welfare loss 
as a result of failure to meet the targets.
The major factors responsible for the present financial 
status of GEB were: incorrect output estimation,
underestimation of costs and failure to reduce system 
losses.
In Chapter VII, GEB's pricing policy between 1961 and 
1986 was examined in terms of the bases of tariff policy, 
the approach adopted and the tariff that prevailed. On the 
bases of tariff policy, it was indicated that four main 
factors dominated GEB's pricing policy in the period.
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Table Iï.3
Actual and estimated "optimal" prices, output and marginal costs using the actual return on capital 
base.
Years Estimated Actual
Output "Optimal" Marginal Output Price Marginal
Price Cost Cost
GHH Paise per KWH GWH Paise per KWH
(1 ) (2 ) (3) (4) (5) (6 )
1961 385.09 13.61 5.9 441.14 12.58 5.92
1962 466.41 12.76 6.52 509.02 12.91 6,54
1963 578.26 1 1.22 5.87 576.63 13.01 5.89
1964 745.97 10.4 7.58 656.81 13.97 7.59
1965 990.64 09.37 6.94 764.14 14.00 6.93
1966 1,065.25 11.17 8.58 945.32 12.12 8.59
1967 1,353.54 09.40 10.69 1,174.7 12.13 10.69
1968 1,627.87 09.19 10.97 1,403.7 12.04 10.96
1969 1,480.05 13.09 10.32 1,752.1 12.41 10.47
1970 1,828.41 12.43 10.42 2,013.2 12.55 10.56
1971 2,491.0 10.83 10.97 2,346.4 14.01 11.0
1972 2,757.9 13.11 11.93 2,469.5 14.7 11,89
1973 2,553.33 16.55 12.74 2,948.5 15.1 13.14
1974 3,643.58 14.11 13.98 3,144.1 15.97 13.76
1975 3,695.11 15.57 15.08 3,678.0 20.26 15.3
1976 4,561.12 15.61 17.51 3,974.7 21. 0 0 17.1
1977 4,602.38 23.53 22.25 4,692.5 24.68 22.8
1978 5,025.67 27.19 25.52 5,155.1 25.44 26.29
1979 5,819.32 26.41 30.15 5,883.6 27.07 31.02
1980 6,326.05 30.87 35.31 6,243.8 32.78 35.98
1981 7,149.5 31.13 42.39 6,516.7 36.27 41.24
1982 7,765.76 41.22 50.92 7,047.2 44.89 49.15
1983 7,727.01 45.9 57.84 7,240.1 54.68 57.06
1984 8,110.77 54.11 65.89 8,080.4 60.34 68.08
1985 8,968.08 56.39 81.26 8,578.1 65.19 81.1
1986 8,773.14 60.82 92.81 9,015.2 70.04 99.0
Source; Estimated output and price are calculated using the method explained in this Chapter. The 
detailed data are presented in Table 9.1 and 9.1a in Appendix to Chapter IX.
The first is the total cost of operation but the 
actual cost did not lead to full cost recovery. The second 
is the capacity constraint and the "demand" for 
electricity. The interesting point here is that GEB's 
demand concept was strictly speaking not demand at all 
since it was based on trend extrapolation and these were 
independent of price. Putting it differently, electricity 
demand was assumed to be perfectly inelastic with respect
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to price. Also, the lack of awareness of demand in the 
absence of a supply constraint leads to underestimation/ 
overestimation of demand. The other factors were the 
financial target as recommended by the Energy Survey of 
India Committee (1964), the Committee on Power (1980) and 
the prevailing administrative framework.
GEB's approach to pricing could have been based on a 
two-stage procedure. The first stage involved the use of 
the budget constraint to determine the desired average 
revenue for the industry and for each year in a chosen 
planning period. In doing so, the cost of operation and 
electricity sales were both predetermined by GEB. The 
second stage involved the structuring of electricity prices 
among the various consumer classes such that the average of 
the prices equalled the desired grand average revenue. It 
is useful to determine the general conditions under which 
a financial constraint approach would lead to an "optimal" 
policy. Since the disaggregation is immaterial here, the 
model can be given by.
Max W = S(P) +R - C“(X) .................. (9.18)
s.t. (1) X < X ................... (9.19)
(2) R - C“(X) = PX - C"(X) = 7T° ...... (9.20)
where P, X and X are price, output supplied and capacity 
output respectively, R is revenue, C" is the minimum cost 
incurred in earning the revenue, 7t° is the profit target, W 
is welfare and S is the consumers' surplus. GEB's pricing 
methodology is appropriate if the following conditions 
hold. The first is that the consumers' surplus [S] must be 
constant, for example, equal to zero. In that case, the 
producer's surplus (R - C) is constant and captured by the 
financial constraint. On a more general note, the condition 
is that GEB's objectives are irrelevant, or more 
specifically, that there is no welfare motivation. The 
second condition derives from the fact that in (9.20), 
there are two unknowns (P,X) but one equation. Thus, to
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determine price from (9.20), we require output to be fixed 
and or predetermined. The capacity constraint in (9.19) can 
be incorporated by using it partly to predetermine output.
So one could say that GEB's approach assumes that (1) 
there are no objectives and (2) output is fixed or 
predetermined and, therefore, independent of price. Even if 
we continue to assume that the output is given, the prices 
on the basis of given output could be derived as,
R - C"(X) = PX - C"(X) = 7T°..... (9.20)
Since, GEB earns revenue from other sources, we need to 
incorporate OR in the equation,
[PX + OR] - C"(X) = 7T°  (9.21)
Solving for P,
[7T° +C”] -OR
P= ..............  (9.22)
X
One can derive prices using this simple approach assuming 
that the output is predetermined.
The prices that we derived using this simple approach 
and the prices charged by GEB, can be compared in Graph 
IX.1. We can observe that the estimated prices were higher 
than the prices charged by GEB.
Both assumptions in fact summarise important results 
in the analysis of the bases of GEB's pricing policy. The 
implication is that GEB's financial constraint approach is 
largely a by-product of the criteria on which its pricing 
policies are based. Since the assumptions (or at least one 
of them) are untenable, the financial constraint approach 
is unlikely to lead to an optimal pricing policy.
Graph IX.1
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IX.4 Conclusion.
The comparison of estimated prices and the price 
charged suggested mispricing. Also, comparison of estimated 
price under the assumption that output is predetermined, 
and the price charged, indicated the same. This estimation 
of prices in this study is based on restrictive 
assumptions. It is important to take into consideration the 
real value of assets and not historical values, inflation, 
the social opportunity cost of capital, and shadow prices 
of fuel. It is also important to take into consideration 
the cost of each plant, the cost of generating electricity 
at different times of day on the basis of using different 
plants in increasing order of cost i.e., the plant that 
generates electricity at the lowest unit cost is used the 
first and so on. It would be important to know the cost of 
providing electricity by consumer group at different times 
of day. It should be noted that these important aspects 
were not incorporated in this study due to the lack of 
detailed data, required time and finance. But considering
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the technological advancement in the field of computer 
packages to-day, if reliable data were available, and the 
finance to compile the data on the sophisticated computer 
packages were available, it is possible to work out an LRMC 
based tariff for different consumer groups at different 
times of the day. The main consideration in doing so, would 
be again the ability of the supply system to implement the 
recommended tariff at little/no extra cost. Considering 
this fact and the limitations on the resources, time and 
ability to get the data, though this study is restricted, 
it gives a guideline to the supply system regarding the 
lower bound of the average revenue that it is necessary to 
earn. Also, although this study is restricted to Gujarat 
State, any State Electricity Board in India, may, of 
course, use a similar method.
369
Appendix to Chapter IX.
Explanation of the data used.
Total electricity sales in Gujarat:(GTsale^)-
The data on electricity demand by all consumers 
include electricity sales to all consumers by Gujarat 
Electricity Board. We need to keep in mind that this is not 
the demand. In India, as we have seen in Chapter IV and V, 
the frequency of electricity cuts (planned and unplanned), 
have been increasing. Gujarat is no exception to this 
phenomenon and hence it is important to realise that 
electricity demand could be higher than sales. The data 
were collected from Gujarat Electricity Board.
Real average price of electricity in Gujarat:(APg^).
Data on total revenue earned on electricity sales 
every year were collected from the Gujarat Electricity 
Board. The revenue earned from electricity sales in any 
particular year was divided by the electricity sales in 
that year to get average revenue earned per unit of 
electricity sold. The series of average revenue earned for 
the years 1961 to 1986 was taken as a proxy for average 
price of electricity in the state. The series of average 
revenue earned was deflated by the wholesale price index 
(All India) to get the real average price of electricity in 
the state.
Real marginal price of electricity in Gujarat:(MPgt).
Different consumer groups in Gujarat were charged a 
different set of tariff schedules. In order to compare the 
tariff charged to different consumer groups in various 
states each state electricity board is asked to send an 
indicative tariff charged to different consumers to the 
Central Electricity Authority. For this purpose, GEB uses 
the tariff charged to different consumer group in its 
tariff schedule. Similarly in order to compare the tariff 
charged to all consumers in different states, a weighted 
average of the tariffs charged to all consumers was 
prepared by GEB. This weighted average of tariff charged to 
all consumers was taken as a proxy for marginal price 
charged to electricity consumers. The series on marginal 
price for the years 1961 to 1986 was deflated by the 
wholesale price index in India to get the real marginal 
price charged to electricity consumers in Gujarat.
Number of consumers in Gujarat: (NCg^).
The number of consumers include all the consumers 
served by the Gujarat Electricity Board. The data on the
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number of consumers for the years 1961-86 were collected 
from GEB. The number of consumers do not indicate the 
potential number of consumers; rather it indicates only the 
connected number of consumers.
Uniqueness of Root of the equation.
Given a function f(x) =0, it has a unique root over
a<x<b if and only if following conditions are true:
(1) f(x) is continuous over a<x<b.
(2) f(a) has opposite sign than f(b).
(3) f'(x) is not zero in a<x<b.
Now in our case,
f(x) = +x*'E -G =0. And 0<x<oo.
We can observe from f(x) that it is a continuous, 
exponential function. To satisfy condition (2), we compute 
f (0) and f (oo) ,
f(0) = -G and f(a>) = -H».
So condition (2) is also satisfied. And f(x) has at least 
one root in the interval 0<x<<».
To check the third condition,
f'(x) = z +x*'a2e*^ '‘ +z'x*'"^E.
Let z' = -(bi+l)/bi, and bl = -0.3165 (from our demand 
equation). Therefore, z' = 2.16. Thus,
f'(x) = 2.16x^ '^ ®e®^ * +x^ '^®a2e“^ ’‘ +2.16x^*^®E.
Given that E>0, a2>0 and x>0(x>0, because the shift
parameter i.e. the income, number of consumers are always 
positive), we can conclude that f'(x) =|=0 in the interval
0<X<oo.
Hence, f(x)=0, has only one root in the interval 
0<x<oo. Thus, the equation has only one solution for x.
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Results.
Table 9.1
The value of the paraneter A, G and E using the expected rate of return as 6%.
Years 4 ^tin million
1961 0.00488148 0.594296 0.958359
1962 0.00411313 0.886690 1.03135
1963 0.00345564 1.335180 0.977128
1964 0.00274327 2.40481 1.31507
1966 0.00213542 4.60846 1.28579
1966 0.00187844 6.00163 1.47817
1967 0.00156135 9.3484 1.72434
1968 0.00130759 14.2191 1.80174
1969 0.00128602 13.0157 1.74052
1970 0.00105806 20.9392 1.66183
1971 0.00081113 42.11115 1.6395
1972 0.000689638 61.0686 1.65117
1973 0.000692003 52.4668 1.79124
1974 0.000510054 119.472 1.64822
1975 0.000487536 119.67 1.62508
1976 0.000394628 202.701 1.54513
1977 0.000343437 273.068 2.10394
1978 0.000300451 361.844 2.19096
1979 0.000261875 485.121 2.1355
1980 0.000229304 641.009 2.39653
1981 0.000202352 826.428 2.30686
1982 0.000170464 1,233.9 2.39047
1983 0.000165579 1,174.73 2.41233
1984 0.000149742 1,401.71 2.34426
1985 0.000133674 1,742.5 2.33664
1986 0.000133411 1,522.81 2.61705
Note: The demand function (8.9) and cost function (6.3) were used. The data on the variables like 
income, number of consumers, wholesale price index are given in the Appendix to Chapter IX. The 
values of were taken from Table (VII.2). The expected return on capital [(the rate of return as 
31 till 1980, column (7) of Table VII.3, and 6% from 1981 column (8) of Table (VII.3)], revenue 
from other sources [column (3) of Table (VII.3)], total fixed costs [from Table VII.la]. Using 
these data and the computer program to solve the equation we have obtained this result.
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Table 9.1a
The estimated level of output and price using the expected return, the marginal variable cost based 
on the estimated output, the marginal fixed cost (= ÀFCS in Table VII.lb), the ratio of total 
marginal cost and the price.
Year XI
urn
Pnl
Paise/KWH
MVCel
Paise
MFC 
= AFCS
MTCl
(MVCEl+KFC)
Ratio
(PnliNTCl)
X
Sstu
price
of
hi^
oomstraint.
1961 341.46 19.9029 00.48 5.31 05.81 3.42 0.2889
1962 403.376 20.1961 00.57 5.83 06.42 3.14 o,m
1963 491.978 18.6983 00.67 5.06 05.75 3.25 0.2806
1964 600.038 20.7073 00.79 6.63 07.44 2.78 0.2543
1965 810.176 17.6939 00.94 5.81 06.78 2.61 0.2427
1966 881.761 20.3045 01.11 7.27 08.40 2.41 0.2278
1967 1,034.17 22.005 01.32 9.11 10.46 2.1 0.1992
1968 1,233.92 22.0584 01.52 9.08 10.68 2.06 0.190)
1969 1,196.99 25.5914 01.82 8.19 10.05 2.54 0.238
1970 1,497.75 23.3479 02.89 7.84 10.08 2.31 0.2193
1971 2,043.67 20.2524 02.72 7.71 10.50 1.92 0.1799
1972 2,396.81 20.4367 03.31 8.03 11.42 1.78 0.1ÉK
1973 2,201.2 26.4568 03.76 8.38 12.22 2.16 O.20B2
1974 3,189.04 21.5011 04.92 8.12 13.18 1.63 0J392
1975 3,200.83 24.5107 05.73 8.28 14.17 1.73 0.1542
1976 4,015.63 23.3492 07.36 8.65 16.23 1.43 0.1068
1977 4,258.73 30.0796 08.82 11.99 21.06 1.42 0.1048
1978 4,731.62 32.9056 10.86 12.97 24.17 1.36 0.0917
1979 5,342.69 34.6074 13.6 13.97 28.03 1.23 0.0640
1980 5,822.87 40.1164 16.76 15.28 32.62 1.22 0.0629
1981 6,462.1 42.852 21.07 16.44 37.85 1.13 0.088
1982 7,447.52 47.047 27.6 18.29 46.4 1.01 O.OOB
1983 7,304.95 54.8214 31.56 20.5 52.6 1.04 0.013
1984 7,819.83 60.7356 39.07 20.48 60.23 1.00 O.CCK
1985 8,443.46 68.2194 49.00 22.15 72.04 0.95 -0.018
1986 7,916.64 84.1434 53.48 26.67 80.99 1.03 0.012
Source: Calculated on the basis of the data presented in Table 9.1.
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Table 9.2
The value of the paraneter k, G and E using the actual rate of return.
Years 4 4in ni11ion %t
1961 0.00488148 0.594296 0.492042
1962 0.00411313 0.88669 0.458408
1963 0.00345564 1.33518 0.359091
1964 0.00274327 2.40481 0.388767
1965 0.00213542 4.60846 0.406111
1966 0.00187844 6.00163 0.570402
1967 0.00156135 9.3484 0.395905
1968 0.00130759 14.2191 0.379986
1969 0.00128602 13.0157 0.612076
1970 0.00105806 20.9392 0.582703
1971 0.00081113 42.1115 0.508909
1972 0.000689638 61.0686 0.771131
1973 0.000692003 52.4668 0.848761
1974 0.000510054 119.472 0.727729
1975 0.000487536 119.67 0.646113
1976 0.000394628 202.701 0.59132
1977 0.000343437 273.068 1.39546
1978 0.000300451 361.844 1.59172
1979 0.000261875 485.121 1.24962
1980 0.000229304 641.009 1.44055
1981 0.000202352 826.428 1.07735
1982 0.000170464 1,233.9 1.78537
1983 0.000165579 1,174.73 1.61871
1984 0.000149742 1,401.71 1.79177
1985 0.000133674 1,742.5 1.35724
1986 0.000133411 1,522.81 1.03775
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Table 9.2a
The estimated level of output and price using the actual return, the marginal variable cost based 
on the estimated output, the marginal fixed cost (= AFCS in Table VII.lb), the ratio of total 
marginal cost and the price.
Year X2
MKWfl
Pn2
Paise/KWH
HVCe2
Paise
MFC 
= AFCS 
Paise
HTC2
(MVCEl+MFC)
Paise
Ratio
(Pn2:MTC2)
X
Price
of
constraint.
1961 385.09 13.6119 0.607 5.31 5.90 2.31 0.69
1962 466.41 12.7654 0.707 5.83 6.52 1.96 0.58
1963 578.25 11.2223 0.822 5.06 5.87 1.91 0.56
1964 745.972 10.4089 0.958 6.63 7.58 1.37 0.3
1965 990.613 09.3729 1.12 5.81 6.94 1.35 0.28
1966 1,065.25 11.1735 1.32 7.27 8.58 1.3 0.25
1967 1,353.54 09.4024 1.58 9.11 10.69 0.87 0.13
1968 1,627.87 19.1912 1.88 9.08 10.97 0.83 0.18
1969 1,480.05 13.0867 2.27 8.19 10.32 1.27 0.22
1970 1,828.41 12.4314 2.72 7.84 10.42 1.19 0.17
1971 2,491.0 10.836 3.29 7.71 10.97 0.99 0.01
1972 2,757.94 13.1169 3.86 8.03 11.93 1.09 0.09
1973 2,553.33 16.5542 4.76 8.38 12.74 1.3 0.24
1974 3,643.58 14.1131 5.64 8.12 13.98 1.00 0.009
1975 3,695.11 15.5708 7.03 8.28 15.08 1.03 0.03
1976 4,561.12 15.6132 8.45 8.65 17.51 0.89 0.11
1977 4,602.38 23.5389 10.81 11.99 22.25 1.06 0.05
1978 5,025.67 27.1983 13.31 12.97 25.52 1.06 0.06
1979 5,819.32 26.4186 17.05 13.97 30.15 0.88 0.13
1980 6,326.05 30.8739 20.7 15.28 35.31 0.87 0.014
1981 7,149.5 31.1359 24.8 16,44 42.39 0.73 0.32
1982 7,765.76 41.2206 30.87 18.29 50.92 0.81 0.21
1983 7,727.01 45.9067 36.56 20.50 57.84 0.79 0.24
1984 8,110.77 54.115 47.6 20.48 65.89 0.82 0.2
1985 8,968.09 56.3888 58.94 22.15 81.26 0.69 0.38
1986 8,773.14 60.8219 72.35 26.67 92.81 0.65 0.45
Source: Calculated on the basis of the data presented in Table 9.2.
375
Data used.
Table 1.
Data used for the estimation of the demand function.
Year GTsale SDPg NCg PH I
1961 441.0 14,054.2 0.1403 0.1258 0.9984
1962 509.0 15,461.5 0.1666 0.1291 1.0000
1963 577.0 15,340.1 0.2047 0.1301 1.038
1964 657.0 16,358.7 0.2507 0.1397 0.102
1965 764.0 17,796.9 0.3164 0.1400 1.223
1966 945.0 16,519.4 0.3897 0.1212 1.316
1967 1,175.0 16,933.8 0.4526 0.1213 1.499
1968 1,404.0 18,535.8 0.5077 0.1204 1.673
1969 1,752.0 17,253.5 0.559 0.1241 1.654
1970 2,013.0 18,990.1 0,6416 0.1255 1.716
1971 2,346.0 21,892.4 0.7822 0.1401 1.811
1972 2,469.0 22,561.8 0.9258 0.1470 1.9124
1973 2,949.0 18,005.0 1.0994 0.1510 2.1044
1974 3,144,0 22,022.2 1.2534 0.1597 2.53
1975 3,678.0 18,980.7 1.3945 0.2026 3.1674
1976 3,974.0 24,391.9 1.4634 0.2158 3.133
1977 4,692.0 25,973.8 1.6409 0.2468 3.1982
1978 5,155.0 27,604.7 1.8171 0.2544 3.3648
1979 5,883.0 29,215.5 2.0639 0.2707 3.3648
1980 6,243.0 29,244.9 2.301 0.3278 3.9407
1981 6,516.0 30,400.0 2.439 0.3627 4.6597
1982 7,047.0 33,824.0 2.6718 0.4489 5.0943
1983 7,240.0 32,620.6 2.8403 0.5468 5.2284
1984 8,080.0 33,144.2 3.0841 0.6034 5.7228
1985 8,578.0 34,610.0 3.3438 0.6519 6.1284
1986 9,015.0 31,107.8 3.6223 0.7004 6.4798
Note: GTsale = Total Electricity Sales in Million KWH in Gujrat, SDPg = State Domestic product in 
Gujarat in Million Rupees^ at 1970-71 prices. NCg = Number of electricity consumers in Gujarat in 
million,
Pn = Nominal price of electricity in Rupees per unit (i.e.KWH).
I = Wholesale Price Index at all India; 1962 = 1.
Source: Personally collected from unpublished sources at Gujarat Electricity Board.
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CONCLUSION.
The organisational structure of the electricity 
industry changed substantially after Independence. The 
ownership and control of the industry moved from the 
private sector to the public sector. The industry grew at 
a fast rate. Installed capacity increased fast, as a result 
of availability of capital in the public sector. Having 
created the capacity to generate electricity various 
incentives were given to increase electricity demand (KWH). 
Hence KWH sales also grew rapidly. In fact the KWH sales 
grew so fast over the period that the capacity was not 
enough to fulfil the growing demand. Thus electricity cuts 
became a predominant feature of the electricity industry in 
the later period (i.e., mainly after 1972). The change in 
the control of the industry did not affect the diversity of 
the regions.(pespite the difference in the ownership, the 
difference in per capita consumption of electricity of 
different regions still prevailsT\ High system losses also 
continued till 1986.
One of the expected benefits of the change in control 
and ownership of the plants was to protect consumers' 
interests. But from the frequent electricity cuts (i.e., 
brown-outs and black-outs), it is self evident that the 
neglect of consumers' interests did not change much. The 
electricity cuts led to one more problem. Electricity 
utilities did not know the true/spontaneous electricity 
demand (KWH). This led to problems in planning the 
additional capacity. We had to use the data on electricity 
sales in our analysis.
In our attempts to study the reasons for the observed 
fast growth of electricity sales, the need to study 
different consumer groups was realised. Also the need to 
observe the effects of independent variables in two sub­
periods (i.e. before and after obvious electricity cuts) *7
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was realised. Comparing the effects of income and price on 
three different consumer groups at all-India level, the 
income elasticity of industrial consumers was found to be 
higher than the agricultural and 'other' consumers. 
Comparing the sub-periods, it was observed that in the 
first sub-period the income elasticity was higher (in the 
case of those consumers where the effects of independent 
variables was different in two periods i.e., per capita 
sales and industrial consumers) than in the second sub­
period. High income elasticity suggests that the 
electricity demand (KWH) may continue to grow at a faster 
rate than the growth in income. As far as the price 
elasticity were concerned, it was negligible in the case of 
'other' consumers, and it was the highest in the case of 
industrial consumers. Comparing the price elasticity in the 
sub-periods, the price elasticity in the second period is 
not different from zero. This indicates that with the 
existing pricing policy it would not be possible to use  ^
price as a tool to manage electricity demand.
Due to differences in the combination of economic 
activities, income, plant mix in different regions of a 
vast country like India, it was important to study 
electricity demand at state-level. Like at all-India level, 
we found high income elasticities and low price 
elasticities also at state-level. Despite the differences 
between the four states in our sample, we gathered that the 
agricultural consumers were more sensitive to changes in 
price and income than industrial consumers. There was a 
case of positive price elasticity suggesting possibilities 
of mispricing. Thus, high income elasticities at state- 
level indicate that electricity demand would continue to 
grow fast. Since the pricing policy was different in four 
states it is difficult to generalise on price effects. It 
is also not possible to say anything about the states' 
ability to manage demand at different time of the day.
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On the basis of the study for only one state, it can 
be said that pricing as an instrument was not properly used 
by the (Gujarat) State Electricity Board. The public 
electric utility failed to spread awareness amongst its 
consumers regarding the true cost of electricity at 
different times of the day. The State Electricity Board 
might have been affected in two ways: firstly in
reliability, and secondly in its financial performance. The 
demand during the peak increased faster than at off-peak 
periods. The utility failed to supply electricity at the 
peak and as a result the consumers had to experience 
inconvenience and/or loss in production. The lack of 
reliability in this manner led many consumers (mainly 
industrial units) to invest in their own generating sets.
From the financial performance of one electricity 
board (Gujarat Electricity Board), it was observed that 
though they were expected to cover full (historical) cost 
of supply; Gujarat Electricity Board failed to do so. When 
on historical costs it was making a loss, it would have 
made a huge loss on replacement cost. Therefore tariffs  ^
were a lot less than average, up-to-date accounting costs, I 
and there is a strong presumption that tariffs were less I 
than marginal economic costs.
Observing particular features of tariff structure, the 
following points were thought to be noteworthy.
1) The classification of consumers and the structure of 
tariffs to various consumers were found to be 
extraordinarily complex. One reason for complexities in the 
administrative structure could be in the simple form of 
metering. In the absence of time-of-day metering it is 
possible that the classification of consumers would be such 
that it can capture similarities amongst consumers and 
charge the same rate.
2) Gujarat Electricity Board offers block tariffs. It 
charges decreasing block tariffs and it was observed in
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Chapter that though there are several reasons in
defence of such a tariff, in a situation where there is no 
excess supply any policy that promotes sales is not 
rational. It is difficult to justify decreasing block 
tariff.
3) Gujarat Electricity Board's tariffs are characterised by 
differential pricing across consumer groups and differences 
in charges should reflect only differences in cost and 
demand. Costs varies across consumer groups mainly because 
consumers are supplied at different voltage and at 
different times of the day. Gujarat Electricity Board's 
multi-part tariff is very complex. Firstly, charges are 
divided into two, namely power demand charge (or capacity 
charge) and energy charge (or operating charge). Secondly, 
for most of consumers, both the charges are further broken 
down into a fixed charge (or minimum charge) and a set of 
variable charges. Thirdly, the fixed and variable charges 
vary across consumer groups.
Thus, not only was the level of electricity price too 
low, but the tariff structure was also not based on 
appropriate concepts.
In our attempts to design a level of price on the 
basis of cost and demand functions of Gujarat Electricity 
Board, it was found that, at aggregate level, given GEB's 
targets, the estimated "optimal" price of electricity in 
each year between 1961 and 1986 was higher than the actual 
price. There are two cases of mispricing. The first case of 
mispricing arises because of GEB's failure to take 
cognizance of the aggregate demand and cost functions when 
determining the desired average revenue. The second is 
mispricing of a given output.
Though the estimated electricity price in this study 
is based on aggregate demand and cost functions and that it
Chapter VII, page 287.
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is too simplistic it is possible to derive the prices at 
disaggregate level by extending the same basic model. But 
the determination of price differentials among consumer 
groups should be based on the groups' demand and cost 
functions. Though this is a case of only one State 
Electricity Board and the conclusions cannot be generalised 
for all states, it remains important for all states to 
design a pricing policy that allows the consumer to be 
aware of the costs and help State Electricity Board to 
eliminate financial losses.
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